Challenges of arms transfers facing the emerging supplier states in the new international political economy by Khwela, Gcwelumusa, Chrysostomus
CHALLENGES OF ARMS TRANSFERS FACING THE
EMERGING SUPPLIER STATES IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
By
GCWELUMUSA CHRYSOSTOMUS KHWELA
Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Military Science (Political Science (Mil.» at the
University of Stellenbosch
Study Leader
Co-study Leader
Mr H. A Bailey
Lt Col F. Vrey
DECLARATION
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is
my own original work and that I have not previously, in its entirety or in
part, submitted it at any university for a degree.
Signat Date
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
ABSTRACT
The fundamental motivation for emerging arms suppliers to produce arms was the desire to overcome
their position of dependence in the system of arms production and transfers. However, their
predicament as late entrants into the system castigated them to fail in this endeavour. This failure is
based on three criteria, which also assist in the identification of emerging suppliers. Firstly, the
weaponry they produce is far below the sophistication characterised by higher levels of technological
advancement. Secondly, they can only produce one or two advanced weapon systems. Finally, they
rely on the leading suppliers for certain sophisticated components of weapon systems which they cannot
produce themselves and as a result, become so dependent that they, with an exception of a few, are
unable to go beyond the simple reproduction or retrofitting of existing weapon systems. The capability
to produce arms was restrictedly extended to certain states in the post-war era, and even those states that
obtained such a capability were confmed to producing small arms and platforms for naval vessels.
Those states that went beyond these capabilities did so with the assistance of other states or specialists,
the initial intention being to meet domestic requirements, and ultimately to dispose surplus Second
World War equipment in the re-transfer market. The emerging supplier states' intention to develop
indigenous arms industries was driven by the political urge to reduce their reliance on the leading
suppliers and to nationalise the arms production process for import substitution in order to meet
domestic security needs. Since the emerging suppliers began the process of defence industrialisation
from the importation of complete weapon systems to import substitution, and ultimately to the
promotion of exports, they mainly relied on technology imported from the leading suppliers. On the one
hand, the leading suppliers attempted to hinder the efforts of emerging suppliers to promote arms
exports so as to protect their oligopolistic share of the arms market through tightening the controls and
regulations on technological supplies. On the other, the emerging suppliers were impelled to promote
their arms exports in order to overcome the saturation of their domestic markets, to utilise effectively
their arms production capacities, and to positively affect their balance of payments through the
procreation of foreign exchange returns.
This study reached the following conclusions and inferences:
1. The arms trade has evolved to be characterised by the transfer of military technology, which did
not feature in the arms transactions of the previous periods.
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2. The gap between the leading and emerging suppliers is widening with regard to the
sophistication of technological capabilities, and accordingly the stratification within the arms production
and transfer system is sustainable and reinforced, thus making it hard for the lower tiers to progress
beyond their current status.
3. The emerging suppliers' share of and contribution into the arms market is constricted, and as
such they specialise in specific (often uncomplicated) weapon systems that constitute niches in the
global market.
4. The unfolding arms production and transfer system is characterised by a fiercely competitive
atmosphere, and consequently, only those states that can subsidise or integrate their efforts are enabled
to sustain an advanced arms production faculty.
5. As the emerging suppliers begin to introduce more and more of their wares into the market, the
costs of research and development begin to soar in the same manner as those of the leading suppliers,
thus urging them to become more export-oriented.
6. Participants in the system will be compelled to relinquish their comparative technological
superiority in order to survive, thus narrowing the gap between the capabilities possessed by both the
leading and the emerging suppliers.
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OPSOMMING
Die onderliggende motivering van opkomende wapenverskaffers om wapens te produseer word
toegeskryf aan 'n behoefte om hulle relatiewe afhanklikheid in die stelsel van wapenproduksie en -
handel te oorkom. Boonop het die laat toetrede tot die stelsel hierdie opkomende verskaffers se kanse
tot sukses verder belemmer. Die rede vir die onsuksesvolle toetrede word gebasseer op drie kriteria
(wat ook dien as identifiserende eienskappe van opkomende wapenverskaffers). Eerstens, die wapens
wat opkomende verskaffers lewer skiet tekort aan die vereiste gesofistikeerde standaarde van die
gevestigde wapenprodusente. Tweedens, hulle kan slegs een of twee gevorderde wapenstelsels
produseer. Derdens, sekere komponente van wapenstelsels word verkry by die gevestigde verskaffers,
wat lei tot afhanklikheid tot so 'n mate dat die opkomende verskaffer se vermoëns beperk word tot
eenvoudige reprodusering of herinstallasies van bestaande stelsels. Trouens, in die post-oorlog tydperk
is die vermoë om wapens te produseer doelbewus beperk tot sekere state wat 'n afgebakende reeks van
handwapens en uitrusting vir vloot vaartuie kon vervaardig. State wat verby hierdie vermoë beweeg
het, het dit gedoen met behulp van ander state of spesaliste, oorspronklik met die oog op die
huishoudelike behoefte maar ook om ontslae te raak van surplusse uit die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. 'n
Politieke begeerte om in hulle eie sekuriteitsbehoeftes te voorsien deur middel van invoersubstitusie, het
die opkomende verskaffers genoop om ontslae te raak van die afhanklikheid op gevestigde verskaffers
en om die wapenproduseringsproses te nasionaliseer. Hulle het hoofsaaklik gesteun op ingevoerde
tegnologie om die verdedigingsbedryf te industrialiseer. Die proses het so verloop: volledige
wapenstelsels is ingevoer, daarna het invoersubstitusie plaasgevind, en daarna 'n bevordering van
uitvoere. Gevestigde verskaffers het endersyds probeer om (deur middel van strenger kontrole en
regulasies of tegnologiese ware) die opkomende verskaffers te verhoud om hulle oligopolistiese houvas
op die mark te belemmer en andersyds moes opkomende verskaffers noodgedwonge hulle uitvoere
bevorder om te voorkom dat die plaaslike mark versadig word. Die laasgenoemde aspek het ook die
betalingsbalans van opkomende verskaffers positief beinvloed as gevolg van die inkomste uit
buitelandse valuta.
Hierdie studie kom tot die volgende aanames en gevolgtrekkings:
1. Wapenhandel het só ontwikkel dat die oordrag van militêre tegnologie die hoofkenmerk geword
het in die stelsel - 'n ongekende kenmerk tot dusver in die ontwikkelingsgang van internasionale
wapenhandel.
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2. Die gaping van tegnologiese vermoëns tussen opkomende en gevestigde wapenverskaffers word
groter en daarmee saam word die stratifikasie in wapenproduksie en -lewering volhoubaar en versterk,
wat lei tot 'n beperking op die vermoë van opkomende verskaffers om vooruitgang te maak.
3. Opkomende verskaffers se aandeel in en bydrae tot wapenmarkte bly beperk en spesialiseer
daarom op spesifieke (meestalongekompliseerde) wapenstelsels wat gemik is op sekere nisse in die
wêreldmark.
4. Die ontluikende wapenproduksie en -handelsisteem is uiters kompeterend, met die gevolg dat
slegs state wat hulle pogings kan subsidieer of integreer in staat is om gevorderde fasiliteite te onderhou.
5. Met die toenemende aanbod vanaf opkomende verskaffers, styg die kostes van navorsing en
ontwikkeling vir beide die opkomende en die gevestigde verskaffer wat weer beide dwing om hulle
uitvoere te beklemtoon.
6. Deelnemers in die stelsel sal gedwing word om hulle vergelykende tegnologiese voorsprong
prys te gee om te oorleef in die stelsel, waarna die gaping tussen die vermoëns van opkomende en
gevestigde verskaffers verminder sal word.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.10BJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This is an endeavour to inductively explore, through a qualitative design, the ability of emerging
arms supplier states to cope within the evolving post-Cold War competitive milieu of international
political economy against the leading and well-established supplier states. As an exploratory effort,
no theoretical perspective was adopted and perhaps this might be reflected as the endeavour reaches
its conclusion. Case studies of the leading regional emerging supplier states were done based on the
structures of international political economy. The states selected were determined by their
prevalence in a regional setting in terms of their security and economic power, and specifically their
status as arms supplier countries. These studies ultimately resulted in a combination of the fmdings
that led to the development of inferences, which were hoped to subsequently lead to the enrichment
of the existing theories of arms transfers. These inferences, it is hoped, will in future be evaluated
against existing theories in order to establish discrepancies, congruity and/or consonance.
According to Laurance (1992:5), "the study of the arms trade can lead to a deeper understanding of
global politics writ large, the fact is the literature of the arms trade has been very uneven in terms of
the historical periods, suppliers, recipients, rationales, and effects studied". For Laurance (1992: 10),
the lack of research in this field, particularly in the 1980s, was rooted in the deficiency of policy
initiatives on the issue from both the perspectives of suppliers and recipients, as well as from the
advocates of arms control. However, it was predominantly a consequence of the failure of the
Carter Administration's undertakings and the proliferation of new and unimpeded suppliers in the
system. In the 1990s research on the field resurfaced as a reaction to policy initiatives with regard
to the proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially after their utilisation by Iraq in the Persian Gulf
War, and the establishment of the United Nations Arms Trade Register in December 1991.
Krause (1992:8-9) indicates five general weaknesses of the literature on arms transfers. Firstly, that
it is not based on history, as it makes no reference to the process before the Second World War and
it rarely refers to the location and changes in arms transfers to the overall context of the
development of international relations. Secondly, the literature is centred on the United States and,
with a few exceptions, is orientated towards providing policy prescriptions for the United States.
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2Thirdly, the motivations of the recipients and the impacts of arms transfers on them are briefly
discussed. This is perhaps due to the nature of information available, which is mainly about
suppliers, and this, however, impacts on the conclusions drawn because they will be incomplete
without the recipients' concerns and responses on the evolution of the arms transfer system.
Fourthly, the literature fails to integrate economic, military and political perspectives, thus
overlooking the interaction of the various motivations in the pursuit of arms transfers. Finally, it
fails to analyse the system of arms transfers within the context of interstate interaction in the global
system; thus leaving the broader theoretical and analytical issues unaccounted for. The major flaw
therefore is that there is little or no analysis of the structure of the arms transfer system.
According to Krause (1992: 5), the existing literature on arms transfers "fails to treat arms transfers
within their systemic context" and thus provide a defective guide to addressing specific concerns
such as standardised categories for suppliers, specifically minor suppliers vis-a-vis the leading
suppliers, as well as to forecast their future role. Krause (1992: 8-9) further notes that
"There has been little detailed work on how to divide the tiers or on what would
determine membership in them (other than an ad hoc evaluation based on market
share), no systematic attempt to relate this to the structure of the defence industry in
various states, no attempt to determine if this structure is historically aberrant, and
little attempt to assess the possibilities of movement between tiers"
Thus, for instance, minor suppliers are sometimes referred to as second-tier suppliers (Laurance,
1992:130), third-tier suppliers (Krause, 1992:29), Third World suppliers (Catrina, 1988:56; Moodie,
1980:294; Collinson, 1989:98), or secondary and potential suppliers (Frank, 1969: 125).
Frank's (1969:50-51) categorisation of suppliers in the 1960s into principal, secondary and
developing suppliers, created the foundation on which the various tiers were divided. Principal
suppliers, according to Frank (1969:51), referred to those states that produced their own indigenous
armaments and had been continuously involved in their exportation since the Second World War.
Secondary suppliers differed from the principal ones in that they were intermittently involved in
exporting the arms they produced; they produced some of their armaments through licensed
manufacture; and they were "medium-to-small" arms sellers and buyers. Whereas, developing
supplier states had little or no involvement in arms exports since the Second World War, but
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3emerged as small arms exporters in the 1960s and had a potential to increase their arms export
capabilities.
In order to support Frank, Laurance (1992:138) maintains that the reason is basically that as
developing suppliers they become firmly established in the niche markets where the leading
suppliers are reluctant or unable to partake. This is due to the Third World demand for low-level or
mid-level technologies that leading suppliers no longer produce or because of international
constraints that the leading suppliers have committed themselves to. Laurance (1992: 131) describes
these developing suppliers as second-tier or Third World suppliers, while Krause (1992: 153)
designates them as third-tier suppliers.
In accordance with Krause's (1992:127) categorisation the United States and Russia are designated
as leading suppliers because of their status as superpowers during the Cold War period. The
second-tier suppliers are those states that have a global status that can be equivalent to that of the
United States and Russia (or the former Soviet Union), since they have the capability to produce
arms at an adequately high standard of sophistication. These suppliers also have the ability to
produce a melange of modem armaments by using idiosyncratic designs and applying independently
produced or imported components. Furthermore, they can ensure their own national independence
and maintain their global status without adversely affecting their national economies. However, the
reason for referring to them as second-tier leading suppliers is that they still depend, to a certain
extent, on inputs from other (mainly the first-tier) suppliers and they still maintain the capability to
reproduce other suppliers' technologies, which does not demand absolute autarky. Amongst these
are France, the United Kingdom and Germany. States below this standard, such as Sweden, Canada,
the Czech Republic, Switzerland and Belgium, can therefore not be referred to as second-tier
suppliers. The reason is that "they possess only a specialised and limited production capability,"
and "have no meaningful design independence in major systems" (Krause, 1992:151). Hence, they
would rather fall into the category of emerging suppliers in the third-tier.
It is upon this basis that Krause (1992:92) cautions against the utilisation of the conventional
classification of arms suppliers into first-tier (superpowers), second-tier (industrialised states) and
third-tier (developing states) suppliers. His circumspection is based on the fact that several
producers from the developing states appear to be significant suppliers similar to other industrial
producers such as Sweden, Italy, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Switzerland and
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
4Belgium. Hence, the concept of emerging suppliers is adopted in this discourse, since the
conventional categorisation used by the United Nations (UN) and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) overlooks this factor. Nevertheless, the major problem emanates from
the statistical figures that are usually provided, as they fail to reflect the enormous disparities in
technological capabilities along with the diverse motivations that these disparities procreate. For
example, SIPRI (1999) and the Congressional Research Service (1999) place suppliers into two
categories, to wit, major exporters (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and, ironically, China and Italy) and other notable exporters, without contemplation of the
divergences that exist within these categories.
Emerging suppliers are thus characterised as those suppliers, such as Sweden, Brazil and India, who
because of the need to gratify their national security requirements resisted the leading suppliers'
pressure not to develop their own arms production capabilities (see Table 1.1 on p. 14). They had
managed to overcome the restrictions imposed on them by developing their own indigenous
capabilities before and during the Cold War period, even though their level of self-sufficiency was
not extensively advanced (Krause, 1992: 156). Moreover, in most instances where emerging
suppliers are assessed, they are still viewed according to the Cold War paradigm, as overshadowed
or as appendages of the leading suppliers, and not as forces in themselves and for themselves. This
endeavour therefore aims to scrutinise the emerging suppliers in this latter sense: as future potential
competitors amongst themselves as well as in their struggles for markets with the leading primary
and secondary supplier states. The intention is to assess their efforts to overcome the imbalances of
the Cold War past, as well as their efforts to move beyond being merely regarded as regional players
into becoming important actors in the global arms market.
According to Pearson (1994:47-48) emerging arms producers, particularly those from the Third
World, appeared in reaction to security and welfare pressures, but also became eager to reach the
level of leading producers in technology as technology has been perceived by most political leaders
to be a key to security. The international power structure based on anarchy compels most states to
upgrade their general capabilities. Thus most political leaders struggle to keep pace with the
technologically and militarily advanced states by ensuring that their economies are adept to the task.
However, the environment dictates that for those states coming late into the arms-exporting
exercise, their economic capacities will be always vulnerable to the uncertainties of the market and
the volatility of the global economy.
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5Hence, it becomes important that emerging suppliers should be further scrutinised, especially since
they have not been assessed thoroughly enough in the past, particularly from an international
political economic perspective on arms transfers. This became the reason why the researcher
decided on this topic for such a study. The aim is to provide a guide on the challenges and the
orientations of most emerging supplier states and companies towards the future of arms transfers to
both governmental and non-governmental agencies interested in this field. Moreover, the emphasis
will be on enriching existing theories on arms transfers and providing topics for further research,
analysis and action from the perspective of the emerging supplier states, especially, since the field is
still dominated by American and European studies.
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
According to Karp (1994:176), arms transfers are at the nexus of international relations since they
provide the basis for the understanding of the international phenomena and processes ranging from
the fields of international security and international economic dynamics to international and
domestic political developments. Pierre (1982:3) avers that the arms trade is "far more than an
economic occurrence, a military relationship, or an arms control challenge - arms sales are foreign
policy writ large" and further, "in order to be better understood the arms trade phenomenon must be
viewed in the wider context of the transformations under way in world politics. Arms sales must be
seen, essentially, in political terms."
The arms trade is similar to the trade in other commodities such as oil, technology, food, clothing,
and other merchandise, and is therefore not vindicated from the dynamics and pressures of market
forces. However, it is a phenomenon that is uniquely relevant to international politics as it directly
affects the functioning of global security (Laurance, 1992:3-5). Its political prominence is visible in
the reactions by recipient states, particularly in the developing world, to suggestions for the
establishment of an arms control regime as this impacts directly on their national security
obligations, especially their rights to self-defence. Moreover, as an instrument of foreign policy, it
reflects an increase in the trade of advanced technology, thus impacting directly on the forces of the
international political system, as well as responding efficaciously to international economic
developments, such as the volatility of the gold standard, oil price fluctuations, and the developing
world bebt. Its prominence therefore is seen in its ability firstly, to indicate the number of eminent
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6actors in the international system; secondly, to connote the qualitative and quantitative changes
brought about by the transfer of military capabilities in the international system, and finally, to
influence or effect changes on important systemic aspects such as conflict and its management,
economic developments, dependence and interdependence, and globalisation.
For Harkavy (1975:1), "the obvious fact that sales, loans and gifts of weapons have become a huge
global business and a veritable hinge of global politics ... one might indeed be tempted to claim that
the international trade in arms ... has become the weightiest and most important instrument of
international power and diplomacy". The channels used to transfer arms are often the same
channels of international relations and diplomacy, and because of this, the parties involved in an
arms transaction are often companions of the diplomats in the delineation of the nature and trends of
international relations. With greater government involvement in arms production and transfers, the
diplomat and the salesman are often one or are often in the same boat, as arms salesmen are civil
servants employed to promote defence exports. Furthermore, the nature of the contemporary arms
industry connotes a series of jointly combined industries that produces a weapon system rather than
one identifiable so-called arms industry. This is due to the blending of science, technology and
strategy fusing a wide range of occupations and skills that are beyond the scope of one discernible
institution called an "arms industry" (Frank, 1969:6-7).
According to Pierre (1982:275), "arms sales are a barometer of politics among nations". Their
prime significance "lies neither in their military impact nor in their economic consequences, as is
often assumed, but in their political dimension. Whenever arms are transferred, they affect the
political relationship between the supplier and the recipient. There is also likely to be an important
impact upon other states within the region of the recipient country. And the transfer may well have
consequences for the relations among the principal suppliers." Therefore, Krause (1992:1) believes
that the international arms trade has an influence on the direction of international relations as well as
on the evolution of the sovereign state system. However, the relationships amongst these realms are
ill defmed, as changes in each of these domains are linked to changes in arms transfers and
production. Perceptions of state transformations with the changes in the role of arms transfers,
particularly the guaranteeing of wealth, power and triumph in armed conflict are eminent. As a
result, the emergence and evolution of the global arms transfers system can be perceived as a
kaleidoscope through which these transformations in the international system can be viewed.
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7There are several reasons for arms transfers to attain significance in international affairs, according
to Pierre (1982:275-278). Firstly, it is the increase over the years in the quality and quantity of
arms being transferred. Secondly, it is the diminution of other security and diplomatic reassurance
mechanisms such as alliances, military intervention, and the forward garrisoning on an ally's
territory that prompted the large-scale increase in arms transfers. This is from both the demands of
the recipients for more armaments in order to defend their interests as well as the pressure by
suppliers to supplant the infeasible reassurance mechanisms. Therefore, contemporarily, arms play
a significant role as instruments of diplomacy and security. Thirdly, as a consequence and a
contributor to the diffusion of power globally, a tremendous increase in the demand for armaments
is prevalent, which is reflected in the perpetuation of conflict and the intensification of antagonisms
within regional complexes. Fourthly, as a consequence of the diffusion of power in international
relations, new regional powers emerged. Their ascendance was accompanied by an increase in arms
in order to strengthen their regional preponderance, and maintain the regional balance of power. At
same time the incidences of regional conflict would be effectively reduced. Finally, local military
power has become paramount in most regions of the world as a result of nuclear weapons. Their
proliferation denotes a multiplication, rather than a reduction, in the demand for conventional
weapons as states elect to rely on their own capabilities instead of their allies for the purposes of
national security.
The complication, however, is the inconsistency of the literature that addresses the issue of arms
transfers, particularly with regards to defmitions, as well as the categorisation of the weapons
systems. For instance, the terms "arms transfers" and "arms trade" are usually used synonymously:
whereas the latter refers to arms transfers that are arranged on commercial terms, "arms transfers" is
more comprehensive by designating all arms transactions that occur regardless of the contractual
agreements attached to them (Catrina, 1994:191). Furthermore, Catrina (1994:191) argues that the
weapons of mass destruction are not covered by any of these terms whilst there is no justification for
excluding them, except by specifying which weapons one is referring to, conventional or non-
conventional. The main element that affects the categorisation of specifically conventional arms is
the manner in which prominent research institutions defme specific concepts of arms transfers.
They all defme conventional arms differently. Some exclude small arms and light weapons, as well
as other types of war material short of lethality, such as communication equipment, medical
equipment and a multitude of additional military support items (Neuman, 1994:50-51). These flaws
in the defmitions also include technology, components and parts that might be used in the
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8production, assembly, upgrading and/or the maintenance of the weapon systems. This inconsistency
and disharmony results in incongruous statistical presentations of the flow and, subsequently, in
trends in arms transfers from one international player to the other.
Perhaps these defmitional defects can be attributed to the motivations that drive the various
institutions to pursue research in this field. According to Catrina (1994: 191-192), research on arms
transfers has either benefited or suffered as a result of vested interests, be they ideological, moral
and/or economical. On the one hand, research benefited by placing the issue of arms transfers on
the research agenda and the inferences motivating further research to authenticate or repudiate the
fmdings. On the other hand, research suffered due to the role normative factors played in
disregarding or even underrating certain items of arms transfers. These defects consequently
become contagious on the end-users of the data in that they arbitrarily choose the source they intend
to use in order to be amenable to the points they want to project. Their results reflect discrepancies
on the findings and as such it becomes difficult to develop conclusive theories on arms transfers. A
major contributing factor complementing these defects is the role played by state agencies to
classify and prohibit access to information regarding the details of arms transfers. This is mainly
due to security reasons, the fact that information may be used by their adversaries and thus eliminate
the prospects for secrecy and surprise (Sokolski, 1994: 159). The uncertainty and secrecy that
clouds arms transfers, and consequently the poor quality of the data that analysts have to rely upon,
underlies the poverty and "the tentative nature of some of the evidence (and hence conclusions)
presented" in most of the literature (Krause, 1992:11). In order to highlight some of these problems,
it is perhaps appropriate to briefly scrutinise what really takes place in the field of arms transfers.
Arms are sold or offered as military assistance for a variety of reasons, of which the broadest
categories are economic and political. Economic reasons include business or government profits,
improving the balance of payments, alleviating unemployment, amortising research and
development costs, as well as "maintaining a warm base for cyclical arms industries dependent on
high levels of external threat" (Harkavy, 1994: 15). The political category includes the
concretisation of alliances; the strengthening the regional balances of power; the acquisition of
forward basing areas, the interception of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems, and the attainment of political leverage and influence on domestic and
international security policy inclinations. Military assistance, according to Neuman (1994:49),
encompasses all actions by states, international organisations, or other non-state actors that
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9contribute directly to the military efforts of combatants or would be combatants. It also refers to the
provision of training, logistical support, intelligence, moral-political support, fmancial aid and/or
sanctuary besides the supply of military hardware and technology. Other coercive actions that help
the one side above the other through denial of assistance or the application of punitive measures, for
example, embargoes, freezing of assets, censure in international institutions and threats of retaliatory
military action, are also dimensions of military assistance, especially to states and their rivals in
combat.
The political category of arms transfers, therefore, refers to the attainment of strategic goals. The
goal of strategy, according to Beaufre (1965 :209), is to accomplish the intentions of policy, utilising
to the optimum the resources available. The main intention is to impose upon the adversary the
desired goals, which are to demand of him to relinquish the pursuit of his own goals. The intentions
of policy are expressed in the form of national interests, which may in turn be categorised into vital,
major or peripheral interests. Vital interests usually exist in the international arena amongst nation-
states and these interests should never be compromised by a sovereign state. If they are affected,
grave harm can befall such a state and hence their defence requires the utilisation of forceful
measures. The major and the peripheral interests do not necessarily require the application of
acrimonious measures to the extent of coercion (Drew and Snow, 1988:26-30). According to Drew
and Snow (1988:205), strategy has to identify risk to the nation-state's interests, and these are
determined by political authorities. In the international arena, nation-states prefer to defend and
promote their interests and would even revert to military action for them.
Historically, Harkavy (1994:19-20) argues that arms transfers comply with the extant international
system and this was resonated throughout the rest of the Cold War era, where arms transfers could
be characterised in terms of bloc polarity. The fact that in the 1970s and the 1980s new de-
colonized states emerged and attained a non-aligned posture made the "tight bi-polarity" system, in
Morton Kaplan's terms (extracted from Harkavy, 1994: 19-20), into a "loose bi-polarity" system.
This made these states to bargain between the United States and the Soviet Union as the
superpowers in terms of leverage, influence, and the content and nature of the arms market. This
situation did not alter the superstructure of international alignment that remained entrenched on the
ideological divide, even though the People's Republic of China (PRC) defected from the Sino-
Soviet bloc; France militarily withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); and
the world witnessed the political turbulence and variances of states like Iran, Egypt and Indonesia .
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Klare (1996:857-858) concurs with Harkavy that arms transfer patterns internationally are
intertwined with the developments in the world security environment. In addition both they concur
with the changes that are producing conforming shifts in the global flow of armaments. If one
overlooks the United States' hegemonic period after World War n until the end of the 1950s, the
world arms traffic was dominated by competition between the two power blocs led by the United
States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War era, (early 1960s to the late 1980s). Anxious to obtain
military allies from the emerging states of the Third World, the two superpowers offered
sophisticated armaments through grants or less-pronounced sales to countries that were willing to
align themselves with one or the other of the existing power blocs. These armaments consisted of
the largest weapons flow ever experienced, particularly into areas that were regarded as central to
the global correlation of forces. In order to maintain close ties with these states, sophisticated major
combat systems - battle tanks, fighter aircraft, helicopters, missiles and warships - were transferred,
resulting in high monetary values for global arms transfers in the 1970s and 1980s. The intention
was to gain influence, retain allies and maintain leverage by supplying their regional partners and
surrogates - states or insurgent forces - with large quantities of advanced weaponry, and, in some
cases, instigating unprecedented regional arms races.
These patterns, according to Klare (1996:858), "constituted what might be called the cold-war
paradigm of global arms trafficking". This paradigm consisted of the following trends: (1) the
undisputed preponderance of the superpowers and their allies over the global arms flow; (2) the
domination of ideological and geo-strategic considerations in the determination of the flow of arms;
(3) the emergence and increased momentum of regional arms races in the contested areas of the
developing world; and (4) an inclination on the part of the recipient countries to demand
sophisticated top-of-the-range weapon systems vis-a-vis their rivals. During this period, particularly
in the 1970s, emerging arms suppliers entered the arms production and transfer system as global
arms suppliers (Laurance, 1992: 130-131). They had a greater impact on the system in the 1980s
due to the attention they received from other actors and analysts. However, they realised several
factors regarding their role in the system. Firstly, that they could not compete effectively with the
leading supplier states due to the latter's expertise in the field. Secondly, that they became
preponderant suppliers to those states engaged in interstate conflict, due to the battle-tested nature of
the equipment they provided, the relatively lower production costs of the equipment, as well as the
fact that most of them belonged to the same group as the other developing states that procured the
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equipment. Moreover, that the equipment they sold had fewer strings attached as compared to the
leading supplier states.
Emerging suppliers were driven by five fundamental motives to produce arms, according to Krause
(1992:162). These were to reduce the relations of dependency on capricious suppliers when
confronted by serious threats to their own security; to expand their position in terms of regional
and/or international power relations; to increase their efforts toward economic modernisation; to
develop indigenous skill and technologies; and to save hard currency and improve their balance of
payments by introducing import substitution measures. The study will concentrate on these motives
and trends through the assessment of continuities and changes, and as such develop the ability to
forecast future motives and trends.
Within the emerging international system of the post-Cold War period, Harkavy (1994:22-23)
believes that one has to observe the relationship between the two bases of power within nation-
states, as to which one is dominant between economic or politico-strategic (security) considerations.
In his analysis of the different epochs of international relations and the corresponding trends in arms
transfers, Harkavy (1994:22) maintains that there is a "growing submergence of security
competition; such a submergence would lend an entirely new meaning to structural concepts such as
bi-polarity or multi-polarity. One seeming hallmark of the emerging period is the absence of rival
alliance blocs. NATO continues to exist, but who are its enemies?" Most studies on the post-Cold
War security scenario, according to Harkavy (1994:24), have agreed on two main points: (1) that the
United States' ascendancy of the military technological revolution will remain unchallenged for the
next decade, "albeit with some diffusion of capabilities, pertaining not only to weapons themselves
but also related doctrinal and organisational matters"; (2) that with regard to the four elements
composing the military technological revolution, information acquisition systems, command and
control systems, precision weapon systems, and weapons platforms, the latter is the main
component of the past and current arms trade traffic. Notwithstanding its prominence, it is
contemporarily regarded as the least important.
"For the moment, however, the most basic realities are those of a depoliticization and
denationalization of the arms trade. With reference to the former, one can point to a diminution of
the former geopolitical impetuses to selling arms, at least as applied to the superpowers, resulting in
a largely commercially based arms transfer system. Regarding the latter, ...the growing
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multinationalization of arms production and trade has made it more difficult to analyze the arms
trade primarily in terms of national rivalries" (Harkavy, 1994:27-28). If this is the case, what then
is the methodology followed in analysing this complex and multidimensional field of arms
transfers?
1.3 METHODOLOGY
An evolving design that caters for flexibility and adaptability in instances where other methods may
be required will be employed to address the research problem. The discourse starts with an
overview of the state of global security in the post-Cold War era. This was done by evaluating
pertinent documentation on the subject so as to identify predominant phenomena, trends and
processes. Accordingly, the basis for the understanding of the nature of global security and the
influences it might have on the current state of arms transfers is created. According to Laurance
(1992:197-198), the trend of continuing regional conflicts might increase the demand for
conventional weapons, particularly with the increase in conflicts motivated by the regeneration of
nationalism and ethnic friction that emerged with the negation of the Cold War. Emerging arms
suppliers, therefore, are the ones that are going to benefit from this demand as they produce
weapons that are low-cost, mid-level technology, combat-tested, and actually apt for the current
conflict conditions.
Furthermore, this tendency might even dampen the drive towards more sophisticated armaments,
thus pressurising recipients to focus more on adopting extant technologies. By implication, the
system will be characterised by a smaller global military-industrial complex, since this is reinforced
by the fact that defence budgets are reduced in most developed states along with the existence of
stupendous quantities of serviceable surplus equipment obtainable in the arms market. Moreover,
the move towards "regionalisation" of the arms trade is becoming a possibility, particularly with the
success of a single market in Western Europe, the establishment of a North American free-trade
regime, the enhancement of the integration of Southeast Asian states under ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations), and the contemporary emphasis on the African Union. The increasing
commercialisation of the arms trade might also act as a catalyst to an inclination towards
regionalised arms production.
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Laurance (1992:198-199) maintains that the lack of money towards purchasing new equipment,
particularly in the developing world, will lead to states opting for upgrades and used-but-modem
systems. Albeit the system will remain being a buyers' market, most recipients will be the
belligerent states engaged in regional conflict situations. This buyer's market existed as a
consequence of the increase in the number of arms suppliers, thus intensifying competition amongst
the latter and subsequently providing the buyers with more leverage in terms of dictating the
conditions for purchasing arms. With this tendency promoting some of the emerging suppliers,
most leading suppliers - especially those producing advanced weapon systems - will be negated by
the system, sometimes being forced to integrate their defence industries and to collaborate with the
emerging suppliers in order to compete as major arms suppliers in the system. For the emerging
suppliers, their role will greatly depend on the developments regarding the arms trade control
regimes, treaties, agreements and other arrangements that are as yet to appear in the system.
Secondly, from the basis of the condition of global security, an attempt will be made to understand
the changes in the systemic politico-strategic setting and the influences these might have on the
trends in arms transfers, placing specific emphasis on the changing scenario from the Cold War era
into the post-Cold War period. The reason for approaching arms transfer behaviour from a systemic
level rather than other levels is that the data being utilised for the analyses are produced by states
which makes it more observable and easier to conceptualise by using comprehensible rules.
Moreover, the data utilised is more current from a state perspective and, therefore, for an efficient
operation the currency of the information is more pronounced at the systemic level. Finally,
possibilities for reaching consensus are more pronounced at the systemic level than at other levels,
as the field is intensely saturated with varying interpretations, particularly at the state level
(Laurance, 1992:170-171).
Thirdly, case studies are conducted on the various selected states based on the following aspects: the
historical (political, military and socio-economic) rationale for the attainment of an arms-
manufacturing capability; the major arms suppliers from the period prior to attaining an arms
manufacturing capability to date are selected; the current market; the projected market; and
problems and successes with regard to: production and trade; fmancing research and development;
the transfer of technology and know-how; and the intricacies of the global security milieu. The case
studies selected are considered to be archetypes of the categories of states being studied, and
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accordingly, all the aspects referred to above are deliberated upon in each case and are presumed to
be generally applicable to the other states within the same category (see Table 1.1 below).
Table 1.1: The Categorisation of Conventional Weapons Suppliers
Leading Suppliers Emerging Suppliers
Primary Leading Secondary Leading Primary Emerging Secondary Emerging Tertiary Emerging
Suppliers Suppliers Suppliers Suppliers Suppliers
United States France Sweden Brazil India
Russia United Kingdom China(pRC) Israel South Africa
Germany Italy South Korea Singapore
Canada Taiwan Malaysia
Czech Republic North Korea Argentina
Ukraine Pakistan
The Netherlands Australia
Belarus Iran
Poland Egypt
Spain Chile
Belgium
Switzerland
Japan
Slovak Republic
Hungary
Bulgaria
Romania
Austria
Sources: Congressional Research Service. (1999). CRS Report for Congress: Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations,
1991 - 1998. The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service; SIPRI (1999). "The 31 Leading Suppliers of Major
Conventional Weapons, 1994 - 98." SIPRI Arms Transfers Project. Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute;
Bitzinger, Richard A. (1994). "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge." International Security.
Vol. 19, NO.2. Fall. pp. 170 - 198; Klare, Michael T. (1996). "The Arms Trade in the 1990s: Changing Patterns, Rising Dangers."
Third World Quarterly. Vol. 17, NO.5. pp. 857 - 874; Krause, Keith. (1990). "The Political Economy of the International Arms
Transfer System: The Diffusion of Military Technique via Arms Transfers." International Journal. Vol. 45, Part 3. Summer. pp.686
-722; Kurth, James. (1991). "The Common Defense and the World Market." Daedalus. Vol. 120, Part 4. pp. 207 - 228; Neuman,
Stephanie G. (1989). "The Arms Market: Who's on Top?" Orbis. Vol. 33, Part 4. Fall. pp. 509 - 529; and Whynes, D. K. (1979).
The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure. London: Macmillan.
Amongst the emerging suppliers, Sweden is remarkable as a unique, non-aligned and neutral arms
supplier state in Europe, and this makes it to be an outstanding model for the primary emerging
arms producers and suppliers. It has a technologically highly developed arms industry due to the
state's neutrality stance that emphasises national independence and a high level of autarky in arms
development and production. Moreover, Sweden was never an ancillary to any superpower during
the Cold War period, unlike the other primary emerging suppliers such as the People's Republic of
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China, Italy, Canada and the Czech Republic. Sweden therefore produces indigenously most of its
various major conventional weapon systems that include naval vessels, combat aircraft, tanks,
armoured vehicles, heavy artillery systems and missile systems.
Another case study, as a salient model of secondary emerging suppliers, is Brazil, which differs
from the primary emerging suppliers on the grounds that it began late to develop an indigenous arms
development and production faculty. Correspondingly, Brazil has not as yet captured the process of
innovation at the edge of technological advancement, and therefore still relies heavily on inputs
from the leading suppliers. Yet, it has an expansive and enterprising arms production faculty that
strives to develop specialised equipment at a very high level of technological sophistication.
Besides, Brazil maintains a distinguished niche in the international arms market, which is solely
focussed at meeting the general requirements of the developing states of the South as well as the
specific needs of the developed world. In fact, Brazil provides a remarkable model amongst other
secondary emerging arms suppliers such as Israel, South Korea, Taiwan and North Korea. The
main reason is that Brazil's initiative to develop a vigourous defence industry was not buttressed nor
endorsed by any other global power, as was the case with the other protégés of the United States and
the former Soviet Union.
The final case study is that of India, which is regarded as a tertiary emerging arms supplier within
the hierarchy of the arms production and transfer system. It shares this status with other emerging
arms producing states, such as South Africa, Malaysia, Australia and Singapore, amongst others,
which have not yet established themselves as prominent and formidable suppliers within the
international arms market. However, India has all the attributes of a secondary emerging supplier,
and could even become a primary emerging supplier, if the economic and commercial
considerations could outperform the security concerns as the rationale for developing, producing
and transferring armaments. Actually, India established one of the largest defence industries in the
non-western world, as part of the effort to offset the impact of such security concerns.
Paradoxically, though, it became one of the largest arms importers in the world. The major reason
for this was that India's arms production was mainly based on licensed and co-production
arrangements as a resuIt of unsuccessful and dear indigenous arms projects, which were also not
compensated through energetic exports like the other emerging suppliers. Accordingly, the failure of
the Indian defence industry to successfully penetrate the export market has made it to remain
amongst the ranks of the tertiary emerging suppliers.
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These three case studies provide the essence of this endeavour and the data collection methods were
mainly focussed on secondary sources, which included the review of documents such as books,
published and unpublished articles as well as newspaper clippings. Unfortunately, the intention to
conduct unstructured in-depth interviews with executive officials of the major arms industries and
members of the diplomatic staff of the selected case studies were hindered by financial and
institutional constraints. However, efforts were made to consult with scholars and analysts of
international security studies and arms transfers in order to entertain their views and interpretations
of the (emerging) trends and processes with regard to the cases of study.
Fourthly, information is collated according to the demarcated aspects dealt with in the case studies
and, interpretations of the data are produced with contingency preparations for the problems of
reliability and validity arising from the discrepancies in the definition, as well as from the
presentation of data by -the various individuals, institutes and publications consulted. Fifthly,
inferences are developed (for further research) based on the combination of the findings and analysis
of all the case studies handled. Possibilities for the testing of the inferences developed with the
evolution and evaluation of the theory could not be conducted as a result of the limitations of the
research endeavour. Conclusions, therefore, substantiate the analysis and evaluation, as well as
attest to the value of the effort.
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The discourse is composed of three parts, part one deals with the theoretical perspectives as well as
the political and economic realities of arms transfers. Part two is composed of the case studies, and
part three consists of the analyses, findings and conclusions. Under part one, chapter two focuses on
the international political economy of global security in the post-Cold War era; chapter three looks
at the arms production and transfer system and the dynamic significance of technology; and chapter
four analyses the rationale for transferring arms: the international political economy of arms
transfers. Part two deals with the case studies: chapter four, the primary emerging suppliers
(Sweden); chapter five, the secondary emerging suppliers (Brazil); and chapter six, the tertiary
emerging suppliers (India). Part three is made up of chapter seven that concentrates on the analysis
and findings; and chapter eight, as the final chapter, focussing on the summary and conclusions.
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PART ONE
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE
POLITICAL ECONOMIC REALITIES OF ARMS
TRANSFERS
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CHAPTER 2 - THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The "new world order" that was ushered in by the end of the Cold War, resulted in the unification of
Germany, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the end of the world socialist system in East and
Central Europe. This new order was promoted further by the involvement of the coalition forces led
by the United States against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, with the victory of the coalition
confirming the only residual superpower status of the United States in the post-Cold War era.
The various paradigmatic approaches placed their partisan emphasis on the nature of the new world
order, especially in the United States, resulting in that country being the champion of the previous
East-West conflict. The (neo) realist paradigm emphasised the anarchical nature of the post-Cold
War situation with the unipolar type of relations, where the United States had to concentrate on the
questions of national security and the well-defmition of threats since there was no tangible threat
from the East, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. The liberal pluralist accentuation was on the
nature of international relations as being far from geo-strategic, as was the case in the Cold War
epoch, but more geo-economic and, as a result, viewing matters of national security only with
regard to the threats to national economic interests. These became the two main international
political paradigmatic contests, albeit with ancillary variations, that surfaced and accompanied the
concept of the new world order.
This does not mean that the other regions in the world were neither affected nor tried to comprehend
the changes that the new world order introduced. The global decline of the Soviet Union as a
superpower as well as the end of the Cold War could be felt even in the poorest countries
internationally. It proposed changes in the manner in which players in domestic and international
politics viewed themselves as well as others. It introduced drastic and fundamental changes that
negated and buried the protuberances and the quintessence of the Cold War, especially for the Third
World. However, perilous threats to peace and security are the main problem of the Third World,
and in most instances they assume unmanageable proportions. The ability of the United Nations
(UN) to maintain peace and security in the post-Cold War era becomes questionable in the light of
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these threats. Failure by the UN to attain permanent solutions to conflicts in the Third World,
according to Owolabi (1996:8), obliges the re-examination of the factors that have led to this
situation as well as the probable innovative sketches that may be utilised to ease the tension.
Since globalisation and regionalisation dominates the scene presently, there is an endeavour to
search for a new and shared paradigm of security, which should be global security. This refers to "a
system of world order or security" embodying a programme that caters for common security
globally. The intention is to create a global security system or a system of world order that
"presupposes a universal concept of security with a shared set of norms, principles, and practices
which result in common patterns of international behaviour" (Haftendom, 1991: 11-12). This
system therefore presumes the existence of strong institutions that will regulate relations between
units and actors within the system as well as enforce the commonly accepted rules and norms. It
negates the preponderance of military force in favour of co-operative strategies through the creation
of "institutions around common interests, in facilitating the evolution of shared norms and
principles, and in furthering a common understanding of the problems confronting mankind"
(Haftendorn, 1991:12). This new paradigm is supposed to conform to three main proposals by
explaining the issues of diversity and change - within and between the various regional complexes
and states; elucidating the dynamics of transition from one preponderant concept to another; and
unravel the critical aspects of systems transformation (Haftendorn, 1991: 12).
In this chapter the paradigm of global security in the post-Cold War era will be discussed in order to
identify predominant phenomena, trends and processes. In doing so a basis for the understanding of
the nature of global security is created on which the influences it might have on the current state of
international political economy could be determined; as well as the influence that salient trends of
international political economy, such as globalisation and interdependence, have on the nature and
content of current thought about global security. The major theoretical perspectives and their
ancillaries are reviewed regarding their views on the concept of global security and the broadening
of its agenda. The cardinal argument raised therefore is the broadening of the agenda of global
security and the implications this might have on the current politico-strategic environment.
Accordingly, the basis for understanding the nature of global security and the influences it might
have on the current state of arms transfers will be created.
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The chapter begins with a review of the features of the post-Cold War order that necessitates the
broadening of the agenda of security. The broadening of the security agenda contains the defmition
of the concept of security, the arguments for and against the broadening of the agenda, and the
introduction of a balanced prescription of global security. Furthermore, the international political
economy and the structure of security are discussed, including the effort of ensuring economic
security within the international political economy of market democracy and the international
political economy of the Third World security problematic. The last portion argues that the
presence of weak states in the international system makes the latter unstable and therefore unable to
guarantee the effective implementation of global security.
2.2 FEATURES OF THE POST -COLD WAR ORDER
There are four large structural dilemmas of the present world order which, according to Brzezinski
(1991/92:7-8), are crucial to global security and are structural consequences of the Cold War. The
first is the manner in which Europe will define itself in future - whether it will be a Europe on a
supranational basis, a deeper before wider Europe, a wider before deeper Europe or a Europe of co-
operative states. The next refers to the nature in which the states of the former Soviet Union are
going to transform themselves - be it a reversion to the past or fundamental transformations as
anticipated by Western states. Then it is the manner in which the Asia-Pacific region will organise
itself, whether Japan should assume the predominant role that is congruous to its economic
prevalence and the anticipation on the PRC's viewpoint vis-a-vis this position. In the last instance,
the manner of handling the problems of the Middle East, particularly the thorny issues of the Persian
Gulf region and the inextricable Israeli-Arab conflict. However, there is a fifth, quite significant,
structural dilemma that is overlooked by Brzezinski and that is the discord between the developed
North and the rest of the developing Third World - one that could actually determine the course of
the post-Cold War period. It is upon this structural dilemma that the final section of this chapter is
focussing, since the North-South predicament does not guarantee the stability of global security in
the post-Cold War period.
The end of the Cold War introduced new assumptions about the nature of the new world order.
Firstly, with the establishment of "market democracy" as a universal standard, all the problems
relating to global economic interdependence, cultural intercourse, trade globalisation, and
environmental calamities, were forecasted to be eventually eliminated. This assertion was based on
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the premise that co-operation on an international scale had been hampered by ideological
differences, and as these came to an end, co-operation would be naturally augmented. The second
assertion, which springs from the first one, maintains that as ideology and globalisation are in
tandem removed, a world government will be ushered in, under the auspices of the UN, managing
the overall global funds. In fact, according to this assertion, the current international system is
different from what was previously assumed: it is a loose system, which also "appears to be
progressively divisible, flaky and transient" (Laïdi, 1994: 1). Power and purpose are strongly
contrasted within the contradiction between the expeditious process of market globalisation and the
prominence of ethnic, cultural and regional identities. Perhaps this retreat into identities, according
to Laïdi (1994: 1-3), reflects a response to the processes of globalisation and therefore does not
provide any direction. If it could be comprehended from this perspective, it may trigger a "chain
reaction" that threatens the practice of political sovereignty within states, and in particular the
military aspect of the individual state.
The inability to connect military power and purpose raises two sets of problems. Firstly, during the
Cold War era, the concepts of defence and security conformed naturally. Whereas currently, on the
one hand, the concept of security is broadly applied, on the other hand, there is no politico-military
actor that is systematically connected and identified with the security problem. Military reaction
(defence policy/purpose) to problems of insecurity is not efficacious and firm to frame security
policies. Secondly, defence is viewed entirely from a national perspective, with alliances playing a
supplementary role to this actuality. Wider and deeper alliances, such as in Europe, occurred as a
result of specific factors, such as sharing (necessarily) the cost of military research and
development; the lack of a collective military instrument fuelling an urge for "collective
supranational identities"; and the inadequacy of national solutions to addressing threats emerging
from problems of "political contagion" (for example the spill-over effects of the political
consequences of the disintegration of weak states), instead of a clash in inter-state relations (Laïdi,
1994:2-3).
Looking at this situation from another angle, war between great powers is not something that can be
ruled out as a result of the end of bipolar tensions between the United States and the erstwhile
Soviet Union. A lot of ideas abound in current literature about a twenty-first century concert of
powers and a new balance of power, while in other parts of the erstwhile Soviet Union and in many
parts of the Third World the realities of security dilemmas, interstate wars and local arms races still
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prevail. However, Holsti (1996:206-207) believes that most of these conflicts are bound to emanate
from problems arising within the states themselves rather than from relations between them,
particularly in many parts of the Third World, where substantive or dormant hegemonies, alliances,
nuclear deterrence or balances of power are non-existent. Great powers are mainly going to be
concerned with economic issues, leaving the periphery to deal with the problems of conflict. The
military capabilities of the great powers are going to be used by the UN to revitalise or sustain weak
or collapsing states. Therefore, the UN will continue being a terrain of struggle on two fronts: the
amendment of the Charter to focus more on contemporary demands than the Westphalian
foundation on which it is based; and the problem of representation within the Security Council.
According to Laïdi (1994:4-5), the post-Cold War world is characterised by several representations
which make it difficult to describe it as one era. It began with the fall of the Berlin Wall and it was
the first time that a new international order came into existence without a military clash of the
dominant powers. The collapse of the bipolarity bloc system after the Cold War also initiated the
triumph of regionalism over globalism, which was anticipated (and is still construed) by most
analyses to be the other way round, but however failed to introduce a new order or a delineation of
its own. Approximately seven potential world order models (see Table 2.1 below) began to surface,
each struggling for recognition and each with its own distinguishing features which, however, were
not salient enough to provide a structure that can prevail such as during the Cold War and the other
periods prior to it (Zartman, 1994:xi-xii).
When viewing all these models, it becomes obvious that they represent the various dimensions of
the post-Cold War period and individually therefore can not evolve to become the universal model
of the new world order. Inreality, the fundamental characteristic of the new world order is based on
the intertwining of politico-strategic, diplomatic and economic considerations, and as such, the
intertwining of these considerations determines the new hierarchy of power. The end of the Cold
War negated the ultimate reasons for demarcating between friends and foes, as well as between
central and peripheral conflicts. Conflicts, according to Laïdi (1994: 11-12), have been structurally
altered from being more vertical (these conflicts are not equally important) to being more horizontal
(that the complexity and particularity of conflicts means that they do not require similar solutions).
Furthermore, the fading of the nuclear threat diminished the prevalence of the politico-military
domain in international relations and, correspondingly, economic competition sharpened rapidly.
Gains attained by a particular actor in a specific field became increasingly less conveyable into
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another and, as a result, the gap between political, military and economic power increasingly
widened. The volatility of the international system entrenched this non-fungibility of power and
furthermore diminished the importance of special international regimes dominated by one actor,
replacing them with interim and incomplete arrangements that call for renegotiations at certain
intervals.
Table 2.1 Potential World Order Models
MODEL FEATURES
The United States has the largest national economy, is the leading nuclear power, the foremost
originator and supreme executor of global undertakings.
Managed through the classical mechanism of the balance of power, whereby an allied reaction
is initiated by a hegemony on other states that, in turn, consolidate their capabilities so as to
counter-balance it until it withers away. However, contemporary global interaction is
characterised by a weakening and, principally, a lack of concrete security alliances.
The UN is perceived to have the ability to act as a new world government, as it has managed
to overcome the shackles of the Cold War and can thus become the policeman of the world.
However, the UN is unable to play this role as it does not have the capability nor room to
manoeuvre as a corporate actor since its actions are still determined by a conglomeration of
states and has no independent source of funding.
World Legislative Forum Model A world legislative forum of sovereign states, operating through the UN or other conferences
and forums such as, inter alia, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA Tf), UN
Unipolar Model
Multipolar Model
World Government Model
World Order Model
Market Democracy Model
Regional Communities Model
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and the UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). The problem with these arrangements is that they lack a supreme
authority and have no identity or belief system.
Wherein the world is divided into North-South or East-West based on the structure of belief
and identity, instead of power. This model is based on a structure, which is primarily
economic, at the pivot being the leading capitalist countries, exploiting the underdeveloped
peripheral South through the interuational financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Reflective of the Western values during the Cold War (market economy, human rights, and
democracy), although not prescribing any ideological adherence to its adversaries and these
values are viewed as being universal.
There is no global structure, but the model is composed of regional structures having power
and identity, withdrawn into their own hermitages, and with their own security arrangements.
The model can nonetheless be useful as a framework for analytical purposes with regions
being utilised as "conceptual baskets".
Source: Zartman, I.W. (1994). "Foreword." In Laïdi, Z. (Ed). Power and Purpose after the Cold War. Oxford: Berg. pp. xii - xv.
The main reason for the diminution of the politico-military domain is that the current international
situation discredits the type of approach based on a classical view of the "security dilemma",
wherein the international system is composed of equal actors (states) who pursue the same
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objectives and resort to alliances as soon as the balance of power is threatened by one ambitious
actor. The basis for this approach, according to l..aïdi (1994:20-21), is that the de-coupling of
.power and purpose prevents competition that is focused on overall domination, which demands a
tremendous amount of responsibility. Actors or units would rather seek for co-ordinated selective
choices than to pursue overall domination that will require of them to shoulder certain
responsibilities. Although states are still the most powerful actors in the international system, they,
however, do not possess the monopoly of stimulus that influences the system. This is much more
pronounced in the economic field whereby the application of the balance of power concept is inept
due to "the fragmented nature of the states in international polities, and the imperfect coincidence of
economic and political sovereignty" (l..aïdi, 1994:21).
Therefore, the primary factor here is globalisation, whieh has imposed a number of shared
responsibilities on dominant state and non-state actors alike, and correspondingly, there is no actor
that can claim to dominate the entire international process - not even the United States in the
military domain. This means that the multipolarity that would emerge will be "new, incomplete and
heterogeneous" (l..aïdi, 1994:21-22). What will make it new, according to l..aïdi (1994:22), is that
its various functions will not be categorically differentiated or that global power will be equally
divided. Secondly, the process will be incomplete because it will not provide prevalence to any
actor. Finally, it will be heterogeneous by creating relations between a variation of political actors.
Nevertheless, the state is still and will continue to be the principle organiser of political life
internationally (Ayoob, 1993:45-47). Its role has been augmented by technological advances and
by complex economie interactions, particularly in the Third World, where it is the main motive
force for economic growth as well as the distributor of scant resources. Furthermore, in the East
Asian newly industrialised countries the state has, through the utilisation of the state élite directed
economic development through a prudent combination of motivation, complementation and
systematic pressure towards unprecedented achievements. With regard to major industrial powers,
the current economic debate is dominated by mercantilist attitudes that are more salient than what
used to be the case in the Cold War period, where these attitudes were concealed behind the bravado
of a free market. Despite the existence of other non-state actors in the international political
economic system, the state still occupies the centre stage as the main actor in the relations that
govern interaction within the system.
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However, even if the state is considered to be the main actor in international relations, it actually
exists and operates in three different types of wor Ids (Cooper, 1996: 17-24), which further
complicates the construction of the new world order (see Table 2.2 below). First there is a pre-
modern world, which is still in the pre-state phase characterised by post-imperial chaos. The second
part of the world, which is the modem world, is characterised by a classical state system, where the
state still retains the monopoly of the utilisation of force and wherein powerful states might be
enticed to try to subdue the chaos in their regional settings for a number of reasons ranging from
economic, to defensive, to superiority complexes. The third type of world is the post-modem world
where the state system is also collapsing into a greater order that is founded not on the balance of
power system that emphasises the importance of sovereignty and the separation of domestic and
foreign aspects. Here the emphasis is on "mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, right
down to beer and sausages" and there is great intrusion into areas that were previously the preserve
of state sovereignty (Cooper, 1996:22-23). The shared interests, according to Cooper (1996:24), are
also a result of a nuclear mutually assured destruction that has extended into the conventional
strategic sphere.
Table 2.2 The Three World Types of the Post-Cold War Period
criterion of possessing legitimate monopoly to utilise force, as it had in the past abused this prerogative and
as a result lost its legitimacy.
This world is characterised by a classical state system, where the state still retains the monopoly of the
utilisation of force and has the potential and will to use it against other states. State sovereignty is
recognised with its separation of domestic and foreign affairs, and as a result, external interference is
prohibited and military might and raison d'état are the main elements of political life.
In this world the state system is collapsing into a greater order founded on mutual interference in each
other's domestic affairs and there is great intrusion into areas that were previously the preserve of state
sovereignty. The prerogative of the utilisation offorce legitimated to states is subject to international, but
mainly self-imposed, constraints, where armed forces are, contrary to strategic logic, made transparent to .
other states. State sovereignty is no longer a supreme ideal since it is mainly sacrificed in areas offoreign
affairs and security and the major aspirations of the system are to ensure common standards of domestic
The security system within the post-modem world handles problems that caused the ineffectiveness
of the balance of power, and, through the avoidance of war, it eliminates the consternation of war
represented by modem technology. This system is more commensurate to democratic societies that
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are open domestically and involved in international relations. Accordingly, the less dependent the
system is on balance, the more inclusive it is to strong and large states. Difficulties encountered
within the system are that democratic institutions are still firmly rooted in the territorial state, thus
the packages of national identity and interaction are animated (Cooper, 1996:26). Other aspects of
social life, such as the economy, law making and defence are increasingly being implanted into the
supranational framework, whilst others such as identity and institutions remain largely national.
This reflects the necessity of states to remain as fundamental units of international studies for the
envisioned future. The post-Cold War era, according to Laïdi (1994:22-23), appears to be post-
modern by breaking away from the modernist tendencies which are characterised by given model-
types, linear in nature, with a predictable and direct causality. Therefore, it is currently difficult to
view the international system as unipolar, multipolar or a-polar, but rather as a combination of all
these polarities. Nonetheless, the most powerful actors are still going to continue to provide purpose
in the new world order, as has happened in the previous orders (Laïdi, 1994:24-25).
However, when looking at the notion of classical hegemony, to wit, an actor's ability to control
his/her sovereignty; to identify and effectively utilise the available resources in pursuit of an
enduring strategy to obtain leverage; and a capacity to mobilise support for his/her political actions,
then a different picture is emerging. A post-modem structuring of hegemony is emerging, based on
incoherent processes, pernicious rather than redistributive, providing more autonomy for sub-
national actors instead of state agencies, and rooted on biased strategies rather than on any global
arrangement. Therefore, the notion of hegemony, particularly in a regional setting, is bound to be
tainted by many crevices. Firstly, the conception of a region as "an intermediate register" between
the domestic and the global is no longer prevalent. Secondly, the region is no longer a launching
pad for states towards global policy. "Certain choices which are recognised as regional are no
longer the end result of a laborious balancing of the internal and the world-wide; they constitute
rather the regional interpretation of a world strategy elaborated on the national scale" (Laïdi,
1994:27). Accordingly, a new definition of security is required, that is rather extended in order to
encompass the heterogeneity as well as the unpredictable nature of the post-Cold War period.
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2.3 BROADENING THE AGENDA OF SECURITY
2.3.1 Defining the Concept of Security
Conflict is an omnipresent and an inevitable phenomenon, and as such, its corollary, 'insecurity',
according to Garnett (1996:8), is a "feeling of danger, which comes from uncertainty and instability.
No one likes living with insecurity. It is psychologically unpalatable to almost everyone, and most
human beings take whatever steps they can to minimize it". Therefore, as a deduction, the steps that
human beings undertake to minimise insecurity are broadly termed as security. If this is the case,
then what is the defmition of security?
Figure 2.1 The Ubiquitous Concept of Security
There is no consistent definition of security. The various defmitions espoused differ according to
the respective paradigmatic and theoretical variations prevalent in international studies. "The
ubiquitous idea of security", according to Rothschild (1995:55), "is of security in an 'extended'
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sense." This extended security can be understood from four main dimensions depicted by Figure
2.1 above. One, the concept is extended below the state level, from the security of nations (in a
communitarian sense) to the security of groups or individuals. Two, it is extended upwards, to wit,
from the security of nations to the security of the international system, the supranational level and
up to the biosphere. Three, extension is also understood to be horizontal, meaning that security, in
this sense, covers the military, political, economic, social and environmental milieus. Finally, the
extension of the political responsibility for ensuring security from nation-states (who are still
politically pivotal for ensuring security in all its dimensions), upwards to international institutions,
downwards to regional and/or local governments, and sideways to non-governmental organisations,
the media, public opinion and to other actors convenient, depending on their field of interest.
However, this ubiquitous idea of security does not provide a lucid definition of the concept because,
according to Buzan (1991 :7), the concept is still underdeveloped.
If security is understood from its general definition: "as the pursuit of freedom from threat", it
becomes easier to comprehend it in the context of the international system (Buzan, 1991: 16).
Buzan, therefore defines it as "the ability of states and societies in the system to maintain their
independent identity and their functional integrity" (1991:19). States and societies pursue security
in harmony or in contention, with the essence being the struggle for survival. The pursuit of
security is dependent on the exigency of the issue at hand, whereby the lack of exigency negates the
need for such an issue to be labelled as a "security" issue. Another important aspect, according to
Buzan (1991: 19-20), is on the levels of analysis of the issue at hand, depending on the priority it
deserves, for example, the personal security of individuals is secondary to the security of human
collectives. That is the reason why within the international system, the security of the state becomes
pivotal. Other non-state human collectives, such as those of ethno-national groups are also
important as units of analysis. However, the anarchic nature of the structure of the international
system (without central authority in virtually all its organisational dimensions) mandates the state,
as its preponderant unit, to maintain and preserve its own national security.
Accordingly, between the international and domestic levels of analysis, a close relationship exists,
and actually, the differences among the various levels are only employed for analytical purposes.
They are employed as tools to reflect the institutional arrangements found in the international
system. Hence, Underhill (1994:20-21) asserts that there is only one "politics" in the international
system: the politics of conflict within the ambit of the state. The state becomes the centre of focus
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in a state-society complex, whereby it manages the domestic and international constraints through
internal policy-making and inter-governmental consultations. Therefore, within the auspices of the
state, there are five inter-linked sectors wherein human collectives are concerned about their security
(refer to Figure 2.1 above). Firstly: economic security that relates to a state's access to resources,
fmance and markets that enable it to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and power. Secondly:
political security that relates to the state's organisational stability, and the legitimacy that is
bestowed by the system of government and its ideology. Thirdly: military security that concerns the
state's ability to balance between its offensive and defensive capabilities as well as its capacity to
probe and discern other states' intentions. Fourthly: societal security, referring to the ability of the
state to sustain its culture and identity within congenial levels of progress. Finally: environmental
security that refers to "the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential
support system on which all other human enterprises depend" (Buzan, 1991: 19-20).
There are three significant conditions that are imposed on the security concept, according to Buzan
(1991 :22-23). Firstly, as the highest governing authority and the framework of order within the
international system, the state becomes the primary referent object of security, hence the
preponderance of the policy of "national" security. Secondly, as a highly relational and
interdependent concept, external threats rather than domestic insecurities mostly dominate the
national security agenda. Finally, from the logic of anarchy, security is either dependent upon
harmony or hegemony, which therefore, makes it to be a relative, rather than an absolute concept. If
the system of anarchy is negated, it will, consequently, require the redefmition of the security
concept. Since states are the main policy-makers, pragmatically national security incorporates other
levels of security, be they individual or systemic. Therefore, security implies its classical meaning -
national security - while broadening its relevant dynamics at international and sub-state levels.
Governments, and no other agencies, are at the pivotal point between the sub-state and the systemic
dynamics. However, in the real world, policy-makers have little to do with the actual problematic of
security, but nevertheless, have a substantial impact in the formulation of policies that are "produced
in the name of national security. Because policy has a powerful impact on security problems, ... the
policy-making process itself becomes a major factor in the overall character of the security
problem" (Buzan, 1991 :328-329).
For Haftendorn (1991 :5-6), the concept of security, regardless of how it is referred to, corresponds
to particular values, threats and capabilities that present themselves as challenges. The historical
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evolution of the concept is connected to boundaries of the extension of the global system, "from one
of regionally bounded nation-states, to the highly interdependent political systems of the
industrialized world, to a global community of people" (Haftendorn, 1991:5). This progress is a
result of advances in communication, technological improvements in the art of war, and industrial
growth and commercial development. The concept of national security emerged historically with
the emergence of nation-states in the seventeenth century, with its focus on national survival. The
nature of the international arena pitted each state against another with the interstate system lacking
the common rules and institutions to ensure the enforcement of law. The state, as a sovereign entity,
had to protect and safeguard domestic life, property and peace against external threats.
However, when viewing the security agenda from a systemic perspective, Buzan (1991 :175) argues
that the integrated rational patterns and general structures are emphasised in terms of
interdependence rather than when viewed from a divisible perspective of national security.
Therefore, these two angles are linked at the state, in its individual capacity, and the system as a
whole, where they are interconnected. This is obvious when viewing the intensity of support that
strong states confer on the international system as compared to the weak states; and also the
inefficiency and implausibility of security policies that emphasise the significance of the state more
than the system. This therefore leads to the prevalence of the global security agenda as it
encompasses the systemic level wherein it becomes more congenial to analyse national securities in
relation to each other rather than individually (Buzan, 1991 :23).
Kolodziej (1992:6-9) defmes global security as the threat or the utilisation of force so as to be able
to govern globally. In the absence of an agreement as to how to govern globally, coercion, or its
threat, is used to manage or resolve differences. The global security problem is defmed by the
institutionalisation of the structures of coercion as well as the ascension of the administrators of
force who plan and execute coercive strategies. Any global economic system is supported by a
framework of security that is reliant on force or its threats so as to demand conformity towards the
installed and regulated economic objectives and interests.
After studying the Soviet case, however, it became clear for Kolodziej (1992:10-11) that the agenda
of security can not be restricted to issues of force and threats. Other factors on which traditional
geo-political structures of security depend have to be covered, especially those that ensure the
efficient and efficacious operations of civil economic society. The state, therefore, can be a threat to
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the freedoms of individuals and collectives as any other external aggressor. Furthermore, the
inability of the state to settle armed conflicts within civil society increases the danger for those who
are divided along racial, ethnic, ideological, religious and other communal identity lines. Thus,
even within the state, security has to be interpreted as a global security issue: as human rights
violations and civil rights are currently regarded as issues of global security.
What should be noted is that individual and collective security do not depend solely on the state as
security issues are encountered at all levels of life, which makes the concept of security generally
applicable to all social sciences. The state is a form of "specialized bureaucracy", an institution
alongside others, which monitors and regulates risk, as a provider of security for groups within
society (Shaw, 1993: 174-175). Secondly, the state and its system, become the context within which
risks against individuals and collectives are generated. Thirdly, the state is uniquely bestowed with
sovereignty, which gives it monopoly of legitimate violence; thus it becomes dominant or pivotal
amongst other institutions of modern society. As states begin to "fracture", some of its attributes
become attached to supra-state institutions and others to sub-state collectives or structures.
Therefore, sovereignty is no longer based only on one institution called the nation-state or state-
nation, but it has become shared both below and above. The system of inter-state relations
constitutes a risk environment of institutions that are monitored by the players - states, collectives
and individuals - and in turn, the players are influenced by its operation. The inter-state system is
influenced by other environments existing at the global level - economic, financial, ecological, etc.
- and in turn influences them while at the same time it interpenetrates other systems that operate
within the state. The global security agenda therefore misses the dimension of society, to wit, the
global flow of social relations within which the inter-state system floats.
2.3.2 Arguments for the Broadening of the Security Agenda
Since states and individuals are mainly threatened by non-military phenomena, some analysts have
suggested that the concept of security should be broadened to include health, environmental and
other issues. These proposals, according to Walt (1991:213), are a reminder that it is not only
military issues that demand attention, as military power is not a guarantee for humanity's well-
being. Kolodziej (1992:26-28) also concurs that the agenda of security should be widened,
deepened, and methodologically varied and sophisticated than what the neo-realist agenda
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prescribes. The concept of security should not be reduced nor confused with the concept of the
balance of power but must be connected with the struggle to achieve order and welfare through
legitimate means, such as the state and other societal institutions at sub-state and supra-state levels.
These institutions and governing bodies are legitimately viewed by their members as being
authoritative and protective.
According to Buzan (1991 :368-369), there are three elements that provide the rationale for adopting
a broad agenda. Primarily the mounting population density generates a need for changing priorities
when addressing issues such as threats and vulnerabilities that define the problem of security. This
is more visible with regard to developed states, where the aspect of nuclear deterrence has mitigated
the fear of military attack, and partly because of the emergence of security communities, and
mainly, the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the failures of the League of Nations and the UN can be
attributed to the prevalence of national security interests over those of collective security - national
survival became prominent to global security or world government (Haftendorn, 1991:8-9). States
were required to maintain large military forces and a stupendous amount of weapon systems that
could meet the perceived threats. The unavailability of global institutions to ensure amiable inter-
state relations compelled the structure of the international system to establish patterns of alliances
and nuclear deterrence to regulate co-operative and conflicting relationships. As it became obvious
that the threat of a nuclear holocaust could not be averted, emphasis shifted from national security to
a paradigm of global security.
Global security, as a concept, was based on the consideration of mutual interests as a means of
survival under conditions of nuclear deterrence as well as recognising that the other party will be
inhibited from attacking as a consideration of self-interest. The implication was that the security of
one state was inter-linked to that of other states or of one other state and therefore there was a
relationship of security interdependence among states in the system. This recognition of security
interdependence led to the emergence of regular patterns, which as a result led to the evolution of
international regimes - which became patterns of security co-operation in a situation of anarchy
aimed at ensuring constraint in the behaviour of states. These expressed themselves in the form of
institutions such as alliances, organisations and agreements (Haftendorn, 1991:9). Nonetheless,
Buzan (1991 :370) maintains that the reduction of military threats also put into salience other types
of threats such as vulnerabilities related to the insecure operations of the international market
economy. Jones (1996:206-207) also agrees that the end of the Cold War highlighted the
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deficiencies of a security agenda that was based on a narrow military conceptualisation. In
particular the demise of the Soviet Union and the problems that emerged along with its dissolution,
some of which had been in existence but overshadowed by the Cold War, legitimated a need for a
broader security agenda. Amongst others, these sources of conflict included threats that emanated
from environmental degradation, international migration and the resuscitation of ethno-nationalism.
Walt (1991:213), however, cautions that at the same time such a prescription may excessively
expand the agenda of security studies, wherein other issues such as "pollution, disease, child abuse
or economic recession" will be construed as threats to security. This, according to Walt (1991:213),
would destroy the intellectual coherence of the field and thus render it ineffective in solving
important problems that it is supposed to address. Furthermore, the existence of other hazards does
not eliminate the danger of war, with the current cost of armed forces as well as the risks of modem
war, the scholarly community will be irresponsible to overlook the central issue of the field of
security studies. Freedman (1993:204-205), nevertheless, argues against the idea that research on
the deployment, employment and development of military force should be regarded as the study of
security. Instead this is the study of strategy, to wit, that Strategic Studies is the domain of
understanding the connection between military means towards political objectives.
The second element that provides the rationale for adopting a broad agenda includes the qualities of
the concept of security which are politically beneficial by negating most of the assertions of Realism
and Idealism; the action priority that the concept creates by demanding attention from governments
and the population at large; and the national and international dimensions attached to its broadening,
diminishing the military element whilst elevating its other domains, as well as providing a "balance
between the national and collective security interests" (Buzan, 1991 :372). There is an element of
naïveté in the suggestion that regional or global security systems are peaceful by virtue of being
broader than pure power arrangements or because the level of analysis has been extended. The
existence of anarchy is at the core of the state system, at regional and global levels, and therefore
economic disturbances and the consequential political dissatisfaction at the domestic level may
influence and intensify the struggle for power amongst states and collectives thus plunging a region
or the world into a war. Therefore, the concept of security has to move beyond the construction of a
new make up for power, which is based on military power. This can be an essential condition to
manage anarchy, but not the adequate one. "Economic and political assurances, responsive to
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societal demands must also be fashioned to ensure stable and legitimate security systems"
(Kolodziej 1992:29).
The final element is the integrative capacity that the concept provides by combining the disparate
and regularly detached theories and analyses of the realm of international studies, ranging from
international political economy to special areas of science and technology (Buzan, 1991:372).
Accordingly, a global security system should evolve to accomplish four critical functions. Firstly, it
should provide a perennial order among the units in the system through coercive power. Secondly,
it should become the arbiter among competing and conflicting individual or collective aims,
demands, interests and values within international and domestic civil society. Thirdly, the perennial
order that it provides should facilitate the allotment of resources, goods and services to persistent
demands and increasing popular expectations. Finally, it should ensure the legitimisation of order
and welfare, through the adoption of moral and legal principles and norms that must be accepted to
be authoritative by all the players in the system. A state security system or a global security system
that fails to perform these essential functions is doomed: it is vulnerable to threats of instability,
antagonisms and probably armed conflict and war. From these bases, therefore, global security
policy can be defmed "as the pursuit by groups and states to influence and determine the overall
structure of the international security system or its component parts in preferred ways" (Kolodziej,
1992:11-12).
2.3.3 Critics and Attempts to Develop a Broad and Balanced Global Security Agenda
Two sets of critics are objecting to the broadening of the security agenda. Firstly, the traditionalists,
mostly proponents of a state-centric perspective who argue that this will lead to a loss of focus.
Secondly, certain commentators who are not contented with the elevation of issues such as
environmental degradation to being security issues. Most of the latter are scholars of strategic and
security studies who maintain that by broadening the security agenda, particularly the inclusion of
non-military issues, incapacitates the intellectual cohesion of these fields of study. Others are
concerned with the danger involved in the inclusion of economic and identity issues in the agenda.
The danger, according to Jones (1996:207-208), lies with the enhancement of confrontation-
orientated attitudes and the militarisation of these issues based on the traditional conceptualisation
of security as "national security".
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Proponents of a state-centric perspective, base their contention on two justifications. Firstly, they
argue that empirically the state mediates all the security dynamics at international or sub-state
levels. Related to this assertion is that the state can provide individuals with security, even though it
is usually regarded to be the cause of insecurity for its citizens. Their argument is that it is not states
qua states that are often the cause of such insecurity, but instead particular types of states. Strong
states co-existing in an environment of a "mature anarchy" (a developed international society) can
guarantee individual security (Jones, 1996:210-211). Ayoob (1995:8-11) also believes that as
developments in other domains, ranging from the economic to ecological phenomena, threaten the
state's physical character (the territory and the population) and its socio-political character
(primarily, the idea of the state as shared by its populace and secondarily, the institutions that
generate its physical expression), then those variables have to be considered as having security
implications. If they fail to meet these criteria, then they should be analysed as events or incidents
far removed from the realm of politics and security. Security, according to these arguments, should
be approached in a strictly political sense, which relates to the security of the state, particularly
vulnerabilities that endanger state structures, its regime and its physical traits.
Broader defmitions of security, in this context, tend to become too pliable, so as to loose their
analytical utility. This is specifically applicable to the Third World, where a categorical political
defmition is a valuable analytical tool due to the consistent challenges that the legitimacy of the
state and the regime encounter and the inability of the political system to meet the demands for
economic redistribution and political participation. The historical crossroad of the Third World
state and its comparative infancy, Ayoob (1995:11-12) argues, define its perception of domestic and
external threats. The defmition of security is therefore, compelled to meet two criteria. Firstly, it
has to transcend the traditional western defmitions based on external threats and a military focus.
Secondly, it is bound to focus on the political realm and will only extend to other realms when they
threaten to have an impact on political consequences.
However, critics of a state-centric approach respond to these assertions from different perspectives.
For instance, advocates of the individual-centric (liberal) perspective, on the one hand, according to
Jones (1996:212), argue against state-centrism on the grounds that it is a confusion of ends and
means: states being the means to provide security and individuals being the ends that security is
provided for. They argue that threats are better viewed from the perspective of individuals,
specifically those that relate to basic human needs such as basic material necessities for subsistence.
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Furthermore, collective arrangements by human beings are also beheld as means towards obtaining
individual security approaches.
On the other hand, as a central aspect of human experience, identity - of which national identity is
the most eminent - is of paramount concern to security analysts. These are collective phenomena,
whereby the whole is more important than its individual parts. Various identity-centric views
promote the varying types of identities, such as ethno-national, religious and social-economic
groups. Critics of this perspective argue that there are dangers with the identity-centric
conceptualisation of security: that an exclusionary group-identity will be a prima facie resemblance
of a state-centric standpoint since it will also reflect an "inside/outside structure of anarchy" (Jones,
1996:212-213). However, Jones (1996:213) deduces that these dangers are not indomitable since
identities are overlapping, to wit, an individual has a number of identities that he/she uses at
different times and situations for purposes of convenience.
By way of illustration from a perspective of critical theory, Jones (1996:215) maintains that security
should be understood to be based on some notion of emancipation, to wit, that security theories
should be focused on liberating those who are made insecure by the prevalent order. For the
insecure, security is provided through the removal of physical and human threats which deny them
the ability to achieve their goals and emancipation means freeing them from those threats. These
threats inter alia include war, poverty, poor education and political oppression. Critical theorists
argue that it is neither power nor order that provide true security, but emancipation. Jones
(1996:216) presumes that critical theory provides a good starting point for the development of
emancipatory critical security studies which is based on a people-centric instead of a state-centric or
an individual-centric approach to security. Such security studies should have as their foundation an
emancipatory social theory unencumbered by spurious scientific objectivism. An emancipatory
social theory is more aligned to critical social movements instead of the state and "attempts to
denaturalize and question 'commonsense' assumptions rather than accepting a reified, ahistorical
account of the present" (Jones, 1996:217).
Although the concept of global security seems to offer a better prescription to contemporary security
issues than what is offered by the notion of national security, Haftendom (1991: 10-11) contends
that it, however, has certain conceptual flaws which make it difficult to apply to modern global
conditions. Primarily, its origin, particularly the focus on nuclear parity and deterrence as well as its
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
37
ethnocentric nature makes the concept to be currently based on perceptions and values of analysts
from the United States. Furthermore, it fails to account for military contingencies such as internal
armed conflicts that occur in the Third World, and moreover, it overlooks the fact that threat
perceptions have changed from being focused solely on military attacks towards other threats such
as economic and ecological crises. What should be noted, therefore, is that it is not only state
practitioners who have the prerogative to delineate threats and the appropriate responses to them
(Jones, 1996:209). Other players within the domestic, international, or transnational fields have
done that and continue to do so with immense political, economic and socio-cultural implications.
This therefore justifies the broadening of the security concept since it touches on the day-to-day
customs of individuals, social groups and organisations. 'Peripheral' issues, such as environmental
and food security, are more substantial, significant, and immediate threats to the majority of the
world population than issues of inter-state war. However, the danger remains that elevating these
issues into 'security' issues might lead to their militarisation and as a result impede on their
resolution (Jones, 1996:209). Therefore, the utility of the concept should not only be limited to a
specific regional administration, such as, post-modem Western market democracy. Instead,
Haftendom (1991: 11) proposes that the hitherto neglected dimensions of security should be
included by creatively and competently applying them to the different sectors, areas and regions
where feasible.
The broadening of the agenda of security has to be taken as efait accompli, particularly since there
are various actors contending for the centre of the conceptualisation of security. This is based on
the fact that no actor in the international system can actually claim to be the sole determinant of the
threats and vulnerabilities that individuals, collectives or states encounter regarding their own
security. In fact, a question may be asked as to whom the authority to define security should be
ascribed? Can individuals, collectives or the governing bodies that run the state claim to have the
sanction to define what security is or to delineate the various threats to security? Can they do that
on behalf of other actors in the system or only for their own spheres of influence and/or
responsibility? Ultimately answers to these questions will always reflect the paradigmatic
approaches of those who respond to them; and obviously a blanket approach is implausible besides
the broadening of the agenda that will encompass all the varying and sometimes differing
perspectives. Albeit it will not be satisfactory to all the actors in the system, a broadened agenda
could provide a workable solution to the complexity of the post-Cold War global security situation,
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which, nonetheless, appears to emphasise the political economic (more than the military, the social,
and the environmental) dimensions of security.
2.4 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE PARADIGM OF GLOBAL
SECURITY
The economy and politics are one reality that is analysed as different sectors. It is easier to analyse
them through different lenses/viewpoints since it brings one into clear focus and at the same time
pushing the other aspects into the background. However, these sectors are so intertwined that their
existence cannot be divorced. One way to analyse them together is to look at how they interplay,
particularly when it comes to the critique of international political economy. The non-existence of a
central political authority in a system of states becomes a necessary condition for the emergence of
capitalism and this can be interpreted as a "natural political expression of an operating capitalist
world economy" (Buzan, 1994:89-90). Contests prevail within the structures of the market and the
greater political economic order and, consequently, they determine the changing patterns as well as
the diversified and distinct institutions that emerge within the international system. These
institutions, Underhill (1994: 18) avers, become responsible for the management of the processes of
conflict and co-operation within the system.
Viewing these institutions in this context, Underhill (1994:18-19) contends that it becomes clear
that the market is a political mechanism through which certain outcomes are achieved: certain
sectors of society benefit and others loose from the interaction that occurs within it. It thus becomes
a political institution through which new political and economic structures and patterns are
established, as well as the negation of older ones. If the market and anarchy are "mutually
constitutive phenomena", Buzan (1994:90) maintains that this makes competition within anarchy to
be intrinsically ambiguous. From an economic perspective, market competition is permitted to
develop by a fragmented international political arrangement, which at its phase of superior
performance promotes the pursuit of wider markets through the expansion of domestic economies;
and to aspire to imitate its technique of power-enhancing performance by other states. Economic
actors are thus given more leeway by an anarchic political structure since it ensures their freedom of
movement to and from various governments depending on their congeniality.
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For it to succeed, the capitalist economy requires that market competition should shape the
behaviour of individuals and ftrms, always rendering their survival and prosperity on their
propensity to compete efftcaciously. Continuous insecurity is the basis on which all the units persist
within the market, unless state-managed development and protectionism intercede to provide
temporary evasion. This intervention is also short-lived when the economy becomes inefftcient due
to its demand for external markets as well as when it fails to bolster the state in its international
bargaining processes. When under pressure from disparate economic development criteria, the
anarchic global system tends to brew a contagious tension of the power-security dilemma wherein
powers threaten each other and the corresponding measures taken by the other powers are seen to be
threatening (Buzan, 1994:90-91).
Competition takes on two forms: the struggle for political survival is complemented by competition
for wealth in the market, both of which consequently stimulate technological innovation and
subsequently redeftning the modes of economic and strategic behaviour (Buzan, 1994:91). Wealth
creation and political power, according to Underhill (1994: 17), have been interrelated throughout
the history of the modern international system and as such, all political conflict within this system
has been focussed on these two aspects. Within this situation of economic and political competition,
the state, as an individual, has to struggle for the means to survive, and if it does not possess the
necessary resources to ensure this, then its access to trade becomes an essential element of its
security. Any form of interference with its supply circuit is a direct threat to its power, welfare, and
presumably its political survival. Furthermore, states need to constantly adapt towards developing
trends in the international system or else they suffer the gradual erosion of their power as well as
become vulnerable to those that continuously achieve success (Buzan, 1994:91-92). Therefore, a
state's relative economic performance is closely intertwined with its condition of national security,
since economic growth pivotally determines its position of power within the international system
and thus becomes an essential element of its security.
Concurrency exists amongst scholars of international political economy that a complementary and
deep-rooted relationship occurs between the management of both political power and the market
economy (Underhill, 1994: 17-18). Most of these scholars also share three basic assumptions to this
end: ftrstly, that these aspects are inseparable, speciftcally in international relations. Secondly, that
economic structures, particularly those of the market, are both established and transformed through
politics. Finally, that the competing socio-political interests, which are the focus of political
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conflict, generate or result in the existence of specific economic structures and processes, both at
domestic and international levels of analysis.
The domestic and international levels of analysis, thus, become distinctively artificial as a growing
degree of interdependence between states and their constituencies depicts the international system.
This is in reality where the global economic system contrasts with the political system. According
to Buzan (1991 :230-231), both systems have the ability to present a more balanced structure
wherein significant factors of division are paired with mighty integration forces. In its breeding of
fragmentation, such as national economies, firms and classes, the global economy is bound in its
totality by patterns of trade, production, fmance, communication and transportation. The pursuit of
trade, in order to augment efficiency and welfare, develops dependency patterns which provide
access to market pressures to deluge the whole system. This makes the global economy to be the
main constituent as well as the main result of the increasing density and interdependence
characteristic of the contemporary international system.
2.4.1 Ensuring Economic Security within the International Political Economy of Market
Democracy
There is no clear demarcation between international economic and security concerns such that it
becomes even more difficult to determine as to who the enemy is and what exactly security involves
and this, according to Cable (1995:305-306), subsequently creates a conceptual vacuum. As a
result of improved communications, capital flows and trade, economies are becoming
interdependent and within a liberal global economic system states become vulnerable to external
economic occurrences; They become dependent on foreigners as an essential outcome of becoming
immersed in global markets. Liberal capitalism is characterised by uncertainty and risks that is the
basis of liberty and preference that also, breeds insecurity for individuals, groups, firms and states.
Capitalism reveals the elusive quality of economic security since it is a competitive system whose
dynamic "depends on the interplay of threats, vulnerabilities and opportunities within the market"
(Buzan, 1991:235). Absolute security within such an environment cannot be guaranteed and as a
result only relative security is possible.
Behaviour within a liberal capitalist economy is shaped by the market, wherein the productivity and
affluence of the system is determined by the relegation of the less innovative and incompetent units
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in favour of the most efficacious and imaginative. The competitive nature of the capitalist system
proclaims permanent insecurity for all the units participating within it, and without competition the
system is impotent. With its triumph over communism after the Cold War, capitalism could claim
to be the only system at present that could efficaciously generate wealth and innovation and
simultaneously guarantee political pluralism (Buzan, 1991:235).
The only way that units can guarantee their economic security within such an environment is to
decrease their vulnerabilities by reducing their interdependencies with the resultant autarky
disrupting the system "by threatening the division of labour and economies of scale that make
production efficient. Larger units can evade this contradiction for longer than small ones, but ...
under modern conditions even the biggest units become inefficient if they pursue too great a degree
of self-reliance" (Buzan, 1991:235-236). According to Cable (1995:306-307), economic security
can be defmed in four ways. Firstly, it can refer to those elements of investment and trade that can
directly affect the ability of a state to protect itself, such as freedom to procure weapon systems and
their accessory technology, non-interference with military supplies, or the leverage attained by its
adversary through obtaining technologically advanced armaments. In practice this situation
becomes more compounded with the aspect of dual-use technologies, or when GATT (the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) rules are not applied to the transfers of armaments, as
governments become concerned with them falling into wrong hands, while at the same time
persuading others to purchase the weapons produced only by them. The ambivalence inherent in
this situation makes the defmition of security threats ambiguous.
Secondly, Cable (1995:307-308) claims that it can also refer to those policy instruments that are
adopted for the purposes of aggression or defence, such as trade embargoes, economic sanctions,
investment boycotts and restrictions of energy supplies. Thirdly, relative military capability can be
affected by relatively poor economic performance and therefore requires the adoption of economic
policies that are going to boost economic achievements. Protective trade policies are a typical
characterisation of this form of economic security. Finally, it refers to a fear of a certain degree of
global economic, social and environmental instability. This is associated mainly with the insecurity
found in any market economic system, and other potential threats such as illicit material trafficking,
crime and toxic waste dumping.
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Consequently, it becomes difficult to compile a list of such depraved activities to include them into
a national security agenda. The problem is that to include a lot of other aspects that threaten human
life may stretch the concept of security too wide so that it may start to loose meaning and as a result
become unmanageable (Cable, 1995:308). However, actors can impair the overall efficiency of the
system as they try to reduce their vulnerabilities, and if they neglect their security concerns, they
risk being exploited by the well positioned in the system. This, according to Buzan (1991 :238), is
the incessant contradiction that individuals and governments struggle to overcome so as to attain
relative success, which is more expedient than relative failure.
The most affected are firms as they are entirely economic actors, and as such, are unable to evade
the essential contradictions of economic security. Their security, Buzan (1991 :238-239) argues,
relies on being competitive in the market or through being a monopoly or seeking political
protection for their market share. However, the last option has an inherent contradiction, as their
security interests will clash with the welfare interests of the consumers. Protection in this sense is
claimed by firms on the basis of national security, to wit, that they are maintaining areas of
strategically significant productive capacity that the national economy cannot do without, and these
might be lost to foreign competitors. It therefore becomes the prerogative of the policy-makers to
decide whether the higher costs, and usually mediocre products, are protected from the competition
of the market. Policy-makers are therefore compelled to adopt a specific standpoint regarding the
manner in which they perceive and respond to these contradictions of economic security.
According to Garnett (1996:9), "human greed is infinite"; hence it is always a zero-sum game,
whereby the cupidity of some is always gratified to the detriment of others. The contention is that
wealth, like military security and privilege in general, is always to the disadvantage of others. This
implies that military security of the strong is always to the damage of the weak; and economic
security of those who have is catered for by the economic insecurity of the have-nots. Economic
and cultural globalisation, based on Western standards, has brought about a more established and
constricted world order, with the abundance of legal norms in the international system. This,
according to Laïdi (1994:27-28), is more salient in economic relations whereby concepts of
autonomy or choice are being inundated within interdependence. Indeed, the prospects for business
manoeuvrability are dependent on the rapidity of responses to external conditions instead of
preference and the asymmetry that exists between the capitalist centre and the periphery is much
more deleterious to the latter.
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Therefore, a multinational security arrangement of the core capitalist countries, for instance, might
not consider intervention as a solution to problems in the periphery (Buzan, 1994:98). This,
according to Laïdi (1994:28), may be due to inward looking policies regarding economic and
political restructuring, and a perceived lack of threat or an attitude of apathy arising from previous
failures to provide solutions to the problems of the periphery. The imbalances of the centre,
therefore, are being transmitted to the periphery, with the boomerang effects being refmed so that
they do not impact on the former. This is also reflected in the manner in which Third World and
Eastern European countries are obliged to introduce political and economic reforms in order to
obtain foreign economic resources.
At the same time, intervention, as opposed to isolationism, Buzan (1994:98) contends, can occur as
a result of ideological domination, an intention to protect essential resources such as oil, or an
intention to impose Western standards that are believed to be universal. It is averred, in theory, that
there is no other strategic or economic option to standards based on Western market democracy,
since economic and political reforms based on the market are invincible. Laïdi (1994:28) also
agrees that the post-Cold War era provides one primary peculiarity: "it no longer rests on an
essential principle that is capable of ordering united and simultaneous hierarchy and purpose, as was
partly the case during the Cold War". Indeed, the ushering in of the post-Cold War order brought
about a new international fact of world, "market democracy", which has become the global array,
"the legitimate problematic of the international system" (Laïdi, 1994:29).
On the one hand, the main sphere of the problem of international economic security currently,
according to Buzan (1991 :249), is the truncation of the global functioning of the market and the
fragmented nature of political authority under the international structure of anarchy. Political
authority is curbed in its ability to manage the scale of outreach of the international economy, and
only a world government can achieve this. This fragmentation of political authority and the
curtailment of the global functioning of the market render the international political economy to
suffer incidents of disorder and a possible breakdown. On the other hand, world time legitimises the
ideology of the market and democracy, as its corollary, as well as affirming their organic connection
with development. A virtuous circle is established consisting of development (progress), equity
based on the market, and liberty or democracy. This process is also agitated by the ideological and
technological milieu within which it occurs, wherein there is no alternative that has the capacity to
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challenge the preponderance of market democracy or any hindrance to its global dissemination. Its
prevalence is therefore seen as a necessary condition, having the power to convert society to its
''universal and secular" benefits (l..aïdi, 1994:29-30).
Market democracy, therefore, reflects a political construct, an ideal or system, which does not
provide any ready-made models. lts correlation is rooted in the relationships between probity and
. efficacy and that between democracy and growth (l..aïdi, 1994:30). However, the mutually
constitutive nature of international anarchy and capitalism becomes an ideal circumstance for the
sustenance of the current international political economy. Accordingly, Buzan (1991 :249)
maintains that it forestalls the possibilities of the establishment of a comprehensive government that
might either fail to administer the global economy or hinder the forces that drive the market
economy. Hence, the politics of the state play a pivotal role in terms of mediating between the
political and economic domains, as well as between the domestic and international levels of
analysis. According to Underhill (1994:34-35), the comprehension of the politics of the state,
therefore, means understanding the problem of international political economy. Failures that are
observed in most of the theories of international political economy are linked to, frrstly, trying to
procure the state from the other structures of society; and/or secondly, reifying the state to become a
conscious, self-regulating and rational person.
For instance, realists pursue the integration of the international economy with the fragmented nature
of political authority through the limitation of the scope of the global market. Emphasis, Buzan
(1991:252-253) avers, is on the virtue of the domestic economy and the preponderance of state
objectives, and as a result, stress the importance of protectionism in order to preserve these goals.
They, however, do not denounce the creation of economic spheres of influence where their
economies dominate at the centre. The realist viewpoint argues that with regard to the distribution
of capabilities that might lead to vulnerabilities, a qualitative leap in innovative capability may
provide Japan or Western Europe with the status of being a hegemon or a superpower. Those
importers, whose economies possess the infrastructure, networks of policy and economic
connections, may benefit from technology diffusion in order to augment their military capabilities
(Crawford, 1994:53).
Liberals, by contrasts, pursue the creation of a unified, broadened, and interdependent international
economy surpassing the confmes of anarchy and its fragmented nature in order to encourage
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worldwide market interaction. For liberals, Buzan (1991 :252-253) contends that the global market
is attractive due to its ability to promote economic efficiency, and moreover, it promises prosperity
for those states that participate in it in order to utilise to the maximum their comparative advantage.
It also ensures relatively more security in terms of reducing antagonisms over territory, which
conditions the attainment of wealth to direct control over markets and resources. The rise of trading
states, according to Crawford (1994:53-54), devoting fewer resources to defence will ultimately
overlook the need to maintain policy networks that are necessary for the rapid translation of civilian
or commercial innovation into military power. This will result in the fear of threats and
vulnerabilities withering away and subsequently diminishing threats and vulnerabilities in inter-state
relations, thus strengthening the urge towards the creation of an international society of states.
Interdependence may result in threat reduction, which, in tum, may reduce the power of states, as
policy-makers will not have the legitimacy to expand defence expenditures without being able to
pinpoint the threat (Crawford, 1994:54). Even currently, the state is not seen as an important
decision-making agent wherein significant processes occur regarding social politics, economics and
the international system itself (Underhill, 1994:35). The link between the state, economic structure,
and political contests is found from the self-interests of the various actors or agents - individuals,
groups and corporate economic entities - that contend within both domestic and international
political institutions. Policy preferences of different actors, depending on their position in a specific
structure, reflect these self-interests.
Therefore, global institutions, which exist within an environment characterised by anarchy, consist
essentially of the state as well as intergovernmental bargaining and international regimes, whereby
the politics of the state are projected into the international realm (Underhill, 1994:36-37). The self-
interests of the various individuals and groups that contend within the domestic domain depend on
their political articulation and institutionalisation to be projected into the international domain.
Hence, they are a link between the economic structure and the politics of the state and the
international system. The ability of these interests groups to enjoy political power within the state
as well as their position regarding institutionalised political resources determine the effect they have
to influence state policy. Simultaneously, the ability of the specific state to project its preferences
into international institutional arrangements determines the extent to which these dominant self-
interests will have an impact on the international system.
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Viewed separately, the international economy gives a picture of being a structure and having a
dynamic of its own, wherein businesses and individuals constitute its units and trade and fmance
being the interactions between the units within the structure of the market (Buzan, 1991:231-232).
The market's inherent dynamics have, over time, generated a potent tendency towards wealth
creation and acceleration as well as an aggregation of activity which have resulted in the economic
system correlating, and even surpassing the concomitant conglomeration of activity within the
political realm. Consequences have been effective on locally rooted economies, along with
increased exchange relations between these economies, leading to a global economy in which
economic patterns of production, consumption, fmance and class function. For the cognisance of
these patterns, a global contextual analysis is required. This global economic expansion contrasts
with and fabricates a conducive environment for the continued international political fragmentation
by transcending the state system to such an extent that international capital has become
unconstrained by state interests.
If the international economy is viewed as a subject of the international political system, the
significance of national economies as critical levels of analysis is salient, as the international
economy becomes a part of the complicated intercourse between states. Buzan (1991:232)
maintains that the economic role of the state becomes primary as the economic role and power of
governments is emphasised, as economic priorities become nationally defmed, and as connections
between economic activity and state power are stressed. Individual states increasingly loose direct
control over the market system as it becomes increasingly internationalised or transnationalised and
this engenders a greater requirement for the understanding of the interaction between the
international and domestic levels of analysis. Nonetheless, states remain at the pivot of the
decision-making processes within the international system, as well as attending to the demands of
the domestic political environment (Underhill, 1994: 19-20). They, nevertheless, do not possess all
the economic resources to determine the content and bearing of the international political and
economic order, in accordance with their individual predilections. Therefore, they have to contend
with other states and actors concerning issues that once belonged solely to the domestic domain.
The current global economy, however, reduces the economic choices that the state can assert as its
domestic constituency faces intensifying competition with the other market forces as the economy
becomes increasingly transnationalised (Underhill, 1994:37). Nonetheless, the anarchic setting of
the international system requires the state to playa pivotal role in managing political conflict over
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the structure and institutions of international interaction. Indeed, states are obliged to interact with
each other, thus creating a favourable environment for a particular form of behaviour within the
international political system (Buzan, 1991:232). Moreover, the political and economic systems
become so entangled that it becomes difficult to understand one without the other, and, in addition,
they tend to constrain each other.
It is, however, the political choices of the major self-interests within the dominant states that are
persistently projected into the international domain and these result in their preferred way of
restructuring the institutions and structures of the international system, which include the market.
This restructuring reflects back into the domestic domain by intensifying competitive pressures on
national entrepreneurs, compelling them to utilise their political resources to demand favourable
policies in order to manage the changed conditions. This, therefore, emphasises the role political
conflict plays in determining transformation as opposed to structure as most theories contend.
Structure is shaped by politics whilst, simultaneously, structure constrains and shapes the options
that are available to political actors as they pursue their political and economic preferences.
Therefore, it is the politics that occur within a particular structure, and not the structure in and of
itself, that bring about changes. This is true of the changing structure of international economy as
well as the institutional arrangements that mediate it (Underhill, 1994:37-38).
Most analyses, according to Buzan (1991 :233), link the anarchic structure of the international
system with the capitalist economic structure so that the fragmentation of the political system is a
necessary condition for the advent of the capitalist economy, and that it is a natural political
expression of its proper functioning. The assertion is that anarchic conditions breed freedom from
central political control that hinders the preponderance of the market as a form of social and
economic behaviour. Anarchy and market relations create a competitive environment that is
mutually enhancing. These structural and institutional arrangements instead constrain or promote
and influence the role that political actors can playas they articulate their self-interests. Power is
exercised within an environment of interdependence and anarchy in international political economy
and this is primarily done through the mechanisms of the market, on the one hand, as well as within
a political system that lacks a principal authority, on the other hand. It is within both these
environments that states pursue their "sovereign" interests, and specifically of their constituencies,
of which the results are "determined by the complex interaction of systemic and domestic structural
and process variables" (Underhill, 1994:38).
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Buzan (1991 :233-234) emphasises the argument that economically international political
fragmentation permits market competition by providing economic actors with freedom to move
towards more convivial states whose governments are more than welcoming to the power
advantages they bring into their countries. However, politically, the pressure from different levels
of economic development that international anarchy has to endure, restrains the proliferation of the
power-security dilemma. Powers continuously threaten each other as they rise and fall, with the
military and economic measures that they adopt to preserve their security being perceived by others
to be threatening, and competition for wealth in the market becomes coupled to the competition for
strength in the qualities of survival. Both these competition types stimulate technological
advancement resulting in the redefmition of the standards of success with regards to economic and
strategic demeanour.
Nonetheless, there are two ways in which the secure operation of the global market networks can be
threatened. Firstly by external forces that might violate the smooth intercourse of trade, investment
and fmance; and secondly, by the innate defects of the market itself. The anticipation of external
threats makes it possible to counter them, however, internal threats are not forthright, and have
nevertheless proliferated rather than abated. The global market has innate tensions and
predicaments, which if aggravated, can render it to be viewed by states as a threat to their own well-
being. These tensions and dilemmas of the global market defme the attitudes of states towards it,
whether they support it in their national economies and/or whether they open themselves to it
globally (Buzan, 1991:250-251). Nevertheless, such choices are gradually becoming limited for the
Third World, whose economies are currently faced with globally imposed structural adjustment
programmes that demand an obligatory shift to market democracy.
2.4.2 The International Political Economy of the Third World Security Problematic
Third World behaviour, according to Ayoob (1995:192), is fundamentally determined by the
security problematic, both in the domestic and international spheres. The preoccupation with
security by policymakers in these states shapes the nature of policies they adopt as they
synonymously construe security and status. Bilateral relations between these states and those of the
developed world are not only characterised by suzerainty, Jackson (1993:359-360) asseverates, but
are also relationships of international clientelism and dependency. Similarly, regional powers, such
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as South Africa, India and Brazil, have lesser powers that are in turn dependent on them for their
welfare, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America respectively. The continuity of these
relations is not forecasted to end at any foreseen period, since material inequalities are still striking
and profound, and fmances and economic resources are so restricted that they will defmitely be
distributed to areas where political and economic benefits are anticipated the most.
Although the main layers of the Third World security problematic consist of the domestic, regional
and global dimensions, the primary dimension is the domestic one, as internal vulnerabilities are
specifically responsible for the high rates of conflict within and among these states. These domestic
conflicts, according to Ayoob (1995: 189), translate into interstate conflicts by creating conditions
for neighbouring states to intervene in internal contentions. Despite their similarities, Third World
states are extremely varied, and this diversity has a direct impact on the national security problem
and hence, in essence, it differs from state to state. The point however, according to Buzan
(1991 :96-97), is that all states are vulnerable to various types of threats, ranging from military,
environmental to economic threats, and a multitude also are infested by political and societal
insecurities. The state, therefore, is faced with a multidimensional national security problem,
besides the dilemma of military defence, as it is vulnerable to various types of threats. The diversity
of the national security problem also relates to the variation of their status as powers.
From the perspective of strong states, the concept of national security is applicable to outside threats
and interference, whereas with regard toweak states, the concept fails to identify its referent object,
as the idea and institutions of the state are internally (even violently) contested. Buzan (1991 :99-
101) avers that weak states do not possess a widely pervasive idea of the state or an authority to
ensure unity among its subjects in the void of political concord. These states are de jure states by
virtue of the fact that they are recognised by other states. Viewing security in terms of weak states,
therefore, necessitates that contending groups and/or individuals should be made into principal
referent objects of security as national objects barely exist. Due to the internal nature of their
security problematic as well as its connections to the state making processes, the bulk of these
states' security expenditures are not related to the arms transfers from the North, but are
predominantly operating costs related to internal control for the maintenance of political stability
(Ayoob,1995:193).
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External interference and intervention is in this case difficult to assess as a national security threat,
since it will be in favour of each of the contending factions. The dearth of social cohesion and the
legitimacy of the state and its regime, according to Ayoob (1995:190-191), provide the bases for
domestic insecurity in the Third World. The infancy of the state-building processes as well as the
time constraints requiring them to accomplish these processes are the main causes of instability,
particularly as virtually all of them are remnants of the discontinuities of colonialism. Colonialism
imposed on these states capricious boundaries and forced them together as disparate ethnic entities,
moreover dividing these entities into different states, thus confounding their ability to build
legitimate and integrated states. This, therefore, places the state at the centre of the security
problematic in Third World states since its weakness is the main source of insecurity, and it also
emphasises the perceptions of the political élite whose perceptions are essential in the defmition and
interpretation of the security problem (Ayoob, 1995:191).
The internal dimension of national security, therefore, is of utmost importance as it contradicts the
narrow view of states as coherent objects of security. This narrow view, according to Buzan
(1991:103-104), can only apply to strong states wherein state and society are intimately connected
and, as such, domestic disputes are of minor importance as far as national security issues are
concerned. With strong states, national security is basically concerned with protecting the state's
independence, political identity and culture from foreign interference instead of political threats that
emanate from within its structure. This leads to the question of the justification of internal threats as
a national security problem: Are they threats to the state or just threats to the narrow interests of the
governing élite? Moreover, if they are recognised as state threats, does this not provide the
governing élite with a potent weapon to crush its political rivals? Providing answers to these
questions is a dilemma, as governments are an important symbol as well as a principal
materialisation of the state, and as such, their inherent frailty questions the integrity and the
sovereignty and independence of the state. Then their fate, according to Buzan (1991 :105), "has to
be regarded as a national security issue".
Another important dimension to consider is that most of the marginal weak states have trusteeship
relations with international organisations and leading states, for example, those in the British
Commonwealth, the European Union, and the "Francophonie". Most of them are heavily dependent
on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for their welfare,
which is largely a result of Western colonialism (Jackson, 1993:358-359). Moreover, these feeble
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states are defmed in the global system by their lack of both political and economic power to
influence direction within the most important international trends (Ayoob, 1995: 192). The scantly
available resources are usually depleted by security concerns and consequently programmes for
economic growth and development are dislocated. Furthermore, there is an incessant interference
with the proficient utilisation and employment of capital-intensive projects and technology towards
military enhancement, since this sector plays an important role in these states' political processes.
Thus, it is unlikely that poverty and underdevelopment can be overcome in the foreseeable future as
most of the weak states lack the attraction that foreign investment desires, especially in a period
within which private capital is extremely mobile and zealous for areas of greatest and safest returns
(Jackson, 1993:360). What complicates the whole picture even more, according to Ayoob
(1995: 193-194), is that the low levels of technology and the high level of manpower required
determine the allocation of security expenditure especially as these states' regimes are focussed at
accumulating state power, a characteristic of the early state makers. Three areas require specific
attention: the imposition and maintenance of order, the extraction of resources, and the
administration and regulation of disputed territories. As these are obviously labour-intensive
assignments, they require large numbers of personnel and subsequently increase the ratio of
operating costs to other expenditures on security. Similar patterns are prevalent in both civilian and
military controlled states, along with the violence that accompanies the state making processes.
Since, the military is central in the processes of state building and promoting security, accordingly,
typical of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, its coercive capability is essential
during the early phases of the state building process. That is the reason why Ayoob (1995: 192-193)
argues that the military is always prepared to pursue the state building process on its own by seizing
political power if the civilian élite fails to direct its management successfully. Therefore, the
difference between strong and weak states may even propel the military institution to seize political
power as the only institution that commands national legitimacy and one that has the capacity to do
so in order to maintain the structure of the state. Thus, "strong governments (in the sense of being
dictatorial and repressive), especially military ones, usually indicate a weak state" (Buzan,
1991:104).
Most policymakers do not acknowledge the fact that the strength of a state does not depend on or
correlate with power because weak powers can be strong states while significant powers can be
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weak states. There are several determining factors that make some states stronger than others but
the majority of the states in the peripheral South are weak states as a result of colonialism. When
most of these states were de-colonised, they adopted a European image, which overlooked the
cultural and ethnic boundaries and consequently failed to create new nations that could be
applicable to them, and as a result, they cannot be referred to as nation-states, but as "state-nations".
The type of nationalism that emerged during the anti-colonial struggle ''was not the positive unity of
a coherent cultural group, but the negative one of common opposition to occupying foreigners .
...The political legacy of most Third World governments was a state without a nation or even worse,
a state with many nations. This legacy, plus the existence of societies not well suited to the
demands of complex economic and political relations, defines much of the problem of weak states
in the Third World" (Buzan, 1991 :98).
The demise of the state in the Third World is a consequence of it being a weak entity, its failure to
promote development, and as a colonial configuration, it is confronted by many forces that oppose it
(Buzan, 1994:98). Weak political institutions and structures of civil society fail to ensure the
maintenance of democratic norms of governance as a system of checks and balances towards the
security apparatus (Ayoob, 1995:193). Moreover, the possibilities for its demise become more
pronounced as the centre adopts an isolationist standpoint. For most of the states in the peripheral
Third World, maintaining the state structure has not brought about any possibilities for economic or
political development. Its maintenance, on the one hand, has not provided any prospects for the
attainment of domestic resources enabling them a practicable position within the current level of
international political economy. Allowing its demise, on the other hand, might lead to a violent
restructuring that, nonetheless, might not bring any change on the overall situation.
States, in essence, are generally dependent on their conflict-prone nature rather than on whether they
are democratic or not (Ayoob, 1995: 194). Liberal democratic states can be stable if they are
territorially contented, politically and socially cohesive, and relatively affluent in terms of their
access to resources and industrial development. This argument is based on the reason that only a
marginal part of the population may be alienated from the political and economic organisation of
society. Moreover, within a stable democracy, the struggle for the control of government is not a
zero-sum game that determines the attainment or deprivation of a livelihood. Stable and strong
democracies have a lot to loose with disruptions in the global capitalist economy and the presence of
nuclear arsenals prevents them from shaking the steadfast strategic environment.
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Nevertheless, democratic forms of government do not insinuate an accomplishment of the state
making process for the Third World states, nor do they imply that their vulnerabilities have been
overcome to be considered as internally stable (Ayoob, 1995: 194-195). Being democratic does not
betoken stable nor content democracies, instead they continue to be vulnerable to domestic
instability and as such democratisation may be reversed. Moreover, as the primary focus of these
states is development, there is actually no strong connection between democracy and development -
and if it is there, its occurrence is not because of causality but recapitulation. Cowardly
democratisation does not imply "the beginnings of a new dynamic of development" (Laïdi,
1994:32). Development, according to Laïdi (1994:32-33), is rooted "in the combination of the
appearance of new management teams (democratic or otherwise), the power relationship between
socio-economic operators affected by the reforms, and the existence of institutional and
administrative structures capable of guiding change and neutralising opposition".
Cowardly democratisation occurs as a consequence of internal weaknesses within these states, such
as lack of cohesion and legitimacy, as they also permit global rivalries to permeate them thus
reducing their immunity to external regional and global interference. Weak states also suffer from
vulnerability to changes in global norms guaranteeing the recognition of their sovereignty, as their
territorial integrity and juridical statehood is dependent on these norms which are bestowed by the
international community instead of their regimes being efficacious domestically (Ayoob, 1995: 189-
190). Socio-political cohesion, therefore, which is the essence qualifying states to be states, varies
in terms of the extent to which they may be termed as strong or weak states. "Weak or strong states
will refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion; weak or strong powers will refer to the
traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to
each other" (Buzan, 1991:97). Thus, the main distinguishing feature of the weak states, according
to Buzan (1991 :99), is the high level of threat to the security of the government that is domestically
generated, and that implies a failure to create a domestic political and societal concord enabling
them to eliminate the large-scale utilisation of force in the day-to-day national political interaction.
However, it becomes difficult to scientifically apply the variable of socio-political cohesion as it
lacks a quantifiable measure, and as such, there is no indicator that can define the difference
between strong and weak states.
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Central, therefore, to the provision of a deep comparative analysis and less ephemeral presumptions
within the study of security in the Third World, Ayoob (1995:194) contends, is the understanding of
the state making processes and the variables of state and regime security, independent of the
development and dependency analyses that have dominated the study in the past. Most
significantly, is that the protracted and segmented process of state building is usually telescoped into
one phase by pressures of time and international competition (Ayoob, 1995:193). As they are
attempting to build themselves into "state-nations", at the early stages of this endeavour, states of
the South are infested by domestic violence as a tractable passage to central power. These states
find themselves trapped by patterns of history that imposed upon them economic underdevelopment
and political penetration, and as a result are unable to marshal political and economic resources that
are required to build strong states. Buzan believes that "if these new states follow the consolidation
model of the European states, then state-building is likely to generate plenty of violence both
internally and externally" (1991 :99).
Accordingly, Buzan (1991:106) believes that the establishment of strong states creates the
foundation for the facilitation of national and individual security, albeit it is not invariably its
warranty. However, the intrinsic presence of weak states within the anarchic structure of the
international system does not ensure its stability. At the same time, the establishment of strong
states is not necessarily a sufficient condition for a potent global security since their existence is not
a guarantee of peace.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
The end of the Cold War did not develop into the elimination of the threats of conflict and war but
instead it brought about the dispersion of these threats to promote conflict between the forces of
integration and those of fragmentation (Zuze, 1994:41). This is the situation globally. The demise
of the Soviet Union as a major global power led to its fragmentation and the emergence of new
states. It was the same with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and it may be the case with Canada and
the United Kingdom or Spain for that matter. Forces for secession are emerging in all regions and
countries globally and others are still to emerge. It may be the same case with most of the Third
World states as a result of the defects of boundaries delineated by colonialism. On the other hand,
other states are reuniting, for example Germany, and others are still to reunite, possibly Korea and
the two Congos.
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The world consists of a multitude of states that are weak due to extreme disorganisation and internal
divisions. These states are the former colonies of the Western powers that belong to the current
Third World and those that emerged from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the
Yugoslav federation. The emergence of new states, on the one hand, means that international
boundaries have to be changed and probabilities of new states emerging in other regions will happen
in varying fashions and therefore difficult to predict. The UN Charter, on the other hand, promotes
the doctrine of non- intervention in the territory of a sovereign government and the proclivity of most
major powers is against intervention. As a consequence, possibilities are that if force is no longer
going to be the driving element behind the redrawing of boundaries, then boundaries are not going
to change at all. If they are going to change, then they have to follow the consent given by the
parties involved, such as what happened in the former Soviet Union.
Most marginal Third World states may be pressurised by the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank to unite into more economically viable entities under the auspices of market
democracy, albeit that it does not seem politically probable. Besides, most governments will be
reluctant to give up territory or to combine their jurisdictions with other states voluntarily, rather the
existing state system has acquired a sanctity that most major powers are unwilling to violate or
dispute. The main reason is that interference with international boundaries might result in
international condemnation as well as disruptions to global order that would be provoked by such
action.
A fundamental prerequisite for the betterment of global security is the reinvigoration of the world
economy through the elimination of the Third World debt crisis and ensuring the full participation
of these states in the international political and economic institutional frameworks. Without this
input, sustained defence is unrealisable, parochialism will be intensified, and the ability of society to
defend its well-deserved democratic, economic, and social values, of which the pursuit of security is
aimed at, will be subdued. Moreover, the UN has to seriously consider a new agenda that will focus
on the integration of regional security arrangements in the rest of the Third World into its Security
Council, either on the basis of the obviously flawed Westphalian configuration or restructuring itself
to become a forum for regional security communities. This agenda has to embark on policies that
specifically address the local, economic, political and social foundations of conflicts as well as the
necessary confidence-building measures that will advance the establishment of self-help security
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regimes on a long-term basis. Accordingly, the arms production and transfer system will depend on
these developments, as arms transfers are essentially an international politico-strategic and
economic phenomenon that relies on changes in the global security environment.
It is highly possible that the trend of continuing intra-state and subsequent regional conflicts will
increase the demand for conventional weapons, particularly in East and Central Europe, the former
Soviet states, and in most parts of the developing Third World. The regeneration of nationalism,
ethnic, racial and religious friction and the exposure of weak states that emerged with the negation
of the Cold War, mainly motivate these conflicts. As was indicated in the first chapter, emerging
arms suppliers are the ones that might benefit from this demand as they produce weapons that are
actually apt for the current conflict conditions. As a result, the system will be characterised by a
smaller global military-industrial complex encouraging the sharing of technology between the
various tiers of suppliers, and this is reinforced by the fact that defence budgets are being reduced in
most states. Therefore, the move towards regionalisation of the arms trade as a consequence of the
internationalisation of the defence industries is a great possibility, and the increasing
commercialisation of the arms trade could precipitate the inclination towards regionalised arms
production. Nonetheless, these aspects of arms transfers will be deliberated upon in the following
chapters. Arms production and transfers are therefore the focus of the next chapter, with a specific
emphasis on the dynamic significance of technology.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE ARMS PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER SYSTEM
AND THE DYNAMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
An arms industry is not solely established for political reasons, but there are economic motivations
as well. These include the intention to save the cost of importing armaments from other suppliers,
and by exporting arms the balance of payments is enhanced. Other economic interests that are
generated with the establishment of an arms industry are employment and the intention to maintain
capabilities in the field of advanced technology, and consequently, these interests tend to become a
strong motivation for arms exportation. However, these are not the only economic motivations for
arms exportation. The main motive is the non-existence of a large domestic requirement for
armaments, which tends to affect the ability to achieve economies of scale through domestic
production.
Exports therefore help to lengthen production runs for states that face such a problem by amortising
investment in advanced technology products that require high costs of research and development.
That is the reason why states are struggling voraciously for arms markets and Western European
states resort to multinational production projects. The intention to achieve economies of scale is
driven by the process of qualitative advance, which requires that sophisticated weapon systems have
to be continuously developed and the latest generations have a larger unit cost than the previous
ones. "Both this cost, which tends to outrun the general rate of inflation, and the fact that the newer
weapons are more capable than the older ones they replace, create pressure to acquire smaller
numbers. Shrinking domestic demand in terms of numbers of weapons in turn raises the incentives
to lengthen production runs by fmding export markets" (Buzan, 1987:40-41).
The aim of this chapter is to explain the trends and the dynamics of the arms production and transfer
system, with the main aim of making the international arms market more comprehensible. The first
issues to be addressed are the defmitions of the concepts of arms transfers and a brief focus on the
problems of measurement, particularly the aspects of reliability and validity, as well as the
qualitative and quantitative dimensions of arms transfers. Secondly, focus will be on the inherent
attributes of the international arms production and transfer system, most specifically the activities of
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the various actors and the constraints and opportunities provided by the international arms markets,
along with the role played by technology in transforming the system. Finally, the dynamic
significance of technology will be looked into, which includes the military technological revolution,
the diffusion of military technology, and concluding with the concept of the arms dynamic.
3.2 DEFINITIONS ANDPROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT
3.2.1 Defining Arms Transfers
There exists no clear agreement about the meaning of arms or arms transfers, according to Catrina
(1994: 191), except that they consist of "lethal weapons being produced in one country and
subsequently sold and physically transferred to another country". There are three main problems
regarding the defmition. In the first instance there are the genuine ambiguities in the consideration
of the term "arms", which are theoretically premised. Secondly there is the reinforcement of the
defmition of arms, and subsequently "arms transfers", as these have a political purpose. "In this
context, decisions by governmental agencies or individual researchers about what to include and
what to exclude may be based loosely on theoretical grounds and ambiguities exploited to present
the position of one particular state or group of states in as favourable a light as possible" (Catrina,
1988:7-8). Lastly, a clear conception of arms transfers may exist in principle, but this could, for the
sake of brevity, be connected to military or military use, which complicates the problem because
one will be compelled to substitute the definition of "arms" with that of the term "military" (Catrina,
1988:8-9). The terms weapons/arms, defence, and military are usually used interchangeably,
particularly with regard to combinations such as arms technology, arms production, arms industries,
and arms trade, without actually suggesting any emphasis, although they may in certain contexts be
imparting different meanings. However, these terms weapons/arms, defence, or military are not
synonyms, and they should not commonly be used interchangeably (Catrina, 1988:9).
There is also an inherent problem in terms of how arms can be defmed. Usually reference is made
to the concept of lethality, which, however, is inadequate in its distinction, considering the fact that
any instrument can be lethal if it is misused. What makes the concept of arms more obfuscating is
the inclusion of logistic support, training, services, components, and spare parts as part of the arms
package. In general, these aspects do not pose that much of a threat to the recipients' potential or
real enemies when compared to the provision of actual combat equipment. Wilcox (1979:28-29)
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
59
argues that it is relatively easy to identify articles that have been designed or modified to meet
military needs, along with the related technical data and training, with problems, however, being
encountered with dual-use equipment, services, and technology.
A general feeling of agreement can be achieved in terms of defining what constitutes actual combat
equipment. These, substantially "are the weapons and munitions that are inherently more likely to
aggravate a crisis by their arrival or, conversely, to increase stability by clearly signalling a
determination to make any encroachment expensive" (Wilcox, 1979:30-31). However, the political
impact brought about by the transfer will vary according to the type and sophistication of such
equipment, and whether it will improve the combat capability of the recipient's armed forces or not.
For Lewis (1979:184), the concept of arms includes "military equipment, usually referred to as
'conventional', comprising weapons of war, parts, ammunition, support equipment, and other
commodities considered primarily military in nature - tactical guided missiles, military aircraft,
armoured and unarmed military vehicles, tanks, infantry small arms, and the like". Frank (1969:10-
11) concurs with Lewis when he defmes arms as articles of defence that include all armaments,
''weapons system, munition, aircraft, vessel, boat, or other implement of war". Furthermore they
include "defence property, installations, facilities, and machinery relating to its (war) supply" that
"are considered 'defence articles"'. However, Frank (1969:11) maintains that the latter are usually
excluded from the agenda of arms transfers.
Catrina (1994:191-192) reiterates that the whole description becomes intricate when (1) the
equipment transferred is intended for military forces but is inherently non-lethal or when dual-use
equipment or goods (that can be used by both the military and civilians e.g. transportation or
communication equipment, fuel, foodstuffs or medical supplies) are being supplied; (2) instead of
complete weapon systems being supplied, technology and component transfers or licence-
production occurs; (3) two or more countries jointly fund for research, development or production
for military purposes; (4) change of control and ownership occurs within the borders of the host
country in situations of forward-stationed forces; and (5) transfers occur from one country to
another without the change of control and ownership in situations of forward-stationed forces. It is
therefore prevalent within the research community that defmitions have been applied differently by
even the leading research institutions and agencies on arms transfers. This is mainly due to the fact
that "the political and economic implications of different modes of transfers - for example, sales on
commercial terms or military assistance, and straight transfers or transfer of technology - can be
quite different" (Catrina, 1994: 192).
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Another general problem is the usage of the concept arms trade interchangeably with the concept of
arms transfers. The problem here is that those arms that are supplied as grant assistance would be
automatically precluded from the system, and hence the term arms trade is not exactly adequate to
be strictly applicable to the definition of arms transfers, although most analysts use both
congruously (Catrina, 1988:10-11). Moreover, boundaries of the field of arms trade or arms
transfers are difficult to demarcate since the field of the "transfer of completed weaponry is only the
core of a larger area of concern which might be defmed, more broadly, as the diffusion of military
technology, or military assistance. The latter term, as well as that of military aid, is normally used
to describe weapons giveaways as distinct from cash sales" (Harkavy, 1975:14). In reality, these
concepts seem to spill over into one another such that their delineation is often obscured. This is
due to the fact that these concepts are ambiguous and are applied differently by analysts.
According to Frank (1969:3-5), when the "arms trade" is broadly defmed, it "is a by-product of the
complex military, economic, and political forces that determine the creation, maintenance, and use
of armed forces - regular or irregular. More narrowly, it is the conduits or channels through which
pressures are transmitted between nations in terms of the arms and weaponry required to accomplish
national, or even private, objectives. The 'arms trade' can exist between groups with no national
connection or between supergroups of nations including regional and international bodies."
Included in the arms trade are primary transfers of new weapon systems from arms producing states
to allied or friendly states; secondary transfers of second-line weapon systems; and "the capricious
and extensive private arms market throughout the world" (Frank, 1969:5). The private arms market
includes the black and grey markets, as well as the private entrepreneurs that operate outside the
jurisdiction of their governments.
Laurance (1992: 19-20) identifies several aspects of the arms trade that are usually less considered
or even overlooked as being substantial elements of an arms transfer relationship. These include
logistics and support services, training and technical assistance, the mode of payment, the mode of
production, military utility, and the delivery stage. These dimensions can be used variably,
depending on how the question is reviewed. Defming arms transfers more broadly will include the
transfer of military skills, in terms of training, mercenaries, seconded personnel, and advisors. With
the arms trade becoming complemented by military assistance, or the latter being conveyed along
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the patterns of the former, it accordingly reflects the diplomatic essence of arms transfers in which
case arms transfers become increasingly used as instruments of diplomacy (Harkavy, 1975: 14).
In general, security assistance or military aid is more comprehensive than general arms transfers as
it also includes ordinary military training that is not tied to any arms transaction. Supplier states
providing security assistance pursue it for the purposes of strengthening their allies in need and also
for their own benefit through achieving economies of scale, smoothing their production line,
expanding their defence mobilisation base, and being able to test the capability of their newly-
produced weapon systems where possibilities exist for them to be utilised. However, the major
purpose of military aid for most leading supplier states is the stimulation of demand from the
recipient states (Catrina, 1988:30-31). Moreover, the consideration of other aspects of arms
transfers such as components, ancillary equipment (which among other things include radar and
communications devices), as well as spare parts, would legitimately cover almost the whole field
(Harkavy, 1975: 14; Pearson, 1994:7). These aspects are integral constituents of modern warfare
and therefore essential factors of the arms production and transfers system.
Therefore, arms transfers is not only a concept referring to international arms sales, but it also
connotes arms that are conveyed for political reasons, as well as the global functioning of the arms
industry. Buzan (1987:51-52) maintains that without arms transfers, there will be tremendous
dissimilarities among the various states in military terms, if they were to be compared according to
their capabilities to produce arms. The gap between the various states is narrowed by arms transfers
although they attract a lot of controversy as a result of the commercial interests involved in the sale
of "large-scale means of destruction" (Buzan, 1987:52). This is the reason why arms transfers have
been brought under government control or supervision to avert foreign policy altercations emerging
as a result of unscrupulous commercial transactions. However, this is not the only reason for greater
government involvement in arms transfers.
Governments became the major buyers of armaments, which, according to Buzan (1987:52-53),
was accompanied by the concentration of arms production within a lesser number of large
companies. Thus, governments and the arms industry became partners - in some instances the arms
industry even became nationalised. The states' inheritance of arms transfers led to them adopting
all the pressures that are associated with the practice by channelling arms through the political
processes of determining national interests instead of them being unscrupulously sold by private
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commercial interests. This situation, according to Catrina (1988: 11), created a frantic mixture of
political and economic interests, which is sometimes blamed for the arms races that are reputed to
be fuelled by political competition among supplier states. Furthermore, most governments, as a
rule, preferred to conduct their arms transfers entirely clandestinely or to subject them to a great
degree of secrecy, particularly when they felt that their exposé could jeopardise their valued political
or diplomatic relations.
In essence, arms transfers pertain to "the acquisition and maintenance of national security by nation-
states" and specifically they denote "observable commodities that are traded in the international
system for the purpose of enhancing the military capability or political power of the recipient
nation" (Laurance, 1992:3). The intention therefore is to meet the strategic objectives of states and
collectives in order to satisfy certain political, military, economic and/or diplomatic ambitions
within the domestic domain and the international system. Thus, for both the suppliers and the
recipients, arms are transferred in the search for power, the quest for victory in war, as well as the
pursuit of economic wealth (Krause, 1992:97-98).
3.2.2 Problems of Measurement
3.2.2.1 Reliability and Validity of Arms Transfer Data
One major problem with regards to data on arms transfers, is its reliability, validity, and accuracy,
with sampling techniques being affected by cuts in data collection and statistical experts being
compelled to use deficient data on research that tended to reflect the broad changes occurring in
international economics. Usually in the post-Second World War era, data collection methods
focused on state-to-state transactions that involved major weapon systems allowing for global trends
to be discerned, particularly by the leading intelligence services, regardless of the level of secrecy
and sensitivity involved. The disintegration of the bipolar system insinuated the deterioration of the
arms monitoring system, and the enumeration or evaluation of transfers depended on the dynamics
of the system and individual state policy-making processes. As a consequence, the dynamics and
trends of the international security system could be determined from the production and exportation
of sophisticated weapon systems (Laurance, 1992:21).
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The ftrst problem regarding reliability pertains to the rules of enumerating data, as there is no
standardised format globally and as governments use their own definitions of weapons in numerous
ways. Therefore, when the data is compared, the results are unreliable. Moreover, the secrecy habit
surrounding the arms transfer data compounds this problem, wherein, as a consequence of
bureaucratic politics, information is withheld or distorted. The generic denominator contributing to
the unreliability of data are the political connotations attached to arms transfers as they relate to the
dimensions of national security and the processes of foreign policy, an innate part of the rational
state actor model, which is notoriously deceitful and reputedly manipulative of data to suit its own
orchestrations. The problem of reliability is further complicated by the fact that analysts do not
have access to the same data sources resulting in serious confusion of analyses. This is due to
contradictions within and among sources regarding the dates and quantities of delivery; the lack of
data on the weapons specifications, their models, capabilities, and exact cost; and finally, the
problem of identifying the specific parties involved in a contract (Laurance, 1992:34-36). The
ability to overcome these shortcomings will depend on the analysts' intellectual willingness to attain
such exactitude.
Validity is compromised by the various dimensions of the concept of arms transfers, especially with
regard to monitoring the flow of military capability without considering dual-use equipment, for
example, when the economic consequences are calculated according to contractual data in lieu of
the actual outlays paid by the recipient. In order to subdue this problem, a valid and standardised
defmition of the term arms is a prerequisite. Most analysts tend to rely on defence expenditure data
in order to mirror military capability as a consequence of the belief that the sophistication of a
weapon system is commensurate to its cost. However, within the domain of arms transfers, with the
convoluted intercourse of military aid and grants, barter arrangements, ideological or political gifts,
counter-trade and offsets, among others, this form of measurement becomes incomprehensible.
Moreover, as states can manipulate the data, as defence expenditures fall short of distinguishing
between personnel and equipment outlays, and as there are intricacies of inflation and currency
aberrations, the problem becomes more abstruse. Therefore, "costs as an indicator of military
capability can lead to misleading conclusions ... " (Laurance, 1992:36-38).
Catrina (1988:18) suggests what he believes to be a much more appropriate approach, which is to
view arms transfers according to their quantitative dimension. This approach, according to Catrina
(1988:18-19), can be expressed in two different ways, to wit, by the number of weapon systems
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transferred or the monetary value of the shipment. The number of weapon systems transferred is
usually more tangible and comprehensible than the monetary value, which is subject to analytic
misconstruction and varying technical calamities. Numbers practically provide a more concrete
gauge of military capabilities transferred, although they are predisposed to ignore the sophistication
of each and every weapon system, which has a direct bearing on their military utility and cost. This
problem, however, can be eliminated with a large number of refmed categories of weapon systems,
taking into consideration their capabilities and costs vis-il-vis other closely related categories in the
same genus or class. The direct opposite of this exercise will be to eliminate all the categories and
treat all weapons as one category thus producing a global figure that reflects the number of weapons
transferred, treating all systems as equal.
Nevertheless, Laurance (1992:38) believes that another approach is required in order to overcome
Catrina's problem, such as for instance the use of various indices in order to measure the military
capability of the arms transferred. If one considers the simple process of counting major weapon
systems, the correlation of inventories with capability will not be exact since the standards of
qualitative sophistication of a weapon system and the levels of training to apply that piece of
equipment differs vastly from a case-to-case basis. Thus, other contextual variables such as terrain,
operator proficiency, logistics, and the opponent's capabilities and proficiencies can not be
overlooked. Furthermore, other aspects in the inventories tend to be equivocal to policymakers such
that they are interested in the actual capabilities of a weapon system, to wit, its prestigious nature, its
ability to be destabilising, and most especially its technological dimension.
3.2.22 Measurement Using Cost Data
The most prominent problem of measurement is the nature of the data that is used to compare, more
generally the quality of the equipment transferred and more specifically the cost data of the
equipment, complicated by the exchange rate fluctuations and the tangible buying power. Making
the picture more complex is the tendency of not selling equipment based on market prices as a result
of political or other reasons such as barter agreements or loan arrangements at lower interests rates.
Therefore, cost data, according to Harkavy (1975 :20-21), is not a reliable or valid measure of arms
transfers, unless this data is related to a specific weapon system, regardless of origin and
sophistication, and assumptions be made of the general cost of an ordinary system and other factors
to be controlled for its estimation.
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Harkavy (1975 :20-21) argues that the shortfall with this method is that there are difficulties in
relating the costs of a weapon system to its actual value, due to its origin, sophistication and
accessories and this may have negative consequences on the assessment of inventory trends and
therefore their analyses. Wilcox (1979:32-33) also agrees that usually when arms transfers are
measured in terms of monetary value, this method becomes inadequate when compared to military
capability. Monetary value measures the amount of resources consumed on armaments, that,
nevertheless, could include outlays on related beneficial social projects, such as those arising from
contractual offset arrangements. The problem with monetary value is that it is far from being able
to measure the equipment's potential for destabilisation except in extremely exceptional cases.
Therefore, analyses based on monetary value have to discriminate between commitments and
deliveries, as proposed commitments provide an apt monetary measure of gravity reflecting the
specific obligations that the state is considering to pursue.
On the other hand, arms delivered can be misleading in terms of monetary value vis-a-vis their
politico-strategic impact. Arms deliveries provide a better measure of the flow of arms transfers as
opposed to the actual value, in economic terms, of the arms transferred (Wilcox, 1979:33). For
Catrina (1988: 19), the utilisation of a monetary value of arms transferred incorporates a number of
intrinsic problems. At first there is the problem of having to convert currencies to or from the dollar
value for comparison across states and for correlation over time by eliminating the efficacy of
inflation. The amplification of the costs in weapon systems has been reflected in the increase in
their sophistication, regardless of the inflation specific to military goods, which is estimated to rise
faster than the general inflation index. The problem deepens as it is difficult to distinguish between
the price rise that occurs as a result of advancement in the sophistication of a weapon system, the
one that is a result of normal inflation, and the one that occurs as a result of military goods-specific
inflation (the difference between inflation that is extant in the general economy or the inflation that
is related specifically to military goods).
Sophistication or military capability is much more abstract to elucidate, as it "should ideally reflect
only numbers and combat power, that is, it would be desirable to deflate current-dollar series by a
defense-specific deflation index (which is not available)" (Catrina, 1988:19-20). Another problem
is the one of the details of the transaction itself, as both the suppliers and recipients are often
reluctant to reveal the nitty-gritty of their deals. Moreover, even if the details may be unveiled, they
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
66
become more complex as offsets become involved. Furthermore, if a global view is to be adopted,
it means that a ponderous exercise should be anticipated. Therefore the usual arms transfer data are
not an appropriate indicator for the economic costs or the benefits to the recipients or the suppliers
respectively.
3.2.2.3 The Problem of Small Arms Proliferation
Regularly, according to Harkavy (1975:19), the generally neglected terrain of small arms tends to
distort the whole picture of the arms production and transfer system. This trend is usually
influenced by the fact that small arms are difficult to measure, whereas most of the wars that are
characteristic of the contemporary period are local or regional in nature, revolutionary or civil wars,
and as such are fundamentally waged with small arms. There are very few instances where local
wars, in particular, are conducted with major weapon systems. Nevertheless, major weapon systems
are transferred on a government-to-government basis, whilst small arms are usually conveyed
through private or semi-private dealers.
This becomes more complex when the dealers' approach is based on a seamless web of
multinational subsidiaries with operations that are extensively clandestine in disposition. Virtually
all the agencies monitoring arms transfers, Harkavy (1975: 19-20) alleges, are distressed by this area
of the arms production and transfer system, primarily because it is the major area of interest for
governments and international organisations focussed on reducing or eliminating the possibilities of
conflict in the international system. Nevertheless, within this discourse, small arms are considered
to be a significant part of the arms production and transfer system, indeed a substantial category
besides other categories of major weapon systems, such as aircraft, helicopters, tanks, combat
vehicles, artillery systems, naval vessels, missile systems, and their components, sub-systems, and
spare parts.
Considering all the defmitional and measurement factors mentioned above, the researcher, therefore,
will adopt the posture that the arms trade is not only a concept referring to international arms sales,
but it also connotes that arms transfers are conducted for political reasons, including the global
functioning of the arms industry. Therefore, in this discourse, arms transfers will be specifically
viewed in their political dimension, to wit, according to the policies of the supplier states, so as to
forestall the unnecessary controversies. This, however, does not insinuate that the reactions or the
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responses of the recipients are insignificant in their political dimension. Instead they are perceived
to be central to viewing arms transfers as a political phenomenon. Nevertheless, the intention of this
study is to view arms transfers from a supplier perspective, and accordingly, whenever a compulsion
is identified to address the dimensions of measurement or the definitional polemics, that
requirement will be clearly specified and elucidated.
3.3 THE INHERENT ATTRIBUTES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS
PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER SYSTEM
3.3.1 The Motive Forces of the Arms Production and Transfer System
War or the battlefield is where military technological capabilities are validated, and in their pursuit
of victory in war, states, according to Krause (1992:16-17), are allured to be involved in arms
transfers, production and innovation. The immediate consequence of a war is a fleeting desperate
requirement for more armaments that nonetheless, does not alter the structure of the arms production
and transfer system. However, a protracted conflict, characterised by persisting battles, generates a
demand for the transfer of technology for indigenous production that has a long-term effect on the
arms production and transfer system. Hitherto, the demands of war also compelled states to
strengthen central organisation and to impose taxes on their citizens for the primary objective of
being able to mobilise for war. This became reflected in the international hierarchy of the arms
production and transfer system and thus changes within this system were also shaped by the
objectives of the pursuit of victory in war.
If it was possible, Krause (1992: 16) believes that all states in the anarchic international system will
be producers of armaments. However, the uneven distribution of capabilities and resource
endowments ensures differences in the abilities of states to produce arms, and therefore arms
transfers become the logical answer to the requirement for modem armaments. Arms transfers,
therefore, are a consequence of an inability by states to produce arms, which is intrinsically a desire
driven by the anarchic nature of the international system. This aspect makes armaments to be a
unique commodity, as their production and transfers patterns are determined by comparative
advantage, and thus, changes in the arms transfers structure reflect changes in the entire
international system. The successes of the arms industry are not only dependent on a certain level
of industrial development, but, Krause (1992:13-14) contends that they can, on the one hand,
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become facilitators for rapid industrialisation through the backward and forward connections with
other sectors of the economy, thus stimulating economic development. On the other hand, the arms
industry can have a negative effect on economic development and growth, as it depends solely on
factor endowments, as well as the existence of constraints on the diffusion of global arms
production. Neither of the two extremes are absolutely prevalent in reality, they, however,
dynamically interact in an intricate manner.
The state and governments are responsible for the contemporary arms trade rather than the private
manufacturers, as the former have a vested interest in the sanctioning of exports. Secondly,
governments are responsible for the creation of a viable environment within which the lasting
production of advanced technology for armaments is sustained. Most importantly, governments are
totally convinced that the possession and export of armaments is inextricably linked to the concerns
about national sovereignty and policy making. This relationship between governments and their
contributions to arms transfers are solidified within the context of the contemporary arms production
and transfer system as it transcends the sheer confmes of bureaucratic control (Stanley and Pearton,
1972:5). In virtually all arms manufacturing states, the government is both the "sanctioner", the
licensing authority, and the salesman of arms. This was much more pronounced in the socialist
countries as state establishments were arms manufacturers and therefore had to sell the arms they
produced themselves. According to Stanley and Pearton (1972:85), governments became the
commercial exporters of armaments and their officials had to adopt the mantle and the mentality of
the salesman.
An arms producing and exporting state's knowledge of the requirements of a prospective buyer,
Stanley and Pearton (1972: 105-1 06) maintain, is of vital importance in securing a lucrative deal.
This role is primarily played by militaryattachés or advisors sent as emissaries to the prospective
recipient state wherein they suggest various combinations of equipment that can be purchased in
order to satisfy that state's defence requirements. These package deals are often designed to meet
the prospective purchaser's specific requirements and are often beneficial to the supplier as they
connote and entail the purchase of a larger consignment rather than a single weapon system.
Usually these package deals include the training of technical and operational staff, the provision of
the necessary infrastructure and the after-sale services depending on the terms of the contract.
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In other arms producing and exporting states, particularly where the manufacturers are partly-state
or privately owned, the government often provides financial assistance in terms of credit and trade
protection to the arms manufacturers in order to bolster their exports vis-a-vis their competitors.
Credit terms are essential to the prospective buyers' preference of a conducive arms deal (Stanley
and Pearton, 1972:Il0-111). Inmost instances, the supplier-recipient relationships somewhat tend
to reflect the patterns and dynamics of political and military conflict as well as those of economic
and technological competition existing in the international anarchic system of sovereign states.
However, it is not only the international domain that influences the generation of a "military-
industrial-administrative-technoscienti fie infrastructure", which symbolises a sophisticated arms
industry, but the internal factors are cogent as well (Kolodziej, 1979:17-18). These include an
amalgamation of bureaucratic structures that compose the complex domestic organisational setting
within which arms production and transfers take place, and are potentially querulous factors within
the states' policy-making processes regarding state security and economic-related decisions.
Governments are obliged to respond to these overtures of bureaucratic structures because they
represent convincing political, strategic, security, economic and technological interests and
ambitions. Therefore, their influence is preponderant in the determination of the states' arms
production and transfer policies (Kolodziej, 1979: 18). The interests of bureaucratic or
governmental agencies are reflected in every state's arms programmes, albeit they cannot hinder the
assiduous progress of science, particularly if research is constantly funded. Scientific and
technological innovation, according to Pearson (1994:42-44), usually outpaces the political and
military interests that try to control its progress, especially with the creation of overkill capabilities,
such as nuclear weapons. Hence, appropriate political control fails to contain its evolution and
proliferation. In most instances, new technology originates among civilian scientists and is
converted into military capabilities by governmental agencies and funding, particularly those with a
military proficiency, which provide them with engineering faculties, political organisation and
influence. The military faculties become responsible in terms of determining the type of weapons to
be procured as well as their adaptation into battlefield conditions. Furthermore, retired military
officials are usually recruited into the arms industry through the "revolving door" to provide their
expertise in practical adaptation of the latest weapon systems that are being researched and
developed (Pearson, 1994:44).
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Political and military officials ensure that the process of production, deployment and transfer of
weapons is rigorously controlled, as they can be potential threats to each state's stability if they may
happen to fall into wrong hands (Pearson, 1994:44). However, several interests at the "subnational"
bureaucratic level reflect both private and collective interests, which Kolodziej (1979: 18-19)
describes as being narrow, more particular and personal in nature and, as such, are often in conflict
with the general objectives of the state. When firstly viewed from the perspective of military
security, their demands are much more confined than those of general defence that are grounded on
the considerations of broader aspects of political and economic cohesion and therefore long-term in
orientation. Within, these actors are those that represent the interests of business enterprises that are
focused on magnifying profits, controlling markets, maintaining guaranteed access to credit
facilities, government contracts and subsidies. Then there are the interests of those actors that are
focussed on the expansion of scientific and technological breakthroughs that in turn are spin-o~fs to
and from weapons production. Such interests might be emphasised regardless of the impact they
might have on weapons designs, military costs and global security. Therefore, harmonising these
disparate interests on the basis of operational national policy is an arduous exercise, as these are,
according to Kolodziej (1979: 19), conflicting, overlapping and interdependent and ultimately are a
reflection of "the domestic struggle for power, wealth, and privilege".
3.3.2 The Characteristics of the Arms Market
3.3.2.1 Supplier Markets and the Behaviour of Suppliers
Arms exports are usually promoted by the rapid growth in the complexity and scale of technology
and manufacturing, and the related costs of production (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:137-139). Arms
manufacturing states are therefore compelled to increase their market share, and in some instances
become desperate for them, particularly as a result of the increasing demands arms production has
on capital. To be able to produce advanced armaments, a high rate of fundamental knowledge and
the ability to exploit sophisticated technologies is required. Moreover, vast scales of resources are
required, combined with the knowledge of the future of defence requirements, for which the
weapons are being developed. To forecast the future type of war, the nature of the political situation
and the operational constraints within which the weapon system will be employed becomes essential
to the designers and planners of the project. The perplexity of the undertaking is that these
predictions are not based on substantial evidence, therefore preferences have to be based on
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assumptions that are vulnerable to changes in the conditions they are trying to address.
Nevertheless, even when the conditions to be addressed can be substantiated, these uncertainties still
prevail, as the costs and the cost-effectiveness of a weapon system can never be entirely ascertained.
Qualitative changes in arms transferred have been more or less in congruence with their quantitative
diffusion. Heretofore, states transferred arms that were superfluous and technologically antiquated
within their inventories to the recipient states and groups in order to accommodate top-of-the-range
systems. However, according to Pierre (1982:10-11), contemporary recipients demand the most
sophisticated and advanced weapon systems, whereby foreign orders are given top priority over
domestic requirements, or foreign demands initiate the introduction of a new system that ultimately
furnishes the supplier state's own armed forces. The type of weapon systems dictates the number of
extant suppliers as well as the breakdown of market shares, to wit, that a smaller number of
suppliers will be capable of producing technologically sophisticated and costly weapon systems and
vice versa. The market shares are therefore expected to be concentrated amongst a few suppliers
when sophisticated equipment such as fighter aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuc1ear-
powered systems are considered (Harkavy, 1975:5-6). Nevertheless, the number of producers and
suppliers of weapon systems is dictated by the structure of the global system that also includes the
endowment of resources plus technological factors.
It is not always the case that a state's capability to produce arms denotes a commensurate position in
the supplier market, as this is controlled by larger players who buttress their status by providing
offset arrangements, spare parts, maintenance and military training services. For that state to be
able to maintain its arms production capability, it is compelled to penetrate the arms export market,
so as to be able to regain research and development costs and production investments that can only
be salvaged by achieving economies of scale through exports. Without an export market,
economies of scale can never be achieved unless a huge domestic or co-production market is
guaranteed. Within the international hierarchy of sovereign states, an independent arms production
capability is an attribute and collateral of great power status that is supplemented by an
unconstrained diplomatic posture, and as a result, states pursue it regardless of economic
ramifications. "In short", Harkavy (1975:50) avers, "prestige and economic factors are intertwined
in determining which nations will choose to become producers, and hence usually suppliers".
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According to Krause (1992:88), one of the ways to discern where a supplier state belongs in the
various tiers of arms production and transfers is to assess its shares of military research and
development spending. At certain intervals some states fall out as producers and suppliers of
weapons, while others penetrate the system reacting to a variety of political, economic or
technological stimuli. Their position becomes located in a continuum of the relative degree of
independence in research and development as well as production. Most of the new entrants start
from copying or from license-producing existing systems, or from importing components and parts
that could be assembled domestically (Harkavy, 1975:51-52). The nature of the arms market has
not been restrictive in terms of which arms are able to penetrate it, whether copied, license-produced
or assembled, unless if the original supplier imposes end-use restrictions on the equipment.
Therefore, the capacity for independent research, development and production of comprehensive
systems is not a prerequisite for attaining the status of being a producer and supplier of armaments.
Actually, and most importantly, this capacity becomes an essential criterion for the determination of
a supplier state's position within the hierarchy of the arms production and transfer system. It is,
however, difficult to obtain information on military research and development spending, as most
states are reluctant to divulge such information. Alternatively, Krause (1992:89-91) believes, one
can estimate the value and distribution of global arms production in two presumptuous ways.
Firstly, by making estimates from military spending, through generally assuming military
procurement to be around 25-30% of global military spending. Secondly, by estimating that
approximately one-fifth or one-sixth of total arms production constitutes interstate arms transfers.
These figures do not reflect accurate production and procurement shares of the producers, but they
do provide a criterion from the basis of which a closer statistical value can be discerned.
The first arms sub-market that is found amongst the industrialised states is one where the most
sophisticated weapon systems are transferred and where very few restrictions to trade exist.
Nevertheless, according to Catrina (1988:42-43), a reluctance to share technological knowledge is
prevalent because of fear of competition and national security considerations. Straight transfers are
no longer the norm in this sub-market as most states demand economic-industrial offset
arrangements that are motivated by political interests of maintaining a strong indigenous defence
industrial base and firm-centric parochial economic considerations. The second sub-market is the
one between industrialised and developing states that is characterised by widely varying
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technological sophistication. Straight transfers are also constituted by top-of-the-range sophisticated
systems, and offset arrangements also comprise arms contracts agreements.
The major difference between the first and the second sub-markets is that technological transfer
arrangements are still beyond the technical capabilities and the economic viability of most
developing states. Therefore such arrangements are only limited to those states that have the
financial means to procure both the technological know-how and the appropriate production
facilities (Catrina 1988:43). For example, the emergence of major regional powers such as Brazil,
Israel, South Africa, and India, according to Pierre (1982:4), can be attributed to the contribution
made by the diffusion of military technology, and conventional arms transfers are one component of
this diffusion of military power. This distribution of power in certain instances has an important
impact that is equal to or greater than other economic forms of the distribution of power, particularly
because the denial or the granting of arms absolutely ignites a political and/or psychological
response. Moreover, it is a form of transfer of technology as most states are no longer interested in
commercial off-the-shelf purchases, but require the technology to license-manufacture or co-
produce the weapon systems in their own territories.
The third sub-market is that amid the developing states that used to be characterised by re-transfers
in the 1950s, but is currently dominated by trade in arms produced by the third-tier emerging
suppliers (Catrina, 1988:43-44). These armaments, as a matter of course, are less sophisticated than
those produced by the leading suppliers, albeit their exclusive transfer to the developing world
makes their comparative design simplicity an advantage in terms of employment and maintenance.
This advantage is also reciprocated to the suppliers, as their simple designs require low labour costs
and therefore provide cost advantages to the recipients.
The fourth and final sub-market is the one facilitating trade between the emerging suppliers and the
developed industrialised states. As a recent phenomenon, it is characterised mainly by sub-
contracting arrangements or the exportation of the most sophisticated products from the emerging
suppliers, most of whom are in the developing world (Catrina, 1988:44). This sub-market is
complimented by the fact that the electronic nature of modem warfare has demoted major weapon
systems into mere platforms that have become launching vehicles for complex systems that include
missiles, accompanying penetration mechanisms and defensive equipment. Therefore, to overlook
the sub-market for components, ancillary equipment and spare parts wou1d imply a certain degree of
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
74
myopia as this dimension refers to a specific level of autarky that states have achieved in the
independent production of some weapon systems (Harkavy, 1975:15-16). This does not mean that,
in future, the transfers of major weapon systems are not going to persist, as even the most leading of
the arms producing states still rely on others for certain sub-systems. Hence it is important to realise
that not only complete weapon systems require analysis, since this may result in misleading
inferences.
Spare parts and components are, according to Harkavy (1975: 16-1 7), also essential when viewed
from a politico-strategic perspective, as these can be denied to certain recipient states as a leverage
waged by suppliers, who require the recipient states to fulfil certain politico-strategic objectives.
Furthermore, from a positive angle, spare parts and components can also be used as a multilateral
control measure. Supplier-recipient relationships are usually stabilised through the continued
requirement for spare parts in order to maintain weapon systems, regardless of mutable diplomatic
arrangements. Equivocally, recipients are generally compelled to retain an open and diversified
range of sources for continuous supply, mainly as a means to avert a capricious, and therefore a
pernicious dependency relationship. A further alternative is for states to develop indigenous
independent production of spare parts and components so as to limit the suppliers' leverage over the
use of arms transfers. Those who do not have this capability are often forced to cannibalise some of
their existing equipment thus reducing the number of operable equipment.
3.3.2.2 Technological Change and its Impact on the Arms Production and Transfer System
The hitherto transformation process of the global strategic environment was characterised by the
twin elements of the technological aspect: technological advance and the diffusion of advanced
technology. Buzan (1987:9) maintains that technological innovation was catalysed by the industrial
revolution thus generating unevenness in the quality and quantity of technology possessed by the
various countries. These two related but distinct criteria have a significant impact on the
technological change in weaponry and how this affects the arms production and transfer system
(Harkavy, 1975:41-42). The first impact is on the rate of turnover of the generations of arms, to
wit, the period that exists between the different generations of equipment, thus defming the
qualitative advance of that particular type of equipment. Another impact is the qualitative
achievements or incremental qualities in the performance of a specific type of equipment over a
given period of time, such as the increase in its firepower, mobility, or protection capability.
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Within certain periods, Harkavy (1975:42-43) maintains that there are variations in the rate of
general turnover in most weapon systems depending on various reasons. The funding and
institutionalisation of research and development has an effect on the rate of generation as turnover
of the weapon systems. Other aspects to consider are the duration of the lead times for research and
development and the unit costs that could be substantial, particularly when the quantity of extant
suppliers is taken into consideration. The difference between quantitative and qualitative arms
production also needs to be explained. On the one hand, quantitative production is usually
associated with imminent crises, and, on the other hand, qualitative production is more serene and
involves the production of a series of prototypes and perhaps a few models to maintain a high level
of technological capability. Finally, the introduction of new major weapons categories has a
tendency of fuelling rapid technological growth, usually occurring as a spin-off from the civilian
sector.
According to Harkavy (1975:46-47), phenomenal increases in weapon systems are frequently
ushered in by the introduction of new sub-systems like avionics, missile systems and other
equipment, thus resulting in changes in the patterns of the arms production and transfer system. The
main effect of these changes is witnessed within the market where suppliers become concentrated,
with the secondary leading and emerging suppliers failing to keep up with the rapid pace of change,
while the primary leading suppliers, with their protected immense research and development
facilities, benefit from it. Another effect is that suppliers are expected to pursue expeditious sales of
equipment that becomes obsolete swiftly as a result of a rapid turnover of weapons generations.
Primary leading suppliers are compelled by changing technological advances to be on par with or to
be more advanced than the current changes, otherwise they face the possibility of being relegated to
a secondary status.
This unevenness between and within suppliers and recipients can only be removed either through
the various countries achieving a similar standard of technological savoir-faire, or if the state of
international anarchy is replaced by an integrated political order or, in simpler terms, a world
government (Buzan, 1987:9-10). Contemporarily, the two elements of the technological aspect are
interacting actively and potently. The only atonement presently, Harkavy (1975:47) avers, is the
fact that during periods of qualitative production it is mainly prototypes and possibly a few models
that are produced, and hence it has an impact on the transfer system, as the amount of arms
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transferred are conceivably limited. On the other hand, as a result of a slow turnover of weapons
generations, huge weapon inventories that were stored for a long time are freed to dependent states,
thus increasing the volume of arms transferred in the system.
3.3.2.3 The Offset Bazaar
As a result of deficits in their balance of payments, Stanley and Pearton (1972: 118-119) argue that
most arms purchasing governments are reluctant to incur the full foreign exchange costs of the
armaments they are purchasing. As a result they demand an abatement of these costs, which are
called offsets as a sincere condition of a purchase from the suppliers. Offsets are defmed by Catrina
(1988:33) as arrangements aimed at reducing the amount of currency required in order to purchase
weapon systems or establishing mechanisms to create revenue that would enable the payment of
such systems. These arrangements usually adopt the form of consequential agreements by the
recipients aimed at augmenting their economy, mainly through the enhancement of their industrial
or technological proficiencies.
These offset arrangements are often in the form of expiation performed by supplier states with large
balance of payment surpluses in order to bolster their arms export prospects and consequently
rejuvenate their arms manufacturing capacity (Stanley and Pearton, 1972: 119). Offset arrangements
are, according to Catrina (1988:34-35), generally divided into two categories: direct offsets that is
compensation in related goods such as components or accessories of a procured system, or indirect
offsets, involving compensation in another form besides what is related to the procured item.
Nonetheless, offset arrangements can contain both their direct and indirect dimensions in one
agreement, and their emphases in most current deals is a direct reflection of the preponderance of a
buyers' market. Most suppliers, therefore, do not oppose offset arrangements, even if they are
perceived to promote foreign competition, as long as they do not threaten their national security
concerns. Examples of offset arrangements include counter-trade, overseas investment, co-
production, licensed production, sub-contractor production, and the transfer of technology alongside
co-production and licensed production.
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3.3.2.4 Joint-Development and Production, License Production, and Other Inventive Arrangements
Prices for arms fluctuate according to the dictates of the market along with the identities of the
parties involved in the transaction, the nature of their relationships, and the limits of the subsidies
that the domestic government is willing to provide. Since the market has become a buyers' market
as a result of its vehemently competitive nature, Pearson (1994:38) declares that transnational
mergers, take-overs and strategic corporate alliances amongst firms are beginning to emerge with
the intention of co-producing or co-marketing armaments through amalgamating resources to
strengthen their sales. This transnational interaction is characterised by corporate partnerships
through foreign investment, international subcontracting, international licensing, and joint ventures.
These co-operative arrangements, according to Kolodziej (1979:20), are "techno-economic
relations" between states in the designing, development, production and marketing of armaments,
with the main transnational actor being the private firm or parastatal, resulting in a different set of
relations when compared to those of the national or subnational actors.
These relations are based on technological, economic and strategic capabilities and requirements of
the enterprises along with their reliance and impact on the policy-making processes and necessities
of the governments with whom they have coupled aspirations. Furthermore, they are motivated by
two pressing essentials: the requirement to minimise the costs of new armaments that are nationally
produced and the ambition to achieve a higher level of technological advancement for the state's
armed forces (Kolodziej, 1979:20). Transnational collaboration is perceived by Pearson (1994:40)
as a means of maintaining "the military-industrial-scientific technological systems" of the various
states enticed into technology sharing and joint development and production as opposed to
nationalistic proclivities and the reality of the costly processes of national production. However, the
future seems to be in favour of larger production units as well as the preponderance of transnational
co-production albeit these processes might be hampered by the emergence of trade blocs or regional
arrangements that might implement barriers for external units. For Stanley and Pearton (1972: 151),
co-operation and co-production are means through which supplier states augment their position in
the international hierarchy of power that occurs by enhancing these states' industrial and military
capacities.
The arms industry, therefore, as a technological leader for industry, due to its nature and character,
usually lays claim to the significance of defence or the military on national policies, and thus is,
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according to Stanley and Pearton (1972: 151-152), susceptible to the concept of the
balance/hierarchy of power. The arms industry is in most instances a measure of the state's position
in the international hierarchy of power and therefore the expansion of the role that it plays in the
international arms market reflects th~ role it plays in the international political economy. In trying
to resolve the dilemma between arms production and general development, governments often
emphasise the importance of spin-offs from the arms industries into the civilian sector, particularly
as governments are penchant to fund the former rather than the latter.
The advantages of these collaborative ventures, Kolodziej (1979:20) argues, are that expenditures
become shared between the parties involved, even though the endeavours are normally costly. An
assured market is always availed by the participating states and they also pool their promotional
capacities in the marketing of their jointly produced commodities. Political or strategic national
considerations or commitments do not constrain exports of the arms produced, and there is an
amalgamation of talents that otherwise would have been thwarted by narrow national considerations
(Kolodziej, 1979:20-21; Frank, 1969: 174). This allows for different states to share the skills, assets
and resources to which they could not have access before. Complementing amalgamation as an
advantage, is sharing, which permits concentration on a few types of weapon systems as well as the
regulated phasing of each generation, thus addressing the problem of managing the whole
operational flow. The fact that the sources of raw materials and equipment, along with sub-
contracting, are expanded, thus reducing the element of dependency on certain, and sometimes
monopolised, sources of supply, is another advantage. In addition, the cancellation of a project is no
longer at the discretion of any individual government, and this acts as a guarantee to most
manufacturers (Stanley and Pearton, 1972: 148-149).
Co-operation reduces the desperate need that most suppliers apperceive for exports, mainly as a
result of having to sustain a project since states involved in the project compose a potential, if not a
definite, market. Moreover, in the export market co-operating states are advantaged to secure
contracts as they can reduce the average costs to marginal costs in pricing their sales (Stanley and
Pearton, 1972: 149-150). Finally, and especially important to the firms, is that individual
governmental interference is restrained since management falls into the mutual mechanisms of
oversight and control. Often, governments are averse to rescinding or retracting from such ventures
as they bring to question the crucial issues of national and co-operative security and political
alignments amongst the participating states regardless of the technological or economic imperatives
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involved. Therefore, participating governments are always under extreme internal and external
pressure to make these ventures successful as their failure implies higher costs and losses for them
(Kolodziej, 1979:21).
Frank (1969: 175) maintains that co-development that may ultimately lead to co-production, is
mainly reliant on the identification of the parties' politico-strategic and military requirements and
resources during the early phases of research and development, and as such, the technological spin-
offs can be defined earlier in the production cycle. This type of collaboration, prevalent in Western
Europe (with the ultimate intention of creating an integrated defence and security community on the
basis of collective or co-operative security), has been termed the "internationalization of the arms
industry" (Pearson, 1994:38-39). However, the arms industry still retains a strong proclivity
towards nationalism, as governments, particularly those of the leading powers, have scrupulous
intentions of maintaining strong domestic arms industries to provide for their armed forces as well
as to ensure an austere regulation of the arms trade. Such an atmosphere does not augur well for a
stable internationalisation of the arms industry, which could ensure larger and more competitive
elements within the market. Governments are still cautiously inclined towards ensuring that the
collaborative ventures guarantee satisfaction for their own states, particularly the revenue to be
received and the extent of control that they have to exercise.
The nature and the size of the market, which is defined and conceived by governments, determine
the number of available firms in each country. As a result many firms are forced to restructure into
mergers or to downsize depending on government plans that are inclined to support the surviving
giants. Such a situation leads to idiosyncrasies in terms of production: some, like Russia and the
United States, still retain their overall capacity in sea, land and air, and others, like Sweden, prefer
to specialise in specific systems while purchasing other needs from other sources. Others, like the
United Kingdom and France, maintain overall production but also trim down their firms to fewer
units and have selective practices in terms of awarding contracts (Pearson, 1994:40). It is usually in
the governments' and manufacturers' interests, according to Stanley and Pearton (1972:155-156), to
maintain arms production to such extents that heavy subsidies have to be injected to keep it as intact
as possible. As a result of national security considerations states prefer to avoid specialisation to
ensure uninterrupted supplies on the principle of autarky. The rationale is always similar: that
national defence and security rely on an independent arms production capability, which in tum
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
80
promotes national independence in politics and technology, and accordingly bestows lebensraum
(literally) to manoeuvre.
However, the conditions are not always in favour of an autarkic approach in the majority of cases,
except for those with a formidable endowment of resources, as well as the rare scale of their
arrangement. Therefore policies of protectionism that most states adopt have to be trimmed down
such that they are commensurate with their capabilities, albeit these also need to be weighed against
the exigencies and the odds for co-operation and co-production (Stanley and Pearton, 1972: 156).
An alternative is often licensed production that, according to Frank (1969: 173), also provides
several advantages, such as the fact that foreign markets that have been inaccessible before become
permeable at a minimal investment cost. Secondly, taxes that are usually imposed on royalties are
lessened when compared to corporate taxes that are levied on permanent establishments. Thirdly,
domestic production is often exonerated from expenses that are accrued due to the adjustments that
need to be implemented to satisfy, sometimes unstable, foreign requirements. Finally, trademarks
and patents are established and protected, and at the same time indications for future demands are
identified and the knowledge of other possible markets is achieved. The major handicaps are that
production control is inadequately monitored and that the licensee may develop to become a
competitor after assimilating the technological know-how.
In order to avoid such handicaps states resort to other arms transfer arrangements, such as the
loaning of weapon systems from the supplier state or any other foreign armed forces. The loaning
of equipment, according to Catrina (1988:39-40), is usually preferable for training purposes since
their utilisation in actual combat might involve their dilapidation or destruction. Some states that
lack the facilities to conduct their own research and development of weapon systems habitually
request this expertise from those states or firms that have the capacity. There are similarities
between these arrangements and straight transfers as far as the production process is concerned; or
with licensed production if components and technological know-how are transferred. When
compared to a straight transfer arrangement, the main difference is that the sponsor has rights to the
technological knowledge of the product. Whereas comparing them to a licensed production
arrangement, the sponsor is involved earlier in the agreement, insinuating its efficacy on the overall
design. As a variant, foreign firms can be invited as consultants to enhance domestic research and
development.
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Most states that do not have the capacity to purchase new weapon systems, Catrina (1988:40-41)
asserts that they resort to the upgrading of their extant systems that is often (but not always)
provided by firms that produced the initial system. The process of upgrading or modernising extant
systems and platforms is one of the ways in which operational readiness of an armed force that is
running short of funds can be sustained to a level that can compete with or even outdo in vogue and
expensive systems. Nevertheless, if these are the characteristics of the contemporary arms market,
what role is then played by technology in the arms production and transfer system?
3.4 THE DYNAMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
3.4.1 The Military Technological Revolution
Krause (1992:18) refers to Van Creveld's assertion that technology pervades and governs war.
According to Krause (1992: 19-21), the possession of modem armaments becomes globally a central
element in the determination of the hierarchy of power. If military innovation, on the one hand, is
understood to be an exogenous process, then technological innovation determined the evolution of
the modem state system by providing advantages in warfare to those states that had the wealth and
social organisation to afford and utilise modem weapon systems. For modernisation to take root it
had to be mediated through the state system of which technology, particularly its military
dimension, was assumed to provide the central impetus. Technological change and progress, on the
other hand, can be viewed to be an outcome of a series connection of social and economic forces,
which results in some states capturing the process by accepting its inventions. Nonetheless, both
these processes are intricately intertwined and perhaps each might have occurred in a different
epoch. For instance, technological innovation might have been completely exogenous until the
Industrial Revolution as the state became actively involved in the research and development of
modem technologies. The states' involvement in military innovation increasingly resulted in the
establishment of military-industrial complexes that were obvious in the connections between state
power and the early stages of military production.
Although arms transfers are linked to the inability of some states to produce arms, Krause (1992:21-
22) avers that military technological innovations transform the arms transfer system. These changes
in weapon systems occur in an incremental or revolutionary manner. Incremental changes in
weapon systems involve changes in their destructive power and the nature of their employment, but
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
82
do not, effect fundamental transformation in the doctrine, strategy and organisation of the armed
forces. Revolutionary changes, on the other hand, which do cause these changes, require the
concourse of technological changes, changes in state organisation, and changes in economic
foundations in order to force radical transformations in the overall organisation for warfare. Certain
events in history, according to Gouré (1993:175), came to be noted as military technological
revolutions: the German blitzkrieg that was designed on the basis of the new Panzer divisions in
conjunction with effective close air-support; as well as the utilisation of aircraft carriers and
amphibious landings by the United States in the Second World War. Gouré (1993:175) claims that
if history has ascertained the existence and potential of a military technological revolution then the
concept is elusive because scientists, policymakers and military practitioners have been poor in
estimating and predicting their effects in future engagements. This is due to the fact that it is very
rare that decisions have been made on the basis of the utilisation of new systems. Therefore, both
incremental and revolutionary transformations can not be generalised, and thus are unpredictable
(Krause, 1992:21).
The concept of a military technological revolution, according to Gouré (1993: 176-178), originated
with Soviet military strategists who were trying to comprehend the fate of changes to the means and
methods of combat on warfare. Soviet scholars identified three modern revolutions in military
technology that have shaped the conduct of warfare: (1) the development of gunpowder, muskets
and cannons in the eighteenth century; (2) the mechanisation of warfare with the introduction of the
internal combustion engine; (3) the evolution of electronics and nuclear capabilities; and (4) the one
which is yet to come, according to Soviet Marshall Ogarkov (excerpted from Gouré, 1993: 177), that
is based on advances in sensors and computing systems and may put conventional weapons on par
with nuclear weapons in terms of accuracy and efficacy. Krause (1992:22) confirms Gouré's
conception of the military technological revolution and he avers that advanced electronics and
computers could also lead to a new revolution in warfare, particularly in the field of "stand-off' and
"smart" weaponry, however, contemporary applications are still incremental rather than
revolutionary.
Qualitative changes brought about by the industrial revolution resulted in a rapid pace of change and
a gigantic expansion of technological capabilities both in the civilian and military sectors, thus
affecting every sphere of society. These changes, according to Buzan (1987:19), were a
manifestation of abstruse changes in human knowledge and social organisation and as such not
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uniquely or primarily driven by military interests, but improvements of military instruments were a
result of those changes. The main effects in the military sphere were manifested in terms of five
capabilities: firepower; protection and concealment; mobility; communications; and intelligence.
Accordingly, Harkavy (1994:23) directs one's attention to the conjecture amongst analysts that the
Gulf War ushered in a military technological revolution or that it made such a revolution imminent.
The character of the Gulf War and the sophistication of the technology applied proved that the
coalition forces, particularly under the leadership of the United States, were really in the midst of a
military technological revolution, which was still in its embryonic stage. The quality of equipment
utilised impressed the whole world and really gave a prognosis of the nature of future warfare
(Gouré,1993:177).
According to Krause (1992:22-23), the technological revolution is followed by a continuous process
of modem technological development, which involves scientific discovery, invention, innovation,
and the diffusion of technology through far-reaching imitation. There are two processes that forge
the nature of production and transfers, namely, the reduced earnings in investments on new
technological innovations as production becomes restricted to its original source, and the
confmement of commodities to only domestic markets whereafter it is exported and then
manufactured externally (through direct foreign investment), and fmally procured by the source
from foreign markets. Notwithstanding, these processes have a direct impact on the arms
production and transfer system.
Regardless of the peculiarity that characterised the revolution in military technology, Buzan
(1987:26-28) argues that it should not be considered as existing outside of the broader revolution in
science, technology, and human finesse. The knowledge and the skills that generated the military
technological revolution are indistinguishable from those that are characteristic of civil
technological development. Similarities between the two ensure that civil technological
advancement will always have military applications, and as such, any industrial society has the
potential to convert its civilian technological capacity into a military capability. Arms innovations
are not necessarily aimed towards usage in war, as there are other motives that are technical,
political and economic besides warfare itself (Pearson, 1994:9-10). Political leaders ' enthusiasm
with new weapons, on the one hand, are rooted in political interests that can be accomplished, such
as influence or conquests in their interactions with allies and enemies respectively, while firms, on
the other hand, are basically interested in profits. Therefore, both concur that new military
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technology procreates power. The intention of inventing weapons is to achieve psychological,
political and military leverage over rivals, and as such, weapons intrinsically do not always
determine the course of war. Weapons can influence the cost of the war in terms of personnel and
resources, and in that sense, its results.
Reynolds (1989:151) also agrees that it is not weapons that give a war its character, but the
protagonists' will. Reviewing the Second World War, Reynolds (1989:151) concluded that there
was "little evidence that control over weapons produced a consistent rational relationship between
the means of violence and the ends sought by its use. The simplest solution, both in dealing with the
enemy and in dealing with the allies, appeared to be to allow the means of violence to dictate the
ends sought. The demand for unconditional surrender and total war were the results. Both weapons
and will merged to create virtually an a-political conflict - the negation of rational violence". Gouré
(1993:176) believes that the successful exploitation of revolutionary technology does not only
require the capabilities of new technologies or the willingness of the politicians to provide funding,
but other factors have to be considered. These factors, inter alia, include national approaches; the
nature of military institutions; the quality and standard of military strategy; the limitations and
opportunities of geography; and the combination of military genius, fortitude and sheer fortuity. It
is virtually agreed, therefore, according to Pearson (1994: 10), that the most decisive factors in any
state's abilities to wage war are it's overall productive capability, the number of effective allies, as
well as the quantity of capable personnel that it has been able to mobilise in order to win a war.
3.4.2 The Diffusion of Military Technology
The diffusion of military technological innovations, according to Krause (1992:23-24), happens in a
politically, economically and socially dynamic milieu that determines its affability. This diffusion
occurs in three categories: material transfers (machines and materials); design transfers (blueprints,
formulas, and documents); and capacity transfers (scientific knowledge and technical expertise).
Factor endowments that determine the limits of the transfers are multitudinous and inter alia include
local demand, investment capital, research and development investment, inputs of raw materials,
manpower expertise and costs, infrastructural support, cultural barriers, the significance of returns of
scale, and political will. The last factor is essential since military production requires the support
and participation of the state for its accomplishment and sustenance. Buzan (1987:36) maintains that
the prevalence of revolutions in military technology augmented the significance of technology in the
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dispersion of military power and as a result expanded the range of inequalities in terms of
capabilities among the various states. The role played by arms transfers is to truncate the gap
between those who have the potential to produce armaments and those who do not, but at the same
time the qualitative advance pursued by the technologically advanced states ensures that the gap is
continuously dilated.
The distinction between states occurs in their ability to adapt weapons and/or moreover, to
auspiciously capture the innovative process that depends entirely on the existence of the above-
mentioned factors, central among them being the availability of basic knowledge, expertise and
methods (Krause, 1992:24-25). This is a central component of military strength that guarantees the
leading supplier states a qualitative edge in military technology. The qualitative edge is crucial in
ensuring their power position as well as their security, and consequently, by pursuing this qualitative
advance, they stimulate the process of technological diffusion. Therefore the leading supplier states
struggle to acquire or maintain ''the capability to compete at the leading edge of technological
innovation" (Buzan, 1987:36--37).
The qualitative advance determines the standard for the global system and as a result pressurises the
process of technological diffusion (Buzan, 1987:38). Participants are obliged to either improve on
their capabilities or face the consequences of being second to those who do. This is reinforced by
the tendency of leading supplier states to inject the qualitative advance into the system through
sales, aid or assistance for political and/or economic reasons. The extent of competition amongst
the producers is so intense that they even fail to maintain most of their current innovations for their
own forces. This process of diffusion uncompromisingly elevates the standard of military power
among the secondary powers thus augmenting their incentives to obtain further sources of
technological advance so as to promote and preserve their military precedence. Moreover,
innovations in military technology effect changes in warfare as they become assimilated into the
values and structures of society. These changes, Krause (1992:25) argues, have a double-pronged
significance. Firstly, they reveal a dynamic adaptive interaction between society and technology, as
their reciprocal responses may lead to a long-term sustenance of a social order. Secondly, the
ability or not of society to assimilate technological innovations determines the state's place in the
international hierarchy of arms production and transfers. There are those ''that cannot use modem
military technology, those that use it but cannot reproduce it, those that can reproduce it but not
adapt it, and those that can adapt it but not innovate" (Krause, 1992:25-26).
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Technological advance becomes crucial between rival states at the leading edge: there is always a
struggle to ensure that the antagonists are unable to make a demonstrative breakthrough that would
undermine their own capabilities. As a result, rivals are always under pressure to acquire and
preserve high standards of technological innovation. The process of arms transfers has become
synonymous with the process of qualitative advance that trade creates within the civil technological
sector, and the continuos pressure that is exerted on states to keep up with the pace of technological
innovation that is bound to outdo them if they are not competent. Albeit the processes are similar
they have different consequences, specifically with regard to the state's weaknesses. Civilian
technological weaknesses result in the lowering of living standards whereas military technological
weaknesses may result in the vanquishing and annihilation of the state, thus compelling the
acquisition of precocious technologies that are peerless in the civil sector (Buzan, 1987:38-39).
This is due to the upward trend in standards incited by the pace of qualitative advance among the
leading military producers. Moreover, the recipient states are also obliged either to match or attain
an edge over their opponents by purchasing modem weapons from these producers.
3.4.2.1 The Mechanisms of the Diffusion of Military Technology
The diffusion of military technology, according to Buzan (1987:39-40), occurred in the following
ways: through the physical and political expansion of the states that possessed the technological
capabilities; through the transfer of weapon systems to those states without own capabilities; and by
the transfer of technological know-how and capabilities to the centres of control. The first element
of the spread was prevalent in the colonial period, and currently in instances where foreign bases are
acquired, whereas the spread through the transfer of technological know-how became prominent
after the Second World War. The major contributing factor of the spread was the arms trade, whose
primary motivation was and is the potent configuration of vested interests involved: the "supply
push" and "demand pull" of the suppliers and recipients respectively. Analysts generally view the
exportation of conventional arms as a significant form of the redistribution of power from the
industrialised core to the developing periphery that is presumably equal or greater than the general
diffusion of economic power. Simultaneously redistribution is seen as generating an important
dependence relationship between the suppliers and the recipients (Catrina, 1988: 15).
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Catrina (1988:15-16) insists that arms transfers in this context are perceived to be a web of
interactions and relationships used by the powerful industrialised states to perpetuate their control
over the less-developed states in the south. These activities and relationships are viewed to be
inclined towards procreating a cumulative pattern of leverage, aimed at maintaining the status quo
of an international hierarchy of states. The recipient states are regarded as becoming more and more
dependent on the leading supplier states, while at the same time by refusing to be militarised, they
become more vulnerable to intervention and blackmail by other states, groups of states or insurgent
and/or terrorists groups. This dependence occurs in the economic format, wherein the arms
suppliers transfer their burden of economic crisis onto the recipient states through arms exports, or
in the politico-strategic format, by conveying the operational know-how to the purchasers of their
weapons in the form of instructors or special training arrangements. This dependence relationship is
greatly pronounced when arms, spare parts or component supplies are disrupted, particularly when
there is no alternative source to resort to.
According to Buzan (1987:44-45), de-colonisation became a catalyst to the process of the spread of
military technology as new states emerged and new centres of political power becoming local
terrains of conflict and rivalry. These states, as non-producers of arms, increased the market for
armaments and the consequent military imbalance had to be corrected by ensuring that non-
producers were guaranteed an unending supply of arms. On the other hand, the urge for economic
independence by the newly de-colonised states was accompanied by a desire to strengthen industrial
development and this pushed some of these states to acquire their own industrial capabilities, of
which some had military industrial production as a priority. Generally, most states struggle to
reduce their dependence on foreign technology by developing their indigenous productive
capabilities. However, their late entrance into the arms business means that they have a difficulty
catching up, and consequently have to rely constantly on other arms-producing countries for the
advanced technologies they do not possess (Pearson, 1994:12). Success became uneven since, on
the one hand, not all of these states managed to create an industrial base strong enough to meet their
own military requirements. On the other hand, others even managed to become distinguished
competitors in some sectors of the arms market (Buzan, 1987:45).
Pearson (1994: 11-12) postulates that the process of arms production and transfers evolved parallel
with the general evolution of the capitalist international economic system as breakthroughs in
engineering were achieved together with the demands for larger stocks of armaments by national
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governments that replaced local rulers. Leading weapons producers exploited the existence of wars
and a larger arms market to sell their weapons, thus permitting their firms to attain as much profits
as possible in order to reduce production costs in developing new weapons generations.
Technological precedence was achieved through arms innovation and the arms trade became a
conduit towards gaining investment capital and for maintaining the technological specialities
accomplished. Consequently, the sources of armaments in the international system multiplied albeit
that this was not as a result of the straight transfer of arms. An adequate civil industrial base
became a necessity to enable copies to be manufactured locally or, in most cases, the capability to
manufacture locally was directly transferred from suppliers to recipients (Buzan, 1987:45).
Buzan (1987:45-47) argues that straight transfers of armaments do not encourage the development
of an industrial capability to produce arms, but an adequate civil industrial base is essential for local
copies to be manufactured. As a result, a civil industrial capacity inherently contains a military
capability. Some of the arms productive capability is a direct spin-off from the broader process of
economic growth and development. The transfer of a military manufacturing capability also reflects
an economic and political competition that exists among supplier states as a result of the existence
of a buyer's market. Inmost cases these conditions included the transfer of technology, facilities
and know-how, thus managing to develop indigenous arms production capabilities that reached
eminent levels of sophistication. Albeit that most of these states have managed to achieve a
considerable level of sophistication in their arms production capabilities, they still remain dependent
on more advanced suppliers for specific weapon systems that are of ''the highest standard of
technology available" (Buzan, 1987:47).
Looking at the history of the arms production and transfer system from 1945 to 1955, Krause
(1992:82-83) opined that it appeared to deviate from the ones before it because of four reasons.
First the virtual destruction of Europe's industrial infrastructure after the Second World War omitted
most states that expectedly could have become participants in the arms production and transfer
system. In addition, the division of Germany, the prescription against West German arms
production and exports, and East German and Czechoslovakian submissiveness to the Soviet Union,
put a strain on these states' role in the arms production and transfer system. Their subsequent
emergence as major arms suppliers reduced them to a second-tier status. The United Kingdom was
an exception as a result of maintaining its arms industries intact after the war and remained a second
leading arms exporter after the United States. However, the United Kingdom became a victim of
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the new arms production and transfer system by failing to maintain its first-tier status as a
technological innovator along with the United States.
The second reason given by Krause (1992:83-84) is that the Soviet Union, being in the second
position to the United States if arms transfers to Eastern Europe are taken into consideration,
preferred to be detached from the system. This was due to the existing economic and political
exigencies for rapid recovery, consolidation of accomplishments in Eastern Europe, and the post-
war bipolar predicament. The Soviet Union could have been a major player in the arms production
and transfer system if its industrial and economic bases and global political stature then had been
taken into consideration. Itwas not until1955, after the arms deal with Egypt, that the Soviet Union
became a substantive global supplier. The third reason was the ascendance of the United States as a
leading arms producer and supplier, which in part was heightened by the dearth and lassitude of
other contestants, and in part a result of the wartime increase in military industrial production.
Primarily, the post-war military assistance it provided to the European allies encouraged defence
procurement and expedited the rate of military technological transformation, consequently
facilitating other states' levels of arms production. After the Second World War and until the
1960s, surplus and second-hand arms were transferred free or at bargain prices to allies and friends
to achieve politico-strategic objectives. The United States government realised the probability of
regaining research and development funds as well as satisfying allies by selling to them the latest
arms and equipment. Other governments followed suit, thus initiating the modem push of arms
transfers ''through government assistance, promotions, regulation, guarantees, and credits" (Pearson,
1994:12-13).
Krause (1992:84) maintains that the evolutionary dynamics and the framework of this period
became more apparent in the 1960s especially after the arms deal between Egypt and the Soviet
Union in 1955, which encouraged a concatenation of agreements, predominantly in the Middle East.
France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia and Italy began to produce armaments for their domestic
requirements and for export, while at the same time, an inconsequent appearance of smaller
suppliers such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland occurred. Nevertheless, the United
States' predominant position was not disputed despite the shift of the locus of political competition
to the Third World and the advent of new markets with the acceleration of the de-colonisation
process. The end of the Cold War, although resulting in the abating of tensions between the United
States and the former Soviet Union, restrained foreign assistance and states were compelled to
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procure their military equipment and accessories from commercial sources. Those states which had
an adequate industrial infrastructure, a sufficient resource base, and the political will to produce and
export arms, secured their emerging supplier status, but were confmed by post-independence and
post-colonial politics from developing competent arms industries.
3.4.2.2 The Results of the Diffusion of Military Technology
The spread of military technology resulted in the creation of a hierarchy of states that was
determined by their capabilities in terms of arms production. The top echelon was occupied by
those states that could produce the whole range of weapon systems, and at the bottom were those
with limited capability or non-producers (see Figure 3.1 below). The primary leading supplier
states, according to Buzan (1987:47-48), have a complete arms-manufacturing capability,
complemented by an adequate research and development capacity that ensures top-of-the-edge
technology. These producers and suppliers in the first-tier, as the dominant producers of arms,
according to Krause (1992:32), possess the largest research and development investments and local
markets, thus having the potential to produce the whole range of armaments at the technological
frontier. Therefore, their arms industries are not dependent on exports for their well being albeit
that they are prominent exporters as a result of the demand placed on their advanced weapons. The
benefits they obtain from arms exports make them to concentrate on their perpetuation regardless of
the long-term effects this might have on their productive capacities as they transfer the technological
know-how through licensed- and co-production agreements.
Bottom-of-the-range states are either temporarily or totally dependent on the arms trade for their
modem weapons' requirements for the maintenance or signification of their independence (Buzan,
1987:48). The middle range are partly producing states, which have a significant capacity to
produce armaments of considerable sophistication but do not match the capability or the quality of
armaments produced by top-of-the-range states. Secondary leading, middle-range or second-tier
suppliers are beneficiaries of licensed and co-production agreements with the primary leading
suppliers, as they have less research and development investments, smaller domestic production and
procurement capacities. Therefore, according to Krause (1992:32), they have to depend on exports
or state subsidisation for the interest of their arms industries. Their export shares are constrained by
their incapacity to produce top-of-the-range armaments relative to the primary leading first-tier
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suppliers, and this might also constrain their ability to produce the whole range of armaments,
meaning that they must secure a niche through specialisation.
Figure 3.1 Results of the Diffusion of Military Technology
Adapted from Keith Krause (1992:31 - 32)
Secondly, economic pressures associated with their lesser export market share compel these
secondary leading second-tier suppliers to export, along with the armaments themselves, the
knowledge and skills required to manufacture arms (Krause, 1992:32). Almost all the secondary
leading second-tier producing states are dependent on the primary leading producers and suppliers
for some of their sophisticated top-of-the-range arms and leading edge arms-manufacturing
requirements. Buzan (1987:48-49) believes that there are only two ways in which the secondary
leading producers and suppliers can achieve independence in arms production. Firstly, through
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matching the research and development pace of the first-tier primary leading supplier states.
Secondly, by pursuing independence at all levels, which is currently lower than that of the primary
leading supplier states. Contemporarily most of the secondary leading producers and suppliers are
partly sellers and partly buyers of armaments.
The secondary leading producers and suppliers, Buzan (1987:49-50) argues, were motivated by
different reasons to acquire an arms production capability, but primarily it was their intention to
reduce their reliance on other suppliers, particularly to minimise their political vulnerability to
pressure from other arms producing countries. For these countries the levels of participation in the
arms production and transfer system depends on perceptions of themselves within the international
system as well as on the capacities of their economic bases. Most of them create specialised niches
within arms production and transfers so as to enable them an uninterrupted participation according
to the capacities of their economies and to amortise the costs of research and development,
production runs and imports. However, most of them still rely on foreign inputs for their principal
weapon systems. Even the primary leading producers have to rely on other suppliers for some of
their weapon systems.
Political and economic considerations thus drive arms production policy intentions. Some states,
like Japan, have the industrial capabilities to become prominent arms producers but instead prefer to
playa less discernable role. Other states that did not have sufficient industrial bases to make them
prominent suppliers were pressured by military and political considerations to develop such bases
and since then have developed to become prominent suppliers (Buzan, 1987:50). These are the
third-tier emerging suppliers, who are currently maturing within the arms production and transfer
system. Such emerging suppliers are heavily dependent on exports and find their market niche on
specialised requirements for low-cost, easy-to-operate and unsophisticated armaments. As they
have much lower research and development investments, their production and exports share is
extremely constrained. Their arms industries are perhaps sustained by a strong political will
domestically, which overlooks economic considerations and is committed to procure locally
produced weapons. The sustainability of their arms industries, Krause (1992:32) avers, is not
guaranteed.
The results of the diffusion of military technology therefore leads to the sustenance of a hierarchy of
states, which is fluid and dependent upon contention and struggle within the international system.
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More often than not such contradictions and the ensuing contests involve efforts to strengthen the
armed forces, and most specifically the implements of war. It is usually the defence industries that
become the focus of attention for the arms producing states or the procurement agencies for those
states that rely on foreign suppliers for their defence requirements. Efforts by each state to
strengthen its arms development and production capabilities or to acquire more advanced
armaments propels other states to do the same and thereby creating an incessant cycle of arms
innovation and development within the system, which is referred to as the arms dynamic.
3.4.3 The Concept of the Arms Dynamics
The concept "arms dynamic" was proposed by Buzan (1987:72) in order to provide coherence to the
concept of arms racing that "suggests a self-stimulating military rivalry between states in which
their efforts to defend themselves militarily cause them to enhance the threats they pose to each
other. In other words, given the political condition of anarchy, states are vulnerable to a type of
competition with each other in which military technology is a major independent variable" (Buzan,
1987:69). Buzan (1987:70-72) argues that "military technology has its own historical dynamic of
qualitative advance and geopolitical spread. The idea of arms racing thus suggests that the dynamic
of military technology is in major part responsible for one of the central problems in relations
between states." Arms racing, like arms transfers, lies at the centre of Strategic Studies, if it is
viewed as the manner in which the instruments of force are utilised by those states that possess them
and how these affect their relations. Together with arms transfers, it also links Strategic Studies to
other spheres of international relations, not just in the military spheres, but also within the domains
of economic development and political interaction. Whatever the problems may be with the concept
of arms racing, it delineates a significant element that is distinct from other political or economic
sources of conflict and co-operation in relations between states.
The aspect of a race insinuates a situation of vigorous competition between states for the
accumulation of military strength with the objective of winning the struggle to alter the military
balance of power. However, the race that is often referred to is concerned with the states' effort to
update their armed forces without necessarily altering the military balance of power. Arms racing,
characterised by vigorous competition would be an abnormal situation under peaceful conditions
and as such it will fail to be a designation for a normal updating of armed forces. To draw a clear
demarcation between pure arms racing and the normal updating of armed forces, Buzan (1987:72)
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suggested the concept of the "arms dynamic" that includes all the pressures that compel states to
acquire and upgrade armed forces, which is not only a global process but also refers to specific
circumstances of a state or sets of states. The "arms dynamic" (see Figure 3.2 below) is a
continuum of the concepts of arms racing, on the one extreme, and "the maintenance of the military
status quo", on the other, that can be used to denote the arms dynamic at its normality.
"Maintenance of the military status quo can escalate into arms racing, and arms racing can subside
into maintenance of the military status quo. Between the two lies a gray area in which the direction
of change may be a more appropriate guide to events than any attempt to locate a given case on one
side or the other of some strict but arbitrary dividing line .... Because arms racing and maintenance
of the military status quo are manifestations of the same over-all arms dynamic, they share many
characteristics, and differ more in degree than in kind" (Buzan, 1987:72-74).
Figure 3.2 The Alms Dynamic
Arms Race
Maintenance of the
Military Status Quo
Abnormality·-4I4"-. The Military Balance of Power __ "~.INormality
In the interaction between states as they pursue their military procurement programmes, these may
be done within a wide range of objectives which fall far short of arms racing. These may be the
routine practices of upgrading their armed forces in order to maintain their own stability within the
uncertain conditions of international anarchy. These practices may be done in response to other
states' practices or to the changes that the qualitative advance in technology introduces, which in the
long run, will mould or be moulded by the domestic structure of the state concerned. Therefore, in
order to demarcate between arms racing and the maintenance of the military status quo is to first
identify between what is abnormal and normal behaviour respectively. Normal behaviour would be
dependent upon ''the nature of prevailing technologies, on the pace and scope of technological
change, on the character of prevailing military doctrines, and on the character of prevailing attitudes
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towards the probability, feasibility and desirability of war" (Buzan, 1987: 114-115). Buzan
(1987:120) maintains that by adding the dimension of the maintenance of the military status quo, a
proportionate view to the issue of peacetime military security relations among states is provided
than from the perspective of the arms race, which has a tendency of pushing interpretations towards
extremity.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
Technology plays a pivotal role in the arms business as it also creates a hierarchy of arms producers
and suppliers towards the extreme level of relatively primitive recipients. Most states, on the one
hand, have to rely on foreign suppliers in order to advance their technological dispositions. Arms
producing states, on the other hand, are adopting diverse strategies as a result of uncertain global
markets, so as to cope within the environment of international competition, some with little or no
government funding. In reality, the military sector is globally constricting, as military regimes are
being replaced by democratic governments, defence spending is lowered, arms industries are
becoming impecunious, defence production is fading, military assistance is receding, and the arms
trade has been severely asphyxiated. Nevertheless arms production and transfers still continue,
regional arms dynamics still endure, advanced arms technologies are being developed, as well as
local and regional conflicts are persisting. The slowing down of the procurement rate and the failure
of the suppliers to attain a greater market share insinuates that the modem weapons economy is
becoming complicatedly intertwined into the global economy and, moreover, increasingly
internati onalised.
The end of the Cold War introduced a previous trend of the freelance sale of arms with reduced or
relaxed government control as they experienced both political and economic difficulties in
restraining the arms trade. The entrance of expensive high-tech weapons may also lessen the extent
of arms transfers, particularly when well-armed states start to prefer lower-tech but advanced
equipment, perhaps as a result of the costs or because of the consternation to encourage unrestrained
regional arms races. The inclination by developing states to acquire the technology to develop
indigenous arms production, however, does not lessen their dependency on leading suppliers, since
they still require the components and parts for continued production. Leading suppliers, on the
other hand, also need the foreign markets to perpetuate their arms exports, thus a two-way street of
interdependence is created, despite the difficulties and concerns that arms generate for the leading
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suppliers themselves. The buyers' market encourages recipients to demand offsets and counter-
trade arrangements from suppliers in the form of agreements to transfer valuable technology and, in
turn, the suppliers have to purchase products from the recipients. Political and economic relations
become complicated as recipients are afforded greater freedom of action at the same time
perpetuating interdependence and supplier interference into their internal affairs.
After the Gulf War, the demand pressure for arms mounted, albeit below the peak years of the 1980s
due to global economic problems. Moreover, the technological gap between the producers' and the
recipients' armed forces has constricted, as current transfers are predominantly characterised by the
conveyance of top-of-the-range weapon systems. The transfer of sophisticated weapons systems
implies more technical support, which, in turn, suggests more dependency of the recipients on the
leading suppliers. This implies that the diffusion of military technology is bound to continue into
the future, and sources of arms, particularly secondary leading producers and suppliers, are
forecasted to increase, thus making the arms trade to reflect a combination of the transfer of
technological capabilities and of commercial off-the-shelf weapon systems. The arms producers
will remain stratified according to the process of the technological advance, and this will ensure that
only a few states will attain the status or remain as primary leading producers.
The demand for high-technology armaments leads governments in the developing world to employ
diversification strategies and to adopt makeshift designs and add-ons for the upgrading of their
equipment in order to imitate the leading producers' inventories at lower costs. This trend may
result in the purchasing of intellectual property rather than hardware in future. The legacy of the
Gulf War as well as the period of economic difficulties is determining the type, quality, and quantity
of future weaponry, and efforts are currently towards developing the next generation of
sophisticated computers, stealth, and electronically controlled armaments in order to increase
firepower and reduce human vulnerability. Civilian advanced technology and the costs of
production are also going to determine the character of future weaponry, while simultaneously
problems of military security will impact negatively on the export market, perhaps persuading most
producers to spend more on research and development rather than production. As more and more
components and sub-systems are being dispatched, the black and grey markets will become more
effective, particularly when unrestricted dual-use items are being transferred. Finally, emerging
suppliers will become more preponderant and influential regionally, as weapons are a guarantee for
such purposes within an unpredictable environment. Although economic productivity is perceived
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to be a significant indicator of world power within the modern world, the mix and types of weapons
possessed by any individual state are still regarded as the key to great power status. Is this,
therefore, the rationale for states to transfer armaments?
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CHAPTER 4 - THE RATIONALE FOR TRANSFERRING ARMS: THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARMS TRANSFERS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The congenital connection between arms transfers, the ascendancy and influence of the supplier
country and the subsequent dependence of the recipient country, according to Catrina (1994:200-
201), received increasing attention from the research community, although without tangible "results
that could be generalized beyond the identification of what appear as the most important factors
determining the extent of such influence and dependence". For Quandt (1978:121-122) the
influence of one country over another through the supply of arms is defined as "the ability to alter
the policy of the recipient. ... The exercise of influence will typically involve resolving conflict
between two states in ways that are consistent with the preferences of the arms supplier. The most
dramatic cases of the arms influence relationship involve explicit manipulations of the flow of arms
to effect policy changes on the part of the recipient."
An arms transfer is significantly substantiated according to its contribution to the military power of
the recipient, and this power is utilised to force an adversary from exercising hostility upon the
wielder's interests. Therefore, the relationship between the supplier and the recipient in the arms
transfer system is the need for military power and subsequently security on the part of the recipient,
as well as the need for influence on the part of the supplier (Frank, 1969:2-3). According to Lewis
(1979: 186), within the international political system, states try to change or sustain the policies,
objectives and the behaviour of other states as the quintessential test of power, besides military
capabilities. These anticipated orientations of other states involve the utilisation of incentives such
as diplomatic allurement, economic aid, support of an ally, arms supplies, and/or outright threats.
Therefore, influence is a means to an end, to attain a specific goal or to defend it. Arms transfers
then can be used as influence to attain goals such as supporting allies in need; to gain access to
bases; to protect communication and supply lines; to achieve deterrence, or to ensure commodity
pricing or trading advantages. With the augmentation of the recipient's proficiencies the
possibilities of that recipient's dependence on the supplier are dilated and this becomes a critical
matter of national security as the relationship is both officious and precarious.
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The system of arms production and transfers, which Kolodziej (1979:4) describes as a subsystem of
international relations, can be arranged to be a product of four principal sets of relations between
actors, to wit, "national, subnational, transnational, and international". Furthermore, Kolodziej
(1979:4-5) provides three ways in which the actors are distinguished: their composition, their
principal goals, and the targets of their actions - the latter one being the main item of distinction and
conception as to which set of relations it belongs. The goals that an actor pursues are precisely
articulated as it enters an arms transfer contract and these are operationalised and attained in terms
of the reactions that are expected from the manipulation or control of the target actor(s). The
connection between the goals and their target(s) is therefore the behaviour of the latter, which
change in relative importance and duration as time changes. The relations between and within these
levels of actors are horizontal and vertical in nature and grouped into three substantive sub-
categories: politico-strategic; politico-ideological/diplomatic; and economic, which includes the
dimension of science and technology. All in all, arms production and transfers are driven by three
conventional motivations: military, political, and economic and this analogously means the pursuit
of victory in war; the pursuit of power; and the pursuit of wealth (Krause, 1992:97).
The pursuit of victory in war, on the one hand, includes the intentions to: "(1) guarantee
independence of arms supply to ensure military security; (2) act as a quid pro quo for military
base/landing rights (or intelligence-gathering facilities); (3) assist friends and allies to maintain an
effective (and/or common) defensive posture against external threats; (4) substitute for direct
military involvement; (5) provide testing for new weapon systems". The pursuit of power, on the
other hand, includes the intentions to: "( 1) provide access to and influence over leaders and elite in
recipient states in pursuit of foreign policy objectives; (2) symbolise commitment to the recipient's
security or stability against internal or external threats; (3) create or maintain a regional balance of
power; (4) create or maintain a regional presence; (5) provide access to scarce, expensive or
strategic resources". Finally, the pursuit of wealth includes the intentions to: "(1) provide foreign
exchange and positively affect the balance of payments; (2) reduce the cost of domestic weapons
procurements through economies of scale; (3) maintain employment and infrastructure in defence-
related industries; (4) recoup research and development expenditures; (5) use military production as
an engine of growth for economic development" (Krause, 1992:97-98 [numbering substituted by the
researcher for convenience)).
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Thus, according to Krause (1992:98), the pursuit of victory in war and the pursuit of power are
military-strategic, politico-strategic and diplomatic/ideological objectives that states try to achieve
through arms transfers, whereas the pursuit of wealth clearly refers to economic objectives.
Interdependence, therefore, can be circumscribed to denote the consequences of one actor's actions
towards others, without the consequences being necessarily noticed by either of the two parties, or
perceived to be deliberately fabricated. In most instances actors are not perceptive of the connection
between the causes or conditions of arms transfers and their determining factors, and so actual and
perceived interdependencies have to be delineated in order to account for the various actors'
reactions (Kolodziej, 1979:5-8). Although it is not easy to discern the objectives that each actor is
pursuing within an arms transfer relationship, as these objectives do overlap, for analytical purposes
they will be addressed separately.
The objective of this chapter is to explain the interaction of politico-strategic, politico-diplomatic,
and economic imperatives in the international political economy of arms transfers. The ftrst items
to be addressed are the politico-strategic reasons for transferring arms, which include the definitions
of the concept of strategy and its objectives, the strategic incentives for arms transfers, and the
politico-strategic beneftts and costs. Secondly, the political-diplomatic and ideological reasons are
looked at, and these involve the political signiftcance of arms transfers and the waging of politics
through arms transfers. Thirdly, the economic reasons for arms transfers are reviewed with a
specific focus on the economic and technological incentives, the pursuit of development, the reasons
for maintaining a domestic arms industry, the logic towards enlarging the market, and the economic
beneftts and costs. Finally, the various objectives for arms transfers are compared, particularly the
goals of the different tiers of arms makers and suppliers, the politico-strategic and welfare
imperatives and, at the end, the trends of the current arms production and transfer system.
Since the focus of this discourse, and accordingly this chapter is on the suppliers of armaments, it
would be a colossal task to judge the success of the attempt to obtain politico-strategic objectives
through the assessment and analysis of the reactions or the responses of the recipient states. In fact,
if this effort was undertaken, it would do justice to a thorough appraisal of the whole processes of
arms transfers, especially if Krause's (1992:8-9) concerns about the motivations of the recipients
and the impacts of arms transfers on them (referred to in Chapter 1, pages 1-2), are also considered.
Nevertheless, the researcher opines that through the comprehension of the suppliers' intentions in
transferring armaments, one can deduce the effects anticipated with a little less regard of their
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achievements. Attempts by John Sislin (1994) and Christian Catrina (1988) to determine the
successes of influence did provide some answers but also resulted in a number of unanswered
questions. A more gigantic research effort is needed that includes the recipient states' responses on
a case-by-case basis. The next questions to deal with is what strategy and its objectives that states
and collectives are pursuing in the domestic domain and in the international realm?
4.2 POLITICO-STRATEGICREASONS
4.2.1 DefiningStrategy and Its Objectives
The programme of action, relating means - in the form of violence or a threat thereof or diplomacy
and negotiation - to ends - politically expedient to the pursuer - in a rational manner, under
conditions of opposition or bargaining, is conceived by Reynolds (1989:15-17) as strategy.
Strategy, in his view, "consists of a level of reasoning and action, in which both the means and the
ends are mediated in action so that the latter are formulated and attainable through the creation and
exercise of the former. ... To be rational both means and ends must be commensurable. In deciding
on objectives the politician draws upon resources, organises and deploys them, and so on, but
should not allow his course of action to be determined by his selection of the means" (Reynolds,
1989: 17). Strategy, therefore, refers to the means that are employed or sanctioned to be utilised in
order to meet policy objectives. In making policy, the state reflects what it is going to do by
embracing what is intended and how that is going to be implemented. The series of fmite decisions
involved and the action that follows over time are known as policy.
These policy decisions include a very high political input (Baylis, 1987:2-3), and in the case of war,
for example, Carl von Clausewitz (1980:605--606) argued the point that war was, nothing else, but
an instrument of policy. This means that you cannot divorce war from political life unless you want
to remain with something pointless and devoid of sense. He further reiterated that policy converted
the destructive elements of war into mere instruments. War could not continue relentlessly towards
the absolute, being incomplete and self-contradictory, it had to be treated as part of some other
comprehensive policy because it could not follow its own laws. Hence, the US Institute for Defense
Analysis points to a disposition amongst analysts of security and strategic studies to confuse policy
and strategy. In trying to overcome this problem the Institute defmed policy as "a rule governing
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action or decision", and strategy as a "plan in accordance with which various means, including
actions and decisions, are directed toward the achievement of objectives" (Staudenmaier, 1982:42).
If one adopts Beaufre's (1965:209) assertion of the essence of strategy as an "art which enables a
man, no matter what the techniques employed, to master the problems set by any clash of wills and
as a result to employ the techniques available with maximum efficiency", then strategy appears to
be pertinent to whatever situation that requires the implementation of decisions, particularly if there
is a clash of wills. Beaufre (1965:209) further provided an appropriate definition after considering
the referred to defmition that strategy should be viewed as the "art of the dialectic of two opposing
wills using force to resolve their dispute." The objective is to compel, through the utilisation or
threat of usage of force, the enemy to accept the terms intended to be imposed on him. A
psychological reaction is required from the enemy that he does not pursue an endeavour to reverse
what is demanded of him.
Strategy can thus be viewed as ends, ways and means, which implies that there are objectives
envisaged through which certain courses of action can be achieved with the utilisation of given
instruments (Beaufre, 1965:209-210). According to Buzan (1987:7), the strategists' unique
speciality is about matters that relate to the instruments of force and how they affect relations among
and within states. If strategy is employed towards the attainment of political objectives, these
therefore become politico-strategic objectives, rather than economic, cultural, commercial or
otherwise. They thus have a direct impact on the political and strategic relations between and within
states and other actors in the international system, as well as on the national security of these states.
Hence, they are closely intertwined with the problems of global and national security between and
within states.
4.2.2 Politico-Strategic Incentives for Arms Transfers
The basic requirement for security and protection motivates states and groups to acquire arms. This
is often influenced by several reasons such as: the supplier state's eagerness to allow or forbid
certain kinds of weapon sales or military aid; the recipient state's domestic and/or foreign policies;
interaction between the suppliers and recipients on matters of security and defence; the activities of
private arms dealers; agreements or treaties; conflicts, including war and threats of war;
technological developments; the price and quantity of arms; and the demands of doctrine and
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strategy (Frank, 1969:23-25). National security interests are basically responsible for state
suppliers and recipients to be involved in arms transfers relationships, and therefore can never be
construed to merely reflect unilateral activities of supplying and receiving (Kolodziej, 1979:9).
According to Kolodziej (1979:9), arms transfers are actually political in character, because both
recipients and suppliers want to achieve egotistic strategic interests that mayor may not be
commensurate; and the accomplished transaction may have diverse effects on the internal or
external security relations of both parties. The ideal goal of arms transfers is to satisfy the military
ambitions of the parties with regard to the international hierarchy of power, to augment their
diplomatic position, and subsequently strengthen their respective regimes. Therefore, arms transfers
are basically a low cost and a politically less irritable alternative to stationing troops abroad to
secure what are perceived to be vital interests and to assist allies in need.
Pierre (1982:5) affirms that states usually acquire arms for security reasons, particularly towards
their neighbours and to augment their reputation in the regional balance of power. This, therefore,
constitutes the importance of viewing arms transfers from a regional perspective, because it
provides a proper foundation for their analysis, comprehension, and control. Arms, according to
Pierre (1982:5-6), have a double-pronged effect on the region into which they have been
transferred. The first effect is that they, without intrinsically leading to war, may intensify
contradictions, instigate an arms race, and make war conceivable. On the other hand, arms may
have a positive effect on regional relations, by deterring bellicosity, by calibrating the regional
balance of power, and by restoring general stability. Nonetheless, regardless of the convergence and
divergence of security interests, these can both support the pursuit of an arms transfer relationship,
as manifested in the support given to belligerent parties in a conflict.
Inmost instances suppliers do not have control as to how the arms transferred are to be used by the
recipient. Kolodziej (1979:10-11) argues that the reason is that the incentives that prompted the
initial transfer are usually stronger than those of guaranteeing as to how the arms are to be
ultimately utilised. However, the degree of sophistication of the equipment transferred may provide
a certain level of control for the supplier, particularly with regard to spare parts, maintenance or
repair capability, and other components when an alternative source of supply is unavailable. This,
as such, connotes a dependency relationship. Ideally, Stanley and Pearton (1972:65-66) insist that
all states in the interests of national security prefer to be independent from suppliers abroad in their
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arms acquisitions programmes, however, very few states possess the capabilities to do so. Besides
the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union, and presumably the PRC, no other state had a
sufficiently wide armed force base that allowed for economies of scale in the production of
sophisticated armaments without a resort to imports and exports. These states' defence industries
could maintain a large measure of production, consequently accompanied by a competitive unit cost
as they participated in the global arms market. This participation guaranteed benefits in their
balance of payments, it ensured the amortisation of research and development costs, and moreover it
reduced the costs of their armed forces' procurement programmes.
Within a supplier-preponderant dependency relationship, therefore, suppliers can exaggerate the
controls at their disposal, such as arms embargoes, and restricting some or all of the supplies. The
recipient, on the other hand, may respond by seeking alternative suppliers, cannibalise existing
equipment for spare parts, improve on its indigenous capability to produce armaments, and even put
domestic pressure on the supplier to continue with the required supplies. As a matter of fact, there
are various trade-offs that suppliers and recipients seek in arms transfer relationships. "Where
strategic interests are shared, where a common adversary has been identified, where there is an
agreed-upon military strategy on how to deal with an external threat, arms and bases will be of a
fabric" (Kolodziej, 1979:11). Moreover, Kolodziej (1979: 11-12) maintains that arms transfers can
also be utilised to advance regional security and to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, albeit there is little evidence that supports the success of the latter.
4.2.3 Politico-Military Benefits and Costs
Before grants or sales of armaments were utilised to further military ambitions abroad, states used to
rely on alliances, which proved to be capricious and fragile. Allies, therefore, could be militarily
strengthened through the grant or sale of arms, which could be accompanied by the possibility of
obtaining or installing facilities within their territories. However, the granting or the selling of arms
to allies was not only focussed on reinforcing their capabilities, since, according to Stanley and
Pearton (1972:72-73), there were other benefits that the supplier state could obtain. The most
substantiated politico-military benefits of transferring arms for suppliers included support for allies
and friends; symbolic emphasis of friendly relations; influence of the supplier over the recipients;
leverage on specific policy issues; rights of access to bases, facilities and over-flight rights; the
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accomplishment of the goal of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and for testing
newly-developed combat equipment (Catrina, 1988:71-72).
The sophistication of the supplied arms would require a lasting maintenance and training
relationship between the supplier and the recipient states, and this in turn would ensure that the
supplier state maintains control over the combat utilisation of the equipment and subsequently over
the military policy of the recipient state. The training relationship would require that the supplier
state integrates its own forces within the military hierarchy of the recipient state and subsequently
providing an opportunity for ideological indoctrination of these forces. Furthermore, arms exports
could guarantee a certain level of standardisation within the forces of the allied states. Therefore,
arms exports had an important politico-strategic role to play for ambitious or hegemonic states in
spreading their military tentacles globally. In the first instance there was the utilisation of arms
transfers in obtaining a basing/staging post or flying-over rights. Another advantage were the
benefits from the balance of payments that could be used to offset the costs of having to station
troops abroad (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:74-76).
For Pierre (1982:20-21), arms transferred to assist allies are often cloaked in the robe of
establishing or perpetuating a regional balance of power, which is a relative concept as one state's
balance may be another's imbalance. This is frequently threatened by the possibility of an
indomitable arms race, which is also open to various and even contradictory interpretations. States
usually aver the need to establish bases in the territory of the recipient for forward garrisoning and
for installing intelligence gathering facilities. States also justify the sale of arms on the grounds that
in most cases these have the potential of being tested by the recipients rather than the suppliers.
Arms transfers are, however, not a zero-sum game as it is usually assumed, as the transfer of
military capabilities can also benefit and harm the recipients' interests. The supply of arms can, on
the one hand, be viewed as an implied commitment of friendship; an expression of privileged status;
reverse leverage of the recipient; and the restoration of the morale of the armed forces (Catrina
1988:74-75). On the other hand, there are numerous costs for recipients that include the instigation
of regional arms races; the loss of influence and leverage over the suppliers; surreptitiously implied
identification with the supplier's policies; the influx of foreign personnel; environmentally inept
equipment; and inter-arms-of-services contention (Catrina 1988:75).
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Besides the numerous costs that a recipient state may fmd within an arms transfer relationship, there
are also various military costs and political disadvantages that a supplier state may encounter in
sending arms abroad. Pierre (1982:22-23) affirms that first amongst these is the problem of re-
transfers of which supplier states have no control over as soon as they have been procured abroad.
Lately, most arms transfers are conducted with a clause impeding the recipient from selling the arms
purchased to a third party, or the manner in which these arms are going to be utilised, and this is
usually done through the usage of end-user certificates. However, realistically this is a difficult goal
to achieve, as there are no guarantees to the effect that the arms will not be re-transferred or used in
inconsiderate circumstances. The second problem is the transfer of large consignments that results
in the depletion of the supplier's own inventory and thereby reduce the armed forces' state of
military preparedness. This is always a sore point between the military and political officials as the
former are most concerned about the equipment and the military readiness of their own armed forces
regardless of the political, particularly foreign policy related, consequences.
The third problem that Pierre (1982:23-24) advances relates to the political repercussions that are
associated with the sale of arms to regimes that might be regarded as coarse, with the sudden
changes in political or military bloc alignments that are often unpredictable and therefore hazardous.
Finally, Pierre (1982:24) claims that the problem of transferring arms is that it has the potential of
fmally dragging the supplier state into war. If the antagonistic party that is presumed to be having
more arms support from another parallel supplier, the possibilities for an indomitable arms race that
requires political intervention and resolution is increasing. If the ally is in greater danger of being
vanquished, the possibilities are greater that the supplier state might be dragged into the conflict
since it can not allow its confederates to be subjugated. Other politico-military costs for suppliers,
according to Catrina (1988:71-72), include the loss of flexibility in enduring arms transfers;
opprobrious social outcomes; loss of dignity; technology transfers leading to diminished
competence; the impact of exports on the designing and development of weapon systems; and
ultimately industrial dependence.
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4.3 POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC AND IDEOLOGICAL REASONS
4.3.1 The Political Significance of Arms Transfers
The political connotations that are unique to the arms trade as opposed to the trade in other
commodities, according to Catrina (1988:12-13), are founded on several factors. Arms are
commensurate with the objective of national and global security, which are the basic goals of all
nation-states or state-nations. Furthermore, is the perceived utility that when they are being
transferred they assume a more political than a mere military utility. Finally, their transfer could be
a reflection of the global distribution of military capabilities, which have an extremely sensitive
impact on the international balance of power. In short, the search for national security, which
encompasses the pursuit of territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence by all states
and governments becomes a consequent relationship between the arms suppliers and the recipients,
as the former produce the means for the pursuit of these objectives by the latter. Arms suppliers do
not relinquish their national security or political independence by offering arms to the recipients,
however, in the long- or medium-term, their failure to export arms may lead to the disintegration of
their arms industries, and that might be perceived as rendering their national security vulnerable to
threats.
The profound political significance that the arms production and transfer system has adorned since
the Second World War, according to Stanley and Pearton (1972:6-7), has continued to ensure that
the governments are deeply involved in the system. This is not a matter of choice or preference
since the arms production and transfer system is rooted within the anarchic sovereign state global
system, and as such, it can not be halted without impeding the other. With virtually all arms
producing states, the condition for low cost indigenous production and procurement is almost
entirely dependent upon the ability to export arms, which is an economic problem for the arms
industry, and a political question for the state (Catrina, 1988:13). Actually, Stanley and Pearton
(1972:7) aver that there were two ways in which arms transfers were utilised for political objectives
in the Cold War era: firstly, as part of the conduct of foreign relations; and secondly, in the
determination of the political orientation of a state by the preponderance of the type of weapons it
possessed in its inventory. During this period, arms transfers played an integral part in the foreign
relations of each and every supplier and recipient state. According to the late former president of
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Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, the sale of arms became "a declaration of support - an implied alliance of
a kind" (excerpted from Catrina, 1988:13).
4.3.2 Political and Diplomatic Incentives: Waging Politics with Arms Transfers
Arms transfers can also be used to obtain influence, beyond politico-strategic or military ambitions.
In the Cold War era, the major arms suppliers had undisguised political purposes for arms transfers
and these were steadfastly pursued in the ensuing competition for disciple states. Each of the
leading supplier states, particularly the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union, had to
introduce new arms export inducements in order to prevent the target state from purchasing from the
other supplier in what was labelled as "pre-emptive sales" (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:81-82). Pre-
emptive selling refers to circumstances where an ally is involved in a crisis situation and the security
position demands the supplier state to introduce improvements in its arms supplies in order to
assuage the disparity created by potential or real arms imbalances favouring the adversary (Frank,
1969: 176).
However, with regard to smaller suppliers, arms sales or grants did not have strong political
influence motivations, albeit that does not mean that they were entirely lacking. "All arms-
manufacturing countries will wish to be in good odour politically in countries where they have
important economic interests - actual or potential - and supplying arms is judged a likely route to
political favour" (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:83). The state's power, proficiencies, and centre of
gravity in the international hierarchy of sovereignties, according to Lewis (1979: 186), are dependent
on its arms-supply endowments. Consequently, arms transfers create a relationship between both
the supplier and the recipient, which is, however, precarious, as both parties anticipate to benefit
from it in the form of leverage or influence for the supplier and the augmentation of the capabilities
of the recipient. Arms transfers conducted in the pursuit of diplomatic goals cannot be disentangled
from those in the pursuit of politico-strategic goals as the interests and motives are also indefmable.
Nonetheless, the usually stated objective is the extension of support for the regime that is accorded
arms or the denial of arms to an adversary of that regime.
This is the behaviour of both leading and emerging supplier states alike, and on the receiving end
this gesture, particularly with the broadening of the supplier camp, has been exploited for the sake
of maintaining strategic and diplomatic sovereignty (Kolodziej, 1979:12-13). The supplier's
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leverage is reduced as the web of interdependence unfolds and influence becomes enervated as the
recipient elects between it's own interests and those of the supplier. The fmal result is reverse
leverage, whereby the supplier is compelled to assume a share of the regional or extra-regional
responsibilities of the recipient, sometimes leading to compromising the original intentions of the
supplier. Therefore, the foreign policy conduit of arms transfers results in several interactions
between the suppliers and recipients that ultimately develop into mutual dependencies which help to
shape their responses to local, regional, and international problems and crises. However, these
mutual dependencies are not solid, as either party can elect to disengage from the relationship as
soon as vulnerabilities to vital national interests are discovered (Lewis, 1979:186-187).
Krause (1992: 15-16) insists that the global anarchic system, with its innate conflictive relations,
compels states to pursue large-scale arms production to satisfy foreign policy requirements. The
power of the state in pursuing these foreign policy requirements relies on military organisation
whose adequacy is dependent and greatly affected by weapons technology. The possession of
advanced technology by states is a pivotal component of the capabilities of a state in relation to
other states, and thus serves to explain the role of large-scale arms production in the pursuit of
power by states. Shifts in the distribution of capabilities are indicators of changes in the
international system, and the possession of military technology reflects one of the basic capabilities
of the state. States, therefore, in their pursuit of power, are incited to capture the processes of
military production and innovation. The interests of the state, according to Buzan (1987:40), are
primarily driven by political and secondarily by economic motivations. Two major political
interests, which are adjuncts to the pursuit of autarky for the maintenance of basic security
objectives, are the pursuit of power and influence. Influence and power in international relations
inter alia requires the establishment or the existence of an arms industry, which ensures the
demonstration of status as well as capability.
The pursuit of power is guaranteed with the existence of an arms industry as an exhibition of an
independent capacity to wage war. An arms industry also provides an important tool for influence
by ensuring that the supply of arms is used to gain leverage over, and therefore allegiance from,
lesser powers, as the superpowers clearly demonstrated during the Cold War. Political goals can be
served through arms supplies to allies, to gain new friends, or to oppose contrasting interests in a
specified zone of influence (Buzan, 1987:40). In certain instances the justification of transferring
arms is said to be the ability to gain access to both political and military leaders, which sometimes
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begins with the training of the officer corps of the target state. The endeavour is usually based on
"the possibility that the structure of the foreign army, its force levels, and its weapon systems will be
shaped by the training programs and arms of the supplier country" (Kolodziej, 1979:13-14).
Pierre (1982: 14-16) goes further by asserting that arms can also be used to invigorate alliance and
treaty commitments, with the supplier state supporting its allies within the alliance or through the
promotion of the obligations of a treaty that is in the supplier state's interests. This can also be done
through the denial of the supply of arms to the adversaries of the allies or the opponents of those
states expected to honour treaty obligations. The main political objective of this exercise is to
obtain leverage and influence over the foreign policy decisions or orientations of other states, which,
unfortunately, are fleeting phenomena as they can be forfeited much more expeditiously than they
have been accomplished. The utilisation of armaments to achieve foreign policy objectives can be
exaggerated, particularly their ability to cement relations between states, as this is an inefficient and
risky exercise. The relationship can be ephemeral, especially when alternative suppliers are
available to the recipient, and the consequent political costs become immense for the supplier. The
recipient's acknowledgement of the dependency relationship implied in the conditions of a
transaction may lead to repentance, thus resulting in a capricious relationship that restrains the
activities of both parties (Pierre, 1982: 18-19).
It is not, however, always the case that arms are a foreign policy instrument, especially for the
secondary leading and emerging suppliers, perhaps with the exception of the so-called pariah states,
whose exports are perceived to be a diplomatic opportunity within an antagonistic environment
(Catrina, 1988:14-15). Only a few arms supplier states have the potential to use their arms exports
as a primary part of their foreign policy. The situation with most governments of the secondary
leading and emerging arms supplying states is that they have a limited effect on a global scale,
particularly within a buyers' market, and consequently have to adapt their policies to become more
commercially-orientated. This does not mean that secondary leading and emerging arms supplying
states do not have to take political implications into consideration, as there is a difference between
how they have to execute their arms transfer policies vis-ez-vis the primary leading suppliers. The
question for them is always negative, to wit, they have to indicate to what type of recipients they
should not export armaments so as to avoid embarrassing situations. For the primary leading
suppliers it is different, since they have to decide on political grounds which states shall receive
weapons, all in the name of promoting their political aspirations.
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Therefore, in the Cold War era, virtually all arms producing states were reputed to sell arms in order
to extend and consolidate their influence over other states. This practice is still the same today,
except in terms of the position of the relevant supplier state, whether it is a minor power, a middle
power, or a leading power, in the international hierarchy of states. Klein (1980: 145) maintains that
leading powers have the means to exert influence of which the middle and minor powers are
apparently denied. However, recipient states in a buyer' market are in a position of pitting the
suppliers against each other and also to diversify their supply sources, thus alleviating their
dependence on one supplier. Due to the vulnerability of arms industries to vacillations in foreign
orders, recipients are presumed to dictate the terms of trade in the market. Furthermore, as a means
to sustain their sovereignty, recipient states are likely to develop their own industries thus
transcending into an area previously predominated by industrialised states. However, according to
Pearson (1994:54), research revealed that arms transfers are not a reliable instrument for politico-
strategic influence since they rarely evoke significant political concessions from the recipient.
Nonetheless, on the one hand, short-term concessions are usually attained in the form of basing
areas, but long-term goals, on the other hand, such as changes in the recipient's policies or
influencing the regional balance of power, are not easily realised.
4.4 ECONOMIC REASONS
As an industrial process like all other production processes, arms production depends to a certain
extent "on various inputs and factor endowments in an economy" (Krause, 1992: 13). These include
the standard of industrialisation, an appropriate infrastructure, advanced human resources, backward
and forward connections with other sectors of the economic industry to provide raw materials, sub-
contracting and marketing of spin-offs, a certain degree of state support and control, and the
establishment of a market for the goods. These factors, as well as the political will in the pursuit of
power, which initiated the establishment of an arms industry in the first place, determine the
successes of the arms production and trade endeavour. Constraints on the production process are
primarily determined by the economic factors, particularly the distribution of the factor endowments
that dictates the process' geographical limitations. The state's ability to adapt to changes in the
production process determines the process' long-term successes instead of the ability to copy-
produce technology at its prevailing frontiers. The amalgamation of political and economic
incentives prescribes the pace at which these processes are adopted.
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4.4.1 Economic and Technological Incentives for Arms Transfers
The politico-strategic imperatives behind the pursuit of arms transfers are further redefmed by
economic and technological considerations. According to Kolodziej (1979:14-15), the main
motives for exporting arms range from long and balanced runs through efficient series production to
the ability to spread the costs of research, development and industrial production over a wide
spectrum of production units. The major factor here is that the inability to attain a market window
for the produced armaments will result in the state having to absorb all these costs and ultimately
failing to meet other imperative social priorities. This pressure to sell arms can be construed to be
the ability to use scarce resources efficiently and, as such, compels governments, regardless of
ideological orientation, to respond in a specific manner, although taking into consideration the
varying circumstances. Immediate amongst these circumstances are the availability and
development of productive resources; the existence of national unanimity on the absorption of
military costs as part of the social outlays; and finally, the extent of the arms production capability
that has to be kept running for future utilisation.
The major problem often encountered is that arms manufacturers commonly consider arms like any
other commodity, to have a market value and, as such, to be a potential reservoir of profit. Viewed
from this dimension, arms production and sales, regardless of the losses incurred, are promoted as
the solution, particularly for the perpetuation and advancement of the state's production capability
(Kolodziej, 1979: 15). Kolodziej (1979: 16-17) stresses that a large "number of arms-production
centers, joined to expand scientific and technological capabilities, accelerates the upward spiral of
competitive lethality". The endeavour to maintain and advance scientific and technological
discovery combined with the economics of arms production generates a synergistic effect that drives
the qualitative and quantitative dilation of international production and transfer of armaments. The
complex technological, scientific and economic processes that are a consequence, overcast by
traditional security and political contests, become difficult to control, resulting in hitherto
unforeseen arms races. Arms transfers, therefore, appear to be the obscure answer to the resolution
of contradictions between politico-strategic and diplomatic requirements and the domestic socio-
economic essentials (Kolodziej, 1979:15).
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4.4.2 Technology and Human Resources: The Pursuit of Development
The transfer of technology is an important input into the process of development. This, combined
with the flexibility that exists amongst the various sectors of the economy, insinuates that the socio-
economic growth and development of a state is intensely influenced by the infusion of military as
well as civilian technology (Neuman, 1979:226-227). According to Neuman (1979:227), those who
deny this fact have to look at the scale of training, infrastructure construction, and industrial demand
procreated by the inculcation of military technology. Moreover, its overtures ensure that new
communities and eventually satellite cities are developed, particularly in remote areas, thus
introducing the necessary amenities such as water, roads, electricity, communications, housing and
ports, as well as the development of human resources. Furthermore, there are countless examples of
the spin-offs from military technology into the civilian sectors that cannot be ruled out as part of
inputs into the development process. The spin-offs in terms of skilled labour from the arms
production process are enormous, but these are accompanied by political problems, particularly
within constituencies where arms industries are located (Stanley and Pearton, 1972: 132-133).
Arms industries are one of the effective instruments for overcoming problems of unemployment in
depressed areas through sponsorship or the allocation of contracts. However, problems of flexibility
are often encountered when a government-sponsored project is faced with financial difficulties or
when skilled labour requires to be relocated. Currently, defence industries are less dependent on
specific localities for their manufacturing processes and, in most instances, local communities are no
longer dependent on them for employment opportunities. These industries rather encourage rigidity
in terms of technical education, perceptions on social development, and the restraints they impose
on diversity (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:132-134). Therefore, Neuman's (1979:228) study
generated three important fmdings. Firstly, at a certain period of time socio-economic standards are
mutated by the introduction of military technology. Secondly, the quality and quantity of equipment
procured, determines the extent of technological spin-offs into the civilian sectors. Finally, the
generation of skilled labour, infrastructure construction, and industrial productivity are the essential
ingredients dictating the pace of socio-economic development.
4.4.3 Maintaining a Domestic Arms Industry
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Primary among the characteristics of the current arms production and transfer system is the demand
it imposes on funds that are embodied in costs for research, development and manufacturing.
Regardless of these spiralling costs on the defence manufacturing industry, there has been less
assured prospects for securing arms export orders. As more and more states develop the capacity to
manufacture weapons, the numbers of suppliers increases, thus saturating the market and
intensifying the extent of competition. Accordingly, the defence industry is embroiled in an
inevitable dependency relationship with governments, as the latter provide the elementary funding
for research and development for major projects, as well as endorse the creation and maintenance of
domestic and external markets (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:5-6). As a result, most arms producing
states are pressurised to export arms in order to compensate for the costs of production and also to
be exposed to the ferocious competition in the market. Accordingly, they are introduced to the
necessarily tenacious technological developments such that they can subsequently improve on their
own technical faculties.
The state's competitive position is also perceived to be improved by the exportation of arms,
particularly by advanced industries in terms of technological accomplishments. A higher value in
terms of foreign exchange is presumably bestowed by sophisticated arms when compared to less
advanced and unprocessed goods. Moreover, armaments are believed to ease the burden of paying
for imports, for providing access to strategic resources, and for securing domestic employment and
economic growth. "For developed economies", Kolodziej (1979:15-16) argues that "arms
production and sales are seen as the advanced thrust of the civilian expansion of the nation's
economy and as a means of keeping pace in the technological race and in the search for markets.
For developing states, an armaments industry, like the aeronautics industry in Brazil, is considered a
key component of a nation's economic and political modernization."
"Deprivation of the export market", according to Stanley and Pearton (1972:69), ''would probably
mean a slow death for anyone of these companies as they are constituted at present." Arms
industries in states with a large demand from their own armed forces, such as in the United States,
are advantaged by the economies of scale that result from long production runs. This in turn means
that their unit costs are desirably lower compared to their competitors in the arms market, especially
with regard to sophisticated armaments. The withdrawal of such states from the international arms
market will not be disastrous, but it would be economically rather uncomfortable for them.
However, for those states that rely on exports for maintaining their arms industries, the denial of
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exports would imperil their national security and "the social and economic consequences of such a
withdrawal would hold out extreme hazards in domestic politics" (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:70-
72).
Armaments are high value items and as a result they have a minor impact on altering the balance of
payments. Stanley and Pearton (1972:124-125) argue that their national conversion ratio - goods
that require a high proportion of national knowledge, skills and domestically produced materials - is
very high and consequently their earning power is more than what numerical figures provide.
Therefore, their innate high value and prominent conversion ratio makes them a tantalising
commodity for export, primarily for attaining foreign exchange and subsequently advantaging the
national coffers. Moreover, the export of advanced weapons necessitates the further sale of spare
parts as well as the demand for accessory equipment, infrastructure, training and technicians. "It is
therefore not surprising that weapons are one of the most buoyant items of international trade"
(Stanley and Pearton, 1972: 131).
What should be noted is that there is no substantial reciprocity between the state of balance of
payments and the arms trade. This, according to Stanley and Pearton (1972:131-132), is apparent
when the fluctuations in the balance of payments are observed: when they are in deficit trade does
not regularly increase, or when they are in surplus it does not decrease. There are various factors
that influence this state of affairs and these inter alia include the demand for armaments; the
proclivity to protect or maintain earned markets; the long-time spans between orders; and the
opportunistic allurement of prospective sales. Notwithstanding, the enticement to export arms is
apparently urged by the balance of payments regardless of the efficacy of the effort.
4.4.4 The Logic towards Enlarging the Market
The process of arms production is supposed to be more exacting during all the phases, which
invariably includes less tolerances as well as assiduous testing for reliability. Stanley and Pearton
(1972:140-142) contend that the innate uncertainties tend to make the arms industry to be highly
inflexible, particularly if the industry is not diversified to include civil production within the
establishment. This allows overheads from military production to be diffused into civil production
and also to equilibrate the workload within the establishment. Secondly, the costs have to be
shouldered by governments as private manufacturers and fmancial institutions are virtually unable
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to sustain the risks or to mobilise the resources required for the arms production process. Thirdly,
the focus of arms production is not always to maximise but to optimise output. This is based on the
logic and experience that arms production and transfer policy is always grounded on the same
premises: that production which is focused on military priorities in order to determine the quantity
and type of weapon systems required, is essentially a costly qualitative and quantitative exercise;
and if production is focused on economic priorities, then few sophisticated weapon systems are
produced, which is both a costly and complicated exercise.
Government and industry are compelled, in both instances, to increase output so as to compensate
for the costs incurred and to hope for the amortisation of the costs through foreign sales.
Contemporarily, with the increase in sophisticated weapon systems, the break-even point in arms
production takes longer to reach, albeit it is usually compensated for by the learning curve (Stanley
and Pearton, 1972:142-142). A continuous urge by non-producing states to procure weapon
systems based on the right to defend themselves adds to the desire by arms producers to increase
their arms sales and, therefore, the non-producing states will always uphold this right to their
sovereignty, dignity, independence and equality (Buzan, 1987:41-42). This right ensures that the
non-producing states do not become second-class states by not being able to match their forces with
those of the arms producing states and thus being politically reduced to becoming states that fail to
manage their own circumstances.
The maintenance and the augmentation of the arms trade is thus characterised by a strong
community of interests between the suppliers and recipients, and this proclivity guarantees that arms
transfers continue to be a central feature of international relations (Buzan, 1987:42). For the
emerging suppliers, including most of the leading suppliers, the lengthening of the production runs
is of crucial importance because the average price of each unit produced is permitted to fall as the
costs of production are spread over a wider number of units. Secondly, if costs can be recouped
from a longer run, then sales can be based on the marginal rather than the average cost, thus
allowing greater flexibility to lower the price in order to capture the market. Finally, the learning
curve has to be redrawn on each and every phase, and if the production run is interrupted, it
becomes detrimental to the whole process thus the benefits are delayed (Stanley and Pearton,
1972:145-146).
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It is therefore in the interests of both the manufacturers and governments to lengthen the production
runs rather than to cancel a project. For emerging suppliers to be able to compete effectively in the
arms market, wherein the type of weapon systems, the trends of arms production and transfers, as
well as the environment for the types of weapons to be employed are determined by the leading
suppliers, they have to offset the strains through efficient production that can be achieved by
prolonging the production run, or through enlarging the arms market. Emerging suppliers as well as
other leading producers, like those in Western Europe, have to co-operate, co-develop and co-
produce as a way of enlarging the market. According to Stanley and Pearton (1972:146-147), ''the
logic of producing advanced weapons implies that the alternative to co-production is not national
production, but no production at all".
4.4.5 Economic Benefits and Costs
From an economic perspective, Catrina (1988:71-72) maintains that arms transfers' benefits include
the achievement of favourable balance of payments; the support of employment programmes; the
maintenance of a sustainable defence production base; linkage of commercial sales to defence sales;
as well as security in the supply of resources such as raw and strategic materials. Pearson (1994:37-
38) also agrees that advanced defence technology has always ensured sustained exports, high
employment levels and enduring profits, even during periods of economic recession, due to directed
government research and development investments that ease the costs, the risks and constraints of
production. The costs are lowered with longer production runs as processes are being mastered and
as economies of scale are being established. Therefore, government guarantees to procure large
numbers of equipment for their armed forces, widening export markets, and subsequent expanded
production, reduces the costs of the unit produced and ensures dilated profits. Hence, government
agencies playa major role to arrange and fmance exports in order to sustain industrial employment
and at the same time reduce the costs of the equipment required by the state's armed forces.
Cahn (1979: 175-176) believes that there are at least three ways to measure the role of arms transfers
in a state's economy: the relative importance of exports towards the gross national product (GNP);
the arms exports versus the total exports ratio; and the arms exports contra the gross national
product ratio. According to Cahn's inferences, arms exports are both important and encouraging to
the arms producing states' defence production and economies, including those of the major arms
producing states - although with regard to the latter, they have a relatively minute effect on total
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economic performance. These benefits are also accompanied by costs, which include detrimental
effects on development as a result of large financial resources absorbed by defence expenditure; re-
transfers that impact on the suppliers' competence; and the subsequent impact of arms transfers on
commodity prices (Catrina, 1988:72).
Pierre (1982:24) also affirms that the economic significance of arms transfers are not as remarkable
as they are usually portrayed. According to Pierre (1982:24-26), case studies conducted in the past
revealed that the economic benefits of arms transfers are less than what is commonly presumed.
There were two inferences that could be deduced from the economic effects of arms transfers.
Firstly, that arms exports usually constitute a minute fraction of the total exports for most arms
producing states. Indeed, arguments against the justifications promoting arms sales maintain that
the vindications based on the positive effects arms sales have on the balance-of-payments are
pernicious because arms exports are a minor component of the total exports of leading arms
suppliers. Moreover, these rationales are open-ended as they can defend any arms transaction.
Furthermore, any export of a domestic product, be it civilian or military, provides the same benefits
on the balance-of-trade (Cahn, 1979: 176-177). Therefore, the effects of restraining the export of
armaments would have a little impact on the economies of most of the arms producing states, with
the exception of the regions and firms that are dependent on arms production (Pierre, 1982:24-25).
The second inference was that no arms producing state was less or more dependent than others on
arms exports for enhancing its balance of payments (Pierre, 1982:26-27). Often the justification is
that arms sales stimulate commercial transactions (Cahn, 1979: 177). However, according to the
data on total exports of the major western states, this allegation is nullified, since there is no
evidence suggesting or indicating that a recipient state's procurement of a specific supplier's
weapon system automatically led to the extension of trade relations. On the contrary, trade relations
might have existed between the supplier and the recipient prior to an arms transfer relationship or
that a dependency relationship was a consequence of an arms transaction due to other arrangements
that were part and parcel of the whole package, such as spare parts, components, sub-systems,
training and maintenance. It is usually the tendency of the authorities of the respective supplier
states to justify their arms sales on the basis that one of the economic benefits of arms transfers is
the opening up of civilian markets.
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Another argument for arms sales is that they ensure collaboration amongst allies. It is true that co-
operative research and development reduces the costs by avoiding duplication, by encouraging
longer production runs, and by ensuring a relatively reliable and expansive market. Nevertheless,
there are impediments too, in terms of the costs commensurate with the politico-strategic and
economic complications of co-ordination and the absence of competition (Cahn, 1979: 177-178).
Therefore, arms transfers are a means of maintaining viable national defence industries that are
connected to images of independence, sovereignty and prestige, which are, nonetheless, political
enterprises (Pierre, 1982:27).
Regarding employment, Cahn (1979: 179-180) argues that the defence industry employs between
one and one-and-a-half percent of the working population in virtually all the arms producing states.
The main power of this industry is located in the fact that it is partly or wholly government owned in
most of these states, and if not, the government has a vested politico-strategic interest in it. The
decisions that governments adopt that might have an adverse effect on the industry are reflected
directly, unequivocally, and consequently politically, on the respective governments. The major
factor of employment is further impounded by the fact that the more sophisticated the equipment the
industry produces, the more capital-intensive it becomes, particularly when compared to other forms
of public enterprise. Therefore, the labour force employed in the defence industry has to be
disproportionately highly trained and skilled.
According to Catrina (1988:75-76), the main benefit of arms transfers is the transfer of technology
that may benefit an indigenous arms industry or may have civilian application also. Other benefits
are the offset arrangements that tend to have a positive impact on the recipient state's economy if
they are sustainable, and if not, they become a sheer reduction of the cost of the procured
equipment. Costs are usually manifested in the drain they cause on financial resources, regardless
of the terms of contract, as weapon systems also require infrastructure, consumables and
maintenance. Moreover, the domestic industry may be compelled to be re-orientated towards
defence production at the expense of civilian production, particularly within states with an inchoate
industry.
With regard to the balance-of-payments considerations, Cahn (1979: 175-176) assumes that short-
term advantages can be accumulated as a result of increased sales, but these are counteracted by
foreign exchange constraints that most would-be recipients encounter. Recipient states would rather
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purchase capital equipment and other non-military commodities from the supplier state with the
meagre foreign exchange funds than armaments procured through offset arrangements. On a long-
term basis, arms sales increases would confer an exchange rate appreciation that could strengthen
the supplier state's currency, but at the same time causing a decline in the export of non-military
commodities. The result would be a decline in employment in the civilian sectors of the economy.
Therefore, an adequately performing economy would achieve the same employment levels, with or
without increased arms sales. The only difference will be that the different sectors of the economy,
the civilian and defence sectors, will be dissimilarly affected.
In short, there are defmitely negative spin-offs on society from the introduction of military
technology, on the one hand, depending on the type and quantity of equipment received. These,
amongst others, include the drain on sparse human and natural resources, the disruption of civilian
amenities, as well as the strain on the infrastructure and communications facilities (Neuman,
1979:235-236). On the other hand, no matter how gloomy the economic picture of arms transfers
can be painted, Cahn (1979: 180) declares that there are, of course, economic benefits and causes of
prospective savings that can be identified. These include the restoration of research and
development outlays, the accomplishment of economies of scale accompanied by the effects of the
learning curve, the reduction of overheads, and the stabilisation of the production-line if it is not
affected by cessation and the consequent start-up costs.
Therefore, prima facie, the benefits of arms transfers may appear to be massive on the entire
economy, particularly with regard to the creation of wealth, the generation of employment, and the
positive effect they might have on the balance of payments. However, most evidence denotes that
such benefits are not that significant, especially for states that are heavily dependent on domestic
demand for armaments. Indeed, there might be negative implications on employment and trivial
consequences on the balance of payments, but on the surface, benefits can only be evident if
concessionary arrangements are not inherent in the contracts, as they tend to diminish the benefits of
arms transfers (Krause, 1992: 108-11 0). Therefore, the macro-economic benefits of arms exports
are relatively minor even though the overall impact of arms production on the economy may be
consequential, and as such, arms transfers are fundamentally subordinated to the pursuit of power
considerations.
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4.5 OBJECTIVES COMPARED
As it has been observed, the three important concerns, wealth, power and war, which are also sets of
forces for change in international relations, are intersected by the system of arms transfers (Krause,
1992:2-3). Wealth, on the one hand, refers to those economic forces that shape the manufacturing
and dispensary of goods between and within states. To a certain extent, arms production and trade
is vulnerable to the same pressures and dynamics that affect the production and distribution of other
commodities. On the other hand, the pursuit of power by states and groups often compels them to
change their positions within the arms transfers system, thus reflecting changes in the hierarchy of
power within the international system, since preponderance within the system is partly determined
by the state's ability to seize the process of defence innovation and production. As another
dimension, the pursuit of victory in war is usually a facilitator of drastic changes in military
innovation and production and, moreover, it has a significant influence on the society within which
new military technologies are introduced.
According to Krause (1992:2-4), the motor of technological change is primarily the motive force
driving the life cycle of the arms production and transfer system. The location of the state within
this cycle along with the progress of the cycle per se, decisively determine the options that states
have in terms of using arms transfers as instruments of influence. It is important to understand the
manner in which the structure limits and provides opportunities to the options available to the
actors, as well as the impact of past constraints to recent trends, rather than to focus on the
mentioned schemes of the policy-makers. There is a common acknowledgement amongst all states
that arms transfers have both political and economic advantages and drawbacks, along with
implications of security and insecurity for themselves and other actors. Within the domain of global
security, arms transfers have become a tool of government diplomacy, indeed a notable diplomatic
tool, increasingly "valuable than ties of history, or culture, or treaty, or even of investment and non-
military trade" (Stanley and Pearton, 1972:8-9).
4.5.1 The Arms Makers and Suppliers
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides a typology consisting of
three tiers of suppliers according to their different patterns of behaviour and policy orientations
(Harkavy, 1975:97-98). Firstly, it is the hegemonic pattern of supply, whereby major suppliers use
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arms transfers in a comprehensive endeavour to obtain or preserve spheres of influence, thus arms
transfers become instruments for politico-strategic purposes. Secondly, it is an industrial pattern of
supply, wherein the intention is to preserve an advanced arms industry by achieving economies of
scale through far-reaching exports. Within this pattern of supply, in its purest form, arms are
exported indiscriminately to those who have the ability to pay. However, in reality, most suppliers
are bound to follow this pattern of supply, although not in its purest form, due to politico-strategic
considerations. The final pattern of supply is the restrictive one, whereby supplier self-imposed
restrictions are implemented as they pertain to states that are reputed to be directly or indirectly
involved in internal, regional or global conflict. With the last pattern, supplier states vouch to
export arms where they are not to be obnoxiously used, but are procured for deterrence, prestige and
exhibition.
However, Krause (1992:98) provides another typology similar to the SIPRI version, but goes further
to uncover the variation in the motives of the various suppliers according to the tier to which they
belong. This typology provides a classic method of determining the location of a supplier in the
hierarchy of the arms production and transfer system (see Figure 4.1 below). The primary leading
suppliers, in the first-tier, are presumed to be relatively obdurate to economic factors and
unperturbed by the pursuit of victory in war, as they are technologically preponderant and huge in
size, therefore are focused on the pursuit of political power in their arms production and transfers.
Secondary leading producers and suppliers in the second-tier are compelled to follow the pursuit of
wealth because they are driven to follow the technological lead of the frrst-tier states (Krause,
1992:98). For the primary leading arms supplier states the main purpose of transferring arms is to
fulfil the ends of foreign policy, with economic benefits assuming a secondary rank, which is vice
versa for the secondary leading suppliers in the second-tier (Catrina, 1988:70). Finally, third-tier
emerging supplier states are assumed to follow the pursuit of victory in war, or the pursuit of
security, as they are technologically inferior and vulnerable (Krause, 1992:98). For the emerging
suppliers it is presumed that arms transfers are primarily an instrument of maintaining and
expanding a viable defence industry and also an integral part of international trade (Catrina,
1988:70).
The central assertion here is that the "interaction of these different motivations after a period of
revolutionary technological innovation directs the evolution of the global arms transfer and
production system and helps explain the rapid diffusion of new military technologies, as states
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attempt to assert their status and independence in the international political hierarchy" (Krause,
1992:98). Nevertheless, for all the arms supplying states, regardless of rank in the arms production
and transfer system, arms transfers involve both political and economic considerations, and thus
they also serve political goals by virtue of intending to maintain a sustainable arms industry. In this
sense economic means are used to serve political ends, or in other words, economic sustainability is
"not an end in itself but a means to achieve maximum self-sufficiency in arms procurement"
(Catrina, 1988:70).
Figure 4.1 OBJECTIVES COMPARED
SUPPLIERS
Adapted from Keith Krause (1992:98)
RATIONALE
Poli tica I Po'Wer
Wealth
Victory in War
Wealth
Pol itica I Powwer
Victory in War
Victory in War
Wealth
Politica I Po'Wer
Although British, French and German views tend to stress the economic benefits of arms exports
(Cahn, 1979: 181), it is the usual assertion by those states to use arms supplies for commercial
reasons and that they are apathetic about influencing the recipient's inclination, identity or political
allegiances. They often argue that they are only concerned with the profits they gain from arms
exports, which ensure employment and longer production runs. The client's ability to pay and credit
ratings are presumed to be the primary factors for a transaction to take place, even if the recipients
are opposing belligerents in the same conflict. This is the common argument often advocated by the
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secondary leading suppliers that they use arms exports to compensate for their limited domestic
arms markets because their military establishments are relatively small to maintain their arms
industries ''warm or operational" (Pearson, 1994:54-55).
However, the benefits are more substantial than they appear to be in pure economic terms. For the
British, the French and the Germans, arms transfers are vital for the enduring activity of the national
defence production lines, which is innately entangled in the pursuit of political independence 'and
prestige within the anarchical global system of sovereignties (Cahn, 1979: 182). For these states
arms industries are strategically significant for future security considerations, which means that
commercial incentives are combined with politico-strategic reasons for arms transfers (Pearson,
1994:55). There is also a perceived connection between technological advancement and medium- to
long-term industrial growth, through direct links, spin-offs, as well as linkages with other sectors of
the economy (Cahn, 1979:182).
The Japanese, for example, are of the opinion that their modest defence expenditures are a major
contributing factor to their exceptional economic expansion "by freeing resources for industrial
investment that would otherwise have been spent on the armed forces" (Cahn, 1979:181-182). The
deduction could be made that there are no purely politico-strategic or economic reasons for arms
transfers, except perhaps for hegemonic powers or certain firms and arms dealers (overt and covert)
respectively. Therefore, the economic significance of arms exports is substantiated within the
individual defence sector or specific firms that are reliant on arms production. Although there are
apparent economic deliberations on the role that arms transfers play within and between states that
should always be considered they are nonetheless of a minor significance relative to political
considerations. "The international trade in arms has become such a prevalent implement of foreign
policy for many countries, both recipients and suppliers, that economic criteria are subordinated to
political considerations" (Cahn, 1979: 182).
The economic environment of arms transfers has a very special nature as all governments,
regardless of political ideology, have vested interests in the type, quantity, quality and destination of
the arms produced within their territories. These interests compel governments to subsidise and
control the process of arms production and marketing, particularly as most arms industries are
inclined to be allured by their specific government contracts. This also makes arms a unique part of
international trade and commerce as a result of their lethality and, as such, they can be used to inflict
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damage on specific political, economic, individual and group human interests. Arms are also simple
commodities like other merchandise as their value is determined by market forces and influenced by
subsidies. Therefore, "in international relations weapons are both an instrument of power and an
object of wealth" (Pearson, 1994:40-42). Hence, the definition of state policies towards arms
transfers, according to Krause (1992:14), is dependent on political factors as well as prevalent
economic and political beliefs.
Pearson (1994:29-30) maintains that arms exports are actually sales of surplus production in order
to amortise future production. In most cases countries that consumed large portions of their
revenues on defence, particularly on arms production and imports, were those that possessed
relatively larger revenues than others, or those that had ambitious military build-up projects, some
even including nuclear military technology. The prevalent general pattern for arms procurement
included motives of military growth and effort, as well as an incessant possibility for international
conflict instead of involvement in any particular war. Military autarky, in the antiquated
mercantilist sense, according to Krause (1992:14-15), would presume that armaments should not be
transferred to any other party, except solely for political reasons, resulting in direct interference into
the general flow of arms transfers.
Within the laissez-faire school of thought, trade in arms will be perceived to provide wealth and
power, and as a result generate sustainable growth and development, and, therefore, require less or
no interference at all. This becomes the basis for indirect political interference into arms transfers
that may also result in the reduction of objections to trade in technology, whilst the fountains of
technology are not threatened. If they become threatened, then the possibility of a neo-mercantilist
revival is inevitable with the consequent concerns over the role of arms transfers in technological
diffusion (Krause, 1992:15). Therefore the motive behind the voracious arms acquisition
programmes becomes an admixture of military ambitions, threat perceptions and greater economic
wealth (Pearson, 1994:30). However, other perceptions such as cultural, historical, emotional, or
ideological views on domestic or foreign security threats have an influence too on the entire military
build-up projects.
For Pearson (1994:46-47), a state bent towards military autarky, particularly in the field of
sophisticated armaments, has to adjust its requirements to the demands of the market, to wit, to
produce arms that will fascinate foreign buyers so as to achieve longer production runs and
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economies of scale that will reduce the costs of production. Therefore, a combination of both
military and economic concerns is required in domestic arms production that ultimately has to be
dictated upon by the global arms market. Furthermore, these ambitious developments can become
counterproductive as they might fuel the "armament adequacy dilemma" (security dilemma) by
forcing neighbouring states that might perceive them to be threatening to elect to do the same, thus
extending the arms dynamic to become an expensive arms racing endeavour (Pearson, 1994:47).
When viewed from another angle, military autarky may perpetuate employment as well as reflect
common commitments within a state that are rooted in the distrust of foreign interference.
According to theory, suppliers motivated by politico-strategic impetuses are anticipated to be more
self-sufficient and manipulative in their arms transfers than suppliers urged by commercial reasons.
However, in reality all states have an interest in regulating their arms exports to keep track of their
flow, utilisation, and related technological secrets, particularly with regard to their end-users.
Notwithstanding, practice has proven that end-use controls did not succeed even for primary leading
suppliers like the United States or the erstwhile Soviet Union. States and belligerent groups will
always struggle to obtain state-of-the-art equipment as this has "a certain market appeal": the idea
being that forces armed with the most pernicious weapons will not be easily challenged (Pearson,
1994:55).
According to Kolodziej (1979: 17), ''viewed apart from these (political, strategic, economic and
technological) drives and incentives and the resulting intricate web of reciprocally reinforcing
supplier-recipient relations that give them expression, arms sales as a political problem make little
sense. They are more the result than the cause or the condition of growing supplier-recipient
interdependencies, which are driven, paradoxically, by a penchant of each state to maximize its
independence in all significant areas of national activity. They are the product of the instruments of
modernization that are attributes of advanced, national political structures and have roots that go
deep into the psyche and dynamics of the nation-state".
In most instances, the benefits that are attributed to arms transfers are a mélange of beliefs or
speculations about their significance, which is not necessarily a reflection of their accomplishments.
Both economic and politico-strategic considerations are essential in terms of dictating the exigency
and the orientation of arms exports respectively. Arms transfers and procurements are mainly
stimulated by the need to maintain national security for all the states, with economic benefits being a
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by-product, which is, more often than not, counterbalanced by monetary costs. Therefore,
according to Catrina (1988:73-76), arms transfers are nothing more than politico-strategic benefits
that are accompanied by economic deprivation.
4.5.2 The Politico-Strategic and Welfare Imperatives
Most economic analysts are of the opinion that defence expenditures are innately dissipative and
willy-nilly an inevitable calamity for every country's economy. The analogy mostly followed is the
one of the "guns vs. butter" debate, which utilises the "economic context of scarcity of resources
and opportunity costs" (Neuman, 1979:220-221). What is meant here is that scarce resources are
being misused with the procurement of armaments, which could be used towards economic growth
and development. This point of view represents a zero-sum relationship between defence
expenditure and economic development. Moreover, even military assistance programmes are
viewed as a lavish exercise, because they require the building of infrastructure, the diversion of
skilled labour from civil production, including the expending of funds that were initially allocated
for other purposes into the maintenance and operation costs of defence programmes. The spin-off
effects of these projects are denigrated to be unproductive when compared to direct investment in
development; and the results of arms procurement, it is averred, are arms races negatively affecting
regional co-operation, growth and development.
On the other hand, there is the school of thought, although minute in size, which maintains that there
are positive developmental effects, brought about by arms production and transfers. This school
enumerates the long-term dynamic possibilities that arms transfers may have on industrial
development, on improving technical propensities, and on procreating stability rather than war
(Neuman, 1979:221). Actually, according to this school of thought, arms interests are double
pronged: they are firstly related to politico-strategic interests and secondly to the creation of wealth,
profits and employment, thus ensuring the welfare of the state. However, domestic and international
pressures interfere with these interests in the form of security threats emanating from hostile groups
or states, or global economic and environmental tendencies. Moreover, the dearth of technologies
for arms production makes it difficult to procure them from one reliable source, and therefore
political officials are inclined to opt for independent indigenous production. This, according to
Pearson (1994:44), is rooted on the belief (based on history) that military autarky reduces the state's
vulnerability to foreign impediments and manipulations.
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Military autarky is a tremendously expensive endeavour if challenges of licensed-production are
taken into consideration, along with the difficulties of researching, designing and producing
equipment at a recognised standard of sophistication. These processes require stupendous
investments that very few states can afford, hence even more developed states elect to enter into
joint-development, production and marketing. However, joint-development, production and
marketing, on the one hand, can, even under the conditions of competition, procreate reciprocal
benefits that might reduce antipathy. While, on the other hand, as a result of the conditions of
international anarchy, security threats may become pronounced and ultimately degenerate into
conflict, thus compelling states to shield their own secrets and subsequently interfere with the whole
process of joint-enterprise (Pearson, 1994:44-45).
In the developing Third World countries, leaders often do not demarcate between the objectives of
national security and the ambitions of national development. These are not considered to be
mutually exclusive, but are perceived as intertwined policy goals towards addressing commensurate,
indeed concurrent, political exigencies. Threats to national security by neighbours or insurgent
groups are viewed as being antagonistic to the development project, and as such, investments in
security and defence are considered to be compatible to the whole development agenda, "as
insurance safeguarding the nation's independence, wealth, and development" (Neuman, 1979:228-
230).
Thus, security is not regarded as antithetic to development, but as its prerequisite. Both security and
development are regarded to be the imperative national priorities that all states internationally are
obsessed with (Neuman, 1979:230). From this basis, therefore, it can be inferred that the transfer of
armaments as a means for ensuring the security of each and every state will endure the existence of
an anarchical sovereign state system. In addition, the contemporary interdependent environment
wherein military technology is an essential factor in the economies of many states, there will be a
lasting demand for the utilisation of this technology for development and security purposes. This
manifests itself in the evolution of the theories of development, international security, and strategic
studies, as well as in the practical contemplation and arrangements for security and stability in all
the regions globally.
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4.5.3 Trends of the Current Arms Production and Transfer System
From the 1960s to 1988, there was an enormous increase in arms transfers that can be explained by
the post-war rearmament drive and the Second World War technological advance that impelled most
states to upgrade their armed forces. Moreover, the three tiers of the system came forth during this
time as a result of unanticipated and radical global developments. Within this stratification there
existed a clear qualitative rift between the three tiers, reflecting disparate motivations, policies and
industrial arrangements (Krause, 1992:85). During the same period, Krause (1992:88) notes that the
market shares of the three tiers remained relatively stable. This was due to the decline in the shares
of the primary leading suppliers, the United States and the former Soviet Union. Moreover, both
primary leading suppliers still maintained the locus of technological innovation. What is more
important, according to Krause (1992:85), is that although the focus is still on the arms trade
between states, it would be a fatuous blunder for analysts to overlook domestic procurement or to
perceive interstate transfers to be synonymous to the arms market, particularly if the huge domestic
requirements of the United States, the erstwhile Soviet Union, India and the PRe are taken into
consideration.
This trend, Krause (1992:92-97) argues, was illustrated in the period from the end of the Second
World War to the late 1980s, when export market shares of the United States and the Soviet Union,
in percentage terms vis-a-vis their total arms production, were lower than those of the other
suppliers, whose export shares inclined to be higher than their global arms production shares. This
denoted the lack of impact by major shifts in the global arms market on the overall hierarchy of
arms production shares. Moreover, the hierarchy of ranking among either developing or
industrialised suppliers may have appeared to be common, however, it did not connote an alteration
in the stratification of the arms production and transfer system. This insinuated that shifts in
interstate arms trade were not synonymous with structural changes in the international arms market,
and therefore it provided a clear backdrop of the export policies of the participants. Nonetheless,
the arms producers still remain stratified according to the hierarchy that is generated by the process
of technological advance and this, in turn, still ensures that only a few states remain as primary
leading producers. Other producers will continuously confront the challenge of having their
products competing against an ever-rising level of technological sophistication in as far as their
military utility and market values are concerned (Buzan, 1987:50-51).
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As the trend of the diffusion of military technology is bound to continue into the future, the sources
of armaments, particularly secondary leading producers are forecasted to increase (Buzan, 1987:50).
These suppliers, however, appear to be clogged by various factors that could hinder their further
development. These factors include the fact that they are compelled to forfeit their lead in
technological advancement by having to export their know-how through co-production and licensed
production arrangements. They are currently bound to establish co-ordinated production
arrangements to meet the escalating costs of research and development as well as to develop new
weapons generations, and they have to co-operate to enable an efficacious mobilisation of resources
(Krause, 1992:87-88). This, according to Buzan (1987:50), makes the arms trade to reflect a
combination of transfer of technological capabilities and off-the-shelf weapon systems.
Nevertheless, these producers still have a comparative advantage as they produce high volumes of a
wide range of weaponry at a reduced cost, and they also provide ''technical assistance, financial
credits, and the guarantee of weapons battle tested or at least fully evaluated by their own armed
forces" (Pearson, 1994:21).
The technological gap that used to exist between armaments procured by the arms producing states'
own armed forces and those that are exported to other states has been constricted or is no longer
extant. In the past, state-of-the-art weapon systems were only transferred to close allies and friends,
and other recipients, as a rule, used to receive older technology, mostly used and surplus armaments.
The recipients willy-nilly accepted these weapon systems presumably because they were offered at
less cost or because the recipients lacked the political clout or the financial thrust to demand more
sophisticated systems (Catrina, 1988:27-28). In fact, during the Cold War period most of the Third
World states became heavily dependent on a single major power for arms supplies, whereas
contemporarily, arms are being purchased from a variety of sources regardless of ideological or
alliance connections. This, however, does not mean that there are no longer deals conducted along
ideological or alliance proclivities, as Israel and Syria still demand large quantities of their military
equipment for both political and economic reasons from their Cold War inherited sources (Pearson,
1994:20-21) .
Emerging suppliers in the third-tier were also compelled to remain dependent on the primary and the
secondary leading suppliers for some of their inputs, as tangibly self-reliant and technologically
advanced defence industries did not exist outside of these tiers. This was further strengthened by
the reality that emerging suppliers were not as yet industrially prepared or in a position to advance
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to the technological frontier to become secondary leading suppliers in the second-tier (Krause,
1992:88). Most of the emerging arms suppliers, such as Sweden, Brazil, Israel, South Korea, South
Africa and India, to mention just a few, are ambitious to become regionally influential and
preponderant powers and hence weapons are a guarantee for such purposes within an unpredictable
environment. Although, at present, economic productivity is perceived to be the important indicator
of world power, Pearson (1994:49) argues that within the modem world the mix and types of
weapons possessed by any individual state are still regarded as the key to great power status.
The ability to produce and market arms is, according to Pearson (1994:49-50), also viewed as an
economic necessity that is also profitable. Militarisation in the present context is more capital-
intensive than labour-intensive, and therefore largely reflects dependency relationships. States are
now compelled to rely on high technology in trying to maintain the military status quo and as a
result perpetuate the global arms trade, which has become an expensive and lucrative business. This
situation makes it difficult for those states with meagre resources to afford the latest or high
technology equipment. Nevertheless, for all states' military and political leaders, weapons are a
symbol of prestige in terms of advanced technological capabilities, but they also procreate a general
dread for warfare, especially when their focus is on securing a weapon system in which a large
amount of money was invested.
Current transfers are predominantly characterised by top-of-the-range weapon systems, sometimes
these include systems that have been newly introduced into the supplier state's own armed forces or
even hardly introduced at all. According to Catrina (1988:28-29), this change in arms transfers has
two contrasting effects. For the recipients it means an increased global redistribution of military
capabilities, thus offsetting the benefits to smaller powers. In contrast, it means that more
sophisticated weapons will require more technical support, and at the same time increase the rate of
attrition in the battlefield. The dependency of the recipients on suppliers for technical support, for
re-supply of spare parts, components and more systems will increase, and consequently this could
elevate the suppliers' control over the resolution of a conflict. The reason for this is the growth in
the demand for high-technology armaments, which leads cash-strapped governments to employ
diversification strategies by acquiring weapons and components from a variety of sources.
Governments also adopt makeshift designs and add-ons for the upgrading of their equipment to
imitate leading weapons producing countries' inventories at lower cost. This trend may result in the
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purchasing of intellectual property rather than hardware in future (Pearson, 1994:23-25).
Nevertheless, only a few states can afford to obtain the latest technological equipment, and as such,
most states are focussing on improving their anti-tank and air-defence capabilities, as well as
striving for advanced guided missile systems. This trend is accompanied by an effort from most
states to acquire more sophistication than quantity for their armed forces and this includes the
capabilities to manufacture various types of ballistic missiles.
The implication therefore is that the arms trafficking paradigm of the Cold War became depleted
with the demise of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of its successor, Russia
(Klare, 1996:858-859). Russia began to witness a massive drop in its arms export orders from
approximately US$18 billion (in constant 1993 dollars) per year in the late 1980s to approximately
US$3 billion in the early 1990s. A second excruciating factor was that there was a sharp decline in
the procurement of major weapon systems like tanks, combat aircraft, artillery pieces and warships
and this resulted in a huge drop in total global arms transfers (Klare, 1996:859). For instance, after
the Gulf War, the demand pressure for arms mounted, albeit below the peak years of the 1980s, due
to global economic problems. Moreover, a political predicament of choosing between spending
meagre revenues on arms or on consumer goods confronted many governments, especially those
faced with foreign or domestic security threats. Most of the leading arms purchasers of the 1980s
reduced their arms procurement programmes as a result of economic uncertainties, budget
reductions, embargoes and boycotts, as well as shifts in world policies towards co-operative and
collective security arrangements (Pearson, 1994: 19-20).
Furthermore, the demand for arms was affected by most countries' intentions to become self-reliant
through the establishment of their own arms industries, and, at the least producing key equipment
and parts. Such self-reliance programmes were mainly induced by arms embargoes compelling
states such as Israel, Argentina, South Africa, Chile, and India, to establish indigenous arms
industries, albeit not insinuating total independence from key weapons and component imports from
the leading producers (Pearson, 1994:20). Accordingly, "the arms trade has not simply evolved into
a smaller version of its old self, but has changed into something new, producing a new paradigm of
arms trafficking" (Klare, 1996:859). This new paradigm is not clearly defmed as the Cold War
paradigm, albeit its essential features and trends are unveiling.
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These trends include: the indisputable preponderance of the United States in the international arms
market; the centrality of economic, as opposed to politico-ideological rather than the politico-
strategic, reasons for arms transfers; the emergence of a new arms dynamic in the Asia-Pacific
region as well as the augmentation of extant markets in other regions; and a change in defence focus
from external to internal considerations in the selection of armaments (Klare, 1996:859). Actually,
the admixture of regional conflict and the availability of funds to purchase arms continuously fuel
the global arms trade. However, the alleviation of some of the conflicts that were motivated by
Cold War antagonisms, the gratification of weapon requirements for most states, and the
omnipresent world economic recession, continue to reduce the demand for armaments. Cuts in arms
production and exports resulted in budgetary deficits and slack import demand for most arms
supplying states (Pearson, 1994: 13-14). Nonetheless, other states, confronted by large arms
stockpiles and problems of unemployment, viewed the arms trade optimistically and thereby
provided the market with competitive products at bargain prices, thus resulting in cash sales.
Another important trend has been the advent and prominence of other non-state actors such as
sectarian forces, insurgent groups, as well as grey- and black-market dealers in the arms transfer
system (Klare, 1996:859). Pearson (1994:60-61) also concurs that arms are not always procured
through legitimate government or industry channels, as they offer a lucrative business for smugglers
and a variety of groups or covert government agencies that are involved in secret deals. Grey
markets connote government-approved deals that avoid legal channels or evade internationally
agreed restraints or embargoes, sometimes using third parties for the shipment of secret armaments.
The black market refers to a process in which private arms dealers and smugglers process illegal
arms shipments in small packages in order to avoid detection by government agencies. The black
market becomes more effective when components are being dispatched, as these are usually dual-
use components that are not restricted by law. In most cases, such illicit deals are often employed
under war conditions since the pressure to process them is usually activated by immediate war
requirements and thus represent a great challenge to governments because they often happen
without official sanction and could provide fuel to conflict situations.
Other trends include the inability of Russia to compete effectively in the arms market because that it
does not possess the resources to subsidise its arms shipments to its allies abroad. The collapse of
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation resulted in Russia's former allies like Poland, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Romania seeking to procure military systems from the West and also soliciting to join
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NATO (Klare, 1996:859). During the Cold War period, Poland and the former Czechoslovakia (the
current Czech and Slovak Republics) had defence industries that had been built even before 1945,
and thus had the experience and skills to occupy secondary leading supplier status in the second-tier.
However, their production and exports were not freely determined, as they had to conform to
CMEA (Community for Mutual Economic Assistance) economic planning and the Warsaw Pact's
military and security policies. Up until the demise of the Eastern Bloc, the industries of Central and
Eastern Europe were "integrated extensions" of the Soviet Union's defence industry and these states
were used as channels for its arms transfers (Krause, 1992:87). Nevertheless, these states,
especially the Czech Republic and Poland, continue to produce various sophisticated weapon
systems and are involved in joint-development and production projects with several leading
suppliers. Currently, they occupy the position of primary emerging suppliers, along with Sweden,
Canada, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, within the hierarchy of the arms production and
transfer system.
Harkavy (1994:23) provides a checklist to understand the "shape of the future", which he claims
appears germane to the analysis of the arms trade. This includes a decline in defence spending by
the great powers and an increase by the small powers; a co-ordinated effort by the extant nuclear
powers to stop further proliferation - which will be a further attempt at collective security, with the
primary focus on the weapons of mass destruction. There are further attempts at augmenting the
role of the United Nations, together with the use of international law. Economic imperatives are
currently vying with politico-strategic considerations for importance within an imminent three-bloc
competition, wherein Europe, besides the United States and Japan, might become the world's
powerhouse. The PRC may become a challenge to international stability as the importance of Asia
in the world continues to increase steadily, and if security concerns continue to decline in
importance. The United States' bargaining power in Asia is consistently decreasing, even as it
needs Asia as a source of capital. There is also an evolving struggle between finance and trade, as
the former is increasingly globalised, and the latter is becoming more regionalised, whilst the ability
of the state to control economic activity at the national level seems to be declining. The presence of
the United States is being discerned in every region of the world, although it is becoming
decreasingly preponderant, as it's moment as the only superpower will be very brief. Power will
continue to be more evenly distributed as the United States' military dominance recedes and as other
states' economic achievements improve.
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Some of these trends, Harkavy (1994:23) maintains, are already visible in the new world order,
however, it remains to be seen whether they do have an impact on the structure of the arms
production and transfer system or not. Since the legacy of the Gulf War and the period of economic
difficulties is determining the type, quality and quantity of weaponry that can be expected in the
future, Pearson (1994:99-102) believes that efforts are currently towards developing a next
generation of sophisticated computers, stealth and electronically controlled armaments. These
armaments are intended to increase firepower and simultaneously reduce vulnerability towards their
human operators.
Efforts are also focussed on employing technologies that are effective in other weapon systems into
other systems, like the utilisation of stealth technology, which was is on aircraft, on naval vessels.
The overall intentions are to ensure that the "enemy" suffers more casualties than "own forces";
personnel costs are reduced; and to keep advanced defence industries are kept warm, presumably at
higher levels of productivity. Civilian advanced technology and the costs incurred are also going to
be influential in determining the types of next generation weapons, while simultaneously problems
of military security will be encountered in having to export these weapons abroad into the arms
market. Pearson (1994: 102) suggests that one of the solutions could be to design and test the next
generation of weapons in the laboratory by using simulators or a few prototypes, then create a few
copies that could be produced in bulk when required. This means that instead of spending
eminently on production, money could be spent on research and development as a cost-cutting
consideration.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
Global economic problems and the shift from military to civilian-based economic and technological
advancement on the part of the leading supplier states encourages a change in previous patterns of
excessive defence spending and production globally. This might precipitate that supranational
management and control of conflict and peacekeeping should ensure the denial of access to weapons
for the various warring parties on a global scale. The political utility of arms transfers appears to be
weakening as arms recipients are not bound by superpower tensions to choose between arms
produced by either the East or the West. This becomes more pronounced as voting behaviour within
the United Nations or reliable influence over policy inclinations is no longer an effective option for
arms supplier states. Moreover, the successes of defence conversion and diversification, particularly
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amongst leading supplier states, might weaken the economic motives for arms transfers. This
situation, however, is not a premonition for the disappearance of arms transfers, especially as arms
continue to be produced within an environment of international anarchy actualised in the sovereign
state system. Perhaps new technology might introduce novel systems that might reduce arms
transfers in the long run, however, in the short-term, mechanisms have to be investigated and
instituted for an improved regulation of the process.
There are currently three tiers in the arms production establishment globally. The primary and
secondary leading suppliers are still preponderant in their production of advanced military hardware,
which includes strategic missile systems, modem airframes, jet engines and electronic systems. On
the other hand, the emerging supplier states have to produce equipment that contains foreign
components as well as exploit sectors of the market that are abandoned or disregarded by the
leading producers. The increase in the matrix of suppliers and equipment augments the potential for
the incessant proliferation of weapons. The segmentation of the arms market also increases the
probabilities that the wealthy and strategically favoured states will attain more potent systems than
the rest. A trickle-down effect will occur (as is the case currently), wherein the less advantaged
states who are eager to obtain state-of-the-art equipment, will purchase older or lower-tech
equipment from the advantaged. Dealers who supplement inter-governmental transactions by
collecting surplus equipment and thereafter sell it to needy governments and political groups usually
provide this equipment. What usually transpires is that wars in one region commonly generate
surplus equipment that is sold off to other conflict-prone regions, thus precipitating a contagious
effect as the weapons from one war potentially fuel another.
Within any conflict situation the political dilemma of armaments involves the determination of
influence that might be achieved through arms supply and the possible utilisation of force or the
imposition of political control over arms transfers to the belligerents in the conflict. Generally, arms
supplied to effect certain political outcomes in international relations have been proven by previous
research to fail, perhaps due to the nature of the international system. The transformation of the
bipolar system into a more open structure advances a certain number of profound changes. Firstly,
access to arms has a potential to increase for states and armed groups within a buyers' market that
sort of neglects the political implications of such supplies or the demeanour of the recipients.
Secondly, there is no alternative to the conception that arms production provides a channel to higher
technology and profits, and in future, consolidations, mergers, and co-production arrangements by
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arms producers would be more likely and the surplus production and the impetus to export arms
may consequently gradually shrink. Thirdly, the spread of technology encourages the lethality of
armaments, complicating the security dilemma, and augmenting the possibilities for deterrence or
desperation. Fourthly, the depression faced by military budgets encourages hopes for international
negotiations and peace arrangements through supranational organisations that might set reasonable
limits and promote global security. Finally, the necessity to fmd solutions to ethnic and border
disputes magnifies the primacy of the political dilemmas arising from arms transfers, especially the
transfer of small arms and inhuman systems, such as landmines.
The production and marketing of arms is a response to two major structural imperatives: firstly, the
external pressures procreated by the intrinsically anarchic nature of the international system; and
secondly, the expanded domestic demands for social welfare. These two systemic imperatives
explain the moderate but uncompromising emergence of new centres of arms production and the
subsequent dilation of the arms production and transfer system, prompting states to create military
industrial complexes in order to meet their politico-strategic and welfare requirements, regardless of
ideological orientation. Nevertheless, it is quite evident, judging from the prevalent motivations,
that economic imperatives are a means of, rather than the opposite of attaining politico-strategic
goals behind the formulation of arms transfers policies in the contemporary system of international
relations.
The rationale for transferring arms is also critical in the determination of the stratification of
emerging suppliers in the hierarchy of the arms production and transfer system into primary,
secondary and tertiary emerging suppliers, as it is the case for the leading suppliers. However, the
position of each emerging supplier is also determined by the geographical bestowal of resources and
the period during which it began to establish the faculty for arms production and development. The
question therefore is does it have the technological propensity to move to a higher level as an arms
producer and supplier? The first attempt at comprehending this stratification amongst the emerging
suppliers begins with a focus on the primary emerging suppliers such as Sweden, the Czech
Republic, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Poland and Belgium. Hence, the focus of the following
chapter will be on these suppliers, with specific reference to Sweden as a unique, non-aligned and
neutral arms supplier state in Europe, which therefore makes it to be a remarkable model for the
primary emerging arms producers and suppliers.
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CHAPTER 5 - SWEDEN: A PRIMARY EMERGING SUPPLIER WITH
A POSTURE OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The Swedish arms industry is technologically highly developed due to the state's neutrality stance
that emphasises national independence and a high level of autarky in arms development and
production. This insinuates that Sweden, like other primary emerging producers and suppliers, such
as Canada and the Czech Republic amongst others, produces most of its various major conventional
weapon systems that include naval vessels, combat aircraft, tanks, armoured vehicles, heavy
artillery and missile systems. As a means of maintaining this diverse defence development and
production capability under the conditions of shrinking defence budgets and the increased unit
production costs for weapon systems, Sweden was compelled to increase international co-operation
as well as to expand its weapon's exports. Despite an incessant policy of self-sufficiency, Swedish
arms production is also typified by increased imports of foreign sub-systems and components that
are utilised to develop indigenous weapon systems as well as an increasing tendency towards joint
ventures. The Swedish defence industry, according to Wulf(1993b:147-149), is mainly composed
of six core firms, employing a skilled work force of approximately 30 000, and defence research and
development accounting for over 20 percent of overall research and development.
For Udis (1993:142), Sweden is an interesting case to study, especially amongst the primary
emerging suppliers, as there is a strong interaction of both political and economic imperatives in the
decisions to develop, produce and transfer armaments. Moreover, Sweden was never an ancillary to
any superpower during the Cold War period, unlike the other primary emerging suppliers such as
Canada and the Czech Republic. Since the early 1930s, Sweden pursued a politico-strategic posture
of non-alignment and neutrality, which was buttressed by the intention to be independent from
foreign arms suppliers, thus resulting in the state developing a relatively huge subsidised defence
industry that was economically costly to maintain. Especially the capability to design and develop
advanced weapon systems became onerous to sustain for a small neutral European state. Sweden
was regarded as a medium-sized producer that had the capability to develop and produce a number
of modem major conventional weapon systems, along with Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Poland and Spain. However the country was faced with an intrinsic foreign policy
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dilemma in its arms production processes: that arms exports were limited and procurement budgets
were too small to sustain the current defence industrial base (Wulf, 1993a: 10). The solution to this
dilemma was to follow the Western European trend of streamlining its industrial base into co-
operative projects with other industrial firms.
Sweden, according to Udis (1993:142-144), manufactures one of the most advanced aircraft,
submarines, missile and radar systems in the world, which is a technical capability that the Swedish
government indicated would be sustained through increased arms transfers and collaborative
arrangements with other arms producers and suppliers globally. The perception within the Swedish
government is that collaboration with other arms producers will lead to the sharing of sophisticated
technology, particularly in the aircraft and electronic sectors, and this will spill over to the general
industry, as a resuIt strengthen Sweden's position in the global economy. However, this policy
tends to clash with the neutrality stance that Sweden has pursued for more than sixty years,
particularly the country's membership of the European Union (EU) and the intentions to co-operate
with other member states in the development, production and transfer of sophisticated weapon
systems. Furthermore, this position also encroaches on the other dimension of Swedish foreign
policy, the stringent restrictions on arms transfers, which were being reviewed for their relaxation in
the face of being involved in collaborative ventures that could be impeded by indigenous rules
hindering transfers to third countries.
This chapter, therefore, is an endeavour to understand Sweden's position as a striking case study of
a primary emerging producer and supplier of armaments within the hierarchy of the arms production
and transfer system. What is more phenomenal about this case, is Sweden's predicament as a
neutral and non-aligned state trying to sustain its defence production and transfers capability within
the conditions of the internationalisation of the defence industries and specifically within the
Western European context. As a country with one of the oldest defence industries, Sweden could
have been regarded as a secondary leading supplier like France, the United Kingdom and Germany,
however, the stance of neutrality and non-alignment obscured the country's status in terms of
bipolar Cold War relations. These relations tended to elevate the protagonists on both sides, as well
as led to the emergence of new regional powers that had also assumed a politico-strategic status as
producers and suppliers of armaments that were able to compete at the same level with Sweden.
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Hence, this chapter tries to look at the nature of Sweden's defence industry, which begins with
defence production in the post-war and Cold War periods. Focus then shifts to the role of the
defence industry in the country's political economy, mainly the defence industry and international
political economy, and the role of the state in Sweden's defence production and transfers.
Furthermore, attention is on arms production and exports towards the post-Cold War period,
particularly the regulations and problems regarding defence exports, as well as trends in military
research and development. Finally, the stance of neutrality is discussed within the conditions of the
post-Cold War era, which is generally the role of the state, society and the defence industry under a
different structural environment.
5.2 DEFENCE PRODUCTION IN THE POST-WAR AND COLD WAR MILIEUS
With the advent of the Second World War and the subsequent occupation of Denmark and Norway
by Germany, Sweden's international trade linkages were severed, particularly with the United
Kingdom, and as a result Sweden had to rely on German supplies for raw materials and mechanical
equipment (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:68). During the war, Sweden focussed its attention on
building a technologically advanced and independent defence industry to effectively outfit its own
armed forces, especially with advanced weapon systems such as tanks and aircraft, after being
isolated from trade with the Allies in addition to the need to reduce its dependence on arms transfers
from Germany (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983:140). Hence the establishment of the National
Industry Commission (IK), an organisation that was formed to manage the efficient augmentation of
the defence sector (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:68).
Actually, the industrialisation process in Sweden began in the 1870s, rapidly developing towards the
end of the century and after the First World War. Ikegami-Andersson (1992:47-48) maintains that
Sweden became one of the world leaders in the fields of iron and metal processing, electronic
engineering, as well as paper and pulp manufacturing, which remained as intact industries even after
the Second World War. Thus, Sweden benefited greatly in the post-war reconstruction of European
industry and infrastructure as a result of eluding the war's destruction and accordingly emerging as a
comparatively superior actor in science and technology. Because of a rich technological
background and a highly modernised educational system, Sweden also managed to absorb advanced
foreign technology to develop its own industrial base with a capability to produce indigenously
designed advanced weapon systems. With the increased tensions in Europe after the Second World
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War, Sweden remained as an isolated state after attempts to establish a Nordic defence alliance
crumbled with Norway and Denmark joining NATO. This position, Holmstrom and Olsson
(1983:141) argue, compelled Sweden to adopt a foreign policy of ''non-alignment in peace aiming at
neutrality in war", as was the case before and during the Second World War.
Defence production in the period 1954-1979 was largely determined and sponsored by the Swedish
armed forces, thus becoming the basis for the nature and direction of the country's defence industry.
Although there were no fundamental changes in the country's foreign policy since the end of the
Korean War, the defence outlays doubled effectively in the period from the mid-1950s to the late
1960s. Nonetheless, according to Holmstrom and Olsson (1983:142-144), as a percentage of total
Swedish production, defence production dropped from less than five percent to less than four
percent in the 1960s and to approximately 3.5 percent in the late 1970s. Although most of the
defence outlays were utilised on personnel and maintenance, a substantial, albeit diminishing, share
was used in the procurement of new weapon systems characteristic of fixed-size armed forces,
particularly from the mid-1960s toward the end of the 1970s. However, as weapon systems became
technologically more complex, the costs of individual units also increased, so was the quantity of
personnel due to conscription, which was devised to ensure a very large, rapidly mobilisab1e,
contingent in times of war in order to supplement a relatively minute peacetime permanent force.
This situation insinuated that the country had to be able to equip increasing armed forces with
advanced weapon systems when the economic resources were consistently receding, with the
struggle between quantity and quality in production becoming the norm.
Table 5.1: The Leading Firms in the Swedish Defence Industry
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The option for quality, which was the most prevalent trend, implied that the military posture of
engaging the enemy beyond the country's frontiers could not be effectively executed from all
directions as other forces had to be equipped with technologically less-advanced weapon systems.
This military posture insinuated that priority had to favour the air force, as it received approximately
60 percent of all the equipment procured in the early 1960s, ultimately becoming reduced to slightly
more than 50 percent in the late 1960s and the rest of the 1970s (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983: 145-
146). This reduction, however, also affected the army and the navy, as armoured units and naval
vessels were reduced due to both economic and military-strategic imperatives. These reductions
were endorsed in instances wherein cheaper alternatives could be chosen as a result of technological
advancement, such as the option for missiles instead of aircraft, which was engendered by the rapid
progress in electronics. Thus fewer firms received the majority of the vanishing orders for defence
equipment and systems, especially the leading firms (see Table 5.1 above) such as Saab-Scania AB,
Bofors, Volvo, Ericsson, Hagglunds, and the state-owned Fërenade Fabriksverken (FFV).
From the1960s toward the 1970s, three quarters of the defence equipment was purchased from these
six enterprises, which ultimately resulted in one or two firms producing one category of weapon
systems, and sometimes compelling others to establish joint research and development ventures with
assorted costs and benefits. Benefits were attained from continuous contact between the producers
and the domestic armed forces, which through long-term relationships generated a certain level of
proficiency arising from the persistent application of research, development and production
faculties, and subsequently leading to longer production runs that reduced the unit costs of the
equipment procured (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983: 146-147).
Nonetheless, despite the benefits of the processes of concentration, there were short- and long-term
costs as well, which, according to Holmstrom and Olsson (1983:197-198), became more
pronounced in the 1970s. For both economic and politico-strategic reasons, there were strong
arguments in favour of procuring indigenously produced equipment, since the armed forces had
specific requirements that could not be gratified through imports without exorbitant modifications.
However, the positive spin-offs arising from military research and development on the Swedish
economy and society were not taken into consideration by the armed forces when deciding on the
type of equipment to purchase, as politico-strategic considerations were preponderant in the
determination of such decisions. The focus of the Swedish military was on the long-term effects of
a dwindling indigenous defence industry on the capability of the country to defend itself, since
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retaining a sufficient domestic technological capability and to at least modify or license-
manufacture foreign produced equipment was considered as significant in both military and
politico-strategic terms. Both arguments maintained that indigenously produced or modified
equipment was resilient to enemy countermeasures, and that dependence on defence imports
permitted foreign political interference as well as depreciated the Swedish state's sovereign stance
of neutrality and non-alignment.
Yet the pressure to import escalated due to the rapid increase in the sophistication of weapon
systems resulting in higher develoPI?ent costs, particularly since domestic demand in Sweden was
limited, and for politico-strategic reasons, co-production arrangements were considered to be
inappropriate in order to reduce costs. The only alternative, therefore, was to import foreign
produced systems or components for indigenous licensed-production, which throughout the 1950s
and 1960s amounted to approximately 10 percent of total procurement. More than a third of foreign
equipment was purchased through the military purchasing agency, Forsvarets Materielverk (FMV).
Most of these imports included technology, sub-systems and components for the production of
missile systems, helicopters and various aircraft (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983: 198).
Sweden was also more than willing to participate in joint or co-operative arms development projects
with members of the European Free Trade Association on weapons procurement, particularly in
areas such as self-propelled guns, radar-guided torpedo boats, anti-tank missile systems, and
surface-to-surface tactical cruise missiles (Frank, 1969: 132). There were also efforts by the
Swedish arms manufactures to engage in international co-production arrangements through co-
operation and mergers. However, Holmstrom and Olsson (1983:150) argue that these endeavours
were limited by the high degree of concentration within the country's defence sector, wherein each
defence sub-sector was overshadowed by a single producer, except for the electronics sub-sector.
This situation created problems for other industrial firms, as they preferred a diversified sub-sector
that would not be bogged down by stagnant monopolies procreated by firms that were specialised on
a particular technological capability, from which positive spin-off effects were normally anticipated.
It was rather different to a situation wherein there was a conglomeration of both defence and civilian
manufacturers who did not rely solely on defence contracts but could also combine their efforts or
be sub-contracted to satisfy specific military requirements. For these latter enterprises, a vigorous
conversion from civilian to military production or vice versa was amicably amenable.
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The high degree of concentration within the Swedish defence industry was characterised by mergers
and co-operation arrangements, which became conspicuous in the 1970s with the emergence of
single producers in each sub-sector of the industry, except for the electronics sector. In the 1980s,
according to Ikegami-Andersson (1992:78), close to 50 percent of the total expenditure of the
Defence Material Administration (FMV) went to the five major arms producing firms, Saab-Scania,
FFV, Bofors, Ericsson and Volvo. Similar to the general Swedish industrial structure, this high
concentration in one sub-sector of the defence industry was also reflected in the civilian industry.
Moreover, there was a high level of collaboration amongst the major defence producers in each sub-
sector, especially in the realm of high technology, such as aircraft development and production, with
the JAS Industrial Group being a prime example. Another example was the merger between FFV
Ordinance and Bofors AB in 1991 that resulted in the establishment of Swedish Ordinance-FFV
Ordinance/Bofors AB, which in 1992 became Celsius Industries, a merger between Bofors,
CelciusTech, FFV Aerotech and Kockums (Deitrick, 1999:153). These collaborative arrangements
were obligated by constraints in the technological and financial capacities of each manufacturer as
well as the limited number of industries.
Accordingly two main deductions could be made concerning the Swedish concept of an arms
industry. Firstly, in the Swedish context, arms production formed a minute specialised sector of
each and every large corporation (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983: 162). According to Ikegami-
Andersson (1992:78-79), there were considerable efforts by Swedish arms producing firms to
diversify their production, either into developing new defence products or to producing civilian
products, which was inspired by the dearth of reliance on defence production for the major
corporations, reflected by the share of defence sales in their total sales (see Table 5.2 below). For
those industries whose production restricted diversification into civilian production and which faced
serious financial constraints, such as the manufacturers of naval vessels, these were propped by the
state through nationalisation.
Table 5.2: Degree of Dependence on Defence-Related Sales
( ()HI'()I~ \ II()\ ".I.III~"'".I1I1.1 \ "h" I """'" I I \ \,,10<1
IlItllI,11 H.'
PERCENTAGE OF DEFENCE SALES 8 11 50 25 29
Source: Ikegami-Andersson, M. (1992). The Military-Industrial Complex: The Cases of Sweden and Japan. Aldershot:
Dartmouth.
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Secondly, the state entertained the proclivity of retaining defence production in privately owned
enterprises since the defence sector was closely connected to the entire engineering industry, thus
the leading arms producers were the private corporations that were also preponderant in the Swedish
economy as a whole. These private corporations, Holmstrom and Olsson (1983:162-163) allege,
were also linked to each other through family relationships or through the fmancial institutions, such
as the Wallenberg group. The Wallenberg group was involved in more than half of the purchases
made by the state's military purchasing agency, FMV, as a result of its preponderance in the three
leading corporations, Saab-Scania, Ericsson, and ASEA (Allmëna Svenska Elektriska AB, which
had absorbed Hagglunds and Sëner in 1972 as a parent corporation). The Volvo Group and AB
Bofors, with its subsidiaries, accounted for approximately 13 and 10percent of deliveries to FMV
respectively.
The Swedish government also encouraged ftrms to collaborate or to amalgamate in certain sub-
sectors, which nonetheless was perceived to be a prevailing trend for defence industries in the new
international political economy (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:78). Moreover, Holmstrom and Olsson
(1983:163) believe that a trend was developing towards a greater involvement of foreign role-
players. The role played by foreign influence was expressed in five ways, through: (1) foreign
subsidiaries within Sweden, such as Svenska Phillips, which was entirely Dutch-owned; (2) direct
imports from abroad; (3) minority shares that became owned by foreign companies within Swedish
corporations; (4) the utilisation of foreign sub-contractors; and (5) the outsourcing of maintenance
work to foreign companies.
S.3 THE ROLE OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN SWEDEN'S POLITICAL
ECONOMY
S.3.1 The Defence Industry and the International Political Economy
As the Swedish economy was primarily managed by the government with a large public sector, the
conditions were therefore conducive for the government to implement arms production and transfer
policies with minor constraints arising from other sectors of Swedish society (Ikegami-Andersson,
1992:53). Defence production accounted for less than two percent of total industrial production in
Sweden, with around 90 percent of defence production being produced by the engineering sector,
which was more or less five percent of this sector's total output. The chemical industry, on the
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other hand, produced around five percent for the defence sector, particularly explosives, since the
Swedish chemical industry was smaller than the engineering sector, hence was the value of its
output. In the 1970s, the defence industry as a whole had approximately 40 000 employees, with 36
000 being directly engaged in production, and an additional 18 000 personnel being employed by
defence sub-contractors (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983:165-166). Although Sweden managed to
reduce military expenditure and arms transfers according to its security stance of non-alignment as
well as a restrictive foreign military sales policy, in the 1980s, however the country increased its
arms transfers to India and other states in the Middle East. These increased military sales led to the
addition of new control measures in order to ensure that government control and the non-aligned
stance were sustained, nonetheless with mediocre successes (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983: 166).
As a small state in Europe, Sweden had a proportionately huge military production faculty, which
necessitated increased arms exports. For example, the share of arms exports to total exports
fluctuated between 0.8 percent to approximately 2 percent in the period 1985 to 1990 (see Table 5.3
below). During the same period, Sweden became the ninth leading arms supplier, and moreover,
due to its gradually expanding involvement in international arrangements for collaboration in arms
development and production, its role as an arms supplier became increasingly pronounced. The
incessant dilemma, however, according to Ikegami-Andersson (1992:41-44), was the ability of
Sweden to reconcile this role with its non-aligned and neutral stance as well as its image as an
advocate of global disarmament and arms control. With the increasing trend towards the
globalisation of the world economy, especially after the end of the Cold War, Sweden managed to
remain as a unique actor in international politics. This was based on the state's idealistic policy of
non-alignment and neutrality, which ensured a self-sufficient defence industry as well as a
consistent policy on restricting arms transfers.
Table 5.3: The Share of Arms Exports to Total Exports
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
0.82 1.22 1.57 2.02 1.81 0.98
Source: Ikegami-Andersson, M. (1992). The Military-Industrial Complex: The Cases of Sweden and Japan. Aldershot:
Dartmouth.
Ikegami-Andersson (1992:44-46) argues that as an advanced industrial country, with a splendid
indigenous technological background and a highly skilled workforce and engineers, Sweden is one
of the relatively affluent countries in the world, although heavily dependent on exports as a result of
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a constricted domestic market. Therefore, the economy in Sweden is oriented more toward intra-
regional and international trade, as well as overseas production through multinational corporations
typical of other countries in the EU. Moreover, Sweden has a large state sector in the national
economy that also plays an important role in military research, development and production and
arms transfers. In the 1970s, the export of defence products in Sweden accounted for approximately
I percent of the country's total exports, and for 3 percent of the engineering sector's total exports.
Towards the end of the 1970s, 21 percent of defence production went to exports with less than 40
companies being involved, and Bofors alone accounted for more than 51 percent, while the
combination of Karlskronavarvet (for warships) and Fërenade Fabriksverken (FFV) accounted for
close to 36 percent of such exports. The transfer of aircraft dominated arms exports in the early
1970s, while towards the end of the decade traditional weapons, such as artillery systems, small
arms and ammunition, became prevalent. Close to two-thirds of arms transfers went to the Nordic
and the non-aligned states in Europe (Holmstrom and Olsson, 1983: 170-171).
Military research and development accounted for more than general research and development, as
the government had invested massively in the former programmes since the Second World War.
For example, according to Holmstrom and Olsson (1983:172-174), in the 1970s, more than one-
quarter of total outlays by the state on research and development were earmarked for defence
projects, principally through the Ministry of Defence, which transferred three-quarters of these
grants to the military purchasing agency, FMV, and the rest to the National Defence Research
Institute (FOA), the central defence headquarters, and for medical research. The FMV transferred
portions of military research and development grants to the various state- and privately-owned
industries and consultants, most of which (approximately three-quarters) went to indigenous
industries, especially the engineering sector's aerospace and automobile sub-sectors. The share of
military- focussed research and development to general research and development was
approximately 13 percent in 1973, declining to about 9 percent in 1979. Industrial contribution to
military-related research and development was fractional compared to the contribution made by the
state, and most of this contribution was earmarked for the export market.
In 1986, Ikegami-Andersson (1992:55-56; 60) maintains that the government funded 36.9 percent
of the total military research and development expenditures in Sweden (see Table 5.4 below), as
compared to 52.4 percent in France, 46 percent in the United States, 38.5 percent in the United
Kingdom, 35.3 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and 19.9 percent in Japan.
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Within those states where there was a greater contribution made by the government towards military
research and development, the implication was a relatively intimate relationship between the
government and industry. In other instances, such as the FRO, government was close to the
institutions that conducted research and development projects such as universities and other
colleges. Moreover, in most instances where military research and development was mainly
financed by private entrepreneurs, it was often subsidised through government funding. As a small
European state that primarily relied on indigenous military research and development, Sweden spent
a relatively large amount of financial resources on military-related research and development.
Outlays on military-related research and development were considerably increased in the 1980s as a
result of the development of the JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft as well as the development of an
anti-submarine warfare research project. In 1988, Sweden spent 8.8 percent on military-related
research and development in comparison to other Western countries (see Table 5.4 below), with
France spending 16.2 percent, the United States 12.7 percent, the United Kingdom 11.6 percent, the
FRO 6.1 percent, and Japan 2.35 percent.
Table 5.4: Comparing Sweden's Military Research and Development Expenditure
Developed States United United France FRG Japan Sweden
States Kin dom
1986 (percentage of State funded R and D) 46 38.5 52.4 35.3 19.9 36.9
1988 (percentage of Military Rand D 12.7 11.6 16.2 6.1 2.35 8.8
to other R and D)
Source: Ikegami-Andersson, M. (1992). The Military-Industrial Complex: The Cases of Sweden and Japan. Aldershot:
Dartmouth.
5.3.2 The Role of the State
As a ratio of total government expenditure, military expenditure in Sweden was gradually reduced
since the end of the 1950s due to economic and financial adversities, which demanded the
privatisation of social welfare imperatives that had guaranteed the persistence of the Social
Democratic government (lkegami-Andersson, 1992:57). Although there were general arguments
that a small producer and supplier, such as Sweden, could have an exceptional technological niche
in a specific field of defence production if it was buttressed by the state, the Swedish government
nonetheless provided financial support to boost diversification strategies with the intention of
ensuring versatility in the face of a vacillating international arms market. The Department of
Industry, according to Holmstrom and Olsson (1983: 158), established a special committee in 1979
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to investigate such possibilities, which resulted in the underpinning of certain Saab-Scania and
Volvo projects, as well as the propping up of other industrial sectors, such as textiles, steel, and
shipbuilding, so as to enable them to survive the conditions of economic degeneration.
Table 5.5: The Degree of State Intervention in the Defence Industry
Unlted Sta tes United Kin dom France FRG Sweden
31.6
35.6
40.8
47.8
42.3
50.6
42.3
48.4
48.4
64.5
Source: Ikegami-Andersson, M. (1992). The Military-Industrial Complex: The Cases of Sweden and Japan. Aldershot:
Dartmouth.
State intervention was more pronounced in Sweden, Ikegami-Andersson (1992:52-53) argues, as a
result of a greater share of government expenditure that was a percentage of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) as compared to other leading suppliers in the Western hemisphere (see Table 5.5
above). Moreover, government employment was significant (32.1 percent in 1980 to 1985)
compared to other developed countries. With such a large public sector, it insinuated that the
government was in control of a large share of Sweden's national economy, especially since there
was a high degree of collaboration between the government, labour and business in the
determination of state economic policies. Actually, according to Holmstrom and Olsson
(1983:163), the defence industry managed to influence military decision-making during the Second
World War with the establishment of a national procurement agency, a predecessor to the FMV,
within which government and industry co-operated in devising procurement policies. With the end
of the war, this co-operation ceased, albeit there were no contradictions between the two on issues
relating to national defence or arms procurement, as both agreed on the need to strengthen Sweden's
stance as a non-aligned state in the midst of a Cold War confrontation.
Since the importation of weapon systems was not a preferred option, especially during the 1950s
and the 1960s, government and industry, as well as the legislature, were compelled to co-operate in
developing new weapon systems that had to be commensurate to the adopted stance of non-
alignment. Such an environment, on the one hand, permitted the defence industry to determine the
direction and the time required to develop and produce weapon systems with less consideration for
specific military requirements. The general concern was therefore the maintenance of a particular
domestic production capability regardless of the need to meet the military-strategic objectives of the
armed forces. With the decline of the political tensions in Europe during the late 1960s, government
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and industry were criticised for adopting such a stance, particularly since an increasing debate
concerning the military-industrial complex was unfolding in the United States (Holmstrom and
Olsson, 1983:163-164).
On the other hand, the type of co-operation that existed between the government and the defence
industry in Sweden discouraged the establishment of industrial associations to lobby the government
to adopt certain policy objectives. It was only in 1986 that the major corporations such as Bofors,
Saab-Scania, FFV, Ericsson Radar, and Volvo Flygmotor decided to form the Association of
Swedish Defence Industries, Sveriges Fërsvarsindustrifërening, which was a descendant of Swedish
Aerospace Industries (SAl). SAl, according to Ikegami-Andersson (1992:79), had previously co-
ordinated and represented the interests of firms in the aerospace sub-sector such as Saab-Scania,
Volvo Flygmotor, LM Ericsson Telefon company, SRA Communications and FFV, especially
where they required a collective national voice. Nevertheless, these associations were less
significant compared to the FMV (Defence Material Administration) and the OB (the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces) in terms of the general planning for arms production and
procurement.
Public opinion was also vehemently opposed towards the power wielded by the conglomeration of
the military, the arms manufacturers, and the state bureaucracy through the generation of profits and
national prestige for their selfish interests by building unjustifiably huge and costly armed forces.
The major focus of the critique of the military-industrial complex in Sweden, according to
Holmstrom and Olsson (1983:164-165), focussed its attention on three major factors: (1) the lack of
democratic influence over decision-making; (2) the rotation of powerful individuals between
positions in the armed forces, the defence industry, and the Ministry of Defence; and (3) the
extremely advanced level of military technology such that it could not meet the requirements of an
essential defence capability.
The influence of the trade union movement was also heavily pronounced in Sweden, which,
according to Ikegami-Andersson (1992:49-50), was a characteristic feature of the Scandinavian
state since the beginning of the 20th century. However, there were strong arguments for shifting
from social corporatism to enterprise corporatism, as is the case in other western European and
North American states. Sweden, which was regarded as a distinctive neo-corporatist state, with a
well-organised trade union movement since the 1980s, was characterised by a government that was
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deeply engaged in co-ordinating relations between business and labour. This was a type of
collaboration that was consolidated by wartime experiences that allured both economic interests into
national policy-making and planning. The trade union movement became well established in
Sweden in the latter part of the 19th century, with the labour organisation becoming the strong
political base of the ruling Social Democratic party, thus ensuring the sustenance of working class
interest through the tripartite collusion of government, business and labour.
However, Ikegami-Andersson (1992:50) alleges that this tripartite co-operation was disturbed in
1974, with the beginning of a world-wide recession, and the incessant strikes of 1980, which
unveiled the flaws of institutionalised business-labour understanding and the subsequent state
management deficiencies, mainly as a consequence of fmancial constraints. Nevertheless, the
tripartite partnership still continues to influence and encourage state involvement in the national
political economy, as trade unions are still substantially influential politico-economic actors, and
hence are effective in the determination of defence policy in general, and arms production and
transfer policies specifically. A consistent tripartite partnership in the determination of state defence
policies continues to ensure the sustenance of a high standard defence industry, with a steadfast
research and development capability to ensure the country's self-sufficiency in military technology.
5.4 ARMS PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS TOWARDS THE POST-COLD WAR
PERIOD
5.4.1 Defence Exports: Regulations, Problems and Prospects
In 1985, the share of Sweden's GNP represented by defence production was approximately 1.1
percent, with the share of total industrial output occupied by total arms production output amounting
to 1.8 percent, after decreasing from 2.1 percent in 1978. Only 10 percent of military equipment
that was procured by the country's armed forces in 1985 was directly imported from foreign
suppliers. Nonetheless, there were considerable levels of licensed-production and co-production
arrangements with foreign firms as well as the indirect importation of components and sub-systems
that ranged from approximately 30 to 35 percent of the country's total defence procurement. For
example, jet engines and electronic components and sub-systems were license-manufactured in
Sweden based on arrangements with foreign suppliers. The share of arms imports to total imports
were approximated at 0.2 percent in 1987 and 0.3 percent in 1988, which included components, sub-
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systems, data packages, as well as helicopters, army support aircraft and air-to-air missiles. Arms
imports from the United States amounted to 67 percent, 22 percent from the United Kingdom, and 9
percent from the other suppliers (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:87-88). The relatively large share of
defence transfers from the United States brought into question the non-aligned and neutral stance of
Sweden's foreign policy, as a primary supplier and recipient dependency relationship seemed to
prevail between the two states.
As one of a few non-aligned and neutral states in Europe, Sweden had perceptions of having a
defensive armed force, coupled to an advanced defence industry, that was envisaged to playa
balancing politico-strategic role in Europe. Simultaneously, Swedish arms exports became
reflective of those of other emerging suppliers in terms of the similar pressures that were
encountered in the international arms production and transfer systems, regardless of the official
statements that averred otherwise (Hagelin, 1988:157). According to Frank (1969:130), the
Swedish defence industry produced approximately 85 percent of its weaponry for the country's
armed forces, at the same time limiting its export capability through policies that were averse to
transferring armaments to states that were likely to be involved in conflict. Although such policies
were restrictive to a certain extent, they assured the country the flexibility to choose its preferred
recipients.
As a share of total exports, arms exports accounted for 1.22 percent in 1986 and 1.57 percent in
1987, which increased to 2.02 percent in 1988, with aggregate values of arms imports and exports
for 1978 to 1988 indicating that Sweden was a net exporter of arms.- With increased transfers to
India in 1978-1979 and in the mid-1980s, Sweden's arms exports increased substantially, which
nonetheless contrasted the decrease in the country's defence share of the GNP. The implication
therefore was that the pursuit of arms transfers was intended to maintain the arms industry
operational (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:90). The pressure to pursue arms exports was brought to
bear by the limited domestic market as well as the fact that Sweden, as a net arms exporter, was thus
compelled to sustain its defence industrial capacity.
According to the 1985 to 1989 aggregate exports, Sweden was rated as the ninth largest supplier of
major weapon systems globally, the twelfth largest supplier to the Third World, and the seventh to
the developed countries (lkegami-Andersson, 1992:90-91). The major recipients of Swedish
weapon systems included India, the former Yugoslavia, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland,
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Malaysia, Singapore, the Nordic states and the neutral European states, as well as the newly
industrialised countries in Asia. Since 1946, the governments of Sweden had attempted to control
the export of what was called ''war matériel" (Hagelin, 1988: 157), under a committee review
established in 1934, and the promulgation of an act in 1935 that created the War Matériel
Inspectorate (KM!). All arms transfers were strictly regulated and monitored according to the
country's military export regulations under the management of the KMI, which was assigned to the
Foreign Ministry (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:91).
The establishment of the KMI to control the sale of military products created a political dilemma
that was related to the existence of a defence industry whose production became focussed towards
the export market in order to maintain an advanced and sophisticated standard of arms design,
development and production. These standards would otherwise be degraded if the defence industry
was to focus solely on producing for the domestic market. Although Swedish policy restricted the
transfer of arms to belligerents in conflict, practice was however different as long as the conflict was
considered to be non-hegemonic, regional, or global in nature (Hagelin, 1988:157-158). The KMI
operated according to guidelines laid down by the government in 1971, promulgated in 1972, and
reiterated in 1983 and 1988, which prohibited the export of military equipment and systems to states
involved in armed conflict or engaged in internal conflict. The guidelines also included states
within which internal armed disturbances occurred or where weapons of Swedish origin could be
used to suppress human rights (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:91).
Since Sweden's policies were defined by its policy-makers as "nonalignment in peace and neutrality
in war", which, according to Pierre (1982:120-121), was a highly armed posture of neutrality, it
implied that the country was compelled to sustain a strong defensive capability that required a solid
and self-sufficient defence industry. However, this perception tended to contradict with the revered
restraints on arms transfers since a sophisticated defence industry was difficult to sustain without
exports, particularly when domestic requirements were inadequate to achieve economies of scale.
Notwithstanding, a self-reliant defence industry was considered as a cornerstone of the policy of
neutrality and non-alignment.
Nonetheless, arms transfer regulations were often circumvented, as it was virtually impossible to
monitor all arms transfers, especially for a net arms exporting country like Sweden (Ikegami-
Andersson, 1992:91). Hagelin (1988:166-167) claims that some Swedish firms, such as Bofors,
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
155
were also accused of having violated arms transfer regulations with impunity by exporting certain
restricted defence items to unacceptable recipients, or having permitted amiable recipients to re-
transfer Swedish weapons systems to unsuitable states. Moreover, Swedish firms' involvement in
international defence industrial co-operation was not restricted by the country's arms transfer
regulations, and this implied that regulations could not restrict the transfer of co-developed weapon
systems. Furthermore, regulations did not have stricter controls on re-transfers as these could be
side-stepped in order to retain the reputation of Sweden as a reliable supplier internationally.
The re-transfer of arms by recipients of Sweden arms was, according to Ikegami-Andersson
(1992:91), difficult to control as possibilities were high that such arms may have been re-transferred
to restricted states and regions. However, despite the strict regulations on arms exports, these
increased tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of innate ambiguities that made the
regulations ineffective in prohibiting illegal arms sales. Hagelin (1988:165-166) also avers that the
tensions between public opinion and the defence sector regarding arms exports were more visible
when concerns were raised regarding military sales to racist South Africa and also when it became
obvious that Sweden was being used as a surrogate by other Western states. Sweden had to accede
to the dictates of the United States in order to attain desperately needed technologies for advancing
the defence production sector, hence co-development and co-production arrangements were entered
into with the United States regarding sales to Ethiopia and Latin American states. Accordingly,
Sweden was implicated in the promotion of Western values to the Third World, on the one hand,
whereas, on the other, Sweden had no similar arrangements with states in the Eastern Bloc nor ever
exported its indigenously developed systems to those states.
Consequently, Sweden was prompted to reconsider whether to strictly apply a formal policy
restricting arms exports or to loosely implement a formal policy. This was mainly due to the
emerging trend of the internationalisation of the defence research, development and production
faculties arising from the intolerable costs of modem sophisticated military technology and the
reduction of demand for weapon systems in the post-Cold War era (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:91).
Restrictions on arms transfers were, on the one hand, unconditional, meaning that they were based
on international arrangements, affiliation, and membership. On the other hand, the restrictions were
also conditional, to wit, they were based on the principle that arms transfers were permitted and
restricted by the government on a case-by-case basis. The Foreign Ministry was therefore
responsible to ensure that arms transfers did not clash with unconditional restrictions as arms sales
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were only permitted to states which were not engaged or implicated in armed conflict, harassed by
internal armed unrest, and/or believed to abuse human rights (Hagelin, 1988: 159).
Swedish arms exports were not only affected by unconditional and conditional restrictions, but were
also limited by fierce international competition in the arms market, as well as the critical role played
by public opinion. The major driving force behind aggressive arms exports was the recession in
global defence economic conditions, which placed Sweden in a political dilemma of having to
integrate restrictive arms transfer policies with the objective requirement of enhancing arms exports
in order to sustain and improve domestic defence production. In the short-term, the only alternative
that was availed to the defence sector was to utilise the flaws in the legal framework through the
sale of dual-use technology and equipment; expanding the scope of international defence co-
operation; and to export arms through third parties. Moreover, the government was compelled to
provide incentives such as export credits and financial guarantees in order to support defence
exports. These efforts became visible in the sale of artillery and other systems to India and
Indonesia, which insinuated that involvement in conflict or the existence of internal armed
contradictions respectively were no longer a barrier to Swedish arms exports to the Third World.
Therefore, according to Hagelin (1988:163-164), the major factor that had to be considered was the
intensity of the conflict, to wit, that when conflict was perceived to ebb, it was then decided what
arms exports could be permitted.
Indeed, Pierre (1982: 121-122) concurs that a self-sufficient defence industry that was restrictive on
exports was expensive to sustain, as the case of Sweden proved with a highly advanced
technological defence industrial faculty and, accordingly, a well-equipped defence force in the
world. lts exports were exceptionally limited in quantity as well as to the number of recipients, and
as an example, one of the leading arms manufacturing firms, Saab-Scania AB, can be taken into
consideration. Saab-Scania AB, according to Holmstrom and Olsson (1983: 150-152), was
established in 1968 after Scania- Vabis AB, which produced trucks and buses, was absorbed by
Saab, thus lessening the firm's reliance on defence production, especially in the 1970s, whereby
most defence production was centred in the aerospace sector. The military share of total production
was reduced from roughly 15 percent to approximately 10percent as the 1970s progressed, and
employment in the aerospace sector varied between 13 and 18 percent of the firm's total
employment. Besides defence production, the firm was involved in the manufacturing of aircraft,
which were at its technological core, including motor vehicles and electronics. The aerospace
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division had a leading development capacity amongst Swedish firms as it employed more than 2 000
engineers who principally designed and developed military aircraft, and to a lesser extent missile
systems and military electronics.
A ten percent profit was always guaranteed on all the deliveries conducted by Saab-Scania to the
country's armed forces, and this system was subsequently changed in the mid-I970s whereby
contract arrangements based on a calculated profit were devised. Holmstrom and Olsson
(1983:153-154) assert that advantageous contracts were mostly obtained from the long-term and
secure orders from the domestic armed forces that were, in most instances, paid in advance, leading
to very high profits especially during the 1970s. However, towards the end of the 1970s, profits
abated from more than 80 percent to approximately 33 percent. The production of military aircraft
guaranteed Saab-Scania a technological edge, which was threatened when the future of the Swedish
aircraft industry was questioned. This situation led the firm to engage in joint ventures with other
local firms, such as Bofors and Ericsson, in order to lessen development costs through the utilisation
of available foreign-developed components and sub-systems, and more significantly, to substantially
expand its export faculty. In the 1960s and the early 1970s, Saab-Scania exported the Draken
fighter aircraft to Denmark and Finland, the Saab 105 trainer/attack aircraft to Austria, and the Saab
Safir combat support aircraft to Pakistan and other Third World states.
Approximately 20 percent of the aerospace sector of Saab-Scania' s total production was exported in
the early 1970s, which, however, declined in the mid- to late-1970s, as the firm failed to obtain
export contracts for the Viggen fighter and the Saab 105 trainer aircraft. The reason, Holmstrom
and Olsson (1983:154-155) argue, was their higher unit prices compared to those produced by the
United States or other West European aerospace industries. Although Sweden offered generous
offset arrangements such as investments in the production of aircraft as well as in other civilian
sectors, all attempts failed as a result of the existence of a buyers' market, which insinuated fierce
competition amongst firms in offset or counter-trade arrangements. Indeed, the relatively minute
size of the Swedish aircraft industry, compared to those of the primary and secondary leading
suppliers, insinuated that Sweden could not compete effectively in the offset or counter-trade
infested buyers' market. Secondly, Swedish exports were also affected by the politico-diplomatic,
ideological and politico-strategic considerations that were characteristic of the Cold War arms trade.
Thirdly, as a result of Sweden's stringent regulations on weapons exports, Saab-Scania could not
freely exploit the lucrative Middle East market, thus reducing its ability to expand its foreign
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market. Consequently, by the end of the 1970s, exports amounted to more or less 10percent of
Saab-Scania's aerospace division's total sales. The solution, therefore, was to diversify production
toward civil passenger aircraft and acting as a sub-contractor for other foreign firms. Nevertheless,
despite the adoption of a diversification strategy in 1979,83 percent of the aerospace division's total
production was retained for defence production.
From 1988 to 1989 Saab-Scania became the largest supplier of defence equipment to Swedish
armed forces, accounting for approximately 20 percent of national military research and
development and acquisitions outlays, with the aircraft division and the subsidiary Saab-Scania
Combitech being the major military producers. Production within the aircraft division and Saab-
Scania Combitech accounted for 62 percent of total sales in 1989, decreasing to 48.8 percent in
1990, with the share of military sales declining as a result of commercial aircraft production. The
share of military sales to Saab-Scania's total sales was reduced from around 15 percent in the 1970s
to approximately 8 percent in 1988 (lkegami-Andersson, 1992:75). As the main contractor for the
JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft, Ikegami-Andersson (1992:75-76) maintains that the aircraft division
of Saab-Scania accounted for 65 percent of the project, which was handled by the JAS Industrial
Group, involving Volvo Flygmotor, Ericsson, and FFV (Fërenade Fabriksverken). The JAS 39
fighter aircraft project was initially earmarked for the air force, and also had a potential export
market world-wide with the co-operation of British Aerospace (Condom, 1996:23).
Although Sweden was a major producer of weapon systems due to its long historical role as a
leading European power with a solid domestic industrial base, Sweden's foreign political, economic
and military relations were thoroughly scrutinised in order to ensure that the stance of neutrality was
not compromised in any manner, nor its national security policies were dictated upon by any other
power. Therefore, the stance of armed neutrality compelled Sweden to export its defence products
in order to sustain an independent research, development and production capability (Hagelin,
1988:159-161). This posture, according to Pierre (1982: 122), was, however, very difficult to
sustain since sophisticated technology was becoming exceedingly expensive, and Sweden was
consequently pressured either to increase its exports and to enter into co-operative arrangements
with other West European states in order to obtain and retain a qualitative technological edge in
arms development and production. Such reconsideration therefore was accompanied by a cautious
increase in arms sales since 1975, which was employed with the assurance that the policy of
neutrality was not compromised whatsoever.
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5.4.2 Trends in Military Research and Development
As a technology-oriented industrialised country, Sweden's gross domestic expenditure on research
and development was in 1985 estimated at 2.9 percent as a percentage ofGDP, and 3.09 percent in
1987 compared to 3.38 percent in the United States, 3.13 percent in the FRG, and 2.62 percent in
France in 1986 (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:93-94). The budget for military-related research and
development increased substantially in the 1980s as a consequence of the development of the JAS
39 Gripen fighter aircraft, with both the defence agencies and the defence industries contributing
17.3 percent in 1983 to 1984. In 1981, the ratio of military-related research and development in the
total national public fund budget for research and experimental development was 7.8 percent
compared to 6.3 percent in Japan (1984), 10.1 percent in the FRG (1983), 36.5 percent in France
(1980), 49.6 percent in the United Kingdom (1983), and 64.3 percent in the United States (1982)
(see Table 5.6 below).
Table 5.6: Sweden's Ratio of Military-Related Research and Development
Developed States United
States
United France
Kin dom
FRG Japan Sweden
Percentage of MiHtary Rand D
to other Rand D
64.3 (1982) 49.6 (1983) 36.5 (1980) 10.1 (1983) 6.3 (1984) 7.8 (1981)
Source: Ikegami-Andersson,M. (1992). The Military-Industrial Complex: The Cases of Sweden and Japan. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Due to the government's fmancial constraints and the subsequent limitations on the defence budget,
military research and development was considerably circumscribed to approximately 9 percent of
the defence budget in the 1983-1984 fiscal year, albeit this was a relatively large amount amongst
the small neutral states of Europe. The functions of planning, arranging and fmancing of military
research and development projects were considerably discharged by the government, with the other
private arms corporations playing a substantial but rather subtle role. Nevertheless, with the
increasing trend towards co-development and co-production arrangement amongst Sweden's
defence firms and other foreign industries, there was a great potential for the private arms
corporations to playa leading role in military-related research and development compared to that of
the state (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:94-95).
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As the development of new sophisticated military technology became more costly in the post-Cold
War period, thereby constricting the capacity of most countries to independently conduct military
research and development, Sweden was also compelled to depend on imports from other suppliers.
Moreover, according to Ikegami-Andersson (1992:95), it had to rely on the co-development of
weapon systems, sub-systems and components with other foreign arms producers. The leading
suppliers of weapon systems, sub-systems, components and technology to Sweden became the
United States and the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding, Sweden found itself in a quagmire
regarding its non-aligned and neutral posture vis-a-vis the growing need for reliance on foreign
advanced military technology generated by the unbearable costs of indigenous research,
development and production.
Accordingly, Sweden resorted to the fabrication of government-to-government Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) permitting the exchange of military technological information with other
arms producing states. These states included the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the
FRG, France, and the Nordic states, and most of the MOUs were arrangements for licensed-
production or the direct procurement of defence equipment and systems. Although most
arrangements for co-development and co-production were mainly conducted with the Nordic and
the neutral European states, the latest arrangements insinuated a tendency towards greater
international co-operation with the North American and Western European (mainly NATO) states
(Ikegami-Andersson, 1992:95). As an example, was the extent of international co-operation with
British Aerospace (BAe) on the JAS 39 Gripen project, and the unequivocal encouragement by the
Swedish government for local corporations to seek greater international involvement so as to reduce
the costs of research, development and production.
5.5 MAINT AlNING NEUTRALITY IN THE POST -COLD WAR PERIOD
5.5.1 State Intervention and the Current Defence Industry
International relations during the Cold War period permitted Sweden to steadfastly pursue its
politico-strategic posture of neutrality and non-alignment and at the same time enhanced the
potential of the armed forces both qualitatively and quantitatively. Hence, the necessity of
independence in the supply of military equipment and weapon systems was emphasised as a pivotal
part of the country's politico-strategic posture. However, according to Ikegami-Andersson
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(1992:107-108), the nature of the Swedish economy did not conform with a defence industry that
was entirely focussed on the domestic market, as it was intrinsically highly internationalised, to wit,
having a long tradition of trade, as well as the licensed-production and overseas production from
and through multinational corporations. This contradiction became more apparent with the
conspicuously constricting domestic defence market, which compelled Swedish arms manufacturers
to consider an aggressive drive to obtain and maintain a niche in the arms export market.
Since the end of the Second World War, Ikegami-Andersson (1992:108) maintains that the Swedish
Social Democratic Party had a firm and solid political hold on the government with the strong
support of the broadly organised trade union movement. This, therefore, insinuated that the
government had a dependable grip on the national economy, the industry, as well as on general
social welfare. Simultaneously, the private sector had the latitude within the state's industrial policy
to pursue its own programmes such as rationalisation, with the state only intervening in instances
where other industries required to be promoted through financial assistance or through
nationalisation, for example, the shipbuilding industry. This element of state intervention was not
however salient, except for cases that were really in need for such intervention. Nonetheless, there
was consistency in the co-operation between the state, business and labour, especially in the
development, production and export of armaments, which ensured the sustenance of a high level of
military research, development and the production of relatively advanced weapon systems.
Those industries that were still under state-ownership were rather successful as part of a social
corporatism that integrated both the interests of industries and labour, as well as of the bureaucracy
and the military in the regulation and the promotion of arms development, production and transfers.
Although a contradiction existed between the strict regulation of arms transfers, the high level of
arms development and production, and the internationalised character of the Swedish economy,
Ikegami-Andersson (1992:108-109) argues that the government managed to circumvent these
antagonisms through the maintenance of a strong political control capacity. Sweden had a relatively
large industry in Western Europe when compared to other small neutral states such as Finland,
Austria and Switzerland, thus questioning the justification of such a high defence industrial capacity
in the name of neutrality.
The Swedish leadership had advanced several justifications for the promotion of arms transfers to
other states, especially the evidence that military personnel costs had increased, the inflation rate
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was bulging, the defence budgets were unstable, and domestic demand had decreased. Moreover,
the development of new advanced, sophisticated, and expensive technologies compelled defence
firms to seek more markets and international defence co-operation in order to sustain their
operations, as well as to maintain an advanced defence research, development and production
capability. From a business economic perspective, the argument was that exports resulted in
lengthened production runs, thus reducing the unit costs of the weapons systems. The market was
therefore expanded and firms were enabled to reap better returns. The defence economic
perspective also maintained that with exports, prices for weapon systems were reduced, thus making
defence acquisitions more cheaper in the long run, whilst at the same time guaranteeing employment
in the defence sector (Hagelin, 1988:161).
From a politico-strategic standpoint, the argument stressed the position that lengthened production
runs ensured a protracted readiness, especially when the production process of a certain weapon
system was supposed to be extended. All these perspectives were supported by the political
economic argument that defence exports increased the state's total exports, thus augmenting its
foreign exchange and balance of trade position. It was further argued, according to Hagelin
(1988:161-162), that foreign arms sales enhanced Sweden's stature from a politico-strategic
perspective, in terms of obtaining technology that would have been difficult to attain as a non-
aligned and neutral state. Moreover, the diversification of suppliers of war material reduced the
dependence of other recipient states from the leading suppliers that had strings attached to their arms
transfers. Therefore, with the latter argument, Sweden was focussing on increasing its military
exports to the Third World as a primary emerging supplier, particularly to those recipients that were
not traditional markets of the leading powers.
5.5.2 Structural and Societal Conditions in the NewEnvironment
According to Ikegami-Andersson (1992:109), Sweden had a comprehensive defence system that
was labelled as "total defence", which included military defence, civil defence, economic defence,
and psychological defence, that was ushered in by a Parliamentary Manifesto of 1972. This total
defence system also promoted the defence industry as a central feature of Sweden's politico-
strategic posture of non-alignment and neutrality in international relations. However, the changed
conditions of the post-Cold War era were not supportive of a heavy military build-up as the demand
for armaments was diminishing rapidly on a world-wide scale, whereas defence industries were
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anticipated to sustain their production faculties for being able to provide the necessary implements
during times of need. Moreover, governments internationally were faced with financial crises due
to deteriorating national economies such that defence budgets became no longer sustainable, as was
the case before the end of the Cold War. Within these changed conditions, the Swedish defence
industry was focussed on being restructured or rationalised, as a recommendation by the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces (OB) and the Defence Material Administration (FMV).
The processes of restructuring and rationalisation, which were planned for the beginning of the
1990s towards the 21 st century, still maintained the basic tenet of self-reliance in the production of
military equipment and weapon systems in preparation for war or crises. This production process
was called "K-production" (Ikegami-Andersson, 1992: 109), whereby the government and defence
industries were expected to co-operate and co-ordinate their activities in encouraging the
development of technology-led industries such as aircraft, missiles and electronics. Technology-led
industries were to be encouraged particularly to participate in international collaborative
arrangements so as to catch-up with rapidly progressing advanced technologies. K-production also
promoted the sustenance of non-techno logy-led industries that produced traditional weapon systems,
which formed the essential basis for self-sufficiency. Traditional weapon systems, such as artillery
systems and tanks, were also supposed to sustain themselves through aggressive exports, integration
or rationalisation, or else be replaced by imports. Nevertheless, the new conditions seemed to
encourage the integration of both military and civilian technologies in the development of high-
technology products, as well as increased participation in international arrangements for the co-
development and co-production of high-technology weapon systems, particularly with NATO states
(Ikegami -Andersson, 1992: 109-11 0).
Although the tendency towards international co-operation with NATO states in the development and
production of weapon systems and military equipment appeared to clash with Sweden's politico-
strategic posture of non-alignment and neutrality, the state, nonetheless, already imported high-
technology components and sub-systems from mainly NATO states (Ikegami-Andersson,
1992: 110). Thus, the Swedish case becomes an illustration of "another form of adjustment to
reduced domestic military spending - the conscious decision to sacrifice a domestic weapons
capability across a wide range of weapons and seek alternative sources abroad" (Udis, 1993: 144).
The stance that Sweden adopted was nothing new, as other European states had done the same
previously, nonetheless not under the conditions of non-alignment or neutrality. What appears also
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to be a radical move from strict self-reliance in weapons production was the decision to no longer
design and develop certain traditional weapon systems, such as main battle tanks, and instead import
these from abroad. This insinuated that the range of defence products that were produced
indigenously were to be reduced through imports and to specialise across a shorter range of military
products. This can therefore be interpreted as a departure from the principled stance, which,
according to Pierre (1982: 122), made the Swedish defence industry to be a unique entity: being able
to produce a wide range of technologically advanced equipment in very low quantities.
Furthermore, the process of the internationalisation of the defence industry, which began in the late
1980s, was, according to Skëns (1993: 160-161), a result of intense transformations in the post-Cold
War political economic environment. This process also included the national concentration of
defence production through the establishment of mergers and acquisitions; diversification and
conversion into processes of civilian production; the privatisation of formerly state-owned defence
firms; and the reduction of outputs. These processes occurred simultaneously through overlapping
or integrated strategies that were prompted by rapidly rising research and development costs that
were complemented by declining or sluggish domestic or foreign demands for weapon systems, thus
compelling the direction of technological developments towards the internationalisation of
technology-led defence industries. The main pressure was the need to extend production runs in
order to achieve economies of scale, which was rather difficult for small European states with small
domestic arms markets, whose companies were impelled to seek co-operation with other foreign
companies in order to survive in a highly competitive market.
However, such a situation created a difficulty for the control of arms transfers, as most initiatives
were focussed at the state level for the implementation of policies, decision-making and regulations
(Skëns 1993: 161). On the one hand, the Swedish Social Democratic Party government was
experiencing a diminishing grip over political and economic conditions domestically, as wildcat
strikes became a characteristic feature of the country's political economy in the 1980s. Ikegami-
Andersson (1992: 110) believes that these strikes insinuated that the widely organised trade union
movement, which formed the political basis of the Social Democratic Party government, was
disintegrating or else loosing its influence. The implication, therefore, was that the government was
slowly loosing its hold on the defence industry and simultaneously being unable to control arms
exports, particularly with the growing trend toward co-development and co-production of weapon
systems technology on an international scale.
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On the other hand, the defence industries were becoming more interested and focussed on these
developing trends in order to keep pace with changes in the high-technology race and to secure their
place in the export market regardless of state budgeting and planning, thus suggesting a tendency
toward less state intervention and control in their day-to-day activities (lkegami-Andersson,
1992: Il0). What appeared to be the case in this instance was that Sweden was becoming compelled
to follow the trend of integration in Europe, as the defence industry became more and more
autonomous and integrated with other industries in the European Union. The government was thus
prompted to adopt a more associative stance in its diplomatic dealings with other Western European
states, including the United States and Canada. Therefore, Ikegami-Andersson (1992: 117)
extrapolates that power relations within the military-industrial-complex were becoming completely
transformed, as the defence industries, instead of the state, began to take a leading role in the
determination of the direction and pace of their own progress.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
The Swedish defence industry was compelled to respond to two major external factors in its
development since the Second World War. First, was the diminishing Cold War tensions in Europe,
which undermined the unanimity that used to characterise the formulation of Swedish defence
policy and the subsequent allocation of funds to the defence establishment, with the share of
weapons procurement being the main casualty. Second, was the inevitable tendency of producing
more advanced and sophisticated weapon systems that necessitated a rapid increase in development
costs, thus prompting Sweden either to import some of its advanced military requirements or to be
complacent with technologically mediocre equipment for its own armed forces. For the Swedish
defence industry to sustain itself, Holmstrom and Olsson (1983:177-178) deduced that it either had
to wait for domestic defence orders, which were not easily forthcoming; to focus on expanding the
export market, which was nonetheless limited by the state's stringent arms transfers regulations; or
to diversify into civilian production, which was rather possible as the defence sector was a fraction
of large industrial corporations. However, defence contracts provided a tremendous impetus
towards advancing the faculty for research and development, even though the defence sector was
insignificant in quantitative terms, except for its technological sophistication as well as the politico-
strategic implications that it posed domestically and internationally.
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The organisational features of the defence industry in Sweden also reflected what Ikegami-
Andersson (1992:119-120) referred to as a military-industrial-labour complex or a military-
industrial fraternity instead of a classical military-industrial-complex concept of the United States.
This was mainly due to the fact that Sweden perceived the necessity of a defence industry for
different reasons than those of the United States. Primarily, the defence industry was viewed as a
central feature of the non-aligned and neutrality stance in international relations. Secondarily, it was
viewed as a significant engine for ensuring social welfare, particularly employment, in the political
economy of the country. Whereas in the United States, the profit-making imperative had also
developed to become the major driving force besides the hegemonic politico-strategic
considerations, especially in the post-Cold War period.
Nevertheless, Sweden was compelled to cope within the changing global conditions, in particular
the emphasis on the revered non-aligned and neutrality posture in international relations, which was
over and above not mutually exclusive towards the internationalisation of the defence industry,
although it made Sweden vulnerable to the vicissitudes of alliance (NATO) politics. However,
other leading suppliers that were not aligned to NATO, including other emerging suppliers in the
developing world, were also engaging in co-development and co-production arrangements with
NATO member-states, albeit without anticipating any involvement in the problems that directly
impacted on the alliance. The name of the game, nonetheless, was to diversify as much as possible
in terms of partners and sources of supplies in order to sustain an eclectic and independent stance in
the international hierarchy of states. This therefore augurs well for a posture of non-alignment and
neutrality within the Swedish context, as this insinuates that there is no contradiction in engaging
with whatever state in the pursuit of technological advancement, except when the issues of principle
are put to the test.
Sweden therefore provides an interesting case as a non-aligned and neutral state in the developed
world, which otherwise could have featured prominently as a secondary leading arms supplier along
with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, if it was part of the NATO alliance. In fact,
Sweden has all the potential attributes of becoming a leading second-tier supplier if it pursues a
closer relationship with the other NATO member-states in Western Europe in the post-Cold War
period. Hence, it can be concluded that its non-aligned and neutral posture is the major factor that
inhibits and contains this vibrant and excelling arms producer within the ranks of the emerging
suppliers. However, despite the difficulties that Sweden still faces from adopting such a stance, it
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can be clearly argued that the country is at the threshold of becoming a leading supplier, particularly
within the market determined collaborative arrangements with other leading and emerging arms
producers and suppliers.
Nonetheless, other cases that compare closely to that of Sweden as primary emerging suppliers, who
are also at the threshold of becoming secondary leading suppliers are those of the Czech Republic
and Canada. The Czech Republic, on the one hand, surfaced from the shadows of the Iron Curtain,
and has categorically shifted into the NATO alliance in order to improve its politico-strategic and
economic stature within the international hierarchy of states. Canada, on the other hand, has been
and continues to be a dependent partner of the United States within the NATO alliance and the
NORAD (North American Air Defence) joint-command arrangement.: Both these establishments
continue to assure the Canadian state and defence industry a primary position amongst the emerging
suppliers, as it has a sound market within the NATO alliance, although being shadowed by the
United States hinders the transition towards the leading supplier status.
The next case study therefore is that of Brazil, as a salient model of a secondary emerging supplier,
it differs from the primary emerging suppliers on the grounds that it began late to develop an
indigenous arms development and production faculty. Accordingly, Brazil, as a secondary
emerging supplier, has not as yet captured the process of innovation at the edge of technological
advancement, and therefore still relies heavily on inputs from the leading suppliers. Nonetheless,
like other secondary emerging suppliers such as Israel South Korea, and Taiwan, Brazil has an
expansive and enterprising arms production faculty that strives to develop specialised equipment at
a very high level of technological sophistication. At the same time, Brazil maintains a distinguished
niche in the international arms market, which is solely focussed at meeting the general requirements
of the developing states of the South as well as the specific needs of the developed world.
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CHAPTER 6 - BRAZIL: A SECONDARY EMERGING SUPPLIER
TRYING TO DEVELOP A MARKET-ORIENTED DEFENCE
INDUSTRY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In terms of military strength, Brazil has incomparable armed forces in the Latin American region,
and is the largest recipient of arms from the United States and Western Europe. The size of the
armed forces is not linked to any security consideration, but merely a reflection of prestige as the
prominent power in the region, indeed a global middle-level power. Brazil's economy is one of the
largest ten globally, and a territorial giant (sharing borders with ten states) with a population of more
than 120 million people. Although the country was ruled by an overtly nationalistic military junta
from 1964 to 1985, with business and technocratic support in Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro, the
martial regime strove to elevate Brazil into an economic and military giant that could become the
future leader of the Third World.
Behind this perspective emanated the intention to establish an indigenous arms industry, with the
military junta creating the Industria de Material Belieo do Brasil (lMBEL), which was to control
and augment the defence industry. The overall intention was to achieve the highest possible level of
self-sufficiency in armaments, thus impelling the armed forces to obtain second-echelon
indigenously designed systems over more advanced foreign-designed and developed systems. This
motion, instigated by the army, was negatively received by the air force, which was eager to obtain
systems that were more sophisticated than what was indigenously produced. However, according to
Pierre (1982:237-238), a related objective was to augment the country's technological and industrial
development, as defence production was perceived to provide a significant contribution to the
scheme.
The Brazilian arms industry began substantial production in the mid-1960s and was further
promoted by the discontinuance of military co-operation with the United States in 1977 after the
latter criticised Brazil's human rights practices. Lately, Brazil was regarded as a competent supplier
of armoured vehicles, main battle tanks, missiles, and light aircraft (Catrina, 1988:111). Brazil
emerged as a vibrant secondary emerging arms supplier in the mid-1980s, with the three leading
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firms of EMBRAER, ENGESA, and AVffiRAS constituting the backbone of the country's defence
industry. The focus of Brazilian arms transfers were the Third World states, especially the Middle
East, to whom simple and maintainable weapon systems were exported (Franko-Jones, 1992:1). In
fact, Brazil provides a remarkable model amongst other secondary emerging arms suppliers such as
Israel South Korea, and Taiwan, since the initiative to develop a vivacious defence industry was not
buttressed or endorsed by any other global power as was the case with the latter two protégés of the
United States. The initiative for establishing an indigenous defence production capability was
actuated by the Brazilian nationalist élite, which believed that the defence industry was an engine
for advanced technological development and a pillar of great power status in the international
hierarchy of states.
This chapter therefore focuses on Brazil's efforts to develop a market-oriented defence production
and arms transfer faculty, which begins with Brazil as an arms producer and regional power within
Latin America, which expanded its production capability to become a global arms supplier.
Secondly, the focus is on the structure of the Brazilian defence industry, the supply conditions, the
demand for armaments, and the structure of the market. Thirdly, attention is on the economic
foundations of the defence industry, the historical development of the industry's economic rationale,
the role of the state in defence industrialisation, and the state and the defence industry in the
promotion of technological development. Finally, the chapter addresses Brazil's defence exports,
their successes and difficulties.
6.2 BRAZIL AS A REGIONAL POWER AND ARMS SUPPLIER
From a regional perspective, Pierre (1982:232-233) maintains that Latin America was not a major
purchaser of arms, since the sophistication of armaments in the regions' inventory was relatively
lower than in other regions with a greater potential for conflict. What became ironic, however,
about the Latin American market was that the diversity of arms suppliers was more pronounced than
in other regions. This was conceivably due to the fact that political motivations were less salient
than in other regions, which insinuated the preponderance of economic or commercial
considerations in the supplier-recipient relationships. Perhaps it was a consequence of the nature of
disputes in the region, which during the Cold War were beyond the East-West dichotomy, and were
rather focussed on the local geopolitical considerations that impelled states to obtain weapon
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systems. Furthermore, the ascendancy of the military in most of these states during the Cold War
period also became a driving force for these states to acquire arms.
Nonetheless, the region was foremost in developing region-based recipient-determined restraints on
the accumulation of armaments, such as the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho. The 1974 Declaration
promoted the possibility for arms control arrangements to be initiated from the recipients'
perspective rather than the perceivably condescending supplier-determined orchestrations (Pierre,
1982:233). Pierre (1982:235) claims that the nature of conflicts in the Latin American region were
mainly based on revanchist and irredentist attitudes, being focussed on the primarily dyadic border
disputes between the various states. These conflicts were between Peru and Chile, Argentina and
Chile, Bolivia and Chile, Venezuela and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, Guatemala and Belize,
Honduras and El Salvador, and finally between Argentina and Brazil. Although the final dispute
was not likely to end up in an armed conflict, it however had an influence on the two states'
perceptions of prestige.
Nevertheless, the nature of conflict within the region did not necessarily warrant the heightened
concern about national security and military readiness, except that the main reason was the
ascendancy of the military juntas in most of the states, which were more susceptible to the
requirements of their establishments, as they regarded themselves as legitimate guardians against
insurgency and economic chaos. Their accession to power was based on emphasising subversive
threats to obtain popular support and simultaneously distract the latter from internal economic
actualities. For the martial rulers, the inherent appetite for sophisticated and precocious armaments
was inevitable, particularly in a region lacking the existence of a bourgeoisie class, wherein the
prestige of the military was habitually exalted, especially with the possession of modern armaments.
Moreover, advanced armaments were perceived to be a cardinal attribute of sovereignty,
accordingly influencing the establishment of indigenous arms industries for those states that could
afford to do so, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela (Pierre, 1982:235-236).
In the late 1970s, when the prosperous future predicted for Latin American states was proven to be a
fallacy, Brazil began to adopt policies that were intended to maximise the advantages of accessible
potential. These advantages, according to Anthony (1990:103-104), were identified to be the
geographical location of the country as a littoral state; and secondly, the level of scientific and
technological advancement that the country had attained in the previous years. Geographically,
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Brazil had an enormous endowment of natural resources, and moreover, could exploit the expansion
of trade relations between the states of America and the African continent that was a consequence of
the end of Portuguese colonialism in the mid-1970s. The scientific research programmes that had
been introduced in Brazil also initiated the ambition to pursue nuclear programmes. Furthermore,
Brazil intended to strengthen relations with Argentina as regional powers that could co-operate in
restricting foreign intrusion into the continent. This objective was pursued especially during and
after the FalklandslMalvinas War of 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom, which also
reinforced Brazil's ambitions as a maturing regional power. Finally, a common agreement existed
between Brazil and Argentina that in order to be able to exploit the economic opportunities that the
region availed, they had to improve their standards of technological advancement.
As the United States' arms transfers policy changed from military grants to counterinsurgency,
particularly after the popular revolution in Cuba, Pierre (1982:233) alleges that Latin American
states demanded more advanced and costly armaments that were withheld by United States officials.
The reason was the Alliance for Progress policy, which was initiated by the Kennedy
administration, prioritising economic growth and development over military spending, as both these
variables were perceived to be mutually exclusive. Military spending was postulated to dissipate the
meagre resources that could be used for development purposes and, accordingly, sophisticated arms
were considered inappropriate for counterinsurgency operations. For instance, Latin American
states were eager to obtain the then new F-5 fighter aircraft, which was denied by the United States
on the grounds that it would cross the supersonic threshold that was imposed on the continent.
Instead the United States offered the subsonic F-86 aircraft that was rejected by the Latin American
states, which subsequently turned their attention to other European suppliers for more advanced
equipment, particularly France for the supersonic Mirage 5 fighter aircraft (Pierre, 1982:233).
This however became a new trend amongst other trends that were identified by Pierre (1982:233)
concerning the purchasing of military equipment by Latin American states. Firstly, was that the
advancement of their military procurement programmes was relatively stable vis-a-vis other regions.
Secondly, the variety of suppliers continued to increase, as other emerging suppliers such as
Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Canada, South Korea and Israel complemented the leading suppliers.
With the Latin American market becoming accessible, some of the European states took advantage
of this opportunity and rapidly extended their defence exports to the Latin American region.
Finally, autochthonous emerging suppliers, such as Brazil and Argentina, also became salient in the
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region, making the Latin American market the most commercially competitive in the world.
Therefore the commercial character of the Latin American arms market was a consequence of the
withdrawal of the United States as a primary supplier of surplus stocks through grants, which was
based on what was indicated to be the imperatives of hemispheric security.
According to Pierre (1982:233-234), some of the Latin American states, such as Brazil, focussed
their attention on augmenting their indigenous defence industrial bases to become significant
players in the international arms production and transfer system. What became notable about the
Brazilian defence industry was the limited nature of state intervention, as most enterprises emerged
not as state initiatives, which was the case in most Third World arms producing states, but as state-
encouraged private resourcefulness. "Security", it was argued, ''was best achieved by the
development of a dynamic private sector" (Franko-Jones, 1992:2). Therefore, according to Franko-
Jones (1992:2-3), the driving forces behind the success of the defence sector were economic factors
rather than politico-strategic imperatives, in contrast to most arms producing and supplying states.
The focus was to prioritise the needs of the international market in order to ensure a pulsating
economic sector, rather than to capitulate to the demands of the political or military leadership. In
this manner, therefore, success could be guaranteed by greater state and firm co-operation, with the
former intervening to encourage and supplement the latter's efficacy in the market through financial
props, diplomatic marketing, research and development assistance and a pragmatic sharing of
responsibilities.
Franko-Jones (1992:4) underscores the fact that in the 1990s, when the global arms market began to
shrink and demand started to focus on sophisticated electronics sub-systems beyond the Brazilian
defence industry's proficiency, the military availed its research centres in order to stimulate
technological growth. The defence industry was perceived by military strategists to be the driving
force for advanced technological development, if the experiences of the United States' industrial
development were taken into consideration during and after the Second World War. Accordingly,
the defence industry was structured to conform to the supply and demand conditions dictated by the
global arms market.
6.3 THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BRAZILIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
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6.3.1 Supply Conditions
Within the Brazilian political economy, there were favourable supply conditions for the
establishment of a successful defence industry, and these, inter alia, included a stable material and
human resource base, a relatively advanced technological industrial faculty, a comparatively skilled
workforce, a loyal business sector, encouraging state policies, and a vacant niche in the global arms
market. According to Franko-Jones (1992: 14), these conditions permitted the creation of a uniquely
focussed industrial structure dominated by few giant firms that benefited from the availability of
aboriginal natural resources, thus providing abounding inputs for production. However the dearth of
oil, and the subsequent need to import more than 80 percent of it in the 1980s, had a negative impact
on the country's balance of payments. Brazil adopted counter-trade strategies in its effort to
overcome its dire petroleum requirements by barter trading arms for oil, thus relaxing the foreign
exchange stress to permit the importation of intermediate commodities. Therefore, the drive for
technological advancement and industrial development was also stimulated by the need to gratify
fuel requirements, which at the same time became impossible as a results of a concentrated structure
of the defence industry.
Even though the process of rapid industrialisation introduced by President Kubitschek necessitated a
higher price to be paid by Brazil, nonetheless, a "veritable mystique of economic development" was
born, which in 1962 resulted in a growth rate of 5.3 percent although this decreased to 1.5 percent in
1963 (Fiechter, 1975:21). Notwithstanding, the major distortions of the economic system were
apparent and the Brazilian government had to confront them. Amongst these were the exacerbation
of regional disparities as a result of the concentration of the industries in certain parts of the country,
whilst other sectors of the economy were under-utilised. Second, was the over-mechanisation of
plants, arising from the indirect subsidisation of imports of capital equipment, which stimulated the
employment of advanced productive technologies that were often inappropriate for the existing
domestic market, and which required normally inaccessible skilled labour power in Brazil.
Thirdly, was a tendency to fall back on inflation so as to increase the level of overall expenditure
above the existing level of incomes. Fourthly, the agricultural sector was left relatively static, as a
result of the general preoccupation with industrialisation. And fmally, there was a dearth of
administrative and managerial staff to oversee the implementation of the economic programmes
(Fiechter, 1975:21-22). In addition, there were also serious problems encountered in the
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technological sector, as requirement for foreign advanced technology became higher than the need
for indigenously developed technology. Franko-Jones (1992: 14) maintains that the state had to
establish advanced research and development centres and to provide huge import subsidies in order
to overcome the technological backlog, and as such, monopolies had to be promoted in certain fields
as primary technological recipients. Monopolies began to emerge in the aircraft, missile and motor
vehicle sectors as specific firms had to be earmarked to receive the most sophisticated technological
advancements, also considering that a multiple firm production structure could not have managed to
absorb a co-operative state- firm arrangement.
The main beneficiaries of these technological programmes were CTA, the Technology Centre of the
Air Force, and CTEX, the Army Technology Centre. Obviously, CTA became instrumental in
EMBRAER's establishment and accomplishments, whilst CTEX was later involved in the fusion of
the electronic technology dimension in the armoured vehicle sector, led by ENGESA. The
Bandeirante turboprop aircraft project, which was decisive in the inauguration of EMBRAER, was
also initiated by CTA, with the military engineers providing the necessary political impetus for the
firm's establishment. After EMBRAER had fully developed its in-house technological capabilities,
the focus of CTA was shifted towards other supplier firms in the defence industry (Franko-Jones,
1992: 14-15). Brazil also had a large pool of skilled workers from which the defence industry could
attract labour power for arms production. For example, Franko-Jones (1992: 15) claims that
engineers and technicians who were required for the production of aircraft and missiles were
recruited from graduates of the Aeronautical Engineering Institute (ITA), and skilled workers were
selected from the large of pool of labour specifically trained for the automobile industry, particularly
heavy vehicle production, by the Army Engineers Institute (IME), and which were comfortably
transferred to the production of tanks.
Since the 1930s, the state was persuaded to support the defence industry through the concepts of
"Security and Development" that were championed by the Superior War College (E.S.G.), which
galvanised for public support and state investment in military production with the accession of the
military into Brazilian politics in 1964. A programme of military industrialisation was advanced by
E.S.G. trained officials, advocating the provision of incentives and direct subsidies to private
entrepreneurs in the defence sector (Franko-Jones, 1992: 15). The E.S.G. was also buttressed by the
Social Research and Studies Institute (LP.E.S.), an institution sponsored privately by supporters of
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"Security and Development", who advocated a capitalist perspective on the development and
reconstitution of the Brazilian political economy (Fiechter, 1975:29).
The main motive for this purely partisan stance for the defence sector, according to Franko-Jones
(1992:15-16), was the initial scepticism by the private sector towards the political demand for
indigenous defence production, which was construed to require high initial capital investments,
equivocal technologies, and unpromising opportunities when compared to alternative domestic
undertakings. On the other hand, national security concerns were perceived to be distrustful of
foreign capital, which was believed to be extensively focussed on high technology manufacturing.
Hence, the state became the main driving force behind defence production, promoting and initiating
the establishment of arms industries through the provision of technology, human resources and a
guaranteed domestic market.
According to the scholars and graduates of the E.S.G. and the LP.E.S., national security and
economic development were intertwined concepts, mainly since a modem armed force required the
consent and productive capacity of the whole population behind its war effort. In short, in order to
be able to maximise national security, all the factors of economic production had to be coherently
planned and employed towards one national objective, simultaneously minimising domestic
tensions. The proponents of this school of thought argued that economic backwardness that was
preponderant in most Third World states was a consequence of internal contests driven by global
ideological struggles, which were the main calamitous threats to national security. As a cogent
concomitant to development, national security could be optimised by a counter-insurrectionary
approach that was diffused into all sectors and activities of Brazilian society under an assertively
centralised administration that boasted an unmatched planning faculty (Fiechter, 1975:29).
The goals of the centralised administration, according to Fiechter (1975 :29), were to emasculate the
traditional oligarchy, through the introduction of agrarian reforms that guaranteed increased
productivity instead of redistributing land according to the norms of social justice; overhauling the
electoral system; renovating transport and education; eliminating inflation; and establishing a
financial market. Moreover, from an economic perspective, the nationalised sector had to be
strengthened while eliminating the inefficient state enterprises and inviting foreign and domestic
capital to build a robust private sector in the Brazilian economy. Accordingly, as soon as the
military regime took over power in 1964, Castello Branco was assured of a strong military and
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civilian support base from the graduates of the E.S.G. and the LP.E.S., who had a common approach
to Brazilian problems and challenges as well as their solutions, along with a prepared cadre to
assume government responsibilities.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Krause (1992:155) maintains that arms production was
accelerated with the intention of increasing regional hegemony and to achieve technological
advancement. Indeed, international conditions played a very important role in the 1970s by
ensuring that the defence industry received the necessary support and concentration it required
within the domestic realm when Brazil, as one of those states ruled by autocratic military juntas,
began to gain less and less support from the international community. Even the United States
government, under the Carter administration, implemented the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act in 1976, which restricted the transfer of arms to those states that were
regarded as grossly violating human rights according to international standards (Franko-Jones,
1992: 16). The reason for this was the 1968 and 1977 tensions with the United States regarding
Brazil's poor human rights record. The United States ended military assistance arrangements and
prompted Brazil to augment its indigenous faculty to produce armaments as a condition of security
(Krause, 1992: 155).
These changed international conditions expedited the process of concentrating and consolidating the
defence industry in Brazil, as authorities perceived the need to ensure greater independence from
vacillating suppliers in the North. The state, therefore, became the main champion of domestic
defence production through the allocation of maximised resources and in facilitating the transfer of
technological packages from alternative suppliers to the Brazilian defence industry. The defence
industry also received increased support from the various state institutions that nonetheless
encouraged the proclivity towards monopolies in the Brazilian market. Trends in the international
arms market also encouraged analogous tendencies, as only the giant firms with the ability to sustain
longer production runs and to establish extreme support networks were able to withstand the
commensurate costs (Franko-Jones, 1992:16).
6.3.2 The Demand for Armaments
As the market structure of any defence industry is not only affected by supply conditions, the
Brazilian industry also had to consider the characteristics of demand in both the domestic and
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international spheres. Amongst other demand characteristics that moulded the Brazilian defence
industry were the rate of growth of demand, the availability of substitutes, the elasticity of prices,
the cyclical and seasonal nature of defence as a commodity, the method of purchasing, and the
standard marketing procedures. The most conspicuous of all these characteristics was that the
Brazilian armed forces were the sole source of domestic demand for mainly defence products along
with the dual-use nature of certain .military products to gratify both civilian and global requirements
for applicable military technologies (Franko-Jones, 1992: 18).
As the armed forces were the primary consumers of defence products, Franko-Jones (1992: 18)
maintains that they could order a specific weapon system and also determine its price. However, in
Brazil, this capacity was forfeited in favour of foreign military demand and satisfying the demand
for dual-use products, thus allowing most defence products to have a dual applicability. For
example, aircraft could also be used for commercial transportation, armoured vehicles could also be
converted into off-road vehicles or agricultural equipment, and rockets could also be used as civilian
space systems. There were several reasons for promoting dual-use technologies. Firstly, large
subsidies towards the defence sector could be painlessly legitimised. Secondly, according to the
principle of "Security and Development", dual-use technologies became effective in strengthening
the country's economic infrastructure by supporting the transport and agricultural sectors.
Therefore, the state became the driver of economic development, rather than dissipating the
country's resources. Finally, costs were reduced through longer production runs and intra-frrm
learning processes were augmented through the gratification of civilian demands, thus the defence
sector was made more stable and the individual firms more self-sufficient. The argument, according
to the Brazilian military perspective, was that the economic viability of defence firms guaranteed the
security of the state.
The initiation of Brazilian defence firms was primarily focused on satisfying the needs of the
international market, especially the Third World demand for arms, which was high-powered and
enthusiastic in the late 1970s when the Brazilian industry was still surfacing. Hence, according to
Franko-Jones (1992:18-19), the proclivity towards establishing larger firms that could meet the
demand of extensive networks throughout the developing world became so prevalent in shaping the
Brazilian defence industry. Production runs were also lengthened through international marketing
strategies, as firms were permitted the flexibility to scramble for profit availed by the international
market by postponing domestic defence orders for the periods of recession. The nature and
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character of Brazilian equipment and weapon system were enthusiastically received in the Third
World, since they were manufactured for rough terrain and were relatively uncomplicated, thus
befitting the requirements for regional and internal conflicts. Therefore, instead of procuring
sophisticated and costly equipment and weapon systems from the industrialised North, Third World
states could purchase cheap, durable and lucid products from the Brazilian arms producers.
6.3.3 Market Structure
The characteristics of demand, particularly the substantial domestic military requirements and
foreign military sales, carved the Brazilian defence industry into a hierarchical structure (see Figure
6.1 below), with the troika of EMBRAER, ENGESA, and AVIBRAS, followed by other smaller
firms and subsidiaries producing sub-systems, and the nadir being occupied by suppliers of
components and parts. Actually, the Brazilian defence industry is composed of approximately 350
state- and privately-owned enterprises, which are considered to be one of the most successful sectors
of the Brazilian economy. The EMBRAER group accounts for more than 95 percent oftotal aircraft
production in the country, comprising mainly of turboprop aircraft, which became successful in the
United States' commercial commuter market (their military versions also did well in the arms
market). Six firms comprise the EMBRAER group, which includes two primary sub-contractors,
NEIVA and AEROTEC (Franko-Jones, 1992:20).
The AVIBRAS group is focussed on producing defence equipment and systems, conducting space
and chemical research and developing electronic and communication systems within three plants in
the state of Sao Paulo. The firm's installations are responsible for research and advanced
engineering, electronic and mechanical production, as well as the manufacturing of antennas and
earth stations for satellite communications. The other plants are focussed on manufacturing,
assembling and testing defence systems and the production of rockets. AVIBRAS is considered to
be the largest producer of rockets globally, as it manages to attend to a multitude of foreign orders.
Three subsidiaries formed part of the AVIBRAS group, which produced launch vehicles for rocket
systems and self-propelled porticoes for industrial utilisation, power electronics, control panel
circuit breakers and trolley busses. Nevertheless, after the economic crisis of the late 1980s, these
three subsidiaries were temporarily consolidated into a single facility (Franko-Jones, 1992:20-21)
under the AVIBRAS group, which were also reported to be on the verge of license-producing the
Astros II multiple rocket launcher for the armed forces of Sweden and Japan (Catrina, 1988: 112).
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Figure 6.1 The Structure of the Brazilian Defence Industry
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The ENGESA group, as a third leading defence consortium, is constituted by eleven firms, with
ENGESA Viaturas being the largest production unit, producing armoured vehicles such as the Urutu
and the Cascavel, as well as the Osário main battle tank. Parts, components and other systems for
the automobile industry are provided by vertic alised firms acquired or formed by ENGESA in order
to avert irregular foreign supplies as a result of embargoes, shortages, or politically motivated
restraints (Franko-Jones, 1992:21). Franko-Jones (1992:22-24) believes that the expansion of
ENGESA was very impressive, with only seven enterprises in 1983 being expanded to eleven by
1988. The strategy employed by ENGESA was to ensure that production for the Brazilian armed
forces as well as for the international market was accelerated through the mobilisation of prepared
suppliers in the automobile industry. Moreover, ENGESA sub-contracted other frrms within the
Brazilian industrial sector that were eager to provide other components, parts and sub-systems in
order to compliment its vertical production structure. Therefore, ENGESA's success was mainly
attributable to its effective combination of horizontal and vertical procurement strategies, which
guaranteed lower costs and easy maintenance for its products, as well as the employment of fruitful
international marketing schemes.
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The horizontal procurement strategy employed by ENGESA is also very interesting to note as it did
not push towards the establishment of new industries, but instead generated demand for prevailing
firms. Thus rapid deliveries were facilitated and production risk were diffused through widespread
subcontracting, amounting close to 30 percent of overall production and assembly, accordingly
securing approximately 98 percent of indigenous development and production. Furthermore, the
application of standard parts and components within its products, especially tanks and armoured
combat vehicles, vouched for their simple maintenance, as mechanical breakdowns in combat
conditions could be easily restored and embargoes comfortably circumvented. Hence, products
from ENGESA were highly appealing to prospective recipients in the developing world (Franko-
Jones, 1992:24). According to the president of ENGESA in the late 1980s, the capability to produce
advanced armaments was obtained from the expertise brought by foreign immigrants whose
citizenship was expeditiously processed in Brazil (Catrina, 1988: 112).
The major reason for ENGESA to employ a horizontal procurement strategy, according to Franko-
Jones (1992:25), was the Brazilian armed forces' proclivity to discourage destructive or predatory
competition amongst local firms through a cautious apportionment of tasks as well as the
stimulation of diversification within firms. Hence, firms like Bernadini were encouraged to innately
introduce faculties producing bodies for trucks and tanks, after being engaged in manufacturing
strong boxes and steel office furniture since 1912. From the experience obtained in the mid-1960s,
Bernadini was involved in the modernisation of antiquated United States M-3A1 Stuart light tanks,
in collaboration with the Biselli and Novotracêo enterprises, as well as
ENGESAIELECTROMETAL and D. F. Vasconcellos. Actually, in the 1950s, Louseher and
Schwarz (1989:53-54) maintain that Bernadini was also involved with the Brazilian Army in the
upgrading and refurbishment of the United States M-41 Walker Bulldog and the M-4 Sherman
tanks, which resulted in a new Brazilian 30-ton MB-3 Tamoio battle tank. Moreover, the licensed
production and purchase of primarily foreign components resulted in the production of new weapon
systems (Louscher and Schwarz, 1989:54) such as the EE-Tl and EE-T2 Osório main battle tanks
(Catrina, 1988:111).
Another fascinating sector within the Brazilian defence industry was the naval industry, which was
characterised by ambitious projects that were often discordant with the available fmancial resources,
and usually resulted in the suspension or cancellation of certain modernisation programmes.
Projects that had been adopted in 1967 resulted in the Brazilian Navy becoming the most
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modernised and capable in the region by the late 1970s. In 1984, an ambitious IS-year naval
programme was presented to the legislature, which was aimed at doubling the country's fleet, with
the core project being the replacement of the ex-Royal Navy's Minas Gerais World War Two
vintage aircraft carrier with the local construction of an indigenous aircraft carrier (Anthony,
1990: 109-11 0). Other projects envisaged in the 1984 fifteen-year naval modernisation programme,
according to Anthony (1990: II0-113), included the local construction of a nuclear-powered
submarine and an extensive refit project for the INHAUMA Class corvettes. The ultimate intention
was to develop the capacity to export naval vessels under EMGEPRON (Empresa Gerericial de
Projeetos Navais), an organisation linked to the Navy that was established to oversee and facilitate
naval production.
Besides the naval programmes, horizontalised production strategies within the Brazilian defence
industry led to the sustenance and development of firms such as Gurgel, Biselli, Motopecas and
ÓRBITA. ÓRBITA was established as a missile consortium consisting of ENGESA, EMBRAER
and other petty shareholders such as the state owned industry for War Material (IMBEL), as well as
Eska-Engenharia and Parcom-Participacêes. The consortium was responsible for subcontracting the
production of parts and components for its progenitors, in addition to the research, development and
marketing of missile and guided weapon systems, as well as sounding rockets and launchers for the
global civilian space market (Franko-J ones, 1992:25-26). What is curiously perplexing concerning
the establishment of ÓRBITA, according to Franko-Jones (1992:26), was the involvement of the
state in encouraging a public enterprise that directly competed with an already established private
firm, AVIBRAS, which was a trend previously discouraged by the state in the aircraft and armoured
vehicle sectors.
Other firms that constituted a significant sector of the Brazilian defence industry were Novatracáo,
D. F. Vasconcellos, Tecnasa, the ABC group and IMBEL. Another firm, which was part of a larger
conglomerate, the ABC group, was ABC Simuladores e Aviênica, producing simulators and
avionics for the Brazilian aeronautics industry in conjunction with CTA (Franko-Jones, 1992:27).
In Brazil, small arms were manufactured by a multitude of firms, prominent amongst whom was
IMBEL, the Industry for War Material owned by the Brazilian Army. According to Franko-Jones
(1992:28), the main role of IMBEL was to act as an agent for the promotion of research and
development, combining both indigenous and foreign acquired technologies, and to act in co-,
operation with CTEX, the Army Technology Centre. Nonetheless, only 20 percent of IMBEL's
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production was strictly military in nature, as most of the products were destined for the civilian
market.
According to Krause (1992:155), defence industrialisation in Brazil led to increased exports and
also incited the quest for technological advancement. The defence industry was perceived to be an
important technological factor for economic development and rapidly elevated Brazil's position in
the arms transfer and production system. Although most of the technological blueprints and
components were obtained from West European states, progress was rather slow and fraught with an
assortment of failures. Hence, Franko-Jones (1992:29-30) argues that the demeanour of the defence
industry in terms of fixing prices, research and development, product strategy and plant investment,
was often determined by the structure of the market. On the one hand, a competitive sector that
compelled firms to accept market dictated prices usually denied them the capacity to sustain high
standards of investment in their plants or products as a result of lower profitability. On the other
hand, price fixing, larger investment in equipment and plants, greater research and development, and
advanced marketing techniques were permitted by concentration. Nevertheless all of these
intricacies can be distinctly assimilated through the cognition of the economic foundations of the
Brazilian defence industry.
6.4 THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF BRAZIL'S DEFENCE INDUSTRY
6.4.1 The Historical Development of the Industry's Economic Rationale
After Brazil had experienced a decline in its terms of trade, as a consequence of reduced coffee
prices globally, which impacted negatively on the country's capacity to import capital equipment,
President Kubitschek decided in 1956 to expand industrial production by establishing an automobile
industry, as an epitome of technological growth. A new capital, Brasilia, was also established in the
heart of Brazil, with an automobile industry buttressed by foreign capital that was enticed by various
concessions. The automobile industry had a significant impact on the industrialisation process in
Brazil, as industrial production had an average growth rate of 11 percent per annum between 1956
and 1961. Nonetheless, the industrialisation process had other negative effects, such as the transfer
of a considerable part of the country's savings into the modern sectors through direct association
with foreign capital or through investments in activities that were dictated by the employment of
foreign capital. The result was a distorted industrial structure that was geared towards satisfying the
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demand for durable consumer goods primarily required by the upper echelons of Brazilian society
(Fiechter, 1975:20-21).
The military period in Brazil from 1964 to 1985 was also characterised by economic expansion and
industrial diversification which became known as an economic miracle, whereby the military regime
played a central role in reducing inflation, overcoming the political impasses and in improving the
conditions for investment. Actually, the conditions for authoritarianism in Brazil were laid by the
government of Genilio Vargas (1930-1945), which was responsible for the repression of organised
labour in order to alleviate the fears of the middle and upper classes and was instrumental in the
development of an alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie and the military élite. The political
instability that was characteristic of the government of J08.0 Goulart, which succeeded the Vargas
regime, resulted in the deepening of the economic crisis and the military take-over in 1964. Thus
the objective of the military junta was to engage the civilian meritocracy in overcoming the
country's economic adversities, whilst it was focussing on overwhelming a deteriorating internal
security situation. Consequently, an alliance was forged towards the cultivation of a coherent
developmental strategy, which advocated "the centralization of policymaking in the hands of a small
economic team backed by the repressive power of the military" (Graham and Lewis, 1994:213-
214). The result therefore was the establishment of "favourable conditions" for economic growth,
as well as the enhancement and augmentation of the country's industrial sector (Graham and Lewis,
1994:214).
The 1964 military coup became an opportune political moment for defence industrialisation, as the
political, military and economic forces began to interact in modernising the Brazilian economy.
Rather than the military élite being responsible for the creation of the defence industry, it was in fact
the view of virtually the entire national élite since the 1930s to develop a defence industrial sector,
which was perceived as part and parcel of the economic development model for Brazil. Hence,
instead of it being an island, the defence industry became integrated within the country's whole
industrial structure, strongly blended into civilian industrial production. Political independence was
fervently intertwined with economic development, which, according to Brazilian thought, was
driven by a determined state meritocracy that was able to channel political dynamism towards
achieving a globally acclaimed model of political, economic and industrial excellence. Economic
adroitness was viewed to be the generator of "domestic security by encouraging cohesion and
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stability and by fostering international perceptions of Brazil as a world power" (Franko-Jones,
1992:55-56).
Franko-Jones (1992:35) argues that the ability to respond promptly to economic realities, which was
considered to be analogous to responding to military commands, made the Brazilian defence
industry successful, as it was based on the principle of regarding economic growth and
industrialisation as constituting the cornerstone of national security. Therefore decision-making was
rooted in economic and military standards that guaranteed the selection of technologies and
marketing approaches that championed economic progress. Throughout the process of
industrialisation, the concept of security was regarded as having a multidimensional character,
which placed greater emphasis on economic growth as a prerequisite to military strength. Hence,
the overwhelming tendency of conveniently allowing the private sector to playa greater role in the
Brazilian economy in order to promote industrial growth that was responsive to market dictates
rather than to military requirements.
The armed forces were tasked by military strategists to be the upholders of national consciousness,
through pioneering the responsibilities of economic production, moral development, national
education, and above all else, to put the interest of the nation before anything else. Thus, for
Franko-Jones (1992:56-58) the armed forces became the pivotal force for economic development,
as a uniquely dependable and resilient national institution that could unswervingly achieve political,
economic and military objectives, as well as to develop a sound industrial structure to support well-
equipped modem armed forces. Economic development, therefore, was regarded as a prerequisite
for national security, which implied the establishment of the country's basic industry, and the
defence industry becoming part and parcel of the larger industrialisation process. This approach
was further reinforced by Brazil's experiences in both world wars, where it became obvious to the
country's élite that modem industrial capabilities were integral to the development of military power
and the assurance of national security.
The initiative began with the establishment of the Escola Superior de Guerra (E.S.G.), the Superior
War College, in 1949, as an "Institute for Higher Studies" intended for the direction and planning
for national security through expeditious industrialisation (Franko-Jones, 1992:56-58). The
establishment of the E.s.G. was the beginning of the framework within which military officers were
to determine the role they wanted to play in defining the national objectives, and elaborating and
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elucidating the armed forces' defence doctrine. Although the E.S.G. was emulating the United
States' National War College, its curriculum was more extensive and meticulous, since it placed
emphasis on both security and development as commensurate variables, thus establishing the
foundations of Brazilian "military professionalism" that became decisive in the accession of the
military regime in 1964 (Fiechter, 1975:29).
Actually, according to Fiechter (1975:28-29), the E.S.G. became the hub of advanced military and
social studies, wherein both civilian and military objectives were scrutinised and deliberated upon
by military officers and civilian demagogues representing certain sections of Brazilian life, except
the lower classes. Primarily, the objective was to develop a programme of action for Brazil that
would ensure a shared approach to governance, security, economic growth and development. The
E.S.G. was also supported by the Social Research and Studies Institute (LP.E.S.), which was a
privately funded institution, with patrons and participants from the E.S.G. circles meticulously
studying the development and reconstitution of the Brazilian political economy from a capitalist
perspective. The product of these studies was a synthesis of civilian and military perspectives that
emphasised two main concepts, national security and economic development, which became the
prime constituents of the Castello Branco administration.
Franko-Jones (1992:58-60) maintains that the process of Brazilian political, economic, and social
development was rooted in four maxims that were developed by the E.S.G. First, was the abilityto
expand defence thought to accommodate political and economic security through the legitimisation
of arduous political and economic programmes in the name of defence and security, as well as the
mobilisation of fmancial and political support for defence industrialisation. Second, was the strong
emphasis on the ability to utilise the country's abundant natural resources and strategic geographic
locations towards making Brazil a strong global power, particularly in the Latin American and West
African spheres.
Accordingly, and as a third maxim, the federal government, and most importantly its civilian
leadership, were seen as ineffective in mobilising the country's resources towards accomplishing
Brazil's full potential. Hence, finally, an agenda labelled as "developmental nationalism" was
adopted, which was elaborated to ensure the formulation of national policy along painstaking
scientific underpinnings in order to be able to achieve national priorities through the engagement of
both the civilian and the military élite in the doctrine of security and development. When the coup
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of 1964 was finally accomplished, these maxims became the pillars of the military government, with
"national security" as its main motto and "Security and Development" as the official slogan. The
focus was thus on national mobilisation for industrial development through defence production and
expediting the arming of the security forces, in addition to militarily stressing the technological
revolution in warfare (Franko-Jones, 1992:60--61).
6.4.2 The Role of the State in Defence Industrialisation
Although state involvement is limited in terms of political and military control, Franko-Jones
(1992:65) maintains that the state is economically involved in defence production in an
entrepreneurial role according to accepted business criteria. The state became engaged in dynamic
partnerships with the leading firms in the expansion of the industrial base and in the promotion of
technology and exports, whilst not replacing the activities of the various firms. Instead, both the
state and the firms complimented each other by performing economic activities within which they
had respective comparative advantages. The issue then was not who owned what, but who could do
best in what, thus concentrating their attention on the most efficient and effective methods of
achieving both their goals. Accordingly, the most favourable returns were achieved for both sectors
through the employment of mutually beneficial strategies.
One of these strategies was the involvement of state agencies in the development of the defence
industry, such as the armed forces research centres (CTEX, CTA, and EMGEPRON), the National
Development Bank (BNDE), the Foreign Trade Agency of the Banco do Brasil (CACEX), and
FINEP, which financed Brazil's most innovative projects. Therefore, the state was mainly involved
in three major ways within the Brazilian defence industry: (1) research and development; (2)
financing; and (3) state-ownership (see Table 6.1 below on the Sample of State-Owned Enterprises).
Research and development became the major activity involving the state in defence production and,
as such, will be deliberated upon in the following section. Financing, was mainly done through the
BNDE, the Banco do Brasil and CACEX, as well as FINEP. On the one hand, the BNDE was
responsible mainly for authorising the extension of credit to the various firms within the industry.
Whilst, on the other hand, FINEP reported to the Ministry of Science and Technology for the
financing of most of the defence industry's novel projects such as microelectronics, advanced
aircraft, and rocket systems like the AVIBRAS's Astros II system (de Gouvea Neto, 1991:582).
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The entrepreneurial role of the state in the defence industry, according to Franko-Jones (1992:86-
87), insinuated that the state had to assume the risks of any other enterprise, organising and
managing it according to strict economic and business principles. The whole effort was based on
the ideology of developmental nationalism, which advocated the ability to gratify the requirements
of the armed forces whilst ensuring greater economic growth. The idea was to encourage and
promote the private sector through fmancial incentives and technological assistance. This therefore
implied that the state only intervened in instances where the private sector had shortcomings and
always emphasising the principle of maximising profit even within publicly owned enterprises.
Therefore, both modes of management, direct and indirect, were employed by the Brazilian state,
with direct management being manifested in the appointment of top officials for state firms; and
indirect management reflecting itself in the incentives that were provided to encourage efficiency
and efficacy in developing products and expanding operations domestically and abroad, the main
intention being the effort to overcome the risks involved in product development and marketing.
Table 6.1: Sample of State-Owned Enterprises Involved in the Brazilian Defence Industry
Arms of Service/finn Products
Army
CBC (Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos)
IMBEL
Firearms, ammunition, cartridges
Explosives, firearms, telecommunications
Air Force
EMBRAER
Helibras
Navy
AMRJ
Aircraft
Helicopters
Shipyard
Source: de Gouvea Neto, Raul. (1991). "The Role of Transnational Companies in the Brazilian Defence Tripod." Journalof
Latin American Studies. Vol. 23, NO.3. pp. 573 - 598.
The expansion of the defence industry involved the promotion of technology and exports, which
were unwittingly high risk endeavours that, when they were successfully applied, were effective in
procreating growth in the defence industry (Franko-Jones, 1992:88). Usually it was the military that
was influential in the development of the defence industry, particularly with regard to research and
development. For instance, according to de Gouvea Neto (1991:582), the air force and the army
were responsible for the training of most of the scientists and technicians through undergraduate and
post-graduate programmes that were initiated since the 1940s. Basically the defence industry
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benefited mostly from the technological innovations of the military's research centres, CTA, CTEX,
and EMGEPRON, hence most of the indigenously developed military hardware were researched,
designed and developed by these institutions.
Combined with its entrepreneurial role, was the ability of the state to be pragmatic on the efficient
management of the defence industry, to wit, allowing the market to dictate the rules of business
operations rather than focussing on ownership or the political influences, which normally had a
negative impact on the firms' operations. Franko-Jones (1992:88-89) argues that the Brazilian
state's pragmatic programme allowed for private efforts to function fully where possible, but at the
same time supplementing them where the need for such involvement was identified. This approach
was mainly influenced by the eclectic pattern of ownership that was prevailing in the defence
industry. For instance, ENGESA, which was a private enterprise, was in partnership with the state-
owned IMBEL, whereas the para statal EMBREAR and the privately owned AVIBRAS were co-
operating with the state-owned Aeronautics Technology Centre (CTA).
Notwithstanding, incentives and support were provided across the board regardless of ownership,
with the overall intention of attaining economic proficiency. After observing the flaws of both the
laissez faire system in the United States and the West European proclivities for public ownership,
the Brazilian approach, according to Franko-Jones (1992:89), attempted to develop a system that
would combine the best of both systems, which could at the initial stages avoid the problems of
over-capacity and inefficiency in defence production. The formula was always ensuring that
enterprises, regardless of ownership, behaved according to the dictates of the market, with the state
co-ordinating its activities with those of the private firms in order to increase international sales.
Therefore, the state intervened only to subdue substantial economic obstacles, thus dynamically
blending private entrepreneurship with state encouragement and facilitation.
6.4.3 The State and the Defence Industry in the Promotion of Technological Development
The realisation by the Brazilian defence sector of the need to combine economic growth with a
technological faculty, according to Franko-Jones (1992:95), was done through the involvement of
the state in promoting the various dimensions of technology. In fact, the state was engaged in a
well-orchestrated arrangement with the private sector and the multinational corporations in what de
Gouvea Neto (1991 :579; 594) terms as a "Defence Tripod". According to de Gouvea Neto
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(1991 :579), the state had to secure a well-balanced interaction between the three not only to
guarantee the political and economic viability of the defence industry, but also to ensure that its
products were competitive in the international market as a central means towards the general
industrial development of the country. As a consequence, this tripod arrangement was even
extended to other sectors of the Brazilian economy such as petrochemicals and computer industries.
The critical role for establishing a high technology industry was played by the wide range of
research and development institutions through the policy of "seguranca e desenvolvimento"
(security and development) that was guiding the activities of the E.S.G. (Franko-Jones, 1992: 133).
There was a deliberate effort to establish a core of engineers, technicians, bureaucrats, and
entrepreneurs for the defence sector that would ensure Brazil's economic independence and viability
in the technological sector. Besides being a means towards an end, Franko-Jones (1992:95-96)
claims that technology became an end in itself, which within the defence sector became rapidly
generated. Within Brazil, as in other developing states, the achievement of technological
development was limited by underdeveloped technological systems arising from historical
circumstances. Virtually all developing states that had belatedly joined the global technological
race found themselves caught within such circumstances of demanding the latest technology without
possessing the fundamental technological systems. Hence, according to Franko-Jones (1992:96),
most were compelled to instantaneously "develop products and scientific infrastructure to guide
industrial growth in the technological age", which became "a difficult if not quixotic task".
In most instances, within the developing world, such as Brazil, the defence industry became an
appropriate institutional framework to encourage indigenous technological developments (Franko-
Jones, 1992:96). After realising its pivotal role in the country's technological development, without
merely focussing on maintaining a production line for military equipment, the Brazilian defence
industry invested largely in research and development institutions, such as the Military Engineering
Institute, the Marine Research Institute and the Aeronautics Technology Centre (CTA). Franko-
Jones (1992:131-132) avers that most of the outputs of these research institutions were transferred
to private defence industries that usually received orders from the state and accordingly employed
these breakthroughs in the development of qualitative civilian products. In this manner qualitative
research and development was evenly utilised for both civilian and defence production, thus
facilitating national research and development.
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The role of the state was to acquire those technological capabilities which the firms on their own
could not obtain, and also granting protection, providing exemptions from tariffs and taxes, and also
ensuring that it would fmally demand the results of the whole process, thus augmenting international
competitiveness through domestic support and procurement. The state also played the role of
seeking new markets as their economic necessity was made apparent in order to promote further in-
house research and to provide the scale necessary for engaging in expensive research and
development projects (Franko-Jones, 1992: 132-133). Franko-Jones (1992: 133-134) maintains that
institutions such as the Aeronautical Engineering Institute (ITA) and the Army Engineering Institute
(IME) became central in bringing together the entrepreneurs and technicians to utilise their skills in
the evaluation of alternative technologies. Firms were therefore equipped with the foundation and
focus essential to developing production goals and techniques through state support that was
communicated by a determined and pragmatic leadership, which also provided the necessary
fmancial support and the material resources, as well as guaranteed the procurement of successful
production.
In this fashion, indigenous military technological development and production was encouraged and
facilitated, particularly the development of dual-use technologies earmarked for the Third World
market. Moreover, the state ensured through its bargaining processes that Brazilian firms had total
control over the imported technologies, which in tum guaranteed the firms the autonomy they
required to utilise the newly-obtained capabilities for their own benefit as well as for the whole
society (Franko-Jones, 1992:134). In addition, the role played by traditional defence multinational
corporations in the transfer of technology to the Brazilian defence industry was, according to de
Gouvea Neto (1991:591-593), reflected in the number of subsidiaries that were from the United
States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands and Italy, as well as
their collaboration with the local firms.
6.5 BRAZILIAN DEFENCE EXPORTS: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ADVERSITIES
6.5.1 The Successes of Brazilian Defence Exports
In the mid-1980s, Brazil was ranked as the fifth leading arms exporter if the basis of measuring
arms transfers were agreements instead of actual deliveries. Moreover, if other factors were taken
into consideration, such as the role played by foreign components or the extent of co-production
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arrangements, then the picture would be virtually different. Nonetheless, the representatives of the
Brazilian defence industry were apparently convinced that the country had the potential to be a
considerable participant in the arms market. This was particularly the case since production was not
necessarily determined by the domestic market, as Brazil exported approximately 90 to 95 percent
of its production (Catrina, 1988: 113). As a global arms supplier, Brazil was almost at the same par
with Israel and South Korea, as secondary emerging arms suppliers from the developing world.
Moreover, between 1982 and 1986, Brazil was the leading Third World arms supplier to other states
in the developing world, as well as to the developed industrialised states, with 99 percent indigenous
production (compared to Israel with 91 percent indigenous production, the rest being re-transfers)
(Franko-Jones, 1992:35).
Brazil's success as an arms supplier was partially due to its natural and scientific endowments: a
strong industrial base, an abundance of natural resources, as well as a massive scientific community
compared to other developing states. For instance, thirty-five percent of all scientific papers and
books produced in Latin America in 1986 were from Brazil (Franko-Jones, 1992:35-36).
Furthermore, Brazil was ranked second to India in terms of comparing the industries that were
essential for arms production: iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, metal products, machinery,
electrical machinery, and transportation equipment, as well as human resources that comprised the
scientific community that had the potential to produce arms. Compared to India, Brazil had 25
percent of the industrial base that was relevant to arms production, whereas India had only 16
percent. The difference, therefore, was with regard to the scientific community, which was
approximately 8 000 for Brazil and 97 000 for India, including scientists, engineers and technicians
involved in research, development and production (Franko-Jones, 1992:37-38).
When arms producing states are distinguished according to their technological sophistication and
industrial maturity, the assorted range of weapons they are able to produce, as well as the capability
to design and develop rather than to license-produce, Franko-Jones (1992:39-40) argues that Brazil
is regarded, together with Israel, South Korea, India and South Africa, as having both these
faculties. As a secondary emerging supplier, Brazil can design and produce both a wide array and
technologically advanced weapon system. There is a tendency to rank an arms supplier according to
the quantity of arms it exports as well as the type of recipients to whom it exports arms, which,
however, fails to take into cognisance the size of the domestic market, if, for example, the case of
India is taken into consideration. Therefore, "these anomalies point to fact that the industrial base is
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not the sole determinant of the size or export capability of an armaments industry" (Franko-Jones,
1992:40).
Nevertheless, Brazil is one of the emerging suppliers that has managed to aggressively export its
products into the international arms market, with its aircraft and armoured vehicles enterprises,
EMBRAER and ENGESA, becoming part of the leading industries in their domains of weapon
systems. Ross (1989: 18) maintains that the country was also successful in producing and exporting
rocket systems, missile systems and naval vessels. Leading industrialised states have also purchased
an enormous quantity of Brazilian produced weapon systems, including France, the United
Kingdom and Ireland, and other weapon systems were mainly exported to states in Latin America,
Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. What distinguishes the
Brazilian defence industry from those of other emerging suppliers, particularly those in the Third
World, besides the dynamic partnership between the state and the firms as well as the enthusiastic
fusion of technology, is the state and firms mutual pragmatism in the promotion of exports (Franko-
Jones, 1992: 139).
The state, and in particular the military élite, became aware that an economically viable defence
industry relied on promoting arms exports, since they ensured that economies of scale as well as
competitive and efficient production runs were attainable. The reason was mainly that the domestic
market was too limited to support the fledgling (and even to sustain a mature) industry. Moreover,
arms exports were regarded in politico-strategic terms as consistent with the objectives of power
projection, and with the economic objectives of reducing the international debt burden and the costs
of importing oil. Therefore, Brazilian arms transfers also allowed the exploration of other markets
and exposed Brazilian civilian products mainly through counter-trade arrangements (Franko-Jones,
1992: 139). Therefore, there were no policies restricting arms transfers as enterprises were
supported by the government to market their products without any intervention except in instances
where the government was restrained by international obligations, such as the arms embargoes
against South Africa and Libya. Enterprises were allowed to freely market their products and the
government was unequivocal in defending and blessing the commercial and private character of the
deals (Krause, 1992: 169). Brazil also used arms exports as a means to support military self-reliance
programmes by using the export earnings to finance the costs of research and development
programmes (Ross, 1989:5).
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According to Franko-Jones (1992: 175-176), there were four sources of comparative advantage for
Brazilian technology exports. Firstly, Brazil could provide basically the same types of commodities
or services that were provided by developed industrialised countries at a lower cost due to lower
labour costs. Secondly, most of the products or services were adapted to Third World conditions
and accordingly suited most of the Third World recipients and clients. Thirdly, Brazilian products
were mostly developed from raw materials that were available in the country, and hence the supply
costs were easily subdued compared to other producers or suppliers that had to import their
production inputs. Therefore, the only handicap was oil, and as such, Brazil used arms exports in
order to ease the oil burden. Finally, Brazil had the advantage of having developed its own
technological breakthroughs, which made the country a viable competitor in both the industrialised
and Third World markets.
The competitive character of Brazilian arms exports was primarily based on their lower costs as a
result of government support and financing through technology subsidies, lower labour costs and the
basic level of technology applied in the production process. Moreover, with most emphasis being
on producing simple products made the production process less expensive, which in reality implied
that Brazilian firms employed intermediate technologies that had long been explored and forsaken
by the primary emerging and leading suppliers. Thus, most of the research and development costs
were not on generating top-of-the-range technologies but "perfecting simple but unique systems"
(Franko-Jones, 1992:177). Catrina (1988:113-114) maintains that the basic approach within the
Brazilian arms industry was to manufacture uncomplicated and sustainable systems that were
ideally apt for Third World conditions: inexpensive, easily operable, able to endure arduous
circumstances, and readily available spare parts. The technique was to utilise standard components
that were not difficult to obtain, according to the recipients' requirements and the supply conditions,
as well as even providing the recipient with the technological details to indigenously-manufacture
its own spare parts.
What was most important, however, was Brazil's arms export policy, which was defined as liberal,
susceptible, lacking scepticism and unconditional (Catrina, 1988:114). Catrina (1988:114)
maintains that recipients were free to retransfer Brazilian-made systems, and deals that were
supposed to be surreptitious were made licit and handled accordingly. Indeed, the legal system
prevented the release of official details and statistics regarding arms transfers, whereby economic or
commercial interests were preponderant to foreign policy considerations. Therefore, the success of
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Brazilian defence products in the export market, especially for Third World applications, was rooted
in their simplicity, user-friendliness, easy-to-maintain, and durability in the face of rugged Third
World conditions. Since the leading suppliers were pursuing the advancement of technology to its
frontier, Franko-Jones (1992:177-179) argues that emerging suppliers such as Brazil attended to the
needs of the Third World market, which because of limited budgets could only afford standard and
inexpensive systems. Emerging suppliers, therefore, altered the global balance of power, as reliance
by non-producing recipients on traditional leading suppliers was reduced.
Franko-Jones (1992:179-180) claims that one of the fundamental stimulants for Brazil's pursuit of
arms exports was the dearth of oil within its inventory of natural resources. Besides the effort to
assuage the oil handicap, arms transfers were also pursued to stimulate industrial production, to
obtain hard currency, to ease the balance of payments, and to attend to the foreign debt burden. The
millstone of oil could be best alleviated by arms exports, especially since the oil-producing Middle
East and African states increased their demand for arms after the 1973 oil price hikes, becoming the
leading arms recipients in the mid-1970s towards the end of the 1980s. Therefore, such oil-
producing states became natural trading partners with Brazil, which, in turn, could provide the
desired weapon systems.
Therefore it can be inferred that what made Brazil to succeed in this lucrative market were the barter
arrangements that the Middle Eastern and North African states were pleased to entertain in exchange
for oil. Hence the Brazilian oil company, Petrobras, was active in negotiating counter-trade
agreements in exchange for oil with Iraq, Libya and Qatar, which helped to assuage Brazil's balance
of payments problems (Franko-Jones, 1992: 181). The most significant factor about Brazilian
exports, according to Franko-Jones (1992:182-183), was the high degree of technological
competence by EMBRAER (turbo technology), ENGESA (tank suspension systems) and AVIBRAS
(Astros II multiple rocket launcher). These technological breakthroughs were indigenously
researched and developed to suit Brazilian domestic conditions with less or none multinational
participation. These achievements could be attributed primarily to the support and encouragement
that the industry received from the state to manoeuvre within the international markets, thus
providing both political and economic returns for the state and the industry respectively.
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6.5.2 The Difficulties of the Brazilian Defence Industry
By late 1987, sales for the defence industry, which were anticipated to be around US$2 billion, after
a successful US$l billion sales in 1986, dropped to approximately US$500 million. The most
affected, according to Franko-Jones (1992:189-190), were the armoured vehicles producer,
ENGESA, and the missile systems manufacturer, AVIBRAS, loosing almost half their workforces,
accumulating increasing debts, and having to seek legal protection from their respective creditors
towards the beginning of the 1990s. EMBRAER, which also experienced difficulties, nonetheless
managed to increase its sales albeit behind the other non-defence-oriented national ftrms, as it also
had to layoff a certain portion of its workforce. According to Franko-Jones, (1992:200), these
problems that firms encountered with their labour forces due to retrenchments, low wages and
salaries, rocked the defence industry. Professional personnel, such as technicians and engineers also
used the defence industry as a transit centre towards greener pastures in the other sectors of the
Brazilian economy.
Although there were various causes for these crises, two of these become generally salient. First,
was the saturation of the international arms market, especially the dehydration of the Middle East
orders in the second part of 1987 with the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decline in the sales to the
United States as a result of the contradiction on tariffs on Brazilian exports. Moreover, competition
became intense in the arms market with the surfacing of other emerging suppliers such as Israel and
South Korea; the primary leading suppliers' conversion from military grants and assistance to
foreign military sales; and the efforts of the secondary leading suppliers to prop their export-driven
industries. Secondly, as a consequence of technological advancement that was epitomised in the
1991 Gulf War, Brazilian defence ftrms were also compelled to adapt to the changing technological
environment. Subsequently, Franko-Jones (1992:190-191) argues that the transition to new
technologies rendered the Brazilian defence industry vulnerable to international market fluctuations,
which insinuated that more investments were required for augmented research and development, as
well as the importation of advanced electronic sub-systems and components.
Nevertheless, since the defence industry was regarded as a locomotive for economic development,
based on the historically rooted principle of security and development, it was maintained that it
would absorb the blows of international competition through additional investment in advanced
technologies (Franko-Jones, 1992:191). However, such ambitious intentions did not conform to the
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dynamic demands of the international market or to the changing political economic climate
domestically. The reason, according to Franko-Jones (1992:191), was that Brazil was challenged by
a debilitating inflation, the government was incapable of sustaining the defence industry as a result
of a political transition to democracy, and firms were thus rendered impotent to absorb new
technological advancements.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
Since politico-strategic considerations are the main determining factors for states to opt for an arms
production capability, weak industrial capacities are often overcome by the determination of
sovereign states to reduce their dependence on other arms suppliers. Franko-Jones (1992:40-41)
presupposes that the primary reason is the fact that the military capabilities of a recipient state are
vulnerable to the political or military dictates of the main arms supplier, especially during wartime.
Therefore, the perceptions of dependence have a potential to negatively impact on the public profile
of the recipient state's armed forces, particularly the Third World states, whose desire for
independence is also supported by the ideologies of nationalism and non-alignment. As a
consequence, most developing states are prepared to sacrifice their meagre economic resources on
defence production based on politico-strategic, military-operational and/or diplomatic
considerations.
Other emerging supplier states were driven primarily by their position as pariah states in the
international system, such that they could not rely on other suppliers for their military requirements,
hence they strove to become relatively self-sufficient in their arms procurement. Thus, problematic
and unreliable suppliers, who were responsive to internationally imposed arms embargoes or other
politico-strategic or diplomatic restrictions, compelled states such as Israel, Taiwan, South Africa,
India, Pakistan, South and North Korea to develop their indigenous arms production capabilities. A
state that had developed an indigenous arms development and production faculty was, according to
Franko-Jones (1992:41), usually accorded a unique status amongst the club of states that comprised
an international military élite. With regard to those states in the developing world, such a status was
often reflected in their ascendancy into being regional hegemonies or global middle powers.
Brazil is one of the states in the developing world that deserve such a status because, amongst other
things, it possesses an advanced defence industry. The Brazilian defence industry is widely
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constituted and diversified, although it is not a Third World industrial giant as is usually assumed.
Franko-Jones (1992:28-29) claims that the peak year of the defence industry was 1987, when most
of the firms performed to their utmost, albeit none of the top firms acquired returns exceeding more
than US$1 billion. The insinuation therefore, is that the Brazilian defence industry is still far below
the defence sectors of the secondary leading and primary emerging supplier states even though it is
at the pinnacle of the secondary emerging suppliers. Moreover, Brazil only accounts for less than
one percent of the major conventional weapons transfers globally, which implies that as a supplier
state, Brazil is more susceptible to recessions in the international defence market, especially since it
has a concentrated domestic defence industrial sector. Nevertheless, a robust defence industrial base
is still regarded as politically essential, since according to national security analyses, it is deemed to
be a national necessity for wartime conditions and a significant criterion for great power status.
From an economic perspective, the Brazilian defence industry can be able to sustain itself in the
competitive international arms market if it adapts to the changing patterns of supply and demand.
This can be done through maintaining the enthusiasm for technological advancement by linking
defence with civilian production and by canvassing for a larger international market, especially the
intra-American fraternity based on a broader regional vision of security. The trends followed by
EMBRAER, of increasing civilian production, of reliance on private fmancial sources rather than
the government, and of engaging in co-production arrangements with other foreign firms for
technological acquisition and innovation, have the advantage of maintaining the firm within the
international circles of defence production and development.
Brazil has two important pillars that can ensure a sustainable and a growing defence industrial
capability: the focus on satisfying the needs of the international market; and the drive towards
"perfecting simple but unique systems". A market niche will always be availed for cheap, lucid,
easy-to-maintain but effective weapon systems within the developing world, especially since the
international hierarchy of states continues to persist. Brazil, therefore, provides an amazing
archetype of a secondary emerging supplier state, so is India within the ranks of the tertiary
emerging suppliers such as South Africa, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, amongst others.
Accordingly, India becomes the focus of the next chapter, as a defmitive case study of the tertiary
emerging suppliers.
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CHAPTER 7 - INDIA: A TERTIARY EMERGING SUPPLIER WITH A
MAGNIFICENT BUT FRIGID DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The customary view of security according to India's interpretation was that the state had to be
protected, its physical assets, social and cultural norms, as well as lifestyle, from external
aggression, which demanded that the state should posses sufficient capabilities to counter external
interference. However, after the mid-1970s, security began to be perceived as also the ability of the
state to avert, counter and settle domestic unrest and conflict arising from parochial, sectoral or
secessionists interests that could lead to the collapse or fragmentation of the state. The perceptions
of internal conflict became a common feature of politics in the developing states, particularly as a
result of discontented ethnic entities in multiethnic states, such as India (Thomas, 1986:3-4).
As part of the effort to offset the impact of such security vulnerabilities, India established one of the
largest defence industries in the non-western world, albeit remaining one of the largest arms
importers in the world. The major reason for this was that India's arms production was mainly
focussed on licensed and co-production arrangements as a consequence of unsuccessful and dear
indigenous arms projects, which were also not compensated through energetic exports like the other
emerging suppliers such as Sweden, Canada, Brazil, South Korea or Israel. Although India had
similar politico-strategic and socio-economic motives as all other states that opted for establishing
an indigenous defence industrial base (Gupta, 1990:846), the Indian defence industry was not
notably successful in penetrating the export market, as the country's defence exports were limited to
small arms and insignificant items that in the 1980s only amounted to less than two percent of total
production (Graham, 1984: 177).
All the emerging arms suppliers were mainly motivated by the need to defend and champion their
national sovereignty in developing an indigenous defence industry, which also included the
necessity to sustain consistent military supplies in case of emergency as well as the ability to
manoeuvre with regard to foreign policy positions. Moreover, the defence industry precipitated the
industrialisation of the less-developed states and also reduced the hard currency outlays that were
expended through direct foreign arms procurement. Inevitably, and inadvertently, all the arms
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
199
producing states found themselves having to cater for the export market, albeit the Indian defence
industry was not pressured to become an enterprising arms exporter (Gupta, 1990:846-847), as it
nonetheless enjoyed the availability of a relatively large domestic market.
In order to combat threats, India had to develop a technical capability based on self-reliance in both
the civilian (automotive, aeronautics, electronics, shipbuilding, construction and civil engineering)
sectors and in defence. Thomas (1986:6-7) maintains that the strategic posture adopted by India
reflected primarily the manner in which great power relationships and hostilities impacted on India's
perception of international relations. First, was the position that India occupied within the hostilities
between the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc, wherein the PRC was regarded as India's
traditional foe. Second, was the restructuring of relations between the PRC and the United States
after tensions between the former and the Soviet Union had become antagonistic.
Finally, was the more specific regional tension between India and its second traditional rival,
Pakistan; the role that the great powers played in fuelling the arms race between the two South
Asian states; and the influence of regional and global politics on the antagonistic relationship. For
India, these developments in regional and international relations led to the attainment of a nuclear
capability (first detonated in 1974), with Pakistan trying to achieve the same, and the subsequent
shift in India's military strategic posture of "sufficient defence", to contain attacks from the PRC
and Pakistan, towards "limited deterrence", combining both conventional and nuclear capabilities in
fending off its adversaries (Thomas, 1986:7).
As an endeavour to address the position of India within, and as an archetype of, the ranks of tertiary
emerging supplier states, politico-strategic considerations and the issues of defence production and
procurement in India become intricately intertwined. The tensions within the South Asian regional
context, which have of late (in the post-Cold War period) assumed a complex dyadic dimension,
even to the extent of a classical action-reaction model, require that the focus should be on India's
responses to the various threats through typical neo-realist spectacles. The advantage of such an
approach enables the discourse to distinguish between India as a regional hegemon or global
middle-level power and India as an arms producer and supplier that is supposed to be leading
amongst other emerging arms suppliers. India possesses an elaborate, wide-ranging, expansive and
indeed magnificent defence industrial base within the developing world, verily the largest in the
Southern Hemisphere. However, the Indian defence industry has not impacted much on the
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international arms market, and is not envisaged to do so in the near future, despite having the
capacity to produce the whole spectrum of weapon systems than all of the secondary leading and all
other emerging suppliers.
In order to address this enigmatic Indian case, focus will firstly be on defence procurement and the
politics of choice, which includes the political disposition towards indigenous production, the
economic considerations versus the military options, as well as the better options towards defence
procurement and the politics of choice. Secondly, the defence industry is viewed in retrospect,
which includes the evolution of defence production in India, the current state of the defence
industry, the Indian defence industry's collaboration with other suppliers, along with the challenges
and accomplishments of the defence industry. Finally, attention will be paid to the Indian defence
industry's capacity to export its wares within the international arms market.
7.2 INDIA'S DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND THE POLITICS OF CHOICE
7.2.1 The Political Disposition towards Indigenous Production
From the perspective of the policy-makers, India was better off indigenously designing, developing
and producing its own weapon systems without relying on foreign suppliers for weapon systems or
the technology to manufacture them. This, they argued, would enable the country to pursue an
independent foreign policy; save valuable foreign exchange; augment its industrial production
capacity; create new employment opportunities; produce long-term technological spin-offs into the
national economy; and increase scientific and technical know-how that could be a force multiplier in
the civilian sector as well (Thomas, 1989: 190).
Efforts towards self-sufficiency were partly realisable, particularly regarding simple and less
cumbersome technological endeavours. However, with regards to the production of sophisticated
weapon systems such as combat aircraft, helicopters, naval vessels and tanks, problems were
encountered as a result of limited facilities and the costs of research and development, in addition to
the bottlenecks of production that often resulted in the employment of virtually obsolete systems.
Therefore, comparing independent indigenous design, development and production of advanced
weapon systems to those purchased from foreign sources, the costs were discovered to be exorbitant
and the processes to be extremely cumbersome for the former. This was the experience gained with
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the indigenous HF-24 Marut fighter-bomber aircraft project, which was phased out immediately
after its performance was disappointing during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War (Thomas, 1989: 190-
191). Moreover, its successor, the HF-25, which was designed in 1977, was never promoted to the
production phase (Matthews, 1989:424). In fact, most of India's indigenous projects were
distressingly infested with serious shortcomings, and as such, questions were being asked as to
whatever went wrong with the Indian defence industry.
Gupta (1990:846) argues that the problems of the Indian defence industry could be traced from the
inability of the political leadership to realise that a strong foundation was necessary for the
establishment of a viable industry. Rather than pursuing the development of advanced weapon
systems comparable to those produced in the West, India had to establish a proper base in terms of
know-how, experience, and the research, development and manufacturing infrastructure for the
'production of sophisticated defence wares. Moreover, the political leadership pursued more than
ambitious projects with the unrealistic conviction that the components to manufacture such systems
could be produced domestically, which was rather an astigmatic perception of the country's
technological capabilities. Therefore, the ambitions of the political leadership were to see India
emerging as one of the most technologically advanced states in the world, which unquestionably
also included a corresponding proficiency in defence development and production. Nonetheless,
what were the various considerations regarding arms procurement besides the perceptions and the
ambitions of the political leadership?
7.2.2 Economic Considerations vis-il-vis the Military Options
From an economic perspective, the licensed production or co-production of required foreign
developed weapon systems was seen to be the most viable option, since it was a compromise
between the military and the political options. The military option, on the one hand, was the
preference to obtain weapon systems directly from foreign leading suppliers, which was mainly a
response to the acquisition of weapon systems by India's adversaries in the region, so as to maintain
a qualitative military edge and to meet current defence requirements according to prevailing
technological standards that were availed by the global arms market (Thomas, 1989: 189). Since the
military leaders had already acknowledged the implausibility of self-sufficiency in terms of autarky,
they embraced the concept of self-reliance in as far as it guaranteed the consistency of defence
supplies despite changes in the international political scenario (Arnett, 1994:344).
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Moreover, the procurement of weapon systems had to ensure their adaptation to the special
conditions of the Indian sub-continent, which was an assortment of the high altitudes of the
Himalayas, the dust and heat of the Rajasthan desert, as well as the extraordinarily atmospheric
Indian Ocean temperature. Nevertheless, the intention of military leaders had always been focussed
on attaining state-of-the-art systems that would not only prove the country's armed forces
technological superiority in the region, but also to conveniently compete with those of the developed
world (Arnett, 1994:344-345). Therefore, Arnett (1994:345) maintains that it became obvious that
in as much as they would have preferred to purchase weapon systems directly from the leading
suppliers, domestic production was also indispensable in order to meet the specific requirements of
the armed forces. Hence, licensed production or co-production arrangements promised to be the
most viable option, in the long-term, to save foreign exchange reserves when compared to direct
foreign purchases or the transfer of technological know-how, as well as the development and
production of components and sub-systems indigenously.
On the other hand, Indian economists also based their arguments on the MiG-21 fighter aircraft
project, which, according to Arnett (1994:345), initially became costly to produce in India, but
subsequently proved to be cost-effective in terms of saving foreign exchange and in the
development of the Indian aeronautical engineering industry. Furthermore, they indicated other
advantages of licensed production and co-production arrangements, such as the dearth of
technological hiccups, risks of obsolescence, cost overruns, or supply bottlenecks, which would
have been overcome by the original suppliers. Moreover, they mentioned the ability to overcome
the problem of time consumption as the process moves directly into production, thus bypassing the
stages of designing and research and development, along with the evasion of external supplier
interference through the withholding of spare parts within a co-production arrangement. As an
example, they referred to the experiences of Pakistan with the United States arms embargo of 1960,
whereby spare parts for the F-14 Starfighter, the F-86 Sabre combat planes and the M-47/48 Patton
tanks were withheld by the latter (Thomas, 1989: 193-194).
7.2.3 The Better Options towards Defence Procurement and the Politics of Choice
Therefore, the Indian arms procurement policy focussed its attention on licensed production of
sophisticated weapon systems that were acknowledged to be too costly to design and develop
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indigenously, or those systems that were expensive and politically costly to purchase directly from
the leading suppliers (Thomas, 1989: 193). Licensed production of foreign weapon systems was to
be conducted along a diversified base of leading suppliers according to India's non-aligned stance.
Amongst the reasons that the Indian decision-makers stated for a diversified supplier base and
against a joint venture for instance with one of the leading suppliers, was firstly that the Soviet
Union, as an example, had exercised technological export control over certain important
components of the MiG-21, by forbidding the sale of spare parts to states such as Egypt, Iraq or
Syria, which had large inventories of these aircraft (Thomas, 1989: 196).
Moreover, Thomas (1989:196) maintains that the Indian authorities feared that the experiences of
Egypt might also occur in their case, whereby the split in military co-operation would result in India
being denied spare parts for the equipment purchased or granted by the Soviet Union. The United
Kingdom and France, on the other hand, explicitly permitted India to re-export indigenously
manufactured Jaguar spare parts and components in order to recoup the foreign exchange that was
expended in order to meet the costs of the transaction. Nevertheless, these latter two suppliers were
also treated with caution, as the United Kingdom, for example, had joined the United States in
imposing an arms embargo after the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, which was ultimately lifted in
1975.
Secondly, the Indian decision-makers argued that the valuable technical experiences obtained
through the licensed production of the Gnats from the United Kingdom, the maintenance and repair
of other Western-made aircraft such as the Canberras, the Hunters, and the Mystêres, as well as the
similarities of technology between the Canberras and the Jaguars, would provide a concordant
transition similar to the one from the MiG-21 s to the MiG-23s (Thomas, 1989: 196). In addition,
Thomas (1989:196-197) assumes that India was disappointed by the performances of the Soviet
Sukhoi Su-7B during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which was believed to have been virtually
obsolete when it was procured. Nonetheless, India still perceived the Soviet Union to be a reliable
and dependable supplier, as India had experienced problems with military assistance from the
United Kingdom regarding the manufacturing of engines for the indigenous HF-24 Marut fighter
aircraft, which was unsatisfactory and performed poorly in the 1971 war. Furthermore, there was
always the looming threat that Pakistan could influence Western opinion against the transfer of
Western j et fighter technology to India, especially considering the United States' efforts to retain the
prevailing military balance in the South Asian region.
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What is very important to note is that the decision to acquire the Anglo-French Jaguar fighter
aircraft was influenced by domestic as well as international political dynamics that were prevalent at
the time, besides the economic or technological considerations that were influencing Indian
economists or the military establishment respectively. The defeat of the Congress Party, which had
upheld a more Soviet-inclined foreign policy, by the Janata Party in the March 1977 general
elections, resulted in a shift in India's foreign policy stance. The Janata Party maintained that a true
reflection of India's non-alignment stance was the pursuit of a more balanced foreign policy in the
country's relations with the East and the West. This shift in foreign policy was made more apparent
in the selection of suppliers for military hardware and technology, more specifically the selection of
the Anglo-French Jaguar combat aircraft. This position, however, Thomas (1989:197-198) avers,
had negative repercussions on the modernisation of India's armed forces, as the MiG-23 Flogger
was relegated in the contest.
7.3 THE INDIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN RETROSPECT
The production of armaments in India dates back to 1801 when the East India Company established
the Gun Carriage Agency close to Calcutta, and during the colonial period little was done to expand
such a capability. It was only in 1940 after the beginning of the Second World War that the United
Kingdom established six ordnance factories in India as a response to Japanese militarism in Asia.
Between 1942 and 1945, ten more ordnance factories were established, in addition to one clothing
enterprise and an aircraft plant. With the cessation of hostilities after independence, the defence
sector in India deteriorated as a consequence of the Nehru government's intention to expedite the
country's economic development. The Nehru government focussed its attention on industrialisation
along socialist central planning, as the country lacked the necessary capital to drive the
industrialisation process. Priority was given to promoting the heavy machinery and intermediate
goods industries that were directed towards meeting civil industrial needs, with the defence industry
being accorded a low status as it was regarded to be non-productive (Matthews, 1989:407--408).
Moreover, the Nehru government was of the opinion that India should project a benign influence on
world affairs in order to promote Gandhi's ideal of peaceful co-existence and to avoid being
embroiled in costly arms races within the region. After the first Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1948, the
inchoate defence industry was grudgingly revitalised to manufacture only those items that were
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deemed to be essential and to guarantee as much as possible the cost-effectiveness of such
production (Matthews, 1989:408). Arms production in India was therefore reinitiated in the 1960s
as a response to conflicts with the PRC and Pakistan, the drive for regional hegemony, political
sovereignty, and the intention to obtain technological progress. Licences and technology were
obtained from the United Kingdom, the FRG, France and the Soviet Union to produce tanks, naval
vessels and aircraft. Concentration was on attaining arms production technology from the suppliers,
which was usually formalised in contracts, such as the acquisition of the United Kingdom's Vickers
Chieftain Mkl tank technology to build the indigenous Vijayanta tank (Krause, 1992: 155-156).
Terhal (1982:254-255) indicates that the Indian governments had acknowledged the fact that the
process of achieving a complete indigenous manufacturing capability will not be smooth, as several
stages had to be surmounted sequentially before the ultimate capability could be achieved.
Theoretically, first amongst these stages was the attainment of a licensing arrangement with a
foreign enterprise to assemble a weapon system or defence-related equipment domestically from
imported components. The second stage included the capability to manufacture some of the
components domestically from imported components and finally manufacturing these systems and
equipment entirely within India. However, it became obvious that the process of transferring
technology, the manufacturing line, components and spare parts, as well as the payments for the
licence would be very costly, and even exceed the foreign exchange costs of importing the same
weapon system or defence equipment off-the-shelf. Therefore, Terhal (1982:255) avers that it was
accordingly acknowledged that the process of overcoming dependence on foreign suppliers would
be protracted and arduous.
7.3.1 The Evolution of Defence Production in India
The initial task of the Indian government during the 1949 to 1962 period was to maintain the sixteen
ordnance factories that were inherited from the United Kingdom, which were responsible for the
production of rifles and machine guns during the Second World War. In 1951 the government
established an ordnance factory at Ambarnath to produce machine tools and prototype weapons
(Graham, 1984:163). This arms-manufacturing capability, according to Graham (1984:167), was
developed after the 1962 conflict with the PRC as well as the 1965 Kashmir war with Pakistan.
Most of the armaments used in the 1962 conflict were received from the United States and the
United Kingdom, and an arms embargo was imposed by both these states for the latter conflict.
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After the 1962 conflict with the PRC, six additional ordnance industries were established, and the
existing factories were augmented to double their output and also to focus their attention towards
increased defence production, thus reducing civilian output from around 20 to approximately three
percent.
Moreover, during the 1965 war with Pakistan, India became virtually self-sufficient in the
production of small arms, thus being able to replace the arms and ammunition that were required
during the war despite the existence of an arms embargo imposed by the United States and the
United Kingdom. As a consequence, Graham (1984:167-168) maintains that India was not
pressured to negotiate with Pakistan under perceivably unfavourable terms, as India demonstrated
military superiority over Pakistan. Therefore, as from the period after independence, twelve other
ordnance factories had been established, producing a wide array of defence equipment shorn of
major weapon systems and sophisticated military hardware, except for the Vijayanta tank, which
was produced by the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory near Madras.
Although India obtained most of its weapon systems from foreign leading suppliers, this preference,
according to Thomas (1989:189-190), was mainly a response to the acquisition of weapon systems
by its adversaries in the region. The intention was to maintain a qualitative military balance and to
meet current defence requirements according to prevailing technological standards that were availed
by the global arms market. Indigenous design, development, and production, on the other hand, was
more slower and required long-term planning, with the omnipresent risk of obsolescence as a result
of bottlenecks, qualitative advances in defence technological innovation, and drastic developments
in defence requirements. The need to purchase weapon systems from the leading suppliers became
obvious in the 1950s when India lacked the economic and technological bases for indigenous
production, whereas during the same period Pakistan was acquiring advanced weapon systems from
the United States as a consequence of its membership of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).
Consequently, the Indian defence industry became proficient to manufacture a wide range of
advanced equipment through co-production arrangements and to generate purely indigenous
designs, such as the Marut jet fighter aircraft (Pierre, 1982:222). A major part of India's
independent indigenous production included small arms and ammunition, transport vehicles, bridge-
laying equipment, building equipment, and coastal landing craft, along with a sustained effort to
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design, develop and manufacture sophisticated systems such as combat aircraft, tanks, submarines
and frigates. The ambition of the Indian leadership was to have an across-the-board defence
manufacturing capability, regardless of the ability to meet international standards, in order to enable
the state to be self-sufficient in all weapons categories (Thomas, 1989: 199-200).
Sophisticated military hardware and major weapon systems were produced by eight defence public
sector undertakings (Terhal, 1982:253-254; Graham, 1984: 168), which mainly consisted of the
Indian aeronautical industries, called the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) at Nasik, Koraput and
Hyderabad. According to Frank (1969:141-142), HAL went as far as license-producing the Soviet
MiG-21 interceptor air frames and their Atoll air-to-air missiles, and the British Folland-Hawker
Siddeley Gnat tactical jet fighter aircraft after the United States had denied India the right to
purchase the Lockheed F-l 04 as well as blocked the sale of comparable British and French aircraft
because of their critical components. The second pillar of the defence public sector undertakings
was the maritime industry, which produced frigates, patrol craft, survey ships, as well as other
conversion and refurbishment projects. The maritime industry was situated in Bombay, Goa,
Cochin and Calcutta, with the shipyard in Bombay commissioning the first indigenous Indian
survey ship in 1964.
During the 1970s there was an explicit shift from indigenous production towards increased licensed
production, starting from local assembly to certain components production and fmally to virtual
indigenous production. Therefore, instead of focussing on researching and developing new
indigenous designs, Graham (1984:157-158) maintains that the industry emphasised the
modification of imported designs. However, despite this shift, the defence industry was not
adequately prepared to operate at full capacity, thus unit costs were significantly inflated and
accordingly leading to expensive systems and equipment that could have been imported at low cost.
Graham (1984: 165) argues that the major cause of the shift from total self-reliance was the 1962
war with the PRC, which unveiled India's feebleness in terms of defence equipment and other
military supplies. Moreover, it also demonstrated that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's reliance
on diplomatic initiatives were insufficient to address serious external security threats. Subsequent to
the 1962 war, the Indian élite called for the development of a puissant military force that would
render India as a formidable power recognised by the PRC and other global powers.
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There was an overwhelming consensus amongst the Indian political parties for the galvanisation of
the country's resources towards providing for the requirements of the military establishment, thus
resulting in a doubled defence budget and the expansion of the defence industry. Moreover, the
ensuing incessant increase in the defence budget assumed a character of being incontestable and not
being deliberated upon within Parliament, particularly after the establishment of the Department of
Defence Production under the Ministry of Defence in November 1962 (Graham, 1984: 165).
Consequently, defence expenditure averaged around three percent of the GDP per annum during the
early 1980s, and increasing to 5.5 percent in the late 1980s, thus accounting for approximately 20
percent of the total government outlays, as well as 32 percent of unforeseen expenses within the
auspices of Non-Planned Expenditure (Matthews, 1989:405).
The inhibition of the role of Parliament to analyse the defence budget in detail was also ensured by
rigid security legislation, which also even prohibited or discouraged retired military officers or
former bureaucrats from publicly reviewing sensitive defence aspects. Notwithstanding these
structural limitations, Parliament however had a substantial impact on the location of the defence
industrial plants within their preferred districts or constituencies. Furthermore, it had a strong
influence on the issues relating to the linkages between the public and private sectors in the sphere
of defence, whereby the Industrial Resolution Policy of 1948 and 1956 designated all defence
industries as exclusive domains of the state. Parliament had consistently upheld this policy despite
several initiatives to the contrary (Graham, 1984: 178-179).
Graham (1984: 180-181) asserts that major policy decisions regarding the defence industry were
often initiated by the Prime Minister based on politico-strategic considerations rather than the day-
to-day economic operations of the individual firms, a consistent evaluation of their technical
competency, or as a response to perceived military threats. These latter considerations were handled
by the inter-ministerial Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs that made the final decisions on
operational policy and the budget, and its efforts were complemented by the Defence Minister's
Production Committee and the Research and Development Council. The Department of Defence
Production wielded less power compared to the armed Services in terms of influencing the
operational policy of the defence industry, hence there were problems of interference, subsequent
delays, and a lack of accomplishment with several advanced indigenous development projects. In
most cases, decision-making was circumscribed by the intervention of the armed Services, as they
wielded more power than the Ministry of Defence concerning the operations of the defence industry.
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However, the broader economic considerations were overlooked due to the closed nature of the
system, which also prohibited outside expertise and experience to induce pragmatic planning into
the process (Graham, 1984:181).
From 1972 onwards, the focus of the Indian defence industry was on attempting to develop more
sophisticated items, particularly in the sphere of electronics, which was supported by a ten-year
research and development commitment and the acquisition of foreign technology in order to
overcome the overly ambitious local design attempts. These efforts were mainly driven by the
realisation that the objective of total self-sufficiency was infeasible in the short-term, and
consequently emphasis was on obtaining foreign technology through licensing arrangements. This
shift in thinking was also accompanied by the development of the capability to meet the armed
forces' requirements through the production of sufficient equipment, such as the Vijayanta tank,
whose production was expanded to reach its planned schedules of 100Xtanks per annum.
Nonetheless, despite the expanded production schedules, the indigenous production of tanks was
inadequate to meet all the country's needs, and accordingly over five hundred tanks were imported
from 1973 to 1981 (Graham, 1984:174). Subsequently, in the mid-1980s, the Indian government
shifted its attention towards blending the efforts of the public defence sector with those of the
private firms.
According to Matthews (1989:418), considerations for economic and technological development
appeared to be uppermost in the Indian government's initiatives towards sponsoring the integration
of the private sector into defence-related processes in the mid-1980s. Although these goals were not
entirely focussed on the promotion of trivial provincial industry parks, they were rather centred
towards having the military being a fomenter of advanced development programmes on a wider
scale. Nevertheless, these initiatives also had considerations for regional location, so as to ensure
the diffusion of the defence plants throughout the country, which was based on both political and
economic considerations: to upgrade the least developed districts and remote regions of the country.
Consequently, two birds were struck with one stone by generating employment through the creation
of industrial activity in remarkably backward areas, which also insinuated the advancement of
infrastructure and transportation systems for inaccessible and desolate regions.
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7.3.2 The Current State of the Indian Defence Industry
The Indian defence industry currently consists of thirty-six ordnance factories, which cater
exclusively for the needs of the military, particularly the army; eight public sector undertakings; and
forty major research and development institutions (Gupta, 1990:846). In its entirety, the defence
industry comprises the second largest organisation in the country's industrial economy after the
railways, producing around ten to fifteen percent of India's industrial output. The defence industry
is also the largest amongst the emerging arms supplier states in terms of volume, value, as well as
the diversity of production and the research and development faculties (Matthews, 1989:412).
Moreover, it is also larger than those of the secondary leading supplier states in the Western world
(Arnett, 1994:344).
Forty-four percent of all the goods and services produced by the defence industry emanate from the
thirty-six ordnance factories, which were mainly concerned with manufacturing wares for the
military, and most particularly for the army (Matthews, 1989:412). The ordnance factories employ
approximately 59 percent of all the defence industry's work force, and also receive half of the
capital and loans that were provided by the government to the defence industry. Besides the
production of unsophisticated equipment such as ammunition and uniforms, these factories also
transcend into the production of trucks, armoured personnel carriers, missile systems and tanks. As
far as diversification towards the civilian production is concerned, these factories' civilian output is
estimated at only four percent of all production (Graham, 1984:157-158). The major problem that
affected most of the ordnance factories, according to Graham (1984: 176), were the generic-planning
processes that could not overcome the incessant production of similar wares that were no longer
substantial. The consequent quagmire was that over-capacity became the norm rather than the
exception.
Graham (1984: 159) maintains that fifty percent of all production from the Indian defence industry is
accounted for by the defence public sector undertakings, which constitute the second pillar of the
Indian defence industry, employing thirty-three percent of the workers, and receiving less than half
of government loans and capital. These undertakings are responsible for the production of the most
advanced items such as aircraft, helicopters, missile systems, electronic systems and other defence-
related equipment, as well as a vast array of naval vessels (see Table 7.1 below). Furthermore, these
undertakings produce a large amount of goods and services for the civilian market, which are
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estimated to be around half of their total production and consisting, for example, of railway coaches
and earth-moving equipment (Graham, 1984: 159). The growing importance of the defence public
sector undertakings vis-a-vis the ordnance factories is with regard to the increasing complexity,
sophistication and costs of their operations, particularly since they also cater for the maritime and
aerospace sectors of both the military and civilian markets (Matthews, 1989:412). With the ongoing
intention to synthesise the interests of the military and those of the industrial sector since the 1980s,
Matthews (1989:418) maintains that the defence public sector undertakings took the initiative to
establishing ancillary and small-scale sub-contractors for the supply of parts, components, and sub-
systems.
Table 7.1: Defence Public Sector Undertakings
Sources: Anthony, I. (1990). The Naval Arms Trade. New York: SIPRI, Oxford University, pp. 135 - 136; Graham, Thomas w.
(1984). "India". In Katz, James Everett. (Ed.). Arms Production In Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making.
Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington, pp. 159; 176 - 177; Frank, L. A. (1969). The Arms Trade in International
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Relations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, pp. 141 -142; Thomas, Raju G. C. (1986). Indian Security Policy. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University,pp. 166- 167;Matthews, R. G. (1989). "The Developmentof India's Defence Industrial Base". Journal
of Strategic Studies. Vol. 12,No.4. pp. 405 -430, pp. 414 -415.
Besides the ordnance factories and the defence public sector undertakings, India has forty-seven
major research, development and prototyping institutions (Arnett, 1994:345) that are under the
direct supervision of the Science Adviser to the Minister of Defence. These institutions are
exclusively obsessed with defence research on a wide array of aspects ranging from chemistry,
metallurgy, ballistics, aeronautical design and development, as well as electronic systems. The
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which was established in 1958, also co-
ordinates defence research with each ordnance factory and public sector undertaking, as well as with
other public and private institutions such as universities and private enterprises. Defence research
comprises approximately 17 percent of total research that is funded by the government and it also
constituted two percent of the defence budget. When Indian space and nuclear programmes are
considered, the government contributes approximately 50 percent to defence-related research and
development (Graham, 1984: 159-161).
The DRDO became the local science and technology base to accommodate the diffusion of know-
how through collaborative defence programmes, as it had amalgamated the Defence Science
Organisation and the Technical Development Establishment during its inauguration in 1958
(Matthews, 1989:422). Forty-seven defence establishments and laboratories, with more than 6 000
scientists and technologists as well as 10 000 technicians, were placed under its supervision, which
were dispersed throughout the country and operating within comprehensive scientific and
technological fields (Arnett, 1994:345-346). The DRDO therefore is the hub of research and
development for the ordnance factories that lack an in-house capability, and also minimally for the
defence public sector undertakings, especially in the technical improvement of their techniques and
systems. Nevertheless, despite its vast operations, the DRDO is not sufficiently funded through the
defence budget, as it only obtained one percent in the 1960s, rising to two percent in the mid-1970s,
and 5.15 percent in 1988 to 1989. These increases towards the late 1980s reflected a forceful drive
in the direction of indigenous research, development and production, most particularly to develop
advanced aerospace and electronic systems and equipment (Matthews, 1989:422-423).
Most of the difficulties that were experienced by the DRDO in achieving successes with highly
advanced indigenous programmes such as the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the Advanced Light
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
213
Helicopter (ALH), the Arjun main battle tank, as well as the relatively successful Integrated Guided
Missile Development Programme (IGMP), were debatably based on the failure towards systems
integration. The argument was that the failure to integrate the various components and sub-systems
within locally developed platforms stemmed from the country's bureaucratic culture, which was
unwilling to adapt to new and changing conditions, or from a rigid national culture, which was
undoubtedly difficult to transfigure. Bureaucratic cultures were obviously similar in state
organisations globally, but were, nonetheless, also reliant on each country's specific political and
national culture (Arnett, 1994:355).
Within India, in this context, this culture is characterised by strong Hindu values that were
accompanied by a secular democratic parliamentary system that can closely question the activities
of the DRDO. However, Arnett (1994:355-356) argues that strong Hindu values proscribed
Parliament's capacity to do so on the grounds that the DRDO was often led by unfettered
personalities, which was characteristic of the organisation since the country's independence.
Consequently, scientific practice in India became infested with bureaucratic inflexibility in
planning, a proclivity towards import substitution rather than hoisting the country's international
competitiveness, as well as political manipulation of the research programme instead of permitting
close co-operation and co-ordination between the government and the defence industry. The effects
also of the Hindu caste system had often influenced the direction of certain higher classes that had
access to higher scientific education to abhor scientific education and career prospects in this
direction. However, the success of Indian scientists and engineers within Western defence industrial
sectors became apparent proof that most of the problems of Indian defence production were rooted
in institutional rather than Hindu religious or cultural practices.
7.3.3 The Indian Defence Industry's Collaboration with Other Suppliers
The main role player in collaborative arrangements with the Indian defence industry was the Soviet
Union, particularly in developing India's defence technological production base (Graham,
1984: 173), which was a relationship that began in December 1963 with the signing of a trade
agreement to increase India's total foreign trade by 16 percent towards 1964. By 1970, the Soviet
Union was India's largest trading partner, also providing more than 50 percent of the country's
military hardware (Husain, 1986:29-30). Essentially, India benefited from the terms of payment
that were arranged with the Soviet Union, which included the local Indian currency and bartered
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goods, thus permitting for the accrual of advanced technologies and expanded facilities without the
consumption of the country restricted foreign exchange (Graham, 1984: 173).
Besides HAL benefiting, the various shipyards and other public sector undertakings as well as the
ordnance factories also prospered from such arrangements (Graham, 1984: 173). For instance for the
procurement of a Soviet MiG-27 aircraft, India had to pay a quarter of the price that it had to pay for
a French Mirage 2000 aircraft, whilst both aircraft had comparable performance capabilities.
Moreover, Soviet interest rates were consistent on a 2.5 percent level over a 17-year period that was
followed by a seven-year grace period, of which with Western suppliers the credit periods were 10
to 15 years without a grace period and also had to be paid in foreign currency (Matthews,
1989:411). Furthermore, the Soviet Union was even prepared to accept payments in commodities,
thus allowing India to accumulate a substantial arsenal without weakening its financial position
(Gupta, 1990:855-856).
Rather than focussing on the economic benefits of this relationship, the primary motivating factors
were the politico-strategic considerations that were mutually beneficial for both parties. On the one
hand, India primarily coveted the Soviet Union's veto in the United Nations Security Council on the
disputed Jammu and Kashmir regions against Pakistan; and secondarily for the Soviet Union to
buttress the country's Five-Year Plans. After securing the Soviet Union's support on the Jammu
and Kashmir dispute, India also required the Soviet Union to counter-balance the PRC after the
Sino-Indian contradictions became salient in 1959. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was
interested in gaining India's assistance to break out of the Western strategic naval encirclement.
The politico-strategic convergence was to form the basis of a strong relationship that was cemented
by India's procurement of 24XIlyushin 11-14 transport aircraft and 26XMil Mi-4 and Mi-8
helicopters from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. This arrangement was closely followed by an
agreement to license-manufacture 100XMiG-21 fighter aircraft in India, as well as multitudes of
naval vessels and their support and combat systems (Husain, 1986:30-31).
Despite the failures and the limited successes with the local aircraft projects, Graham (1984:172-
173) claims that India recorded a successful project with the Soviet MiG-21 fighter aircraft. The
major problem with the MiG-21 project was its detrimental effect on the country's foreign
exchange, as the costs of its imported components were estimated in 1972 to be more than those of
directly imported aircraft. Nonetheless, the project hoisted HAL's approach to design and
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production, as a phased strategy towards the assimilation of technology was adopted, resulting in a
continual upgrading of the firm's technological faculty. With the three successive MiG-21 models
being built in India, there was a 20 percent modification amongst the various versions, thus allowing
a broader technological base that gradually absorbed new technologies. One other problem that
India had to contend with was the restrictions imposed by the contract prohibiting the re-transfer of
MiG-21 parts and components to states that were not approved by the Soviet Union, such as Egypt.
Moreover, in certain instances the Soviet Union was rather slow in the delivery of some ofthe MiG-
21 components, which often resulted in unnecessary delays in the production schedules.
Besides the fact that HAL had produced the MiG-21 for more than 20 years, and had also began
license-manufacturing the MiG-27 fighter aircraft, it still had to import the key components of both
these aircraft from the original supplier (Gupta, 1990:853). An important negative consequence of
the Soviet connection, however, according to Gupta (1990:856), was the fact that the Soviet Union
inadvertently discouraged the advancement of the Indian defence industry, as it always provided a
second option for foiled indigenous projects. Presumably, if the Soviet option did not exist, perhaps
the Indian defence industry would have managed to accomplish a certain level of self-sufficiency
being compelled by pressure to preserve its foreign currency reserves as well as galvanising more
local resources towards prioritising the success of the indigenous defence production base. Thus,
the existence of an alternative source for advanced defence technologies became an impediment to
the quest for self-sufficiency in arms development and production, although the acknowledgement
of the costs of such an endeavour can not be overlooked. Nevertheless, wherein the Indian defence
industry was pressured and was politically propped and succoured to pursue self-sufficiency, its
defence research and development faculties were able to provide the required wares (Gupta,
1990:856).
Politico-strategic differences also emerged between India and the Soviet Union over the intention of
the latter to obtain the endorsement of the former on the Asian Collective Security arrangement,
which India rejected on the basis that it was apparently anti-Chinese and accordingly placed India as
part of the Soviet camp. Moreover, Gupta (1994:113-114) maintains that India felt that by
sanctioning the proposal, it would compromise its non-aligned status, as the Soviet Union was eager
to attain a naval base in the Andaman Islands or at Vishakhapatnam. Consequent to India's refusal
to these Soviet proposals, it was denied by the Soviet Union access to certain weapon systems and
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was subsequently cornered by foreign currency shortages from procuring weapon systems from the
- leading Western suppliers.
However, after the foreign currency problems were overcome with an improved economic situation
in the late 1970s, India was permitted to procure the Jaguar and the Harrier combat aircraft from the
United Kingdom, and also to purchase and license-produce the HDW submarines from the FRG.
Moreover, in the mid-1980s India was enabled to procure 40XMirage 2000 fighter aircraft from
France and 1500Xhowitzers from Sweden, both for approximately US$2 billion. These augmented
military contracts with the Western suppliers were perceived by the Soviet Union as threatening its
strong position within the Indian defence market, and accordingly offered new and favourable terms
for India to purchase its own wares. These offers were also prompted by the invasion of
Afghanistan, whereby the Soviet Union solicited the support and encouragement of India, as a non-
aligned state, in its new venture into South Asia (Gupta, 1994: 114-115).
What is also important to note, according to Gupta (1994: 115), is that the Soviet Union made such
offers during a period when all the leading suppliers had reversed the policy to supply weapon
systems through security or military assistance programmes, except towards a few vital states such
as Israel and South Korea for the United States, as well as Cuba, Syria and Vietnam for the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union offered India 700XT-72 main battle tanks, of which 600 were to be
license-produced along with 1000XBMP-2 infantry combat vehicles, as well as eight diesel-powered
submarines that supplemented two others that were purchased from the FRG. Actually, the arsenal
that India received from the Soviet Union preceded and even surpassed the transfer of weapon
systems to other Warsaw Pact states.
India also secured collaboration with the United States during its contest with the PRC over the
South Asian regional power status. India had relied on the support of the Soviet Union to eject the
PRC from the South Asian region in 1962, when the PRC overtly claimed to be a South Asian
regional power and declared a dispute over several territories with India. After the Soviet Union
failed to respond, India turned to the United States for military assistance with weapon systems for
mountain warfare. After India had offered bases for the US Air Force following the 1962 Sino-
Indian conflict, it was provided by the United States with radar and communication equipment
worth US$82 million. Other equipment that was promised by the United States under the auspices
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ofIndia's First Defence Plan for the period 1964 to 1969, which was estimated at US$500 million,
was not delivered due to the imposition of an arms embargo. In 1963, India was provided by the
United States with a loan of US$80 million to establish its first nuclear power station at Tarapur
after Prime Minister Nehru had promised not to develop atomic weapons (Husain, 1986:31; 35).
However, following the 1998 underground nuclear tests, the modest technical co-operation between
India and the United States was terminated, which Arnett (1999:384-385) argues, insinuated the
disruption of some of the indigenous projects such as the LeA, the ALH, and advanced electronics
systems that were pursued in collaboration with certain United States' firms. Nevertheless, the
Indian government had anticipated such responses from the United States, hence it provided
adequate funding for the DRDO to make India less vulnerable to undependable suppliers as well as
to pursue the participation of other suppliers such as France, Russia and Israel or to directly import
complete systems. Accordingly, after the 1998 nuclear tests, India and Russia signed a ten-year
arms supply arrangement, which was approximated at US$8 billion, and the Indian government also
increased defence research and development expenditure by 30 percent.
According to Graham (1984:170-171), India had signed an agreement in 1959 with the United
Kingdom for the indigenous assembly of the Hawker Siddeley HS-748 Avro transport aircraft,
which also included the importation of electronics, engines and undercarriages, with the airframe
being manufactured in India. However, the poor performance capabilities of the aircraft led to the
manufacture of only seventy-nine units that could not be exported or transferred to the civilian
market, thus resulting in a huge financial loss for the Indian defence industry. Another fighter
aircraft project, the HF-24 Marut, whose design began in 1956, was flight tested in March 1961.
Since the intention was to produce a supersonic fighter aircraft, an indigenous engine was envisaged
to be developed during the second phase of production. However, an indigenous engine or the
supersonic speed were never accomplished despite several attempts to install imported engines from
the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the FRG, Spain and Egypt.
Other projects like the Gnat and the HTJ-16 Kiran Mark I and II were met with limited successes.
The Gnat light jet fighter project, on the one hand, was initiated in 1956 in collaboration with
Folland and Bristol-Siddeley of the United Kingdom. The Gnat became an efftcacious weapon
during the 1965 war with Pakistan, and in 1966 more orders for the aircraft were sanctioned leading
to the production of 214Xplanes, thus allowing HAL to accomplish economies of scale.
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Approximately 60 percent of the engine and 85 percent of the airframe were indigenously produced
by 1971, resulting in the production of a modified Gnat Mark II fighter aircraft in 1972, renamed the
Ajeet. The first model of the Ajeet was delivered in 1976 and towards 1982 more than eighty
aircraft had been produced, although the air force was not satisfied with the longitudinal control and
the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems of the aircraft (Graham, 1984: 171-172).
On the other hand, Graham (1984: 172) maintains that the Kiran jet trainer aircraft was designed in
India and began its first flight in 1964, after the aircraft was fitted with electronics systems from
Marconi and the Viper II engine from Rolls-Royce-Bristol, both being firms from the United
Kingdom. Although the Kiran aircraft was moderately effective, it also required constant repairs
that consistently removed it from service, and accordingly had to be supplemented by other
imported j et trainer aircraft. Nevertheless, another version (Mark II) of the Kiran was approved at a
unit cost of approximately US$3 million (Graham, 1984:172).
7.3.4 Challenges and Accomplishments of the Indian Defence Industry
During the period from 1963 to 1971, the defence public sector undertakings experienced problems
in meeting their targets in the production of tanks, aircraft and naval vessels, due to several reasons.
First, was the necessary dependence on assembling foreign components, whose delay in delivery
hampered or severed the production schedules. Secondly, civilian leaders instituted overly
ambitious programmes whose targets were not easily met due to an ineffective research and
development base as well as the inability to sub-contract domestically. Thirdly, for Indian defence
production planners, success was defined as the capacity to produce equipment using domestic
components, labour and technology, which resulted in the establishment of a rigid system of
evaluation. The consequence, however, was the attempt by indigenous firms to develop extremely
sophisticated systems and equipment despite the non-existence of an adequate technological base
and the subsequent diminishing returns. Furthermore, the defence industry was often pressured to
modify and improve on imported sophisticated technologies without sufficient resources, thus
impelling them to drastically shift towards producing new items without the necessary incremental
improvements. This tendency, according to Graham (1984:166-167), was mostly characteristic of
the aircraft industry.
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Although it was commendable to pursue such ambitious programmes in order to achieve rapid
technological advancement, it also had a damaging effect on the entire defence industry, most
particularly the tendency to condone the pursuit of unrealistic targets, which has hitherto been
characteristic of Indian defence production. On several instances, the defence industry conceded to
political and military pressure to produce state-of-the-art systems whilst acknowledging the fact that
it lacked the competence to do so. Consequently, such projects would be initiated for an uncertain
period until they were suspended or postponed due to insufficient funding or the project inevitably
became an indigenously conceived platform or system consisting of several foreign components and
sub-systems (Gupta, 1990:849).
The main factor was the political drive towards self-sufficiency and self-reliance that however
limited the country's receptivity towards innovation and advancement. For example, Arnett
(1994:356-357) argues that the failure to achieve an across-the-board import substitution was a
tribute to a justifiably erroneous ideological proclivity towards technological transfers that however
hindered local innovation and co-development with foreign assistance. The attitude of the political
leadership was that India would not be pressured by foreign forces that were perceived to be
conceited, insincere, and inclined towards circumscribing India its appropriate rank in the global
hierarchical state system. The major problem that beset the Indian defence industry, according to
Graham (1984:168-169), was the dearth of materials that were necessary for the successful
production of advanced military equipment, such as specific metals, like special steel and high-
technology electronic systems and equipment, which were unavailable in the civilian economy. The
main reason for the dearth of such metals and high-technology items was that they were not in
demand in the civilian sector, and as such became entirely a requirement of the defence sector.
Moreover, the reluctance of the Indian leadership to outsouree the so-called strategic sectors of the
economy to the private sector, as well as the incapacity to provide sufficient incentives for the
private sector to shift into drastically novel spheres of production, became a handicap to the
qualitative expansion of the Indian defence industry (Graham, 1984: 169). From these bases,
therefore, it could be safely concluded that a military-industrial complex was non-existent in India,
although the output of the defence industry, particularly the defence public sector undertakings, was
integrally connected to the civil sector. The civil market provided an essential outlet for the defence
industry during peacetime and accordingly affording it with strategic planning over the long-term
(Matthews, 1989:416-417). Nevertheless, despite the willingness of the private sector to move into
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such joint-ventures with the state-owned defence enterprises, India lacked an adequate risk capital
sector to engage in large production contracts for the defence establishment, and accordingly the
forward and backward linkages between the defence industry and the domestic economy were not
sufficiently established (Graham, 1984:169).
Instead the relationship was a one-way street, with most of the economic activity being initiated
from the defence establishment towards the private sector, with trade towards the opposite direction
being severely constrained by political and economic reasons arising from the government
(Matthews, 1989:417). The government was weary of the development of huge private sector
engineering concerns that due to the profit motive would not focus towards providing the country
with a potent defence capability (Gupta, 1990:847). Moreover, the government feared that such
motives might develop vested interests in defence production, which could pursue the expansion of
the defence establishment by influencing the adoption of aggressive foreign and security policies.
Nevertheless, the basis of the establishment of the Indian defence industry had always been along
socialist principles, which emphasised the essentiality of public ownership of strategic industries
(Matthews, 1989:417).
Hence the Indian economy had a limited economic multiplier, which could benefit the entire
economy and offset the higher unit costs of weapon systems and defence-related equipment.
Indeed, the Indian economy became more of a dual economy rather than converting the defence
industry to become a leading technological sector as it was envisaged to be by the country's
leadership (Graham, 1984:169). Close to ten percent of the country's defence budget was consumed
on foreign exchange by the defence industry in importing manufacturing machinery and equipment.
The most affected sector was the aeronautics industry, particularly HAL, which had to postpone
some of its projects due to an insufficient research and development capacity, unrealistic targets,
and a dismal response from foreign suppliers for indispensable components. Hence the radical shift
from emphasis on entirely indigenous production of aircraft that was characteristic of the 1950s
towards the improvement and variation of imported technology and the focus on initiating less
complex projects such as trainer and transport aircraft (Graham, 1984: 169-170).
In April 1987, acknowledging the existence of these problems, the Indian government announced
initiatives regarding the elimination of inefficiencies relating to public control of the defence
industry, which were nonetheless in line with the policies aimed at the liberalisation of the economy.
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For the first time, the indigenously developed Arjun main battle tank, which was initiated in 1974,
was envisaged to be powered with an autochthonous diesel engine developed by the Kirloskars
private firm. It was further announced in July 1987 that 50 percent of the systems and sub-systems
that were to be utilised in the local production of the Soviet T-72 main battle tanks and the BMP
infantry combat vehicles would be produced by Indian private sector firms (Matthews, 1989:417).
However, the indigenously developed diesel engine to power the Arjun main battle tank proved to
be inadequate as it lacked the 1 300 to 1 500 horsepower that was required, with the domestic
private concern only managing to produce a 500 horsepower diesel engine that lacked a
turbocharger. Even after the engine was provided with a turbocharger, it failed to meet the desired
.performance, thus the Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) had to
conveniently opt for an imported MTU engine to begin the production of the Arjun in 1991 (Gupta,
1990:850).
In order to meet the backlog for the procurement of main battle tanks, the Indian government
entered into a licensed production arrangement for the T-72S and the T-80U tanks with the Soviet
government (Gupta, 1990:851), as the Indian defence industry was already license-producing the T-
72Ml tanks from the Soviet Union. The CVRDE was still developing an indigenous engine and fire
control system for the Arjun main battle tank, which could make it to be 75 percent indigenously-
produced, as it was still relying fifty percent on German components alone. Besides the concerns
about the weight and the width of the tank, the German engine was reputed to be overheating in the
Rajasthan desert conditions, which was an attribute of the weight of the tank rather than a deficiency
of German technology. Nevertheless, the success of the Arjun would have demonstrated India's
ability to develop its own indigenous systems and sub-systems that would also improve its status as
an arms producing and supplier state (Arnett, 1994:348-349).
One other problem area which affected the capability of the Indian defence industry was to produce
an indigenous fighter aircraft, as problems were encountered with the HF-24 Marut, its successor
the HF-25, and lately the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which was initiated in 1980 (Matthews,
1989:424). Problems with the LCA were encountered during it's initial design and development
phases, since it was conceived as a 200-km range fighter aircraft to ensure battlefield superiority,
particularly to undertake ground attack tasks, within the tropical climate of the South Asian region.
However, the success of the project was circumscribed by the inability to install indigenously
developed components, leading to the involvement of foreign firms in the development of the
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project (Gupta, 1990:851). Electronic systems were to be provided by Martin Marietta of the United
States, Ericsson of Sweden, Dassault of France, and Allied Signal of the United States, and the
General Electric engine was to be supported with components supplied by Northrop and British
Aerospace, thus becoming dependent on three leading and one primary emerging supplier states
(Arnett, 1994:349-350).
Secondly, the Indian Air Force demanded a beyond-visual-range capability to be installed on the
aircraft, which increased its weight from 8-10 tons to 12.5 tons, as well as impelled the inclusion of
a pulse Doppler radar system for which HAL sought the help of Ericsson of Sweden to co-develop.
Nevertheless, despite foreign participation within the LeA project, research, development and
production costs were escalating tremendously, such that the envisaged 400Xaircraft to be produced
for the Indian Air Force were anticipated to result in an enormous cost per unit unless perhaps an
export market was secured, which seemed rather implausible (Gupta, 1990:852) considering the
tribulations that the project was going through.
Thirdly, it became obvious that the project could not be completed within the predicted period, to
wit, of having the prototype flying by 1990 and the first delivery of the aircraft to the air force by
1994. Most observations forecasted the aircraft to be delivered towards the end of the millennium
or during the early years of the twenty-first century. Finally, it also became apparent that the
technology to be employed on the LCA would be of the 1970s or the early 1980s vintage, thus
implying that by the time it would be deployed with the Indian Air Force, it would be using 20-year
old technology (Gupta, 1990:852). By 1994, more than US$600 million had been spent on the
project and most of the industry observers expected the LCA to begin initial production in 2005,
rather than the delivery in 2001, which was predicted by the DRDO (Arnett, 1994:349-350).
Notwithstanding, India and Taiwan were the only developing countries that had continuing
supersonic combat aircraft programmes globally, since it was difficult for virtually all other
developing countries to launch indigenous state-of-the-art fighter aircraft programmes (Gupta,
1994:111). The procurement of 230XMiG-29 fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union to be license-
produced by HAL in the late 1980s, and adding these to the approximately 160XMiG-27 fighter
aircraft that HAL was already license manufacturing to replace the 20XMiG-2l fighter squadrons,
implied that the LeA would not be appropriately accommodated within the air force. Economic and
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technological logic could impel the Indian government to consider the prolongation of the
production of the MiG-27s or the MiG-29s for the air force, which would be at a fraction of the cost
of procuring virtually outdated units of the LCA programme (Gupta, 1990:852).
Similar problems were also encountered with the indigenous Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH)
project, which was pursued as a co-production arrangement with Aerospatiale of France in 1971 in
order to design a single-engine helicopter whose maiden flight was envisaged for 1982. However,
in 1977, the Indian Air Force pressured the government to convert the ALH into a twin-engine
aircraft despite the fact that HAL had almost completed the single-engine design. Consequently, the
contract with Aerospatiale was terminated in 1981 with a loss of approximately US$4 million in
cancellation fees, as well as the dissolution of the single-engine design on which a lot of national
resources had been invested. Subsequently, in 1984, the Indian government concluded a seven-year
contract with MBB of the FRG to begin a new project from the start, which however was
unsuccessful as a result of contradictions with HAL over the technical specifications of the
helicopter. Ultimately, the Indian government opted for the procurement of Mil Mi-25 helicopters
from the Soviet Union in order to compensate for the backlog in the ALH project, which observers
believed was virtually obsolete by the time it was to be produced in 1991 (Gupta, 1990:850).
Actually the prototype, which was intended to incorporate the ability to survive crashes and be very
light in weight, was reputed to be lacking such special features (Matthews, 1989:424).
Unlike the other indigenous weapon programmes, the Integrated Guided Missile Development
Programme (IGMP) was successful in that despite the restrictions on obtaining the technology for
the ballistic missile systems as a result of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), India
fully supported the scientific and technological base to develop these systems. Secondly, the
programme became an integrated venture utilising to a large extent indigenous technologies,
components and sub-systems, thus averting duplication and saving time that with regard to other
weapon systems was wasted on seeking foreign collaboration. Thirdly, the domestic scientific and
technological base was integrated with the private sector and the educational institutions by the
DRDO in developing the IGMP project. Fourthly, the programme became manageable when
compared to the other weapon projects, since the development of a supersonic fighter was often
beyond the capabilities of most developing countries, whereas more than twenty developing states
had accomplished ballistic missile programmes. Therefore, the ballistic missile programme was not
a project that was over-ambitious on the country's research and development capabilities. Actually,
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it was a clear indication that the Indian defence industry had the potential to meet realistic targets if
it had the support and encouragement of the political leadership and the armed Services (Gupta,
1990:856-857).
The inadequacy of the other projects was therefore not with the ability of the Indian scientific
community to produce advanced weapon systems, but with the inability to conduct systems
integration. High-quality theoretical research was a clear attribute of the Indian scientific
community in addition to their proficiency at developing modem components and producing
uncomplicated prototypes of modem weapon systems. However, to blend these components and
sub-systems in concert proved to be less impressive, firstly due to the dearth of proper project
management capabilities that could guarantee fixed design requirements that Indian scientific and
engineering designers could work towards accomplishing. Secondly, was the need to provide
sufficient resources to the sanctioned projects and being able to prioritise between those competing
for limited resources. In most instances funding for indigenous projects was overtaken by the armed
Services' pressures to procure foreign items, thus diverting the fmancial resources that could have
been directed towards indigenous research and development (Arnett, 1994:352-353).
Moreover, according to Arnett (1994:353-354), Indian military planners focussed their attention on
the procurement of new platforms rather than following the global trend of fitting advanced
command and control equipment, sophisticated electronic warfare systems and smart weapons on
older platforms so as to extend their life whilst improving on their capabilities. In this context,
therefore, the weakness of locally developed platforms could be overcome. Finally, military
research and development should have been blended with government-sponsored industrial or non-
military research, as well as complementing these with private sector research and development.
As an emerging arms producer and a prospective supplier in the domain of arms transfers, Matthews
(1989:419--420) argues that India was regarded to have an enormous capacity to produce defence
wares within the developing world, particularly when considering those industries that were
associated with arms production. Amongst these were the faculties for engineering, iron and steel,
non-ferrous metals, metal products, electrical and non-electrical machinery, shipbuilding and repair,
as well as transportation equipment and systems. According to Matthews (1989:420), India also had
a high potential to produce armaments as a consequence of its previous policies that emphasised the
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establishment and promotion of the capacity to develop capital goods, such as the iron and steel
industry, which became one of the largest operations in the developing world.
Consequently, the country became self-sufficient in the production of various metals, including
specialised steels, which were essential for machinery manufacturing. Besides, India was
progressing rapidly in the spheres of computer-controlled machine tools, the electrical machinery
industry, and electronics, especially telecommunications and computerisation. The production of
electronic systems and equipment for the aerospace and other defence sectors was developing
rapidly through the HAL and BEL defence public sector undertakings (Matthews, 1989:420-421).
Hence, Gupta (1994:111) avers that India is one of the few emerging arms producing states to
produce weapon systems across-the-board, despite the obvious fact that most of these weapon
systems are predominantly reliant on foreign components for their successful employment.
Accordingly, India was unable to achieve complete self-sufficiency in arms production as a result of
its incessant reliance on imported components and sophisticated materials and items that could not
be produced locally. The failure to aggregate civil industrial capacity and defence demand was a
handicap to India's drive towards self-sufficiency. Actually, what the Indians did not acknowledge,
was the fact that there was no emerging supplier state that was in a position to develop an advanced
combat aircraft without an adequate civil aeronautical industrial base, thus allowing for the blending
of economical requirements for aircraft, alloys, instruments, accessories, as well as hydraulic
systems. Without a civil aeronautical industrial base, India was hindered from the substantiation of
an adequate base to promote the research and development of various sub-systems and components
indigenously, as the exercise would prove to be uneconomical (Gupta, 1990:853-854).
What the Indians had to recognise was the fact that the country's defence industrial base could not
go it alone without the inputs or the contribution of other foreign suppliers, particularly with regard
to sophisticated weapon sub-systems and platforms. Accordingly, their attention had to be
refocused towards adding value to the niches where Indian science and technology had a
comparative advantage, such as electronics and software, as well as with other platforms that suited
specific environmental conditions similar to those in the South Asian region and the Indian
subcontinent (Arnett, 1994:351). Secondly, according to Gupta (1990:854), the quest for self-
sufficiency was often affected by delays in encouraging indigenously developed systems and
equipment from reaching the production phase, as well as the corollary preference for the licensed-
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production of foreign developed items. The main perpetrators in this context were the country's
armed forces, which had a tendency of adding requirements to projects that had already reached
their developmental stages, thus stretching out and complicating the design and development work
of the projects.
Gupta (1990:854-855) argues that these tendencies within the armed forces, on the one hand, were
encouraged by the hierarchy of the defence establishment in India, which depreciated the influence
and the bargaining power of the defence industrial units vis-a-vis the armed Services. Whereas, on
the other hand, the armed Services have always had a preference for foreign weapon systems and
equipment as opposed to indigenously developed items, which they regarded as inferior and unable
to match the weapon systems produced by the leading suppliers. The other culprits in this context
were the country's political leaders, who also had a decisive influence on defence production by
nullifying the research, development and designing teams' recommendations and projections on the
basis of politico-strategic considerations. In certain instances these occurrences were proven to be
driven by pure greed and corruption, whereby bribes were reported to have been paid to Indian
politicians to select certain contractors and sub-contractors over others, thus negatively impacting on
the country's economic and technological substructure.
Finally, it became obvious that the advantages that India had over Pakistan and the PRe were not
based on technological superiority but on strategic depth and pure quantity with regard to the former
and on advanced Russian technology concerning the latter. Arnett (1994:351-352) maintains that
the production of indigenous designs therefore was not geared towards gaining an advantage over
the two of India's critical adversaries but towards boosting the country's international prestige,
saving on desperately required foreign exchange, as well as on averting the mass departure of
expensively trained scientists and engineers from the country. Nonetheless, most of these objectives
proved to be unrealisable, as the country failed to preserve or salvage gravely indispensable foreign
exchange or to prevent the science and technology graduates from leaving the country. With regard
to the latter, the DRDO was unable to introduce programmes that could guarantee them the
appropriate application of their talents according to their wishes and orientations.
Gupta (1995:455-456) claims that the increase of the Indian defence budget to approximately
US$7.4 billion in 1994-1995 implied a drastic increase during the 1990s that also reflected concerns
about the demise of the Soviet Union, as close to 70 percent of India's defence equipment was of
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Soviet origin. Therefore, to maintain and replace such equipment insinuated a very costly process
that had to reconsider the fact that soft currency procurements were no longer available. The
fragmentation of the Soviet Union also implied that spare parts had to be purchased from the other
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that used to form part of the Soviet
republics as well as the individual defence firms within those states. Indigenous development and
production of spare parts was slow and failing to conform to the needs of the armed forces and
subsequently they had to rely on imported components, particularly for the aircraft, helicopter and
armour projects. Although indigenous production or refurbishment of older systems for the South
Asian theatre could be feasible, it would nonetheless greatly proscribe India's efforts to project
power beyond the regional context, as the country's armed forces could be faced with
technologically advanced adversaries.
7.4 THE INDIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY'S CAPACITY TO EXPORT ITS WARES
Although most analyses maintained that India's role as an arms supplier was limited by the
country's non-aligned posture during the Cold War period, the actual reason however was that the
Indian defence industry was not created for the gratification of the export market. The primary
motive for the establishment of the defence industry was based on politico-strategic and military-
operational, rather than economic or commercial, considerations (Graham, 1984: 177). For instance,
India refused in 1987 to sell the MiG-21 fighter aircraft to Zimbabwe on the grounds that it did not
want to become acutely involved in the problems of the Southern African region. The other reasons
for India's failure to penetrate the export market were delays in production and the dearth of an
effective marketing mechanism or structure (Gupta, 1990:858). India did not succeed in gaining a
foothold in the export market, even within the South Asian region, except for the generous transfer
of helicopters and patrol boats to Nepal and Bangladesh, where these states had previously procured
such systems from other suppliers (Graham, 1984: 177).
The attempts to sell the HT-2 trainer aircraft to Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Cambodia and
Malaysia were not successful, and other ventures were restricted by licensing arrangements, such as
the Soviet restriction for the sale ofMiG-21 components to Egypt (Graham, 1984:177-178). These
licensing arrangements also impacted on India's attempts to export the Vijayanta tank, as Vickers
imposed restrictions on the re-transfer of technology to other states without its approval (Gupta,
1990:858). India, therefore, listed amongst its exports the transfer of surplus equipment such as the
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Centurion tanks through a middleman to South Africa in the 1960s. Other exports included the sale
of non-lethal equipment as well as civilian helicopters to the Soviet Union to be used in Siberia
(Gupta, 1990:857-858). In the early 1980s, India exported fifty Vijayanta tanks to Kuwait, but the
transaction was not followed by other orders (Graham, 1984:178).
In 1982, the Indian government resolved to increase the country's defence exports as a measure to
achieve economies of scale within the defence industry (Graham, 1984: 178), and this resulted in the
establishment of a new high-level committee in 1983 to promote the country's arms exports.
However, in 1985, the export committee handed over its mandate to junior bureaucrats in the
Defence Production Ministry, and in 1989 a new agency was set up to improve on the work of the
export committee. As a result, India exported equipment worth US$35 million in 1989 to 1990, the
bulk of which consisted of civil engineering equipment from BEML, and part of which included
electronic aeronautic and nautical systems for approximately US$6 million (Gupta, 1990:858).
Despite the resolve to improve its position within the export market, India still suffers from the
reluctance to shift from politico-strategic considerations towards commercial proficiency, as focus is
still centred on government-to-government transactions (Gupta, 1990:858). This tendency was also
imbued within the country's economic system, as export pessimism appeared to be preponderant in
the pattern of independent growth that emphasised a closed economic system (Ward, et a1.,
1991:43). The defence industry, however, was beginning to earmark those areas in which India had
a comparative advantage, such as non-sophisticated items that included patrol boats, military
vehicles, weapon-lifting equipment, parachutes, uniforms and leatherwear (Gupta, 1990:858).
Indeed, Gupta (1990:860-861) argues that India could also focus its attention on improving low-
tech systems such as the piston-engine trainer, the basic jet trainer and the 130-mm field gun, which
the country produced indigenously in the 1960s. These low-tech systems could bring stability to the
defence production base and lay the basis for the development of more advanced systems.
Moreover, according to Gupta (1990:860-861), the defence industry could integrate itself with those
of the leading and other emerging suppliers in order to assimilate their advanced technologies and
techniques, as well as focus on the exportation of components and spare parts for the weapon
systems that the country was already producing under licence. Furthermore, with the advantage of a
large domestic market, India could also focus its attention on reassuring its defence industry that the
armed forces would always prefer locally developed systems and equipment rather than those from
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abroad. Finally, the defence industry was not supposed to overlook the interests of the export
market in its defence research and development and had to be prepared to yield to commercial
considerations in order to compete with other enterprising emerging suppliers such as Sweden,
Canada, Brazil, South Korea and Israel.
7.5 CONCLUSIONS
Although India's perceptions of the contradictions between itself and the PRC after the mid-1980s
were not as pronounced as they were during the period after independence, and most particularly
during the early 1960s and the 1970s, it still considered the PRC's support for Pakistan's defence
programmes and the stance of being a South Asian major power as potentially destabilising and
threatening to its own regional power status. Nevertheless, after 1983, the PRC was not included in
the Defence Ministry's Annual Report as a threat to India's sovereignty. Rather the emphasis was
on Pakistan's efforts to develop a nuclear capability as well as the delivery systems that were aimed
at countering India's ballistic missile programme. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir still
remains as the primary cause of instability within the region of South Asia, which has the potential
of developing into a fully-blown conflict from the sporadic acts of fighting between the Indian and
Pakistani forces, as well as the Islamic guerrillas that are often harassing the Indian armed forces.
The Indian government is absolutely convinced that the Islamic guerrillas are instigated and assisted
by Pakistan.
Defence programmes that India is pursuing at present are a response to Pakistan's efforts to obtain
more advanced weapon systems, which is a trend that has been followed over the past thirty years.
India has continued to primarily rely on the successor to the Soviet Union, Russia, as the main
supplier of its major weapon systems, most particularly aircraft, such as the Sukhoi Su-27, the MiG-
27 and the MiG-29, as well as the T-80 main battle tanks. The procurement of the MiGs and the T-
80 main battle tanks was a response to the traditional concern from the military establishment that
the Light Combat Aircraft and the Arjun tank projects were not achieving their desired intentions.
Whilst, on the other hand, Pakistan was continuing to obtain more advanced systems, such that the
two projects were no longer an appropriate counter-measure to Pakistan's maturing capabilities.
India has also continued to emphasise that in obtaining foreign weapon systems, it should be able to
license-manufacture them and also to produce some of their components such that it could be
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allowed to sell back to the original supplier, thus salvaging part of the foreign exchange that it has to
forfeit as a result of the arms purchase.
However, what is still perplexing a number of analysts, is the fact that India is still an acute net
recipient within the arms production and transfer system, although it possesses one of the most
advanced defence industries in the world, compared to other emerging producers such as Brazil,
Israel or South Korea. Yet it was regarded by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) in 1999 as the sixth leading arms recipient in the world, and ironically the 53rd arms supplier
in the system, with arms sales amounting to around US$3 million in 1995 and 1999 (Hagelin, et al.,
2000:368-373). Although India, like all other arms producing states, is compelled to export its
weapon systems in order to sustain its defence industrial base, it is, however, not pressured like the
other emerging and leading suppliers, as it has a large domestic market that is focussed on
'substantial threats' that are politically justifiable to the taxpayers and the legislature. It will be
interesting to observe how the Indian defence industry will cope without such threats, particularly if
it aims to become a major player in the international arms market, with its vast defence industrial
base and particularly its diversified and comprehensive nature.
India's concerns over the bigger picture beyond the South Asian region has also made it to have one
of the largest military machines in the world, characterised by one of the robust navies and air forces
globally. In 1977, according to Husain (1986:33), India had the third largest standing army, the fifth
largest air force, and the eighth largest navy in the world. The primary focus of these forces include
the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean basin; where it co-operates with other littoral
states under the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (lOR-ARC) arrangement,
mainly driven by South Africa, Australia and India itself (Mills, 1998/9:148). The major vexation
in India's foreign relations is global concerns over the nuclear weapons programmes that are
incessantly developing between itself and Pakistan, the resistance to sign the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the triangular
justifications for pursuing such capabilities. India justifies its pursuit of a nuclear weapons
programme on the untouched capabilities of the recognised nuclear powers, most particularly the
PRC, whereas Pakistan claims that it is prepared to forego its own programme if India does the
same.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
231
However, the process is a vicious circle that seems to be intensifying with India's development of
the Privthi and the Agni intermediate range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles under the Integrated
Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMP), and the reports that Pakistan has also developed
its own versions of the PRC's inter-mediate range ballistic missiles capability. Despite the fact that
the international community is showing concern over the unstable South Asian quagmire, efforts
have not been addressed from the perspectives of the concerned parties in the region. This is
apparent from the continuing efforts to develop and procure advanced weapon systems and defence-
related equipment as part of an abnormal arms dynamic. The primary focus should be on obtaining
a political solution to the problem, rather than addressing the concerns from an anti-proliferation
perspective. This political impasse might perhaps be resolved by efforts of other Third World states
in the Non-Aligned Movement or another regional arrangement, such as the lOR-ARC, that is not
perceived to have vested interest or biased towards anyone party in the conflict.
India therefore can be regarded as a tertiary emerging arms supplier within the hierarchy of the arms
production and transfer system. It shares this status with other emerging arms producing states,
such as South Africa, Malaysia, Australia and Singapore, amongst others, which have not yet
established themselves as prominent and formidable suppliers within the international arms market.
However, India has all the attributes of a secondary emerging supplier, and could even become a
primary emerging supplier, if the economic and commercial considerations could outperform the
politico-strategic concerns as the rationale for developing, producing and transferring armaments.
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CHAPTER 8 - ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the specific focuses on the various case studies in the previous chapters, this chapter is an
effort towards consolidating the universal challenges faced by emerging suppliers within the
international arms production and transfer system as well as the international hierarchy of states
characterised by anarchic relations. These challenges are addressed under the following themes:
emerging suppliers and dependent production and exports; political versus economic motives for
indigenous defence production; the evolution of emerging suppliers; the transfer of technology and
perpetual dependence; the stratification of emerging suppliers; emerging suppliers as recipients; and
emerging suppliers and the current arms production and transfer system. These findings, therefore,
lay the basis for the inferences that have been spawned at the end of the study.
8.2 EMERGING SUPPLIERS AND DEPENDENT PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS
8.2.1 Dependent Production
The fundamental motivation for emerging arms suppliers to produce arms was the desire to
overcome their position of dependence in the system of arms production and transfers. However,
their predicament as late entrants into the system, besides the primary emerging suppliers, such as
Sweden, castigated them to fail in this endeavour. This failure, according to Krause (1992:153-
154), is based on three criteria, which also assist in the identification of emerging suppliers. Firstly,
the weaponry they produce is far below the sophistication characterised by higher levels of
technological advancement. Secondly, they can only produce one or two advanced weapon
systems. Finally, they rely on the leading suppliers for certain sophisticated components of weapon
systems which they cannot produce themselves and as a result, become dependent to such an extent
that they, with an exception of a few, are unable to go beyond the simple reproduction or retrofitting
of existing weapon systems. Indeed, the capability to produce arms was restrictedly extended to
certain states in the post-war era, and even those states that did obtain such a capability were
confined to producing small arms and platforms for major weapon systems.
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Those states that went beyond these capabilities did so with the assistance of other states or
specialists, the initial intention being to meet domestic requirements, and ultimately to dispose of
surplus Second World War equipment into the re-transfer market. Therefore, the efforts to develop
an arms production capability were mainly focused on reproducing or retrofitting Second World
War vintage systems, and only a few emerging supplier states progressed beyond that level. The
intention to develop indigenous arms industries was driven by the political urge to reduce their
reliance on the leading suppliers and to nationalise the arms production process for import
substitution in order to meet domestic security needs. Amongst the studied cases, India was
motivated by the politico-strategic objectives as it was confronted by incessant conflict and
correspondingly precarious suppliers; Sweden by its non-aligned and neutral posture; whilst Brazil
(as well as India) was driven by the goals of global status, regional hegemony and geo-political
preponderance. For virtually all these emerging producers the intention was to gratify essential
domestic demands, with the initial effort being centred on producing simple systems such as
ammunition, small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, naval vessels and elementary aircraft.
Emerging producers and suppliers have resisted the leading suppliers' pressure not to develop their
own arms production capabilities and at the same time managed to cope with the restrictions
imposed by the latter to prohibit them from developing their own indigenous defence capabilities,
even though the level of self-sufficiency has not been extensively advanced. The rise and the
sustenance of emerging producers and suppliers of weapon systems led to acute contradictions
between the controls imposed by the leading suppliers and the autonomy that was coveted by the
recipients. Since the emerging suppliers began the process of defence industrialisation from the
importation of complete weapon systems to import substitution, and ultimately to the promotion of
exports, they mainly relied on technology imported from the leading suppliers. The leading
suppliers, on the one hand, attempted to hinder the efforts of emerging suppliers to promote arms
exports so as to protect their oligopolistic share of the arms market through tightening the controls
and regulations on technological supplies. On the other hand, the emerging suppliers were impelled
to promote their arms exports in order to overcome the saturation of their domestic markets, to
utilise effectively their arms production capacities and to positively affect their balance of payments
through the procreation of foreign exchange returns.
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8.2.2 The Pressure to Export Armaments
The trends in exports were almost similar to the trends in production for emerging suppliers, with
increases being experienced in the early 1970s and in the mid-1980s. The oil increases of the 1970s
and the Middle East conflict, particularly the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, augmented the export
potential of most of these states, although it was only an ephemeral accomplishment. In fact, the
problems encountered with maintaining the production base had to be compensated with arms
exports in order to maintain production lines economically viable. Domestic requirements could not
absorb all production and thus economies of scale in production were reduced. Therefore, the
general trend in the augmentation of exports also resulted in increases in the total transfers of
emerging suppliers, and this trend was likely to remain permanent within the system. According to
this general trend, the bulk of the exports were accounted for by few of the emerging suppliers:
mainly the primary and secondary emerging suppliers, with the tertiary emerging suppliers having
little or no exports at all. Nevertheless, there were serious attempts at enhancing their exports, some
being pipe dreams and others encountering stiff competition in the market. The successful emerging
suppliers usually claimed a niche in certain advanced weapon systems categories and the rest within
the simple and elementary sectors of the market, wherein the leading suppliers no longer had a role
to play.
This export-oriented approach became apparent in the nature of production that is currently
prevalent amongst virtually all the emerging suppliers, with the exception of India, whereby new
weapon systems are not necessarily developed for the domestic market, but often prioritise the needs
of the export market. Indeed, before an approval is obtained for the development of a particular new
weapon system, the desires of the export market are initially contemplated. Consequently, weapon
systems that are developed by the emerging suppliers based on licensing or co-production
arrangements with the leading suppliers often lead to controversies between the two, primarily
because of the re-transfer or end-use attachments to the licensing or co-production contract. Hence,
the emerging suppliers are invariably driven towards concentrating even more resources and
technology towards generating a palpably independent research and development capability. Some
of the emerging suppliers exported arms as politico-strategic tools in order to augment their regional
and global status and prestige, by promoting the notion that through the production and exportation
of armaments they are advancing upward the ladder of the hierarchical international state system. In
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addition, arms are exported as a politico-diplomatic instrument aimed at strengthening relations with
other states.
8.3 POLITICAL VERSUS ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR INDIGENOUS DEFENCE
PRODUCTION
All of the emerging arms suppliers are mainly motivated by politico-strategic considerations rather
than economic or commercial impetuses in producing and transferring armaments. The objective is
usually to reduce the state's dependence on other suppliers in order to uphold national security, as
most states are prone to perceiving threats to their interests, particularly their survival, which cannot
be surrendered to other precarious supplier states. Thus, most states that have such perceptions
believe in augmenting their self-sufficiency through establishing solid defence industries. Other
states, such as Brazil and India, are often compelled by perceptions of the status they hold in their
respective regions in addition to, or instead of, security considerations. From another angle, pariah
states, like the erstwhile racist South Africa and Israel, became the most vulnerable to security-
threat perceptions since they were engulfed within an abominable international environment because
of their domestic or foreign policies, and were thus compelled to develop a continuous source of
supply for their military requirements.
The most general motive for producing arms is the eagerness to avert threats to the security of the
state, followed by the intention to maintain or attain regional preponderance and global power as a
hegemon or to sustain a posture of non-alignment and neutrality in international relations. These
politico-strategic objectives are often discouraged by the leading suppliers, and hence the emerging
suppliers are pressured to develop an indigenous production capability in order to avoid dependency
on capricious suppliers. Other emerging suppliers view arms production as an expeditious route to
economic modernisation, which could ultimately result in the development of domestic technologies
and skills. Therefore, the primacy of the politico-strategic motives can be discerned in the evolution
of most of the emerging suppliers, especially those states that were subjected to embargoes as a
result of being involved in conflict or because of internationally intolerable policies, thus being
compelled to initiate indigenous production. Most of these states had restrictions imposed on them
to receive sophisticated systems from the leading suppliers, and their endeavours to establish
indigenous capabilities can be regarded as natural responses of states confronted by threats to their
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security. Without such restrictions, it can be assumed that these states would not have been driven
to develop an arms production capability.
For these states, the economic or commercial motives became a by-product of the politico-strategic
imperatives, as the intention to produce arms became entrenched within their national security
policies. This could be discerned in terms of how the arms industry contributed to general economic
growth and development. Although it is apparent that the politico-strategic imperatives were
paramount for such states to consider developing an indigenous arms industry, it is, however, not
always the case that these are the principal reasons. Military technological spin-offs, such as the
technical and managerial skills acquired as well as the general industrial development programmes
are also considered to play an important role in the general development of the country. Hence, for
instance, Brazil considered an arms industry as an essential element of the country's national
development project. States such as Brazil preferred to develop their weapons technology
indigenously instead of purchasing first-line equipment off-the-shelf from other suppliers.
If the motive for an indigenous arms production capability was solely the pursuit of economic or
commercial advantages, then practically this could not be the case for emerging suppliers, since
complete systems purchased in an open market would be much cheaper than purchasing components
and blue prints for local production. Moreover, if these states were to engage in independent
research and development for their weapon system requirements, the costs would be even higher
than to procure equivalent or even more sophisticated systems within an open market. These
processes would require stupendous amounts in government subsidies, and in addition, it would
have been economically inefftcient to introduce capital-intensive processes of arms production
within mostly labour-intensive economies. Furthermore, capital investment and formation would be
hindered by a defence sector that drains a larger portion of investment capital and technical skills
that are scarce within largely developing economies.
Nevertheless, the defence industry is not entirely an economic burden, as certain spin-offs and
multiplier effects for the civil industry are also possible and tangible. The development of a defence
industry usually leads to an export-oriented industrialisation process that becomes a negation of the
process of import substitution, which further accelerates economic modernisation, the growth of
infrastructure, skills development and technological finesse. However, such spin-offs and benefits
are difficult to obtain and might take time to develop, albeit that they might ultimately reduce the
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burden of military outlays. Those states with a larger domestic market, with defence industries that
are supported by state subsidies and the local industrial infrastructure, are enabled to sustain the
faculty to produce arms. Perhaps, the role played by national perceptions and cohesion regarding
threats to the security of the state are also essential in determining the sustainability of an arms
production capability. Hence, government involvement or intervention is critical in ensuring
domestic industries a niche in the arms market if the emerging supplier states are compelled by
economic considerations to export their products.
As late entrants in the arms market, their success is already encumbered by other producers and
suppliers who also face stiff competition to maintain their industries operational. The symbolism,
prestige and independence provided by the possession of a defence industry makes it difficult for
most arms producing states to relinquish it. Although politico-strategic objectives are the architects
of an arms production capability for virtually all arms producers and suppliers, most analysts believe
that a certain level of economic development is a necessary condition for its successful pursuit.
Therefore, those states that have such a faculty might eventually loose it if they do not possess or
strive to obtain the necessary economic endowments. States having a low level of demand for arms
due to a constricted military force, and accordingly, a restricted domestic market, are thus compelled
to increase their exports, but due to other factors, exports from these states are limited.
In order to achieve economies of scale that are intended to overcome the problems related to
restricted domestic demand for armaments, most emerging suppliers adopt an approach to develop
weapon systems that will from the onset satisfy the export market as well. This approach also
ensures that they are able to recoup the start-up costs through foreign exchange attained from export
orders, thus also guaranteeing lengthened production runs. A major weapon system project that has
a guaranteed export market is also in a better position to receive support from the leading suppliers
through the supply of technical data packages, components, sub-systems and even technical
expertise. Leading suppliers are also aware of the fact that recipients demand weapon systems that
will meet their specific conditional requirements, and these can be best met by systems developed
for their similar conditions, of which the emerging suppliers are better placed to provide. Recipients
are therefore anticipated to demand such systems from the emerging suppliers regardless of the
sophistication that is attributed to the weapon systems developed by the leading suppliers.
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Although virtually all arms producing states are compelled by economic constraints to export their
defence products, most of the emerging suppliers previously had no bureaucratic establishments to
handle arms transfers decisions. Where they existed, they were either primitive or lacked the
challenge of public opinion, as was the case with the leading supplier states, except for those states
that had always maintained a strict policy on arms transfers, such as Sweden. This was due to the
prestige that was bestowed an arms production faculty, which was reflective of the national pride
that corresponded to the political independence of that particular state within the international
system. Within those states where arms production had a strong export-orientation, decisions
appeared to be apathetic to the state's security requirements, which was reiterated by the
significance accorded arms exports as a proportion of overall international trade vis-a-vis the leading
suppliers.
In these circumstances, there was a great propensity for susceptibility to market fluctuations,
particularly with the uneven nature of international trade, as export opportunities became god-sent.
Competition was also vicious among the export-oriented states, particularly amongst the secondary
emerging arms producers and suppliers in the Third World, South Korea, Israel and Brazil, which
are considered to be the most frequent and the most active. These arms producing states are highly
ranked as arms exporters, albeit below the rank of primary emerging suppliers, and are also
considered to have defence industries that are reputedly highly developed within the Third World,
thus implying that the successful exporters are therefore also the successful producers.
8.4 THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGING SUPPLIERS
Most of the analyses of emerging suppliers' evolution as arms producers reflect a ladder-like
pattern, which is reputedly inner-motivated towards self-sufficiency, conforming to the political
leadership's craving for independent indigenous production. The step-like ladder pattern (see
Figure 8.l below) begins with the faculty to conduct uncomplicated maintenance tasks towards
entirely autonomous indigenous research, development and production. According to Krause
(1992:171), this pattern is for analysis and description of the levels of the evolution of the emerging
suppliers' production capability rather than being the reality of the evolution of defence
industrialisation as other analysts would assume. For example, Pierre (1982: 124) insists that to
create an indigenous arms industry is an incremental process, requiring the transfer of technology
and knowledge from the leading suppliers. Pierre (1982:124-125) argues that usually the process
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begins with the ability to maintain imported equipment, followed by the ability to assemble
imported components, then followed by the competence to produce the weapon system itself or
parts thereof through a licensing arrangement, and finally the faculty to research and develop an
indigenous weapon system itself.
Figure 8.1: The Ladder-like Pattern of the Evolution of Emerging Suppliers
Louseher and Schwarz (1989:51) also acquiesce that the process of acquiring the capability to
indigenously manufacture armaments follows similar stages, with the final stage being the ability to
independently research, develop and manufacture advanced systems with little or no foreign
assistance. Most of the states that are inclined towards indigenous arms production follow this
process as a means of ensuring that the major part of their wherewithal is consumed domestically,
thus securing local employment. Moreover, this process is often augmented by the conditions of the
buyers' market, whereby suppliers in competition with each other often make their bids attractive by
offering to have production done in the recipients' territory, as direct offset or counter-trade
arrangement. These arrangements do contain inevitable fatalistic effects for the leading suppliers, as
they could constrict prospective market opportunities and/or provide recipients with technological
capabilities that might be used against them in future. Nevertheless, in most cases, licensing and co-
production arrangements become the stepping stones towards indigenous research, development and
production.
In reality, however, the process is not as sequential as it is portrayed in Figure 8.1, but is rather
erratic, leading to the concurrence that some of the emerging suppliers are competent to reach the
stage of autonomous indigenous research, development and production, particularly within those
states wherein industrial development has reached an appropriate level. This, nonetheless, is not
often the case, since even the primary emerging suppliers in the developed world, such as Sweden,
still have a limited independent research, development and production capability for sophisticated
weapon systems, and also require foreign components for some of their advanced systems.
Nevertheless, the tremendous successes of secondary emerging suppliers, such as Brazil, in the
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international arms market are based on certain political and economic factors. Essentially, it is the
ability, to offer relatively reliable products at low cost due to the abundant supply of labour, when
compared to capital-intensive industries within the developed world.
Subsequently, the weapon systems produced by emerging suppliers are relatively simple to operate,
repair and maintain compared to systems developed by the leading suppliers. Such weapon systems
are often transferred without restrictions on end-use and re-transfers, which makes transactions more
commercially oriented than otherwise. Moreover, the arms production technology that the emerging
suppliers obtain from the leading suppliers is guaranteed and standardised, and therefore acceptable
to the recipients. However, for the tertiary emerging suppliers, such as India, the situation is more
challenging, even for those states that have the capability to produce weapon systems across-the-
board. Therefore, there is neither uniformity in the manner in which the emerging suppliers have
evolved, nor can they all claim to be autonomous producers, as they have not mastered the process
of technological innovation except for a few weapon systems and equipment.
As part of their evolution, emerging arms producers pursue exports as a way of reducing the unit
costs of the weapon systems so as to earn foreign exchange and to obtain certain economic and
political advantages. However, the possibilities for these states to become large-scale exporters are
minimal, as they lack the quality and quantity of skilled labour that has the potential to produce
advanced systems. Advanced weapon systems are dependent on engineering and technical skills
that are not painlessly obtained, and those states that have managed to develop an indigenous
manufacturing capability are unable to manufacture advanced systems independently, except for the
primary emerging suppliers, such as Sweden, to a limited extent. Only a few secondary as well as
tertiary emerging supplier states, such as Brazil, Israel and South Korea as well as India and South
Africa respectively, have the potential to produce medium-level technology systems independently.
Nevertheless, all the emerging supplier states still rely on other leading suppliers for research and
development, which is subsequently transferred through licensing or co-production arrangements.
Although emerging producers may be constrained to secure an export contract before they can
pursue the production of a weapon system, they manage to integrate sub-systems developed by
leading suppliers into their own indigenous systems, thus reducing research, development and other
start-up costs. This enables their systems to be more reliable, acceptable, simple and cheap to
compete with other advanced systems that are marketed by the leading suppliers. Therefore, most
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of the emerging suppliers' indigenous projects have to rely on foreign components and
technological assistance for their success. The reason is that it is not a simple process to initiate a
design and to actually develop it to substantive production.
Through licensed-production, these states are enabled to develop indigenous defence industries,
however, the exorbitant costs associated with defence production and its demand for economies of
scale, compels these arms producers to covet markets for exporting their weapon systems.
However, the painful truth is that such weapon systems can become obsolete even before they
become effectively employed when compared to other systems already available in the market. The
international arms market is, nevertheless, a highly and fiercely competitive market, even amongst
firms within the domestic market. The need to enter the export market is strongly compelled by
economic imperatives, which are primarily driven by politico-strategic necessities. What should be
noted, nonetheless, is that emerging suppliers have the capability to export indigenously developed
weapons systems that contain foreign components, unless re-transfer or end-use restrictions have
been unequivocally imposed on those components.
Those states that have developed a large defence industry, with India being the exception, are forced
to assertively promote their exports so as to be able to fmance their industries, to reduce the unit
costs of production and to alleviate the costs of research and development. Alternatively, states
could collectively or co-operatively produce arms in order to share the costs of production and
marketing as other leading suppliers do, particularly in Western Europe. The main problem is that
although emerging supplier states enterprisingly pursue indigenous arms production and exports,
they do not yet have the capability to challenge the primary or secondary leading suppliers and
accordingly access the higher tiers. Therefore, they are incapable of achieving their desired
objective of self-sufficiency or self-reliance in arms procurement. The reason is that the same
motive that compelled them to covet an arms production capability, that of guaranteed security,
impels them to seek even more advanced weapon systems as they ascend the ladder of technological
sophistication. These systems, deplorably, are only concentrated amongst a few suppliers at the
leading edge of technological advancement, and accordingly self-sufficiency or self-reliance
becomes an illusionary exercise for the emerging suppliers as the military technological goal posts
are shifted even further.
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
243
Emerging suppliers tend to have a problem with advancing further than the phase of limited
independent production of less-advanced systems, or even limited production of sophisticated
systems, due to several reasons. One of these reasons is that the capacity to spend on research and
development, and the capability for technological innovation is still the province of the leading
suppliers. The probability for emerging suppliers to move towards developing the capability to
manufacture essential components such as engines, propulsion systems, avionics, fire control
systems and advanced armour, is still far-fetched. There are a few who have the capability to
develop one or two of the components for certain major weapon systems, but not across-the-board.
The second reason is the fact that with the edge of technological advancement constantly shifting
further, the implication is that the emerging suppliers' relative progress is stalled by the introduction
of new sophisticated systems. Unless the vivacity of technological innovation is slowed down,
these states will face a difficult challenge to move towards the technological frontier ..
The third reason is that for the emerging suppliers to reach higher levels of the ladder of arms
production, they will be compelled to assume a greater (and increasing) share of the international
arms market. If they fail to do so, they will be relegated towards occupying narrow product niches
with the increased constriction and saturation of the market. As most of these states' industries rely
on these product niches, the possibility for them to perish is greater, as they have a lower level of
domestic demand and are thus compelled to depend on the export market. The final reason is that
the process of the diffusion of military technology is obviously rough, capricious and precarious,
thus these emerging supplier states cannot expect the route to technological progress to be smooth.
Nonetheless, there are qualitative technological breakthroughs for some and relapses for others,
depending on the manner in which certain factors are endowed, and the hierarchical structure of the
arms production and transfer system usually remains undisturbed.
Weapons of a lower or middle range of sophistication are easily available amongst the emerging
suppliers, as they have started to create a class or tier of their own that however is still dependent
upon the leading suppliers for particular sub-systems, components and parts at the technological
edge of advancement. The production of advanced weapon systems requires sophisticated
components and sub-systems as well as unique technological infrastructure and resources,
particularly capital for enormous investments, which are often deficient in a number of developing
states. Therefore, emerging suppliers can only affect the arms production and transfer picture
minimally, as the major sophisticated systems, which may drastically tilt the balance of forces in a
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region, will remain solely a domain of a few leading suppliers. Accordingly, the global arms
production and transfer system will remain a hierarchical framework, based on the various tiers,
depending on the level of technological sophistication that a supplier is endowed and capable to
accomplish. Only the primary emerging suppliers, such as Sweden, can effectively transform the
structure of the system because of their technological capabilities that have been proven in the past,
in addition to their proximity to other leading suppliers. For these states, only political will is
required for them to ascend the hierarchy of the system, although they will be constrained by other
factors to do so: financial and other resource endowments; arms control imperatives; the decline of
the need for military coercion; and deliberate efforts by other actors in the system.
8.5 THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND PERPETUAL DEPENDENCE
Indeed, there are very few projects in which independent and indigenous production can be
identified amongst the emerging suppliers. Most of these are simple weapon systems projects such
as weapon platforms, multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and armoured vehicles that do not
necessary require sophisticated components. With sophisticated weapon systems such as aircraft,
naval vessels and missile systems, emerging suppliers are heavily reliant on the leading suppliers for
specific components and sub-systems such as engines, power plants and electronic packages.
Moreover, it is mainly the political will of these states' leadership that will make them to achieve
greater strides as arms producers and suppliers. Inmost instances, there are three basic groups of
factors that promote or restrict the state's decision-makers' efforts towards augmenting defence
programmes in pursuit of national interests. First amongst these factors is the nature and character
of prevailing forces, along with the existing infrastructure to support them. In the second place is
the capacity of the national economy and the state budget to sustain and promote defence
capabilities. Finally, is the politico-strategic posture of the state, its involvement in existing
alliances, as well as the size and scope of the threat to its national interests (Anthony, 1990:159-
160).
There is always a need for states to upgrade their forces without disrupting the existing supporting
infrastructure, as an enormous amount of capital and personnel are committed in sustaining such an
infrastructure. This implies, therefore, that long-term planning is required for the sustenance of such
an infrastructure, and the infusion of new foreign equipment creates problems of compatibility in
maintenance and operation. As a result, states become reluctant to change the sources of their
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supplies. This tendency of sticking to single or similar suppliers creates long-lasting supplier-
recipient relationships, whereby a recipient's discretion to diversify the sources of supply is
restricted by either economic, politico-strategic or diplomatic imperatives. Those states, in
particular, that do not possess an adequate defence industrial base to sustain their long-term force
planning are compelled to import all of their requirements on the basis of availability, which is often
satisfied through the procurement of equipment from single principal sources. In most instances,
such arms transfer relationships are a reflection of politico-strategic or diplomatic patron-client
relationships.
Figure 8.2: The Efficacy of the Transfer of Technology
Source: McLaurin, R. D. (1989). "Technology Acquisition: A Case Study of the Supply Side." In Baek, K., McLaurin, R. D. and Moon,
C. (Eds.). The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries: Supplier Control or Recipient Autonomy? Nam-Ku, Inchon: Center
for International Studies, Inha University.
Moreover, there are variations in the manner in which technology is transferred from the leading
suppliers to the unfolding producers and suppliers. According to McLaurin (1989:61-63), it varies
from the transfer of commercial literature, co-production arrangements, to the creation of turnkey
factories (see Figure 8.2 above). The essence of technology transfer is the provision of advanced
training or education in sophisticated technology or through technical exchanges that result in
incessant contact through various contexts, such as government-to-government, government-to-
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industry, and industry-to-industry with government sponsorship, or being an entirely private affair.
The exchange of technical know-how can be concluded through co-operative or collaborative
research and development, which becomes a very effective method of transferring technology.
Another method is the co-production arrangement between two or more states or their industries,
and also its variation, foreign affiliation, which is the extension of ownership to other states or a
merger amongst various industries in different states.
McLaurin (1989:63-64) believes that a very active and potent force for development, on the one
hand, is the establishment of turnkey operations, which is usually followed by a training
arrangement and the transfer of management services. On the other hand, the licensing
arrangement, which is not in itself an effective channel for transferring technology, is a prima facie
acknowledgement of the licensee's possession of the technology, unless it is viewed as an
institutional framework within which a training arrangement is incorporated. Other channels
include the transfer of engineering and technical data documents, capital and processing equipment,
commercial visits, international conferences and trade exhibits, professional and commercial
literature, fmal products, and undocumented proposals. Nevertheless, there are always problems
encountered in trying to demarcate between military and non-military technology, as there is no
clear dividing line between the two. Moreover, data on military transfers is usually concealed
through government classification and through proprietary restrictions.
What is often documented is the transfer of complete weapon systems, which is not the transfer of
technology, unless know-how is absorbed by the recipient as a result of specific maintenance and
support training and not on the operation of the weapon system in and of itself. However, reverse
engineering is a form of technology transfer, which is the ability to learn about the changes in a fmal
product over a certain period of time. Emerging suppliers usually develop platforms on which
foreign-developed sub-systems are integrated, thus insinuating a mere licensed or co-production
arrangement that cannot be regarded as an independent production faculty. It is only those few
major weapon systems such as the Brazilian turboprop aircraft projects, the Swedish Kockums
submarines and India's ballistic missile systems that can be considered to be independently
developed systems, although they also contain foreign-developed components and technology.
Secondly, only these three states, Sweden, Brazil and India, can be considered to have a faculty to
produce weapons across-the-board, which is nonetheless dependent on foreign technology transfers
and not at a very high level of sophistication, except for one or two systems.
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With the increasing technological capabilities of the emerging suppliers, they also develop the
faculty to adapt existing sub-systems for other purposes. For instance, they are able to purchase
various sub-systems and components from the leading suppliers in order to develop re-engineered
hybrid systems for the export market, particularly to Third World arms recipients. Long-acquired
weapon systems are retrofitted with newly acquired sub-systems and components that result in new
versions of the armaments that are guaranteed to meet the needs of the recipients without increasing
the costs of research and development. Inmost instances, such hybrid systems are developed with
the co-operation of the leading suppliers with sub-systems that are already available in the market.
The process requires their eclectic combination and integration, resulting in a new low-cost product
with proven reliability and the availability of spare parts in the open market. Therefore, a large
portion of the current arms trade is dominated by the re-exportation of re-engineered hybrid systems
within which emerging supplier states, in collaboration with advanced firms in the leading supplier
states, are involved. It is a crucial sector in the arms market within which the emerging suppliers
have a guaranteed niche that might be extensively augmented in future.
As a consequence of a buyers' market, most leading suppliers are keen to provide the emerging
suppliers with technological know-how to promote their indigenous defence production despite the
fact that they are actually facilitating the evolution of future competitors in the arms market. These
competitors are not only facilitated for the development of finished weapon systems, but also
include the development of offshore sub-contractors that could have been availed in the leading
supplier's own defence or civilian industrial base, thus leading to a loss of contracts and the
subsequent loss of employment. These offshore sub-contractors obtain the technological know-how
through licensed or co-production arrangements or through the re-engineering or the rebuilding of
imported sub-systems and equipment. Nevertheless, policy-makers of the leading supplier states are
constrained by the ever-increasing defence costs to obtain quick-fix solutions rather than to consider
the long-term consequences of technology transfers. The reasons for opting for short-term solutions
are firstly that only a few states have the potential to be qualified as emerging producers and
suppliers. Secondly, these emerging suppliers are still heavily dependent on the leading suppliers
for most of their specialised technological and component requirements for their overall weapons
production. So, all in all, the leading suppliers are unequivocally decisive in terms of deciding the
quality and quantity of technology transferred, and hence the possibilities of emerging suppliers
becoming potent competitors in the arms market are still a remote possibility.
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There are important factors that need to be considered with regard to this pattern of dependence.
The first factor is that the development of an indigenous arms production capability, regardless of
the level, accords a state a certain level of independence from the leading suppliers, as it can assert
itself in international relations with a larger space for freedom of action. Albeit such a state is still
technologically dependent on the leading suppliers, it has the advantage that in the longer-term it
could overcome its dependence and become a substantial competitor in the arms market. The
second factor is that the leading suppliers do not foresee the emerging suppliers becoming serious
future competitors in the arms market, rather they are viewed as future collaborators in the
alleviation of defence costs. For the leading suppliers, co-development and co-production
arrangements are rather a necessary evil for the expansion of the market, particularly for specialised
technological and component requirements that can be gratified on a collaborative basis. The
project costs of developing new weapon systems are therefore spread amongst a substantial number
of states and firms, thus resulting in more efficient economies of scale that would not have been
achieved through individual state production.
However, with the shifting technological frontier, as weapon systems become more and more
sophisticated, the technological dependence of emerging suppliers becomes more pronounced.
Nevertheless, the level of dependence cannot be measured as the examination of the supply of
technological components is also linked to the availability of alternatives, particularly within a
buyers'market. Moreover, most of the licensed and co-production arrangements are conducted with
the secondary leading suppliers, which are predisposed to be export-oriented, and as a result are
vulnerable to impart some of their technological competence in order to keep their industries warm
and operational. Furthermore, as a corollary, the secondary leading suppliers might be less bent
towards imposing end-use or re-transfer restrictions on their products, which reduces even further
the intensity of the dependency relationship.
The third factor in the pattern of dependence is that several indicators such as population size and
composition, the domestic market, gross-national product and access to foreign exchange on a long-
term basis, suggest that only a few states have the potential to uphold the flag of being parvenu arms
suppliers. Hence, those below that level are far more limited than their counterparts to develop an
arms production capability that might prove to be a prospective contributor and competitor in the
future arms market. However, these objective indicators can not be considered in isolation from the
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subjective factors such as the proclivity of the political leadership towards the defence establishment
and the possibilities of technological transfers that could overcome the constraints imposed by
political or economic conditions. The transfer of technology is an essential requirement for a state
to develop an indigenous arms production capability, particularly in the realm of sophisticated
systems. Moreover, it is an arena within which the leading suppliers wield more power and
discretion in terms of determining as to who gets what technology, when and how. Thus reinforcing
the assertion that the (secondary) leading suppliers view the emerging suppliers as prospective
collaborators rather than competitors in the future arms market.
What is significant with regard to measures aimed at restricting the transfer of technology, is that the
transfer of components or sub-systems is not politically salient as the transfer of complete weapon
systems and usually does not attract the sensitivity or opprobrium that is often associated with the
latter. Moreover, controls over components or sub-systems are normally difficult to execute, as
some of these are dual-use items and therefore not covered by the arms transfers, re-transfers and
end-use restrictions. Another significant aspect with regard to arms control measures, is the
adoption of global, rather than regional, approaches towards handling the transfer of technology to
emerging suppliers. The problem with a global approach, as opposed to regional approaches,
irrespective of its conceptual elegance, is more convoluted if it is to be ubiquitously applied, since
the respective requirements for arms, for stability and for sophistication, are regionally contextual.
The peculiarity of every region offers a varying mixture of dilemmas and probabilities, and hence
the diffusion of power, one principal dimension of which is the transfer of military technology,
generates a novel focus towards pluralism and regionalism.
Primarily, it is the regional politico-strategic tensions, based on real or perceived threats, which lead
to competitive arms dynamics that are sometimes extended to become regional arms races.
Subsequently, regional approaches become the most effective devices for analysis and therefore for
the development of opportunities for co-operation in the arms production and transfer system,
specifically in the area of restraining further transfers into or out of a region. The diffusion of power
is a consequence of essentially systemic causes, particularly the anarchic conditions that increase the
requirements for armaments and therefore elevate the significance of regional military balances.
Therefore, arms transfers (and the transfer of military technology) are neither an equivocal nor a
petty affair, but a pivotal foreign policy imperative whose salience can never be overlooked within
contemporary international relations.
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8.6 THE STRATIFICATION OF EMERGING ARMS SUPPLIERS
Although political and security reasons are preponderant for virtually every state's decision to
embark on an arms production endeavour, the driving force is usually the desire to be self-sufficient
and independent in international relations. However, during the process of equipping and
developing the armed forces of an arms producing state, the need for more advanced equipment is
always recognised, as the rival state(s) try to do the same, usually through straight (off-the-shelf)
transfers from abroad. The producing state is therefore compelled to obtain more sophisticated
systems that can not be usually produced indigenously, regardless of its relatively advanced industry
in order to counter the efforts of its rival(s). Therefore, the competition it encounters from its
rival(s) coerces that particular state to import foreign systems or to co-produce or produce them
under license, which leads to one of the reasons for most emerging supplier states to fail to become
leading suppliers. From another dimension, the leading suppliers are sceptical and therefore
reluctant to offer the technological know-how to manufacture weapon systems, as these systems can
be used against them in future because of the vicissitudes of international relations and the
probabilities of re-transfers. Moreover, there is the likelihood that these states might in future
reduce their dependence on the leading suppliers and even constrict the size of the market as
competitors. This therefore maintains the market as a hierarchical oligopoly that can only be
marginally altered by the emerging suppliers.
Figure 8.3: The Stratification of Emerging Suppliers
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Within the emerging suppliers themselves there also exists three tiers, the first being the primary
emerging suppliers, followed by the secondary emerging suppliers, Brazil, Israel and South Korea,
which have managed to capture the technical propensity to adapt existing systems for their armed
forces and even to satisfy the export market. This is a required quality to advance to the threshold
of a primary emerging supplier, like Sweden, Canada and the Czech Republic (see Figure 8.3
above). The other tertiary emerging suppliers, such as India, Singapore and South Africa are still
confmed within the ambit of reproducing existing systems, although they have managed to develop
several sophisticated systems, they are still heavily reliant on the inputs of the leading suppliers to
move up the ladder of production. It is therefore important, according to Krause (1992: 180), to note
the extent of technological innovation, as it is the determining factor moulding the patterns and the
hierarchy of the arms production and transfer system, particularly the ranking of the actors.
Although some emerging suppliers have attained a certain level of technological sophistication, they
are relegated by the pace of technological innovation, as the weapon systems become more
advanced and thus the costs for research and development become more pronounced. As an enclave
of the overall industrial sector, the defence industry has the capacity to transcend beyond the general
economical and technological growth rate within the state, albeit with the risk of being constrained
by the fluctuations of the global market. Moreover, the defence industrial technological exposures
acquired can be supplanted to the civilian sectors and even provide the impetus for economic growth
and development. Generally, arms producing states are pressured by the heavy demands of the
production process to pursue exports, which, if a place in the export market is secured, compels the
shelving of other considerations of arms transfers. These include the politico-strategic and
diplomatic imperatives as well as their subordination to the imperatives of maintaining the defence
industry operational and being part of the military technological dynamic.
Nevertheless, the quantity of emerging suppliers will in future be marginally increased or even
reduced by the increasing contributions made by the prevailing suppliers as a consequence of a
greater endeavour by certain states such as Brazil, South Korea and Israel to augment their exports.
Most significantly, with the transformation from a sellers' market to a buyers' market, recipients are
contemporarily enabled to determine the terms and the trends of arms transfers, which however, are
also influenced by the structural and technological constraints governing arms transfers. Such
constraints cannot be ignored, especially in the manner in which they can restrict the process of
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enhancing arms production regardless of the politico-strategic or diplomatic considerations.
Besides, emerging (and some secondary leading) arms suppliers are, to varying extents, recipients of
armaments and arms technology as well, and hence it is necessary to also consider their disposition
as arms recipients.
8.7 EMERGING SUPPLIERS AS RECIPIENTS
Since emerging suppliers are still heavily dependent on the leading suppliers for most of their
technological requirements, and largely for the sophisticated weaponry that they co-produce with
the leading suppliers, they are also a constituent part of the recipients within the global arms
production and transfer system. The recipient's demand for armaments is driven by several major
factors, primary amongst which is the availability of other suppliers that are in a position of
gratifying the recipient's requirements along with the role that other suppliers play in assisting the
recipient's adversaries with the weapon systems they need. In deciding as to what armaments a
recipient desires, the supplier has to also consider the policies and objectives of the principal
suppliers of its recipient's adversaries and also the possibility of the recipient to seek alternative
suppliers in case its vital needs are not satisfied. The selection of an alternative supplier is
determined by several attributes, which include economic, ideological, technological and systemic
considerations, as well as the recipient's growing preference for capabilities that are applicable to its
current circumstances.
The economic attribute relates to a state's resource endowments, whether it is economically viable
to afford the procurement of weapon systems from other alternative suppliers, or that it is dependent
on one principal supplier for all its defence requirements. Effectively, those states that have enough
resources to purchase any equipment available in the arms market have a greater scope to seek
alternative supply sources. Nonetheless, financial independence needs to be supplemented by
favourable politico-diplomatic relations between the recipient state and other supplier states,
otherwise the recipient state will not have alternative suppliers in the international system. Take for
instance South Africa's previous status as a pariah state globally that insinuated that it had no other
enthusiastic suppliers except for the then insignificant Israel, as compared to the mainly leading
suppliers, who could have provided the apartheid state with equipment and systems at the edge of
technological sophistication.
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What should be noted, however, is that the acquisition of armaments within a specific region may be
a qualitatively and quantitatively significant exercise in another region, thus compelling a contextual
analysis of the conflicts and the arms dynamics in specific regions. In the Third World, states
demanded arms as a result of the disintegration of colonial empires after the Second World War and
the emergence of new states, which began to establish national military institutions for defence and
security. The presence of armed forces became an essential attribute of sovereignty and
independence, as well as a token of power and eminence. Most of the newly established states
became involved in internal and regional religious, ethnic, ideological and border conflicts, and
·consequently required armaments for the sustenance of their sovereignty. The Third World,
therefore, became characterised by instability in the relations both within and between states, which
expanded to become civil wars or regional wars within which an enormous demand for arms was
prevalent.
The diffusion of military technology into these areas of strife led to the emergence of significant
regional actors whose power and eminence was partly located in their military faculties, and their
economic sectors remained secondary attributes of power. These actors reflected a considerable
propensity to enhance their military establishments and even to develop their indigenous defence
industries. The leading possessors of sophisticated systems were mainly those states that had the
capability to produce armaments, particularly those that evolved to comprise the ranks of the
emerging suppliers. The impetuses behind these acquisitions were the regional rivalries emanating
from the general arms dynamic leading to unwarranted security dilemmas that were procreated by
ambitions for regional hegemony or quests for international recognition and prestige. Furthermore,
the role played by political contentions and policy-making can not be overlooked in the manner in
which they influenced the intentions and the actual acquisitions of sophisticated systems.
The intention to possess more sophisticated systems was often driven by the ambition to gain a
decisive advantage, which was usually offset by the rival states' acquisition of equivalent or
superior systems, thus resulting in the acquisition of more advantageous systems such as weapons of
mass destruction as well as cruise and ballistic missile systems for their delivery. Such weapon
systems were perceived to enhance the state's prestige and recognition internationally, giving it a
strategic deterrent capability that was more effective than a mere tactical or operational edge. Both
developed and developing arms producing states based their perceptions on the belief that the
possession of large and balanced military forces provided a state with a natural place in the
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international system of power. As a result, pressure was exerted on these states' defence decision-
making processes, as they regarded themselves both as significant regional and global powers, to
maintain and augment their positions in the international hierarchy of states system.
For an arms producing state to obtain advanced weapon systems, it has to acknowledge the
necessity to widen its scope of the sources of supply and to be able to integrate the various sub-
systems and components from these varying sources into developing technologically sophisticated
systems. Unfortunately, this process has to be effected within the confmes of budgetary constraints
as growth in defence outlays has in real terms been reduced since the mid-1980s. Therefore,
governments are compelled by the political pressures to reduce their spending on defence by
seeking other avenues such as collaborative programmes with other states in order to sustain their
defence capabilities, which nonetheless implies that greater interdependence is anticipated in the
future amongst the defence faculties of the various states. Prima facie, the diversification of the
sources of supply may appear to be a military extravagant and irresponsible exercise, since the
integration of miscellaneous components or sub-systems is a difficult process, particularly with
regard to their interoperability. This condition might be more pronounced for less advanced armed
forces if they have to blend their mediocre capabilities with more modem and sophisticated systems.
Therefore, the politico-strategic, military-strategic, politico-diplomatic and economic or commercial
considerations seem to be combined, and not unique, in the determination of the policy to diversify
the sources of supply.
Seeking alternative suppliers also requires personnel that can be able to adapt to new technological
systems through retraining and re-orientation without the sensitivity to foreign penetration and
tutelage, which also implies the acceptance of foreign personnel into the recipient state's defence
establishment. Furthermore, certain weapon systems can not be substituted by others, such that they
have to be retrofitted or upgraded to meet the requirements of the recipient. Most significantly is
the capacity of the recipient state to absorb sophisticated systems, which it is able to employ in
combat rather than systems that are only required for prestige or deterrent purposes without being
utilisable in actual combat. It is often the case that certain sophisticated systems that are procured
by most recipients do not perform accordingly in combat as they do during peacetime exercises.
Moreover, these systems require more advanced maintenance in terms of technical expertise, spare
parts and components such that most recipients prefer to rely on "older, simpler and more durable
weapons" (Snider, 1989:256). From another dimension, such systems provide an advantage for
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certain emerging suppliers, such as Brazil, who offer them in their refurbished, upgraded or
modified versions into the arms market.
Purchasing much more simpler and reliable defence systems guarantees the recipients less
dependence on the leading suppliers, as these systems are capable of effectively competing with
more sophisticated leading supplier-developed systems in combat, at a lesser cost, and subsequently
become platforms that can be easily upgraded to more advanced levels. Pressures for political
compliance from the leading suppliers are therefore reduced, particularly during wartime, whereby
the recipients are compelled to seek sources of re-supply for depleted weapon systems and
equipment. Hence, virtually all leading suppliers, with the exception of the United States, are
reluctant to demand political compliance as a condition for transferring arms to recipients since
these might result in the straining of relations between both states. Moreover, a convergence of
interests is conceivable amongst the secondary leading suppliers and the emerging suppliers as
recipients in order to reduce the latter's dependence on the primary leading suppliers and to
diminish their hegemony and influence as major powers vis-a-vis the secondary leading suppliers.
The adoption of a diversification of suppliers policy is, to a certain extent, a symbolism of the
independence of a recipient from a specific principal supplier, especially considering the reaction of
the respective supplier if it decides to halt the further maintenance of previously transferred
equipment.
The subordinate role of the recipient states within the arms production and transfer system does not
imply that they are actually impotent, as they have managed over the years to develop strategies to
deal with suppliers in a manner that would advantage their own interests. One such method is the
pursuit of counter-trade or offset arrangements for the weapon systems or defence equipment that
they procure from (mainly) the leading suppliers. Recipients obtain various advantages from offset
arrangements, the first of which is to finance trade that is often demanded by economically
disadvantaged states as a result of the inability to fund the high and rising costs of foreign
sophisticated weapon systems. The second advantage is the intention to stimulate exports (and to
limit the constraints of imports that are largely created by policies of protectionism) through gaining
access to new markets by exploiting the availed distribution networks. The third advantage is that
offsets can be utilised to generate economic growth through the erection of the essential
infrastructure required for industrial development. Moreover, other benefits such as the technical
skills for competitive manufacturing and marketing are obtained from such offset arrangements.
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Finally, offsets are demanded as a means towards establishing and acquiring defence industries and
advanced production technology.
Although some of the recipient states have managed to reduce their dependence on the leading
suppliers, which might have implications of influence and leverage, they are nonetheless still at the
bottom rungs of the arms production and transfer hierarchical system. This is the pertinent
persistent disadvantage for them as it is the ambition of virtually every state to be at the topmost
levels of the management of regional and international issues, particularly those relating to their
own security. Therefore, without the faculty to develop and produce advanced armaments, on the
one hand, places the recipient states in a structurally inferior position. On the other hand, this
inferiority becomes the rationale behind their inability to develop and produce advanced armaments,
especially if the historical, socio-economic, political and cultural contexts are taken into
consideration. As a consequence, these states remain victims of the manipulations and
orchestrations of the globally and regionally powerful states, which is nonetheless a reflection of the
more profound uneven relations of international political economy.
8.8 THE CURRENT ARMS PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER SYSTEM
The changes that are visible in the current international arms production and transfer system are a
reflection of the process of the spread of technological capabilities that has occurred since the
Second World War. The spread of military technology also implied the diffusion of power to the
developing world and simultaneously insinuated the reduction of the power of the leading suppliers
to influence recipients' compliance with their policy preferences. This was reflected mainly in the
transformation of the system from a sellers' market in the 1970s into a buyers' market in the 1980s.
The sellers' market, on the one hand, was characterised by a few suppliers and the purchase of
sophisticated state-of-the-art systems by mainly the rich oil-producing states of the Middle East. On
the other hand, the buyers' market was distinguished by a wider range of suppliers and weapon
systems, with the economic imperatives becoming preponderant in the determination of national
security policies for both suppliers and recipients alike. Moreover, recipients started requiring offset
arrangements, which included licensed and co-production arrangements as part of the arms transfer
processes.
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The arms trade, therefore, evolved to be characterised by the transfer of military technology instead
of the transfer of complete weapon systems, as was the case within a sellers' market. The transfer
of military technology also included the shipment of upgrade kits, logistical equipment, and other
components and sub-systems that did not feature prominently in the arms transactions of the
previous periods. However, the contemporary arms production and transfer system is also
characterised by a sluggish pace of technological innovation because of the exorbitant costs
involved as well as the probability that the current engineering designs are surpassing the human
capacity to operate them. Likewise, the nature of military technology is becoming less connected to
the requirements of military strategy and doctrine, insinuating that the current innovations are no
longer capable of moving beyond what is already available within a particular genre of military
technologies.
This is particularly the case with regard to technologies associated with the revolution in mobility.
Although in other sectors of the revolution in military technology, such as protection, firepower,
communication and intelligence, the dynamic of innovation is advancing in a rapid pace, especially
with the new developments in electronic and computer systems. This is manifested in the narrowing
of the gap between the sophistication of technology that is within the inventory of the various tiers
of suppliers and those of the recipients, which is perhaps rather wider with regard to the
sophistication of technological capabilities for arms development and production. If the latter is the
case, then the stratification within the arms production and transfer system is sustainable and
reinforced, thus making it hard for the lower tiers to advance upward the ladder of arms production,
as it would be determined by the imperatives of the domestic economy and the international market.
Over and above, the hierarchical structure of the arms production and transfer system as well as
membership in one of its rungs is not determined by the possession of sophisticated systems within
each state's arms inventory, but by the arms production base, the propensity to conduct research and
development, the advancement of the technology to produce armaments and the reliance on exports
vis-a-vis domestic procurement (Krause, 1992:212). For the primary leading suppliers, their
membership is determined by the propensity to innovate at the edge of technological advancement
as well as the capability to produce sophisticated weapon systems across-the-board. Moreover, they
are not supposed to rely solely on exports in order to sustain their production faculty, as they
possess larger domestic markets and the endowments to conduct research and development
independently. Nonetheless, it is also obvious that the primary leading suppliers are also beginning
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to feel the pressure of the costs of producing sophisticated weapon systems despite their expansive
domestic markets.
The next level in the arms production and transfer hierarchy are the secondary leading suppliers,
who advanced their competence to produce sophisticated weapon systems at or near the
technological edge for domestic consumption as well as for the export market, as they became
heavily dependent on the latter to keep their industries operational. This is more the case since their
research, development and production faculties are limited by their constricted domestic
requirements and have to rely on exports, subsidies or collaboration for their industries to float.
Actually, the rise of economically motivated suppliers went beyond the confmes of the Cold War bi-
polarity as all suppliers became bogged down by the skyrocketing costs of producing
technologically advanced systems that began to dominate the arms trade by placing a strain on both
their economies and defence establishments. The secondary leading suppliers began to place a
greater emphasis on the exportation of their wares in order to salvage the costs of production and
also to reduce their expenditures on defence and social spending arising as a consequence of trying
to efficiently manage their defence industries.
Beyond the focus on exports, was the adoption of co-development and co-production arrangements
as a means of cutting the aggregate costs of the research and development programmes for new
weapon systems, based on the assurance that a definite market existed within the armed forces of the
collaborating partners. The latter approach was also adopted as an avenue towards compensating
for the limited domestic markets that led to shorter production runs for most of the supplier states
besides the primary leading suppliers, such as the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union.
The co-development and co-production arrangements appeared to benefit the emerging suppliers the
most, as they did not have to absorb the costs of research and development that the leading suppliers
had already incurred. Moreover, these arrangements ensured that the emerging suppliers acquired
the advanced technical know-how to develop new sophisticated systems despite the limitations of
foreign exchange reserves as well as the unfavourable competition that was prevalent in the arms
market.
Accordingly, the secondary leading suppliers such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany,
are bent on acquiring a greater share of the arms market, which reflects their employment of
aggressive marketing strategies that complement the diversification approaches adopted by the
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recipients in order to reduce their dependence on the primary leading suppliers. Despite the utility
of these diversification approaches, they also entail costs for the recipients, as they have to absorb
new systems into their customary inventories, and a wide range of supply sources whose technical
expertise for application, maintenance and repair is sometimes varied and incompatible. These
changes are also compounded by what appears to be a decrease in the demand for arms in the Third
World, particularly for major weapon platforms that dominated the arms trade in the 1960s to the
mid-1980s. Nevertheless, novel approaches that evolve as responses to these changed
circumstances will inevitably influence the structure and composition of the international arms
production and transfer system.
At the lowest level of the arms production and transfer system, the emerging suppliers, most of
which are incapable of technological innovation and mainly reproduce existing weapon systems
since their industries are islands in less-industrialised economies, they require enormous political
and economic investments to upgrade their proficiencies. Therefore, these suppliers' share of and
contribution into the arms market is constricted, and as such they specialise on specific (often
uncomplicated) weapon systems that constitute niches in the global arms market. As the rank of
emerging suppliers began to seize a sizeable share of the market by the mid-1980s, it thus provided
alternative sources for certain types of weapon systems and their support. Consequently, the
possibilities of limiting arms transfers to specific regions and recipients became difficult for the
primary leading suppliers, as most of the emerging suppliers had developed their own arms
production and supply capabilities in response to the embargoes and other restrictions imposed
against themselves and other recipients. The most significant of these restrictions were considered
within the conflict context that the recipient states found themselves. Therefore, the decision to
acquire a weapons production faculty became a sine qua non for a state to guarantee its freedom of
action in defending its national interests.
The acquisition of military production technology by the emerging suppliers became realisable as a
consequence of the competition among the leading suppliers for spheres of influence and for an
export market which inevitably resulted in the transfer of production licences and other offsets.
Accordingly, the future arms market may perhaps be more compelling for production licences to be
transferred, as other offset options are not always viable alternatives for the recipients with financial
difficulties and constricted markets for foreign goods. Although there were some remarkable
successes that certain emerging suppliers achieved in the international arms market, which also
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increased their share of this market, these successes implied therefore that the leading suppliers were
no longer an oligopoly in this market. Accordingly, as from the mid-1980s onwards, there were
clear indications that the emerging suppliers were becoming efficacious competitors to the leading
suppliers, thus limiting the latter's access into other sectors of the market.
Therefore, the future characteristics of the arms production and transfer system will consist firstly of
the excess production capacities in virtually all arms producing states, thus leading to a reduced
demand and an exaggerated attempt by emerging suppliers to gain (and maintain) a foothold in the
market. A fiercely competitive atmosphere will prevail as emerging suppliers will find the market
completely absorbed by the capabilities of the leading suppliers, and consequently state intervention
will be the only solution for sinking industries. Fierce competition will promote concentration
instead of the diffusion of the market and subsequently allowing only those states that can subsidise
or integrate their efforts to sustain an advanced arms production faculty. Hence, the primary
motivation for the leading suppliers to restrict the diffusion of military technology to other suppliers
or recipients is the fear of imparting sensitive technological know-how to potential competitors and
enemies, who might utilise it to strengthen their indigenous military faculties against their own
security. Subsequently, the dynamically advancing emerging suppliers are bound to experience
similar pressures as the costs of defence production expand, thus compelling them to become more
export-driven regardless of the politico-strategic or diplomatic imperatives.
As the emerging suppliers begin to introduce more and more of their wares into the market, the
costs of research and development will begin to soar in the same manner as those of the leading
suppliers, thus urging them to become more export-oriented. The only exceptions in this instance
might be states such as India and those countries that have decided to integrate their arms
development, production and procurement faculties, as both India and the latter are guaranteed
relatively large domestic and common defence markets respectively that may allow for efficient
local consumption. The tenet here is that the politico-strategic dimension of arms transfers was and
continues to be the driving factor behind the states' intentions to acquire and even to produce arms.
As it advances the system to its mature phases, it will be characterised by the transfer of arms
production technologies and the obstruction of the pace of technological innovation. The result will
be the transfer of technology through co-production, licensed production and offset arrangements,
which will be the actuality of the globalisation of arms production.
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This globalisation process may assume various formats, ranging from global collaboration in
research and development and production, international sub-contracting, to transnational or
multinational defence corporations. Participants in the system, therefore, will be compelled to
relinquish their comparative technological superiority in order to keep their national or private
faculties operational, thus narrowing the gap between the capabilities possessed by both the
suppliers and the recipients, and making the control of the diffusion of military technology more
difficult to accomplish. Therefore, those states that had attempted to develop their defence
capabilities outside the auspices of an alliance framework, particularly those that had adopted an
outright neutral or non-aligned posture, such as Sweden and India, may have to face difficult
choices in selecting between the various weapon system programmes if they can not share the
burden of developing and producing equipment with other allied states. Moreover, their stance of
neutrality or non-alignment will often compel them to develop a broad indigenous arms production
capability, thus having to invest heavily on developing the necessary infrastructure. In addition,
they will have to make certain contractual commitments with those leading suppliers that will be
prepared to transfer their weapons production technology regardless of alliance undertakings.
Nevertheless.jiespite their stance of neutrality or non-alignment, states such as Sweden and India
still have to rely to a certain extent on foreign assistance in order to accomplish their objectives of
advanced defence industrialisation. With the escalating costs of sustaining and promoting defence
programmes, more importantly since they require the development of specific infrastructure and
personnel, it therefore becomes difficult for those states that tend to pursue such programmes
without foreign military or economic assistance. This is more pronounced in the case of Third
World states, as most of them lack the economic resources necessary to develop an autonomous
defence industrial base without some form of external assistance. Even for the developed states,
perhaps with the exception of the United States, the pursuit of an autonomous defence industrial
programme is difficult under contemporary political economic conditions.
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CHAPTER 9 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.1 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL SECURITY
In the post-Cold War era there is no connection between power and purpose as was the case in the
Cold War era, particularly concerning the military dimension of the state, since the broadening of
the definition of the concept of security revokes the possibility of any political-military actor being
identified and systematically linked with the security problem. Secondly, the nature of conflict is
bound to emanate from within states themselves than from a clash of interests between two or more
states. These conflicts are prevalent in the Third World where the realities of the non-existence of
hegemons, alliances, or the balances of power permit the salience of security dilemmas, interstate
wars and local arms races. In the developed world, the major powers are focussed on augmenting
their economic preponderance and leaving the Third World to handle its own conflicts.
The causes of these conflicts are mainly responses to the prominence of globalisation, as collectives
resort to more simpler identities such as ethnicity, culture or religion. With the collapse of the
bipolar bloc system that was characteristic of the Cold War, the new world order failed to provide
any definable order or system that collectives could identify with. Even the triumph of regionalism,
that became an acknowledged phenomenon globally, did not provide a similar definition in the
Third World context, as regional complexes in that part of the globe reveal antagonistic
contradictions instead of the necessary peaceful co-existence and co-operation. The state, however,
still remains as the most powerful actor because it is still at the pivot of political and economic
organisation globally, in both the modem and the post-modem spheres of the international system.
Although the role of the state is changed in the post-modem world, as a result of it surrendering
other aspects of social life into the supranational framework, identity and social institutions are still
largely rooted in the nation-state or the state-nation setting. Therefore, the new world order can
neither be defined as unipolar, multipolar or as an a-polar order, but actually a combination of all
these polarities, wherein global, regional, national and sub-national interests are intertwined towards
more wealth creation within the confines of a capitalist market democracy, thus necessitating a
broader definition of the concept of security in the global context.
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Therefore, security has to be understood in its extended sense, as a multidimensional phenomenon
that is extended from the state level to other sub-state and supranational or systemic levels, thus
beginning from the individual level towards the systemic levels. The crux of the matter is that
security relates to the exigency of the issue at hand, primarily the field of interest. The state
becomes central when the anarchic nature of the international system is taken into consideration,
whereby the mandate for the preservation of national security is accorded the state in the absence of
a central authority to ensure the security of the international system in all its organisational
dimensions. Therefore, the state becomes the centre of focus in politics, as the management of
domestic and international constraints are conducted through domestic policy-making processes, as
well as through inter-governmental consultations, so as to ensure governance through the threat or
the actual application of force. For an instituted global economic system to achieve its objectives
and interests, it requires a framework of security that is dependent on force or its threat so as to
guarantee conformity.
However, the failure of the state to guarantee security for individuals or other sub-state collectives
or groupings, other institutions such as supranational arrangements or sub-state collective structures
assume the sovereignty that is accorded the state, including its monopoly of legitimate violence. In
that case, therefore, security requires to be understood within its context, as sovereignty is shared
both above and below the ambit of the state. This means that the agenda of security has to be
widened, deepened and made more sophisticated and varied according to context, beyond the
confmes of military power. From a perspective of critical theory, security has to guarantee
emancipation to individuals and collectives from the threats of insecurity generated by the current
world order, particularly threats that deny individuals and collectives the ability to achieve their
goals. The definition of security, according to critical theory, should be people-centric rather than
state-centric. In contrast, the state-centric perspective argues that the issues that do not threaten the
concept of the state in its physical and socio-political dimensions should not be regarded as security
issues, as they do not have any political significance. These issues, according to the state-centric
assertions, contain the danger of stretching the defmition of the concept of security such that it
becomes useless as an analytical tool.
However, the ability to survive within the world capitalist economy is determined by the propensity
of the individuals, firms and states to compete efficaciously, which becomes the basis for all units'
incessant insecurity within the market. The state's interventionist and protectionist strategies are
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also short-lived as the domestic economy begins to seek external markets, which becomes difficult
for the state when it tries to compete in the global bargaining processes. Competition, therefore,
becomes expressed in two forms: the struggle for political survival is complemented by the
competition for wealth in the market, thus stimulating technological innovation and subsequently
constricting or demarcating the modes of economic and strategic demeanour as the basis for
ensuring greater security. Therefore, those states that conform and succeed to adapt to the
developing trends in the international system are guaranteed their national security, whereas those
that fail, suffer the gradual erosion of their power and become vulnerable to those that continuously
achieve success. Thus, economic growth becomes the principal determinant of power within the
international system, and as such, the main conditionality of security.
Economic structures of the market are established and transformed through politics, and the
competing socio-political interests, which are the focus of political conflict, procreate specific
economic structures and institutions that govern the processes of conflict and co-operation in the
international system. The market is thus a political mechanism or institution through which
interaction between units (states, firms and individuals) determines their success or failure, and
through which new political and economic structures and patterns are established and older ones are
rejected. The international economic system provides a balanced structure of trade, production,
finance, communications and transportation, in contrast to the fragmented nature of the international
political system. This compels states to contend with other states and actors concerning issues that
used to belong to the domestic domain. For states to enhance their efficiency and welfare
necessarily have to participate within the global economic structures, which subsequently develops
dependency patterns that become the main consequence of increasing density and interdependence
in the current international system.
Global economic interdependence generates a permissive environment for the continued
international political fragmentation, thus surpassing the state system such that international capital
becomes unconstrained by state interests, and the international economy becomes part of the
complex intercourse between states. Powers continuously threaten each other as they rise and fall,
with the military and economic measures that they adopt to preserve their security being perceived
by others to be threatening. Competition for wealth in the market is coupled to the contest for
power in the qualities of survival, thus stimulating technological advancement that results in the
redefinition of the standards of success. States, in most instances, have the necessary resources to
http://scholar.sun.ac.za/
265
sustain themselves, and those that rely on trade as an essential part of their economic security regard
interference with their supply lines as a threat to their power, welfare and stability and, accordingly,
as vital national interests to be protected.
One of the major factors that determine the power of a state within the international system and
consequently a decisive element of national security affairs, is relative economic growth. This is the
major problem of international economic security, which is the truncation of the global functioning
of the market and the fragmented character of political authority within the ambit of the
international structure of anarchy. Political authority is unable to manage the scale of outreach of
the international economy, which only a non-existent world government could accomplish, thus
rendering the current international political economy unworkable. The state, therefore, under a
global capitalist economy plays the role of mediating between the political and economic domains,
thus creating a conducive or a discouraging environment for the sustenance of the current political
economy under the conditions of international anarchy.
The link between the state, economic structure and political contests is located in the struggle
between the various actors to promote their interests within the domestic and international political
institutions. These interests are therefore projected into global institutions through the state within
processes of inter-governmental bargaining, as well as within the functions of international regimes,
especially when these interests enjoy political power within the state and also concerning their
institutionalised political resources having an impact in the determination of state policy. However,
the economic choices that these interests might have on the international system are limited by other
competing forces that prevail in the international market. Hence the political and economic choices
of the major interests within the dominant states are incessantly projected into the international
system, resulting in their preferences dictating the manner in which global institutions and
structures, including the market, are restructured. This restructuring is reflected back into the
domestic domain by intensifying pressures on national actors to seek favourable policies that enable
an effective and efficient management of the changed conditions. Thus the emphasis on the role
political conflict plays in determining transformation in the international system rather than the
structure itself, as most theories contend.
The new world order can be said to be new if there is a change in its political and economic
structure, particularly if the analyses of the international system are no longer confined to the state
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as the only important decision-maker. With the emergence of new powers as superpowers
complementing or negating the hegemony of the United States and the heir to the erstwhile Soviet
Union, Russia, or all these powers forming regional blocs with other states that become the
sovereign decision-makers beyond the state, the world order can be actually termed to be new. The
centre in the new order is dominated by a coalition of the major capitalist powers in a loose multi-
polar type of arrangement constituting a security community that poses no threat to its constituent
elements. The semi-periphery and the periphery are not regarded as serious military threats as other
states are scrambling to join the security community.
Whether the security community will be able to consolidate itself as an overarching arrangement
depends on the competitive nature of the capitalist market economy, that it encourages either
isolationist or integrationist tendencies. The trends, however, appear to favour the latter option with
arrangements such as the Group of Eight that entail collective economic management, thus
entertaining the idea that the global economy is for the security and prosperity of all member states,
and therefore, its security is dependent on all of them. However, the cultural and class divergences
are in fact augmented by the intemationalisation of capital, as some communities have prospered
and others have not been able to cope with the increasing competition that is a consequence of
increased interdependence and openness. Those communities and classes that have not prospered in
the process become vulnerable to reactionary tendencies that place pressures on the weakened state
system, which might even fail to manage the acute contradictions that might emerge as a result of
global cultural and class differences.
Since economic security within a world capitalist economy is a zero-sum game, whereby the
cupidity and security of some is always gratified to the detriment of others, a multinational security
arrangement of the core capitalist states might not consider to intervene in the problems of the
periphery. The causes might be inward-looking political and economic policies, a perceived lack of
a serious threat, or an attitude of apathy arising from previous failures to provide amicable solutions.
Intervention might be considered as an option in order to impose values that might be deemed to be
universal or to protect essential resources that are available in certain sectors of the periphery. On
the other hand, the imbalances that are encountered in the centre are transmitted to the periphery,
with the boomerang effects being refmed such that they do not have a negative impact on the
former, and the justification being that no other options are possible as economic and political
reforms based on the market are invincible. Therefore, the current problematic of the international
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system is world time, which legitimises the ideology of the market and its corollary, democracy, as
well as affirming market democracy's organic connection with development, growth or progress, as
necessary conditions that have the power to convert society to its universal and secular benefits.
9.2 THE THIRD WORLD SECURITY PROBLEMA TIC
The Third World security problematic consists of the domestic, regional and global dimensions,
with the domestic being the primary dimension, as internal vulnerabilities are specifically
responsible for incessant conflict within and among the peripheral states. Neighbours are compelled
to intervene within internal contentions as states lack internal cohesion and legitimacy, and this
provides the bases for-domestic insecurity in the Third World. The major reasons for instability are
the infancy of the state-building processes and the time constraints requiring these states to
accomplish these processes, moreover as remnants of the discontinuities of colonialism that imposed
on them capricious boundaries and forced them together as disparate ethnic entities, thus
confounding their ability to build legitimate and integrated states. Hence, most of them cannot be
regarded as nation-states, but as state-nations. The state, therefore, is at the centre of the security
problematic in the Third World, as its weakness is the main source of insecurity and the perceptions
of its political élite that essentially define and interpret the nature and character of the security
problem.
The security problematic, as well as their lack of both political and economic power to influence
direction fundamentally determines the Third World states' behaviour in the domestic domain and
within the international system. Consequently, the meagre resources available to them are usually
depleted by security concerns, subsequently dislocating programmes of economic growth and
development. The military sector, therefore, becomes the beneficiary of the proficient utilisation
and employment of capital-intensive projects and technology, as it plays a central coercive role in
the processes of state-building and promoting security typical of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century Europe.
In most instances, the military sector seizes political power and pursues the state-building process
on its own if it perceives that the civilian élite is failing to direct the process' successful
management. This is further reinforced by the weakness or the dearth of political institutions and
structures of civil society that ensure the maintenance of the democratic norms of governance, as
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well as the pressures of time and international competition on the state-building process, thus
segmenting and protracting the process to focus on one phase at a time. Democratic forms of
government, therefore, do not insinuate an accomplishment of the state-building process for the
Third World states, nor do they imply that their vulnerabilities have been overcome to be considered
as internally stable. Whether they are democratic or not, Third World states' demeanour is
dependent on their instability and conflict-prone nature that is reminiscent of virtually all the early
state-makers, and as a result, no strong connection can be discerned between democracy and
development.
Most of the Third World states are weak states, as their governments are consistently threatened by
domestic discord generated by the lack of political and societal cohesion, particularly in the day-to-
day management of political and economic interaction. Moreover, as weak states, the institutions
and the idea of the state are often violently contested such that they fail to play an authoritative role
that ensures unity amongst their subjects, thus are merely de jure states by virtue of being
recognised by other states. Their referent objects of security are the prevailing regime's contending
groups and individuals, as national objects barely exist, thus outside threats and interference, which
are assessed as national security threats, are grouped together with the domestically contending
factions. Therefore, the existence of weak states within the anarchic structure of the international
system presupposes its instability and its conflict-prone nature.
From these bases, therefore, the prognosis points to greater possibilities that the trend of continuing
intra-state and subsequent regional conflicts will increase the demand for conventional weapons,
particularly in East and Central Europe, the former Soviet states, and in most parts of the developing
Third World. The regeneration of nationalism, ethnic, racial and religious friction and the exposure
of weak states that emerged with the negation of the Cold War, mainly motivate these conflicts.
Emerging arms suppliers are the ones that might benefit from this demand as they produce weapons
that are actually apt for the current conflict conditions. Therefore, the move towards the
regionalisation of the arms trade as a consequence of the internationalisation or the globalisation of
the defence industries is a great possibility, and the increasing commercialisation of arms transfers
could precipitate the inclination towards regionalised arms production.
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9.3 THE ARMS PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER SYSTEM AND THE DYNAMIC
SIGNIFICANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
The primary motives behind the evolution of the arms production and transfer system are the pursuit
of victory in war, the pursuit of power and the pursuit of wealth. The state and governments are
responsible for the contemporary arms trade rather than the private manufacturers, as the state and
governments have a vested interest in the sanctioning of arms exports; as governments are
responsible for the creation of a conducive environment for the sustenance of incessant arms
production; and as governments fully believe in the possession and export of armaments as being
inextricably linked to their concerns about national sovereignty and policy-making. In virtually all
arms manufacturing states, the government is both the sanctioner, the licensing authority and
salesman of arms. Currently, weapon systems are no longer produced solely for national
consumption or employment, but are also tailor-made to meet the needs of specific clients on a case-
by-case basis. Governments use various marketing techniques to entice prospective clients to
purchase their armaments, and they often provide financial assistance in terms of credit to the arms
manufacturing entrepreneurs in order to bolster their competitive edge over other contesting
suppliers.
Although scientific and technological innovation usually outpaces the political and military interests
that try to control its progress, appropriate politico-bureaucratic control fails to contain the evolution
and diffusion of scientific and technological innovation. Nevertheless, political and military
officials ensure that the process of production, deployment and transfer of weapons is rigorously
controlled, as weapons can be potential threats to each state's stability if they can fall into wrong
hands. Arms exports are mainly promoted by the rapid growth in the complexity and scale of
technology, manufacturing and the related costs of production, particularly the increasing demand
arms production has on capital. A high rate of fundamental knowledge, the ability to exploit
sophisticated technologies, vast scales of resources, and the knowledge of future defence needs for
which weapon systems are being developed, are required. Qualitative changes in arms transferred
have been more or less congruent to their quantitative diffusion since states had previously
transferred arms that were superfluous and technically antiquated in order to accommodate top-of-
the-range systems. However, currently, recipients demand the most sophisticated and advanced
weapon systems, and their requirements, in most instances, receive top priority than domestic needs
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on the grounds that foreign demands initiate the introduction of new systems that ultimately furnish
the supplier state's own armed forces.
A state's capability to produce arms is not always commensurate to its position in the supplier
market, as virtually all arms producing states are compelled to penetrate the market in order to
regain the costs of research and development and production investments that can only be salvaged
by achieving economies of scale through exports, or through huge domestic or co-production
markets. At certain intervals some states fall out as producers and suppliers of weapons, while
others penetrate the system reacting to a variety of political, economic or technological stimuli.
Most of the new entrants start from copying or from license-producing existing systems, at times
importing components and parts to be assembled domestically, since the capacity for independent
research, development and production of comprehensive systems is not a prerequisite for attaining
the status of being a producer and supplier of armaments. The emergence of regional powers,
therefore, can be attributed to the contribution made by the diffusion of military technology of
which arms transfers are a significant component, as states currently seek the technology to license-
manufacture or to co-produce weapon systems within their own territories.
The emergence of a buyers' market, was accompanied by the emergence of transnational mergers,
take-overs, and strategic corporate alliances amongst firms, with the intention of co-producing or
co-marketing arms through amalgamating their resources so as to strengthen their sales. This
transnational interaction is also characterised by military corporate partnerships through foreign
investment, international sub-contracting, international licensing, and joint ventures, which are all
labelled as the internationalisation or globalisation of the arms industry. However, the arms
industry still retains a strong inclination to nationalism, as governments have scrupulous intentions
of maintaining strong domestic arms industries to provide for their armed forces as well as to ensure
an austere regulation of the arms trade. Co-development and co-production are therefore means
through which supplier states augment their position in the international hierarchy of powers, which
is achieved by enhancing their industrial and military capacities, as the arms industry is in most
instances a measure of the state's position in the international hierarchy of powers.
The possession of the capability to develop and produce modern armaments, therefore, becomes a
central element in the determination of the hierarchy of power globally, as technological innovation,
in its military dimension, determines the evolution of the modem state by providing advantages in
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warfare to those states that had the wealth and social organisation to afford and to utilise modem
weapon systems. For modernisation to take root, it has to be mediated through the state system of
which the military dimension of technology provides the central impetus. Moreover, technological
innovations transform the arms transfer system, either in an incremental or revolutionary manner.
Changes that occur as a result of technological innovation are a manifestation of abstruse changes in
human knowledge and social organisation, and as such, are not uniquely or primarily driven by
military interests, but improvements of military instruments are a result of those changes.
Regardless of the peculiarity that characterised the revolution in military technology, it should not
be considered as existing outside of the broader revolution in science, technology and human
finesse.
The prevalence of the revolution in military technology augmented the significance of technology in
the dispersion of power, and as a result, expanded the range of inequalities in terms of capabilities
among the various states. For arms producers, there is always pressure to acquire and preserve high
standards of technological innovation, which is bound to outdo them if they are not competent.
Recipients, on the other hand, are obliged either to match or attain an edge over their opponents by
purchasing modem weapons from the suppliers. As part of a desire to strengthen industrial
development, these states pushed to acquire their own industrial capabilities of which some had
military industrial production as a priority, of which a few of these even managed to become
distinguished competitors in some sectors of the arms transfer system. The subsequent
multiplication of sources for armaments led to the capability to manufacture locally being directly
transferred from suppliers to recipients. However, as late entrants into the arms business implies
that they have a difficulty catching up with the leading suppliers, and consequently have to rely
constantly on their leading counterparts for the advanced technological capabilities they do not
possess.
The hitherto process of the global strategic environment has always been characterised by
technological innovation, which was catalysed by the industrial revolution thus generating
unevenness in the quality and quantity of technology possessed by the various states, as well as the
diffusion of technology that interacts actively and potently with technological innovation. The
diffusion of military technology resulted in the creation of a hierarchy of states that is determined by
their capabilities in terms of arms production, with the top echelon occupied by those states that can
innovate and produce the whole range of weapon systems, and at the bottom being the limited
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c~pability producers and non-producers. The top echelon states have a complete arms
manufacturing capability, complemented by an adequate research and development capacity that
ensures top-of-the-range technology.
Bottom of the range states are either temporarily or totally dependent on the arms trade for their
modern weapons' requirements for the maintenance or the signification of their independence.
Within the middle range are partly producing states, which have a significant capacity to provide
armaments of considerable sophistication but nonetheless do not match the capability or the quality
of armaments produced by the top echelon states. Benefiting from arms transfers are the bottom of
the range or third-tier emerging suppliers, who are heavily dependent on exports, and find their
market niche on specialised requirements for low-cost, easy-to-operate and unsophisticated
armaments. As they have much lower research and development investments, their production and
export share is extremely constrained. Their arms industries are perhaps sustained by a strong
political will domestically, which overlooks economic considerations and is committed to procure
indigenously produced weapons. The sustainability of their arms industries is, however, not
guaranteed.
Another aspect that is closely linked to the question of arms transfers and the diffusion of military
technology is the concept of the arms dynamic whose extreme dimensions consist of the concepts of
arms racing and the maintenance of the military status quo. The concept of arms racing usually
suggests a self-stimulating military rivalry between states in which their efforts to increase their
military security augment the threats they pose to each other. The concept of the maintenance of the
military status quo refers to all the pressures that compel states to acquire and upgrade their armed
forces, which is a global process denoting specific circumstances of a state or sets of states.
Therefore, in order to circumscribe between arms racing and the maintenance of the military status
quo, is to first identify between what is abnormal and normal behaviour respectively. The
alleviation of some of the conflicts that were motivated by Cold War antagonisms, the gratification
of most states' weapons requirements, and the omnipresent world economic recession, however
reduced the demand for arms. Nevertheless, the arms trade's supply side is still dominated by the
primary leading producers and suppliers of the Cold War past, the United States and the successor to
the erstwhile Soviet Union, Russia, while the other European states are producers on a reduced
scale, as secondary leading suppliers.
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9.4 THE RATIONALE FOR TRANSFERRING ARMS
The relations between and within the levels of actors are horizontal and vertical in nature, and can
be grouped into three substantive sub-categories: politico-strategic; diplomatic and ideological; and
economic-scientific/technological. Therefore, arms production and transfers are driven by three
conventional motivations: the pursuit of victory in war; the pursuit of power; and the pursuit of
wealth. The pursuit of victory in war and the pursuit of power are for analytical purposes
considered to be the military-strategic and politico-strategic objectives respectively that states try to
achieve in their relations within and between themselves, whereas the pursuit of wealth is defmed to
imply the gratification of purely economic objectives. National security interests are basically
responsible for state suppliers and recipients to be involved in arms transfers relationships, and as
such are essentially political in character. The ideal goal of arms transfers is to satisfy the military
ambitions of the parties with regard to the international hierarchy of power, to augment their
diplomatic position, and subsequently strengthen their respective regimes.
States usually acquire arms for security reasons, particularly towards their neighbours, and to
enhance their reputation in the regional and global balance of power. Nonetheless, virtually all
states in the interests of national security prefer to be independent from suppliers abroad in their
arms acquisition programmes. However, very few states possess the capabilities to do so. Before
military assistance, aid and grants or arms sales were used to further military ambitions abroad,
states used to rely on alliances, which proved to be capricious and fragile. Allies, therefore, could
be militarily strengthened through the grant or sale of arms, which moreover could be accompanied
by the possibility of obtaining or installing facilities within their territories. Therefore, arms
transfers had an important politico-strategic role to play for ambitious and hegemonic states,
nonetheless with various military costs and disadvantages involved, such as the problem of re-
transfers, the depletion of the supplier's own inventory, the political repercussions of supporting
latent rogue states and the probabilities of being drawn into an adventitious arms race or conflict.
The political connotations that are unique to arms transfers are rooted in their being commensurate
with the objective of national or global security, their transfer assuming a more politico-strategic
and diplomatic role than a mere military utility in their impact on the international balance of power.
In the post-Cold War period, as in the Cold War era, arms transfers still play an integral part in the
foreign relations of each and every supplier and recipient state. The state's power, proficiencies and
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centre of gravity in the international hierarchy of sovereignties are dependent on its arms-supply
endowments. Both the suppliers and the recipients stand to benefit from an arms transfer
relationship in the form of leverage and influence and the augmentation of their capabilities
respectively. The global anarchic system, with its innate antagonistic relations, compels states to
pursue large-scale arms production so as to meet their foreign policy requirements. These
requirements are pursued through the power of the state, which is reliant on military organisation,
whose adequacy is partly dependent on the level of sophistication of its military technology vis-a-vis
other states, thus serving to explain the role of large-scale arms production in the pursuit of power
by states.
The possession of advanced military technology by a state is a pivotal indicator of the basic
capabilities of that respective state, and shifts in the distribution of such capabilities reflect changes
in the international system. Within the pursuit of power and influence by states in international
relations, they are also inclined to establish an arms industry, as a demonstration of status, capability
and an independent capacity to wage war. Therefore, only a few suppliers have the potential to use
their arms transfers as a primary part of their foreign policy, especially within the conditions of a
buyers' market, where suppliers are compelled to commercially-orientate their arms transfer
policies. Primary leading arms producers have the means to exert influence, of which the middle or
minor arms producers are apparently denied. However, recipient states are presumed to dictate the
terms of trade in the market due to the vulnerability of arms industries to vacillations in foreign
orders, and even to develop their own industries thus transcending into an area previously
dominated by industrialised states.
An arms industry is not solely established for political reasons, as there are economic motivations as
well, such as the intention to save the costs of importing armaments from other suppliers, and by
exporting arms the balance of payments are enhanced. Moreover, an arms industry can generate and
maintain employment and the necessary capabilities in the field of advanced technology.
Consequently, these motivations subsequently become strong impetuses for arms exports for those
states that have attained an arms production capability, as the non-existence of a large domestic
market tends to affect the ability to achieve economies of scale through domestic production,
whereas exports help to lengthen production runs so as to amortise the costs of research and
development. This becomes the reason for states to struggle voraciously for arms markets and
others to resort to multinational production projects. Therefore, the intention to achieve economies
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of scale is motivated by the process of qualitative advance, which requires that sophisticated weapon
systems be incessantly developed.
Like any other industrial production process, arms production depends on various inputs and factor
endowments available in any economy: the standard of industrialisation; an appropriate
infrastructure; advanced human resources; backward and forward links with other sectors of the
economy to provide raw materials and sub-contracting; a certain degree of state support and control;
and the establishment of a market for the fmished products. These factors, combined with the
political will, the pursuit of power and victory in war, which initiated the establishment of an arms
industry in the first place, are critical success factors of the whole endeavour. The major problem
usually is that if arms are considered as any other commodity that has market value, arms transfers
are usually perceived to be the obscure answer to the resolution of contradictions between politico-
strategic plus diplomatic requirements and the domestic socio-economic essentials. As more and
more states develop the capacity to manufacture weapons, the arms market is saturated by
increasing numbers of suppliers, thus intensifying the extent of competition. Most arms producing
states, therefore, are pressurised to export arms in order to compensate for the costs of production
and also to be exposed to the ferocious competition in the market so as to be introduced to the
necessarily tenacious technological developments such that they can improve their own technical
faculties.
For the leading suppliers, on the one hand, arms production and exports are viewed as the advanced
thrust of the civilian expansion of the country's economy, as well as a means of keeping pace in the
technological race and the search for markets. For emerging suppliers, on the other hand, arms
industries are considered to be a key component of the country's economic and political
modernisation. However, the benefits are not as remarkable as they are portrayed, as arms exports
usually constitute a minor fraction of the total exports for most arms producing states, and that no
arms producing state is less or more dependent than others on arms exports for enhancing its
balance of payments. Therefore, arms transfers are a means of maintaining viable national defence
industries that are connected to images of independence, sovereignty and prestige, which are,
nonetheless, political enterprises. The major benefit of arms transfers is the transfer of technology
which may benefit an indigenous arms industry or which may also have civilian applications. Other
benefits include offset arrangements that tend to have a positive impact on the recipient state's
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economy if they are sustainable, and if not, become sheer reductions of the cost of the procured
equipment.
The motor of technological change is primarily the motive force driving the cycle of the arms
production and transfer system. The location of the state within this cycle along with the progress
of the cycle decisively determine the options states have in terms of using arms transfers as
instruments of influence. The motives of the various supplier states vary according to the tier to
which they belong, and this provides one of the methods to determine the location of a supplier in
the hierarchy. Primary leading suppliers in the first-tier are presumed to be relatively obdurate to
economic factors and are unperturbed by the pursuit of victory in war, as they are technologically
preponderant and huge in size, thus are focussed on the pursuit of political power in their arms
production and transfers. Secondary leading suppliers in the second-tier are compelled to follow the
pursuit of wealth as they are driven to follow the technological lead of the first-tier suppliers. Third-
tier emerging suppliers are assumed to follow the pursuit of victory in war, or the pursuit of security,
as they are technologically inferior or vulnerable.
The interaction of these different motivations after a period of revolutionary technological
innovation directs the evolution of the global arms production and transfer system and explains the
rapid spread of new military technologies, as states attempt to maintain or enhance their status and
independence within the hierarchy. Nevertheless, for all the arms supplying states, regardless of
rank in the arms production and transfer system, arms transfers involve both political and economic
considerations, and as such, they also serve politico-strategic goals by virtue of intending to
maintain a sustainable arms industry. In this sense therefore economic means are used to serve
political ends.
Most economic analyses argue that scarce resources are being misused with the procurement of
armaments, which alternatively could be used towards economic growth and development, which is
a representation of a zero-sum relationship between defence expenditure and economic
development. Actually, arms interests are double pronged: firstly they are related to power or
security considerations; and secondly, they are related to the creation of wealth, profits, and
employment, thus ensuring the welfare of the state. These processes require huge investments,
which very few states can afford, thus even more developed states elect to enter into joint-
development, production and marketing.
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Within the developing world, leaders do not demarcate between the objectives of national security
and the ambitions of national development. These are not considered to be mutually exclusive
objectives, but intertwined policy goals towards achieving commensurate political exigencies.
Thus, national security is not regarded as antithetic to development, but as its prerequisite. The
deduction here is that the transfer of armaments is a means of ensuring the security of each and
every state that will outlive the anarchical sovereign state system. Accordingly, within the present
interdependent environment, wherein military technology is an essential factor in the economies of
many states, there will be a lasting demand for the utilisation of this technology for development
and national security purposes. Based on these findings, several inferences are proposed in the
following section, which, however still require further investigation and verification.
9.5 THE EMERGING SUPPLIERS AND THE CONTEMPORARY ARMS
PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER SYSTEM
Within the emerging suppliers, primary emerging suppliers have slightly captured the process of
technological innovation and a limited independent research, development and production capability
for highly advanced weapon systems. But they still require foreign components for some of their
advanced systems. Secondary emerging suppliers have managed to capture the technical propensity
to adapt existing systems and to develop fairly sophisticated systems for their armed forces and even
to satisfy the export market. Finally, the tertiary emerging suppliers are still confmed within the
ambit of reproducing existing systems. Although they have managed to develop several
sophisticated systems, they are still heavily reliant on the inputs of the leading suppliers to move up
the ladder of production.
The changes that are visible in the international arms production and transfer system are a reflection
of the process of the spread of technological capabilities that also imply the diffusion of power to
the developing world and simultaneously insinuate the transformation of the system from a sellers'
market into a buyers' market. The buyers' market is distinguished by a wider range of suppliers and
weapon systems, with the economic imperatives becoming preponderant in the determination of
national security policies for both suppliers and recipients alike. Moreover, recipients require offset
arrangements, which include licensed-production and co-production arrangements as part of the
arms transfer processes. The inference here is that: the arms trade, therefore, has evolved to be
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characterised by the transfer of military technology which also includes the shipment of components
and sub-systems that will augment and enhance the research, development and production
capabilities of the emerging suppliers.
However, the contemporary arms production and transfer system is also characterised by a sluggish
pace of technological innovation because of the exorbitant costs involved as well as the nature of
military technology becoming less connected to the requirements of military strategy and doctrine.
The current innovations are no longer capable of moving beyond what is already available within a
particular genre of military technologies, which is manifested in the narrowing of the gap between
the sophistication of technology that is within the inventory of the leading suppliers and those of the
recipients. However, the argument that leads to the second inference is that: this gap is perhaps
rather wider with regard to the sophistication of technological capabilities for arms production. If
this is the case, then the stratification within the arms production and transfer system is sustainable
and reinforced, making it hard for the lower tiers to advance upward the ladder of arms production.
The hierarchical structure of the arms production and transfer system as well as membership in one
of its categories is determined by the arms production base, the propensity to conduct research and
development, the advancement of the technology to produce armaments, and the reliance on exports
vis-a-vis domestic procurement. For the primary leading suppliers, their membership is determined
by the propensity to innovate at the edge of technological advancement as well as the capability to
produce sophisticated weapon systems across-the-board. They are not supposed to rely solely on
exports in order to sustain their production faculty, as they possess larger domestic markets and the
endowments to conduct research and development independently. However, for every arms-
producing and supplier state, arms exports contribute significantly on the share of public
expenditure allocated to the defence sector as domestic demand declined and the costs of weapon
systems multiplied, thus compelling the defence firms to be excessively export-reliant.
The secondary leading suppliers advanced their competence to produce sophisticated weapon
systems at or near the technological edge for domestic consumption as well as for the export market,
as they became heavily dependent on the latter to keep their industries operational. This is often the
case since their research, development and production faculties are limited by their constricted
domestic requirements and have to rely on exports, subsidies or collaboration for their industries to
float. The emerging suppliers, on the other hand, most of which are incapable of technological
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innovation and mainly reproduce existing weapon systems since their industries are islands in less-
industrialised economies, and they require enormous political and economic investments to upgrade
their proficiencies. Therefore, the third inference is that: the emerging suppliers' share of and
contribution into the arms market is constricted, and will remain as such, since they specialise on
specific (often uncomplicated) weapon systems that constitute niches in the global market.
Inasmuch as the decision to acquire a weapons production faculty was a sine qua non for a state to
guarantee its freedom of action in defending its national interests, the acquisition of military
production technology by the emerging suppliers became a consequence of the competition among
the leading suppliers for an export market, which inevitably resulted in the transfer of production
faculties and other direct offsets. Accordingly, the future arms market may perhaps be more
compelling for production faculties to be transferred, as other offset options are not always viable
alternatives for the recipients with financial difficulties and constricted markets for foreign goods.
The fourth inference is therefore that: the characteristics of the unfolding arms production and
transfer system are distinguished by a fiercely competitive atmosphere as emerging suppliers
uncover a market completely absorbed by the capabilities of the leading suppliers, and consequently
state intervention becomes the only solution for sinking industries. Fierce competition promotes
concentration instead of the diffusion of the market and subsequently allowing only those states that
can subsidise or integrate their efforts to sustain an advanced arms production faculty.
The dynamically advancing emerging suppliers are bound to experience the pressures for attaching
end-use or re-transfer restrictions on sophisticated systems that are incessantly transferred to
demanding recipients despite the sensitivity of the technology incorporated, as the costs of defence
production expand, thus compelling them to become more export-driven regardless of the politico-
strategic or diplomatic imperatives. Therefore the fifth inference here is that: as the emerging
suppliers begin to introduce more and more of their wares into the market, the costs of research and
development will begin to soar in the same manner as those of the leading suppliers, thus urging
them to become more export-oriented. The only exceptions in this instance might be integrated
regional complexes or transnational arrangements that will possess relatively large regional defence
markets that may allow for efficient local consumption.
The politico-strategic dimension of arms transfers was and has been the driving factor behind states'
intentions to acquire and even to produce arms. As it advances the system to its mature phases, it
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will be characterised by the transfer of arms production technologies and the obstruction of the pace
of technological innovation. The result will be the transfer of technology through co-production,
licensed production and other offset arrangements, which will be the actuality of the globalisation of
arms production. This globalisation may assume various formats, ranging from global collaboration
in research and development and production, international sub-contracting, to transnational or
multinational defence corporations. Thus the final inference is that: participants in the system,
therefore, will be compelled to relinquish their comparative technological superiority in order to
keep their natioal or private faculties operational, thus narrowing the gap between the capabilities
possessed by both the leading and the emerging suppliers. This, however, is rather a contrasting
dimension to the second inference (above) that the stratification within the arms production and
transfer system will be sustainable and reinforced, thus making it arduous for the lower tiers to
advance upward the ladder of the arms production and transfer system.
For those states that had attempted to develop their defence capabilities outside the auspices of an
alliance framework, particularly those that had adopted an outright neutral or non-aligned posture,
they have to face difficult choices in selecting between the various weapon system programmes if
they can not share the burden of developing and producing equipment with other allied states. Their
stance of neutrality or non-alignment will often compel them to develop a broad indigenous arms
production capability, thus having to invest heavily on developing the necessary infrastructure. In
addition, they have to make certain demanding contractual commitments with those leading
suppliers that will still be prepared to transfer their weapons production technology. Nonetheless,
despite their stance of neutrality or non-alignment, they will continue to rely to a certain extent on
foreign assistance in order to accomplish their objective of an autonomous defence production
capability. With the escalating costs of sustaining and promoting defence programmes, it will
however be difficult for those states that tend to pursue such programmes without foreign military or
economic assistance. This will be more pronounced in the case of Third World states, as most of
them lack the economic resources necessary to develop an autonomous defence industrial base
without a remarkable measure of external assistance.
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